Recent years have been turbulent for the Arab Gulf States, which have been caught between the United States, a key ally and security guarantor, and Iran, a close neighbor, as the two have clashed over Iran’s quest for nuclear technology. During late 2007 and early 2008, the Gulf States were buffeted by fears that the United States might launch a military strike against Iran’s nuclear assets and, then, after the release of a new U.S. intelligence report indicating that the Iranian nuclear threat was less imminent than previously thought, by fears that U.S. diplomatic efforts to contain Iran might stall. Against this background, the Arab Gulf States, along with Egypt, are advancing a new strategy of cautiously engaging Tehran.

Ahmadinejad Rejects GCC Olive Branch, Reinforcing Concerns
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), consisting of the states of Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain, was established in 1980 to strengthen the Arab Gulf States and to counter Iran’s revolutionary expansionism after the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War. The GCC’s focus was on “enhancing security and stability.” [1] The most recent GCC summit meeting was held from December 3-4, 2007; before the meeting, the Secretary General of the GCC announced that this summit would focus particularly on “issues related to boosting stability in the region” and “adopt a stand to face security challenges in the region, such as the Iranian nuclear dossier.” [2]

The day before the GCC conference, it was announced that, for the first time in the GCC’s history, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad would attend as a guest. [3] The invitation was extended at a time of increased Gulf State concern that the standoff over Tehran’s continued pursuit of a uranium enrichment capability might escalate into a military conflict. (The technology can be used both to produce fuel for nuclear reactors and for nuclear weapons.) Indeed, in opening the summit, Hamid bin Khalifa Al-Thani, ruler of host country Qatar, remarked that the meeting was taking place amid “serious threats” to the region’s prosperity and security. [4]

Before the summit, GCC Secretary General Abdulrahman Al Attiyah said: “I solemnly invite all parties, including Iran, to use the language of reason and dialogue, away from confrontation and escalation.” [5] Ahmadinejad failed to heed that call, however, and his speech at the conference received only a “cool” reception. [6] He was widely expected, according to several Gulf leaders, to come bearing initiatives giving assurances on Iran’s nuclear program and showing new flexibility on the long-standing dispute over the ownership of three Gulf islands. [7] Instead, he remained silent on these two issues and set out an elaborate 12-point proposal to pursue a regional security pact “without foreign influence,” which was viewed with considerable skepticism; as one analyst observed, the initiative was “merely a way for Iran to replace America as the Gulf’s guardian.” [8]

Overall, Ahmadinejad’s performance was roundly criticized in the Gulf States. The UAE-based, Saudi-owned Al-Arabiya, for example, was “strongly skeptical” and “voiced disappointment,” over Ahmadinejad’s remarks; a commentator from Al-Jazeera’s Doha office echoed these sentiments. [9] A columnist in the prominent English-language Kuwait Times commented on what she termed Ahmadinejad’s “commandments” by saying, “Next thing you know, we’ll all be speaking Farsi.” [10] In January 2008, Kuwaiti scholar Dr. Abdallah Al-Shayji cited Ahmadinejad’s behavior at the Doha GCC conference as one more example of Iran’s “missing opportunities” to “stand by us [Arab Gulf States] as Arabs and Muslims, and not [be] a force influencing the region.” [11]

Ahmadinejad was further pilloried in the Gulf, as well as at home, when it was learned that he had solicited the summit invitation, after implying that the offer was a GCC initiative. One high-level Gulf diplomat noted that Ahmadinejad had dispatched Foreign Minister Manuchehr Mottaki to several GCC countries to convey this desire for the invitation, but that at home the Iranian president was “keen to say in his answers to questions about his participation that he received an invitation and accepted it without pointing out that he was the one who took the first step in this matter.” [12] In Iran, a senior MP openly criticized Ahmadinejad for attending the summit under such circumstances. [13]

The summit chair, Qatari Prime Minister Shaikh Hamed bin Jassem Ali Thani, explained that his decision to honor Ahmadinejad’s request for the invitation was based on the region’s unease over Iran. “I don’t think we can try to solve our problems through trying to seal Iran [off from] the region,” he said, going on to note that a military confrontation with Iran would not be in the interest of the Arab Gulf States. [14] Thani’s hopes for an improved dialogue with Tehran were obviously disappointed, however, and one widely read daily declared that Ahmadinejad’s eagerness to attend the summit served to “confirm speculation that the Islamic Republic had used the meeting as a platform to showcase its growing influence” in the region. [15] (A commentary in the pro-Ahmadinejad Iranian website Rajanews.com conveyed a similar sentiment, albeit from a different perspective, proclaiming that Ahmadinejad had “upstaged the Americans” with his “shrewd” presentation at the GCC summit.) [16]

National Intelligence Estimate
The unclassified summary of a new U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran’s nuclear program was released on December 3, while the GCC meeting was still in session. In the document, the U.S. intelligence community concluded with “high confidence” that Iran had halted its “nuclear weapons program” in 2003 – although it defined this term narrowly to mean only the country’s efforts to design a nuclear weapon and to enrich uranium clandestinely. At the close of the summit, on December 4, the GCC released a joint communiqué, but the document made no mention of the NIE, possibly because member states had had too little time to consider its implications and develop a common position. The communiqué also said little regarding Iran’s contributions at the meeting, except to call on Tehran to resolve the situation regarding the “three occupied islands” in the Gulf and to cooperate more fully with the international community regarding its nuclear program.

After the summit, the Gulf States were initially reticent in commenting on the NIE, with several media outlets remarking on their lack of response. [17] Before the week was out, however, reports started appearing that the regional Arab states, “caught off-guard” by the NIE, were concerned that U.S. pressure on Iran would slacken as a result of the new assessment of the Iranian nuclear program. [18] For example, scholar Maamoun Fandy noted that, with the release of the NIE, which he asserted invalidated ongoing U.S. policy, “people here [in the Gulf] don’t know what the Americans are up to.” [19] Such uncertainty, some feared, would give Iran carte blanche to pursue its goal of regional dominance, the Arab Gulf states’ primary concern. [20] Referring to Iran’s continuing development of its uranium enrichment capability within its ostensibly civilian nuclear energy program, one reporter observed that Arab states “worry there’s little difference between evidence of an active quest for nuclear weapons and a civilian nuclear program that could, at short notice, be turned in a military direction.” [21]

Out-Reach Strategy Reinforced
These continuing concerns about Iran’s nuclear ambitions, coupled with uncertainties regarding the ability of the United States to sustain a campaign of pressure on Iran after release of the NIE, appear to have led several key Arab states to intensify efforts to engage and reduce tensions with Tehran. As Diaa Rashwan, a political analyst at Cairo’s Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, concluded, “What happened after the CIA report [the NIE] was that the Arab countries, the Egyptians, the Saudis, adopted another policy. They decided to ameliorate their relations with Iran.” [22] Far from being reassured by the NIE that the Iranian threat might have diminished, these decisions, according to experts from the GCC countries, were the product of continuing “unease in the relation between Iran and the GCC countries,” which led to the belief that “it is better to engage Iran since an open defiance could lead Tehran to confront the GCC.” [23]

Saudi Arabia
On December 12, Iran announced that Saudi Arabia had invited Ahmadinejad to lead the annual Hajj, a symbolic gesture that the Iranian government touted as indicating warming relations between the kingdom and the Islamic republic. Mohammad Hosseini, Iran’s ambassador to Riyadh, for example, declared the invitation was an “important event in the relations between the two countries.” [24] Ali Akbar Javanfekr, Ahmadinejad’s media adviser, particularly emphasized the fact of the invitation, proclaiming, “It is the first time in the history of relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia that the king of this country invites a president of the Islamic republic to make the pilgrimage to Mecca.” [25]

It should be noted, however, that the invitation was extended a day after Ahmadinejad, in effect, requested it, by telling a public news conference that he would perform the pilgrimage if he were invited to the kingdom by King Abdullah. [26] In the prominent Egyptian weekly Al Ahram, one reporter described the dynamic of the invitation as the King “giving permission” for Ahmadinejad to make the pilgrimage. [27]

Nonetheless, news of Ahmadinejad’s participation in the religious rite was received with enthusiasm by the Iranian public, who otherwise seem to be generally disenchanted with Ahmadinejad; Iranians expressed the hope that ties between the Islamic republic and the Saudi kingdom would improve. [28] Neither the invitation, nor its acceptance received significant coverage in the Arab press, however. [29]

Egypt
Further evidence of Arab state interest in more actively engaging Iran came in early January 2008 when Ali Larijani, former chief nuclear negotiator and current representative of the Supreme Leader in Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, visited Cairo. During his weeklong stay, Larijani met with several top Egyptian officials, including President Hosni Mubarak and Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit, as well as the head of the Cairo-based Arab League. Larijani reportedly informed his hosts that Tehran was ready to cooperate with Cairo on all issues. [30] Larijani, a traditional conservative, is a close advisor to Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i and widely seen as a rival of the more radical Ahmadinejad. The latter was said to have “appeared angered” that Larijani had undertaken the visit, stating that his government had a Foreign Ministry that determined the country’s foreign policy. [31] A Foreign Ministry spokesman declared that Larijani’s trip was personal. Larijani, however, brushed off these remarks and announced that his talks with the Egyptian authorities had gone well. [32] The episode suggests that one element of Cairo’s strategy may be to bolster the more moderate factions in Tehran. Popular sentiment in Egypt, it may be noted, regards Iran favorably but disapproves of the country’s hard-line president. [33]

On January 22, 2008, following Larijani’s visit and other several senior-level diplomatic exchanges, Ahmadinejad and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak held their first direct conversation. The interchange took place in a phone call that was initiated by the Iranian president and dealt with issues surrounding Palestine and Lebanon. [34]

Ahmadinejad has long expressed a desire to restore relations with Egypt. After Iranian Foreign Minster Manouchehr Mottaki met with Egyptian Deputy Foreign Minister Hussein Dirar, in December 2007, however, the Cairo-based Al Ahram Weekly observed that local analysts believe Cairo “remains reluctant to restore full diplomatic ties with Tehran.” [35] As an Egyptian expert on Iran remarked regarding Mubarak’s conversation with Ahmadinejad, “The phone call is a sign of improved relations between the two countries but should not be interpreted as if full diplomatic ties will be resumed next week or next month.” [36]

The Iranians, however, had a different interpretation, as four days after the phone call, Foreign Minister Mottaki “announced that Iran and Egypt are on the verge of restoring full diplomatic relations.” [37] Egyptian analyst Diaa Rashwan pointed out that Iran has been particularly keen to promote relations with Egypt, because “Iranian officials recognize that without Egypt their attempts to consolidate their growing influence in the Arab world vis-à-vis America will not be complete.” [38]

Wariness Toward U.S.
In early January 2008, President Gorge W. Bush made a state visit to the Middle East. The trip lasted eight days and included stops in Israel, Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. The planned excursion was announced on December 5, 2007, two days after the release of the NIE, and it was widely recognized that the trip would necessarily “take on a particular significance in the wake of the U.S. intelligence community’s change of heart on Iran.” [39] Indeed, the London-based daily Asharq Al Awsat went so far as to declare that a “key purpose” of the trip was “to repair damage” caused by the U.S. intelligence document. [40] Moreover, according to the New York Times, Bush “pointedly” stated beforehand that he would use the trip to remind American friends and allies in the region that Iran poses a threat. [41] The American President ran true to his word, undertaking “great efforts to rally an Arab coalition to isolate Iran in the Gulf.” [42]

As reflected in the local press, however, the Bush visit appeared to be poorly received in the region, where, as one columnist for Egypt’s Al Ahram pointed out, a recent poll found Bush’s popularity rating to be only 12 percent. [43] Because of security concerns, the U.S. leader had no public engagements, and his sole speech, given in Abu Dhabi – a “stern message,” which urged regional states to isolate Iran – received “only polite applause.” [44] In governmental meetings, Bush and his aides tried to press a similar message, but it was observed that in several cases senior Arab officials contradicted or disputed Bush’s pronouncements “even before he left their countries.” [45] Typical of local press reaction, the Kuwaiti daily Al Rai published a front-page editorial declaring, “President, the region needs smart initiatives, not smart bombs.” [46] The Saudi Gazette, meanwhile, contrasted Bush’s visit to that of French President Nicolas Sarkozy, which immediately preceded Bush’s arrival: “It would be difficult to argue that French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s visit to the Kingdom was not in almost every way a success …. It’s refreshing to see a Western leader come to the Kingdom speaking of peace rather than just issuing warnings on the state of affairs in the region.” [47]

Kuwaiti scholar Dr. Abdallah Al-Shayji appeared to summarize popular thinking in the region, remarking:

We do not want to contain Iran, or confront or be at war with Iran. But we fear from what we hear and see from the Iranians and the Americans. We are being a chessboard in a big, strategic and important region to the world economy and energy. And these chessmen are manipulated by Iran and the United States. We should be wary and concerned about contradictions and views and the possible clash between both sides. The war intensity decreased; that was expected at the beginning and midst of this year. But via the harsh statements of Bush from Abu-Dhabi and his statements in Israel and the United States before he came here, which are very clear, there is a media and political escalation towards Iran.” [48]