The disablement of North Korea’s three principal plutonium production facilities – a 5MW(e) reactor, a reprocessing plant, and a fuel fabrication plant – is nearing completion in Yŏngbyŏn, but ominous signs indicate that the denuclearization process could be headed for a long stalemate. Adding further to the uncertainty of the situation was the February 25, 2008 inauguration of South Korea’s new president, conservative Lee Myung-bak (Yi Myŏng-bak), a man who is expected to be more cautious in his dealings with Pyongyang than his predecessor.

Disablement
Under agreements signed in February 2007 and October 2007 through negotiations known as the Six-Party Talks (among China, Japan, Russia, North Korea, South Korea, and the United States), North Korea agreed to disable all of its nuclear facilities and to provide a “complete and correct declaration of all its nuclear programs.” In return, the other parties to the talks agreed to provide Pyongyang one million tons of heavy fuel oil (for the generation of electricity) and to take a variety of steps to end its political isolation. Steps to permanently dismantle the North’s nuclear program are to follow in a further phase of the understanding. [1]

By late February 2008, almost all of the disablement measures at Yŏngbyŏn had been completed, and although North Korea reportedly slowed the removal of plutonium-bearing spent fuel rods from the nuclear reactor at the site, U.S. officials consider Pyongyang to be continuing its cooperation in disabling the facilities. [2] As a result, North Korea’s ability to produce nuclear-weapons-usable plutonium has been rolled back, and it would probably take several years for the nation to reconstitute this capability.

However, North Korea’s other denuclearization activities have hit a snag, and the Six-Party process could be headed for deadlock. The disablement phase is now stalled because of North Korea’s failure to submit the complete declaration of its nuclear programs by December 31, 2007, as stipulated under the October 2007 agreement. [3]

When the December 31, 2007 deadline passed for the submission of the declaration, diplomats and analysts were less concerned with the deadline than with Pyongyang’s intentions regarding the provision of its declaration. There was little reason for alarm if extra time was needed to ensure that North Korean officials were preparing a complete and correct declaration. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill set a second informal deadline of February 25, 2008 for completion of the declaration to coincide with the inauguration of Lee Myung-bak as South Korea’s new president, and this second deadline has also passed without a declaration from Pyongyang. [4]

The impasse over the declaration stems from disagreements over North Korea’s past procurement activities to support the development of a uranium enrichment capability (a second technology in addition to plutonium production that could provide fuel for nuclear weapons) and suspected North Korean nuclear cooperation with Syria.

North Korea has allowed U.S. access to imported aluminum tubes that were suspected of being procured for the outer casings of uranium enrichment centrifuges. [5] While the DPRK Foreign Ministry denies the tubes were for use in a uranium enrichment program, the Washington Post has reported that traces of enriched uranium were found on sample tubes provided by North Korea, underscoring the possibility that the country had made significant progress in the enrichment process. (See “DPRK Denuclearization Stalls as ROK Reviews DPRK Policy,” WMD Insights, February 2008.) [6] According to subsequent press reports, however, technical analyses of the uranium suggested it was a contaminant, possibly from used uranium enrichment equipment stored near the tubes that was provided to North Korea by Pakistani nuclear expert A. Q. Khan. (In a somewhat similar case, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) found uranium traces on Iranian enrichment equipment provided by Khan and determined that some of this material was produced in Pakistan, not Iran.) The United States has determined that most of the aluminum tubes acquired by North Korea are now being used in conventional weapon systems, whose precise types have not been specified by U.S. officials, but which might include multiple rocket launchers or short-range rocket bodies. [7]

In its official statement in the Six-Party Talks, the North Korean government has declared, “Our relevant agencies do not confirm that they made the alleged procurements [of the aluminum tubes] for a uranium enrichment program.” The state-controlled North Korean media has gone further to directly deny the existence of a uranium enrichment program. Nonetheless, there is strong evidence that North Korea has been engaged in procurement activities consistent with a uranium enrichment program since the 1980s. (See “Six-Parties Adopt Steps for North Korean Denuclearization but Uranium Enrichment Controversy Looms as Major Obstacle,” WMD Insights, April 2007.) These activities may have, at least in part, been linked to an effort to acquire the ability to produce fuel for four nuclear power reactors that the Soviet Union agreed to supply Pyongyang in 1985, a goal that would have been consistent with the North’s policy of import substitution under the state doctrine of Juche or “self-reliance.”

While skillful diplomacy can probably manage the uranium enrichment issue to the satisfaction of the Six Parties, the issue of suspected North Korean nuclear cooperation with Syria may be an even greater obstacle. The open source evidence surrounding the Syrian site bombed by the Israeli Air Force in September 2007 is inconclusive, but the Bush administration increasingly appears to believe that the site was a nuclear reactor under construction with North Korean assistance. According to a South Korean press report, on February 20, 2008, Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill showed a video to some of Lee Myung-bak’s senior advisors that detailed the conclusion of U.S. intelligence that the bombed Syrian site was a nuclear reactor. [8] U.S. officials have repeatedly asked the DPRK for an explanation, a query that in itself provides evidence of U.S. thinking, since, presumably, the United States would not raise this question if it did not believe Pyongyang was implicated in the construction of the Syrian facility. North Korea and critics of the Bush administration claim the Syria issue is an attempt by U.S. hardliners to sabotage the Six-Party process, but such accusations do not appear credible, given the importance the United States has placed on the denuclearization agreement. [9]

Some analysts speculate that Hill briefed Lee’s advisors in the hope of earning support for a harder line against North Korea in case Pyongyang fails to submit a declaration that addresses the Syrian connection. From the U.S. perspective, “nuclear programs,” as stipulated under the Six-Party agreements, include any nuclear exports or technology transfers. However, North Korea may view such a project as a “Syrian nuclear program” and not a North Korean one. Although, according to Hill, North Korea has given the United States assurances that it is not engaged in nuclear cooperation with any other nation and will not undertake such cooperation, Washington has informed North Korean that it must address all past nuclear cooperation, as well. [10] Regarding the Syrian issue, the only publicly disclosed response from North Korea has been that “it does not transfer nuclear weapons, technology and knowledge,” which not only fails to address past behavior, but does not rule out “peaceful nuclear cooperation” with Damascus, such as the provision of an ostensibly peaceful research reactor that might ultimately be used for plutonium production. [11]

The North Korea-Syria nuclear connection is viewed with great seriousness by the United States because of fears that nuclear technology transfers could trigger proliferation in the Middle East or that the technology might be transferred to terrorist groups through Syria. Both Syria and North Korea are on the State Department’s list of state sponsors of international terrorism, although as part of the Six-Party agreement North Korea would be removed from this list once it complies with the agreement’s requirements. [12] Syria is a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and, under Article IV of the treaty, has the right to build nuclear reactors for peaceful use. Under its NPT-required safeguards agreement with the IAEA, Syria must submit all of its nuclear activities to IAEA monitoring, and any reactor construction must be reported to the Agency. Failure to report this activity would be a serious violation of Syria’s obligations under its IAEA safeguards agreement.

Although Pyongyang may be refusing to disclose its nuclear ties to Syria simply to avoid international criticism, other factors may also be at work. The revelation that it had supplied Syria with a nuclear reactor could be seen as a betrayal in Damascus and might jeopardize other lucrative transactions with Syria, such as future sales of missiles or conventional arms. Such a disclosure, moreover, could damage North Korea’s reputation among other arms purchasers, who might fear Pyongyang’s disclosure of additional confidential relationships. In addition, Pyongyang must fear that even if the Bush administration were prepared to forgive its past nuclear transfers, the U.S. Congress, and possibly the next U.S. president, might seek to punish the North for such behavior. Given these considerations, North Korean leaders will probably continue their denials of any nuclear connection to Syria.

In South Korea, most officials seem ready to overlook the DPRK’s past nuclear sales, observing that the “box in the Syrian desert” has been destroyed and that, in any event, such transfers would not have a direct impact on South Korean security. One high-level South Korean official said that as long as North Korea comes clean and reveals the details of the Syrian issue and all other proliferation activities, the matter can be set aside. [13] There will be personnel changes, however, in South Korea’s Six-Party delegation under President Lee Myung-bak, and it is unclear how President Lee and the new delegation will view the Syrian issue.

Challenges for the New South Korean President
The current impasse in the Six-Party Talks will present immediate challenges to President Lee. His initial plan to abolish the Ministry of Unification and merge it with the Foreign Ministry raised concerns that Lee intended to take a hard line towards Pyongyang and that inter-Korean relations were headed for a deep chill. Lee relented and compromised with his political rivals to retain the ministry; however, he nominated Nam Ju-hong as the new Minister of Unification. Nam is a Kyŏnggi University professor who has been highly critical of Seoul’s engagement policy towards North Korea as implemented under former Presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun. [14] However, Nam withdrew his nomination on February 27.

President-elect Lee’s transition team said humanitarian assistance to the North Korean people would continue unconditionally, but there has been wide-spread speculation that aid will be calibrated with North Korea’s denuclearization efforts and its cooperation on other security issues. The first test of Lee’s approach will occur in coming weeks, when North Korea is expected to request large-scale shipments of fertilizer from the South.

President Lee has tried to reassure critics that he will continue engagement and that North Korea has nothing to fear, as long as it denuclearizes. [15] At his inauguration, Lee announced that his policy towards North Korea will be “pragmatic and not ideological.” [16] Indeed, Lee has an ambitious policy to resuscitate the North Korean economy and raise its per capita income to $3,000 in ten years. [17] The plan calls for massive foreign investment and economic opening after North Korea’s denuclearization is complete.

However, it remains to be seen whether denuclearization alone will be a sufficient basis for implementing Lee’s plan. Politically, it would be difficult for Lee to maintain his conservative coalition while implementing such a massive aid effort without addressing threats from North Korean missiles, chemical weapons, possible biological weapons, and conventional forces, including thousands of artillery tubes deployed near the military demarcation line between North and South. Other issues and potential obstacles would surely emerge during the implementation of Lee’s plan, such as human rights in the DPRK and the fate of South Korean prisoners of war and abducted fishermen still in the North. If Lee’s aid program depends on persuading Pyongyang to abandon all of its WMD programs and accept serious arms control measures, a long negotiating process is inevitable and several years will likely be required before Lee’s initiative could be fully implemented.

Should the Six-Party process collapse, the South Korean government appears to have few attractive policy options. President Lee wants to improve relations with the United States and other powers in East Asia, so he will certainly seek international cooperation in addressing the North Korean nuclear threat. It should be noted, however, that the international community also has few alternatives for dealing with this challenge. Military options are unthinkable in the South and referring the issue to the UN Security Council is not likely to be effective, given the inability of previous UN sanctions efforts following the July 2006 DPRK missile exercise and the October 2006 nuclear test.

Lee’s only realistic options are deterrence and containment. South Korea will surely continue to develop its own precision strike capabilities and advanced military technologies to counter the North Korean threat. These measures will likely be coordinated to strengthen Seoul’s alliance ties with Washington, while reassuring South Korea’s East Asian neighbors that these actions are for defensive purposes. One option for South Korea is greater cooperation with the United States in the realm of missile defense. Although Lee and his advisors are predisposed to acquiring robust missile defense capabilities, they are cognizant of the financial and political costs concomitant with extensive missile defense research, development, and deployment. [18] Integration with a regional missile defense system that includes the United States, Japan, and possibly Taiwan would alienate China and Russia and thus carry a very high political price tag for Seoul.

The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is another policy instrument at South Korea’s disposal, but joining the PSI is more of a symbolic measure than a substantive one. According to one South Korean government official, domestic and international laws enable South Korean authorities to interdict WMD shipments in ROK territorial waters, air space and surrounding areas; South Korea can perform PSI-type interdictions without being a member. (For a recent report on the PSI in Asia, see “Proliferation Security Initiative Exercise Hosted by Japan Shows Growing Interest in Asia But No Sea Change in Key Outsider States,” WMD Insights, December 2007.) [19] The Lee administration is in no rush to join the PSI but is not averse to joining. However, this step will be withheld until an appropriate time – if needed – as a response to uncooperative North Korean behavior. [20]

Conclusions
For the moment, Pyongyang’s delay in implementing the declaration phase of its October 2007 denuclearization agreement does not appear to have alarmed the other participants in the Six-Party process. As the months pass, what may now look like a brief setback may begin to loom as an extended stalemate or as yet another instance of North Korea backing out of its arms control commitments. How President Lee’s policy toward the North will influence events remains to be seen, but for the moment Lee appears to have given himself sufficient flexibility to permit serious engagement with Pyongyang to continue.

Daniel A. Pinkston – International Crisis Group