On December 12, 2007, the Russian government stopped fulfilling its obligation under the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty to provide the other States Parties with information about Russian military forces in Europe. Although Russian officials have not formally linked Moscow’s CFE Treaty suspension decision to the government’s dispute with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) over U.S. plans to deploy ballistic missile defenses (BMD) in Poland and the Czech Republic, many Russian statements and actions suggest such a link.

Background
It took NATO and the Warsaw Pact over a decade to negotiate the complex data exchanges and inspections associated with the drafting of a binding and verifiable treaty that would limit conventional weapons deployments throughout the land mass extending from the Atlantic Ocean to the Urals. This enormous region encompassed the territories of dozens of countries, with disparate force structures and security concerns. It was not until the end of the Cold War that the parties were able to overcome the many obstacles that long prevented an agreement.

On November 19, 1990, the then 16 NATO members (Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States) and the six members of the now disbanded Warsaw Pact (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the Soviet Union) signed the original CFE Treaty. The breakup of the USSR shortly thereafter resulted in each of the eight former USSR republics possessing territories west of the Ural Mountains, the traditional dividing line between Europe and Asia, ratifying the accord in 1991. The division of Czechoslovakia into the Czech Republic and Slovakia also led both new countries to ratify the accord.

The complex document established equal ceilings of five categories of “heavy” conventional weapons for both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In the Atlantic-Urals geographic zone, each group agreed to possess no more than 20,000 tanks, 30,000 armored combat vehicles, 620,000 artillery pieces, 800 combat aircraft, and 2,000 attack helicopters. The accord set lower levels for “active” units for each of these categories. It also created several sub-regions where both blocs could deploy equal numbers of specified weapons systems. The so-called “sufficiency rule” further limited the proportion of armaments that any one country could deploy in the treaty zone to approximately one-third of the aggregate total for all CFE Treaty parties. To enforce these complicated restrictions, the treaty instituted a sophisticated system of monitoring, inspections, and verifications. [1]

The CFE Treaty imposed a detailed timeline requiring all 30 States Parties (eight new parties had acceded to the original treaty) to destroy, transfer, or convert to peaceful use all holdings in excess of permitted levels within three years of the treaty’s entry into force on November 9, 1992. A Joint Consultative Group, composed of all the CFE members, provided a forum in Vienna to address technical and other issues relating to treaty implementation as well as to consider ways to enhance the treaty’s effectiveness. [2]

According to NATO, over 60,000 pieces of treaty-limited equipment have been destroyed in accordance with the treaty’s provisions. [3] The reductions, combined with the extensive system of military confidence-building measures, helped eliminate the possibility of large-scale surprise attacks in Europe. Yet, the Warsaw Pact’s subsequent dissolution and NATO’s ensuing expansion soon disrupted these carefully crafted force balances, based on a defunct bloc-to-bloc structure.

On November 19, 1999, the 30 States Parties signed a CFE Adaptation Agreement at a heads of state summit in Istanbul, held under the auspices of the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE). The amended version of the accord replaced the obsolete bloc ceilings and zones with a system of national limits for each treaty party. [4] Although it retained the systems of “flank zones” in northern and southern Russia where special limits on deployments applied – of particular importance for Turkey and Norway – the Adapted Treaty reduced the size of these zones. [5]

In subsequent years, however, only four of the signatories – Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Russia – fully ratified the 1999 Adaptation Agreement. The other parties have refused to do so until Russia fulfills the commitments it made at the Istanbul summit to withdraw all its military bases from the other former Soviet republics. The new European countries that emerged in Europe after December 1990 – including the three Baltic states adjoining Russia – cannot join the treaty until it is ratified by all current members and brought into force. At that point, the accession clause of the 1999 version (allowing additional states to join the pact) will become effective; the original 1990 text did not include such a provision. [6]

A major source of contention between Russia and the West regarding the CFE Treaty is their differing interpretations of the relationship between two important decisions adopted at the Istanbul summit. First, NATO governments agreed to modify the CFE Treaty to account for the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact, de-linking Russian force levels from those of the other former members of the Soviet bloc, some of which had become NATO members. Second, in accordance with the principle that foreign troops can only remain in a host country with its consent, the government of Boris Yeltsin indicated in several Annexes to the 1999 CFE Final Act adopted at the OSCE Istanbul summit (known as the “Istanbul Commitments”) that Moscow would withdraw its military forces from former Soviet military bases in Georgia and Moldova.

Problems arose when it became clear that Russia would not soon abandon its military bases in the separatist regions of Moldova and Georgia. Even today, small numbers of Russian troops remain on the territory of both countries in separatist regions beyond the control of the national governments. Russian government officials argue that they need to support peacekeeping forces in these so-called “frozen conflict” regions of the former Soviet Union pending their resolution. (See Text Box: “CFE Treaty Dispute Spotlights Long-Time Smuggling Havens Transneister, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh”below) The CFE Treaty does not directly limit the size or activities of peacekeeping units, many of which consist of former Soviet military personnel. Russian representatives contend that they can safely remove these troop contingents only after solutions have been reached to the underlying conflicts that have necessitated their continued presence. [7] Additionally, the elaborate CFE inspection regime also does not encompass the “unaccounted-for treaty-limited equipment” possessed by separatist forces in the conflict regions of the former Soviet Union. Much of this equipment is thought to be of Russian origin and has become a supply source for small arms traffickers throughout Europe, Asia, and Africa.

CFE Treaty Dispute Spotlights Long-Time Smuggling Havens Transneister, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh The CFE Treaty dispute has become closely linked to the issue of resolving the “frozen conflicts” in the breakaway regions of the former Soviet Union. The weak law enforcement and porous borders in the breakaway regions of Georgia, Moldova, and the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh have facilitated trafficking in contraband materials, including narcotics, persons, counterfeit goods, and currency – and occasionally nuclear materials and other WMD-related items. Combined with the recent escalation of the clash between Moscow and the West over Kosovo’s declaration of independence, the CFE Treaty issue has underscored how Russia’s continuing support for the autonomy of these enclaves complicates efforts to counter international trafficking in WMD materials and other contraband through Eurasia. Recent incidents have highlighted the potential nonproliferation threats associated with the anarchic conditions existing in the breakaway regions. In June 2003, Georgian authorities apprehended Garik Dadayan, an Armenian national, in the border town of Sadakhlo for attempting to smuggle 170 grams of weapons-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU) across Georgia’s borders with Armenia and Azerbaijan. Smuggling had become rampant in the area after Armenian-Azeri relations deteriorated following the war over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region. Another serious case of attempted nuclear proliferation occurred in 2006, when a Russian citizen of North Ossetian origin sought to sell 100 grams of weapons-grade HEU for $1 million on the Georgian black market. His trial in early 2007 became a source of mutual recriminations between Moscow and Tbilisi over the lack of cooperation between their respective law enforcement agencies. [1] The questionable security of the HEU fuel at the nuclear reactor at Sukhumi, Abkhazia, also remains an object of nonproliferation concern since the local authorities continue to impede international access to the facility. [2] From the perspective of WMD proliferation, as long as these regions lack effectual governments that can implement border controls and exercise legal authority within their claimed jurisdictions, the dangers of illicit WMD smuggling will remain a serious threat throughout Europe. On January 2, 2008, the Russian government inadvertently underscored these risks by announcing that its custom officials had blocked 120 attempts in 2007 to smuggle “highly radioactive material” out of Russia. The agents also detected over 700 instances in which smugglers sought to bring such material into Russia illegally, underscoring Russia’s role as transit country, as well as a source of illicit WMD trafficking. [3] SOURCES AND NOTES [1] Richard Weitz, “Uranium Smuggling Incident Reinforces Concerns about Nuclear Trafficking in South Caucasus,” WMD Insights, March 2007, http://www.wmdinsights.com/I13/I13_R2_UraniumSmuggling.htm. [View Article] [2] William C. Potter and Elena Sokova, “Illicit Nuclear Trafficking in the NIS: What’s New? What’s True?” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 9, No. 2, Summer 2002, pp. 112-120, http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol09/92/92potsok.pdf. [View Article] [3] Will Stewart, “Russia Foils Atomic Smugglers,” Daily Telegraph, January 2, 2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2008/01/03/wrussia103.xml. [View Article]

NATO members have refused to ratify the 1999 Adapted CFE Treaty until Russia completely removes all its troops, military equipment, and ammunition stockpiles from within the two countries’ internationally recognized boundaries. In a November 5, 2007, briefing to Congress, State Department Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, David Kramer, said that Russia must first honor its Istanbul Commitments and completely withdraw all its weapons and troops from Georgia and Moldova before the United States and its allies would ratify the Adapted CFE Treaty. [8]

Russian officials reject NATO’s insistence that a formal link exists between the CFE’s implementation and their military withdrawal from Georgia’s autonomous regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as from Moldova’s Russian-speaking separatist region of Trandsniester. According to Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, Russia fulfilled all its CFE-related Istanbul Commitments by 2001. [9] In his state of the nation address in April 2007, Russian President Vladimir Putin argued that the CFE Treaty “is not in any way legally bound to the Istanbul Agreements.” [10]

The BMD-CFE Link
Several factors suggest that the ongoing dispute between Russia and NATO over U.S. plans to deploy BMD in Eastern Europe contributed to Moscow’s decision to suspend its participation in the treaty.

In terms of timing, Russian leaders have long complained about NATO expansion and the
resulting inequities in the CFE process. But it was not until the United States began formal negotiations with the new NATO allies of Poland and the Czech Republic regarding the deployment of BMD systems on their territory that the Russian government resolved to suspend its CFE Treaty obligations.

During their October 2007 meetings with Russian leaders in Moscow, moreover, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates concurrently discussed the CFE Treaty, BMD, and related arms control issues such as the possible limits on both countries’ strategic offensive forces after the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) expires in 2009. [11] In subsequent months, Russian military and political leaders have simultaneously accused the Bush administration of not following through on or even reversing publicly announced concessions aimed at achieving a compromise with Russia on both the CFE Treaty and BMD disputes. (For more on the Russian response to the U.S. BMD proposals see “Moscow Rejects U.S. Proposals on Missile Defense, Downplays New Iran Missile Test,” WMD Insights, February 2008.)

Several Russian complaints with respect to NATO and the CFE Treaty resemble Russian objections to the West’s approach to other arms control issues, including those involving weapons of mass destruction. In explaining why the Russian government imposed the moratorium on complying with the CFE Treaty, Anatoly Antonov, head of the Foreign Ministry’s security and disarmament department, said that Russia’s concerns about the Treaty “were not listened to and we are forced to take such a serious decision.” [12] Some Russians complain that the West routinely ignores their legitimate international security interests, including those with respect to BMD and START. In addition, Lavrov’s statement that the CFE Treaty “does not make any sense anymore, because all former Warsaw Pact countries, except Russia, have become NATO members,” [13] resembles the assertions of Russian policy makers that the proliferation of ballistic missile technologies has rendered obsolete the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which dates from the same, now-discredited, late Soviet period. Finally, in discussing the CFE Treaty, the chief of staff of the Russian armed forces, Yury Baluyevsky, accused the United States and its NATO allies of using the treaty “to exert pressure on Russia,” [14] a motive Russians also attribute to U.S. missile defense programs.

Most tellingly, influential Russian policy makers have explicitly made the link between the CFE Treaty and BMD disputes. Leonid Slutsky, First Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Committee on International Affairs, justified his November 2007 vote in favor of CFE Treaty suspension by arguing that such a decisive move “will become an indicator of Russia’s seriousness to defend the interests of ensuring its defense capability without compromise, including as response to U.S. plans to field missile defense facilities in Eastern Europe.” [15] Sergei Mironov, the speaker of the upper house of parliament, complained that, “Russia fulfilled the CFE Treaty provisions in good faith while NATO bases sprang up in Romania, Bulgaria, and the United States prepared to install its anti-missile defense system along Russia’s border.” [16] Vladimir Vinokurov, the consul general of the Russian Federation in San Francisco, explained in a commentary published in the San Francisco Chronicle that, with the CFE Treaty limits no longer effective, “the real holdings of Russian military equipment will depend on the evolution of the situation, particularly on the readiness of the other states party to the CFE Treaty to show adequate restraint from installing missile bases.” [17] Russian diplomats have told American reporters that the duration of Russia’s CFE Treaty suspension would depend on developments relating to the planned U.S. BMD deployments in Europe, as well as the concessions the United States made regarding Moscow’s proposed arms control treaty revisions. [18]

The linkage between the CFE Treaty and BMD disputes also derives from their common cause — the expansion of NATO. The incorporation of new members into the alliance during the past decade, especially those belonging to the former Soviet bloc, has both disrupted Cold War-era military force balances and created conditions allowing for the possible deployment of U.S. missile defense systems along Russia’s borders. Russian strategists are quite aware of this connection. For example, international security expert Pyotr Romanov explicitly grouped together the CFE Treaty crisis, the BMD deployments, and a litany of perceived anti-Russian acts by “the West” since the end of the Cold War: “It bombed and dismembered Yugoslavia, brought American and NATO bases closer to the Russian borders (in spite of having promised never to do so), armed the Baltic countries (because they do not formally belong to the CFE), grossly violated the UN Charter (in Iraq), and is now proposing to place an American missile defense shield under Russia’s nose.” [19]

According to Putin and other Russian officials, NATO’s expansion into former Soviet bloc states violated Western pledges made at the time of Germany’s reunification not to establish military bases in such countries. In addition, Russian analysts claim that, “NATO could ease Moscow’s concern by promising not to exceed, during its expansion, the aggregate ceilings for arms imposed by the treaty in 1990 on its 16 members. But instead it is simply pocketing the arms quotas, which were originally allocated to the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union.” [20] According to the calculations of the Russian Ministry of Defense, NATO’s membership expansion had resulted in the alliance now collectively exceeding its permitted arms holdings by approximately 6,000 tanks, 10,000 armored vehicles, 5,000 artillery units, and 1,500 combat planes. [21]

In a November 20, 2007 speech, Putin himself connected the CFE Treaty and BMD issues when he denounced both NATO’s encroachment against Russia’s border “in violation of previous agreements” and its failure to construct a missile defense system to which “all participants” would have equal access, as under his proposals at the June 2007 G-8 summit in Germany and the July 2007 bilateral summit with President Bush at Kennebunkport, Maine. Putin cited both these issues while justifying his decisions to suspend Russia’s fulfillment of its CFE Treaty obligations and raise the combat readiness of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces. [22]

NATO Governments Also Link CFE Treaty and BMD Disputes
Influential Europeans have become increasingly concerned that the disputes over the CFE Treaty and the U.S. BMD deployments are reviving Cold War-like divisions in Europe. After Putin imposed the CFE Treaty moratorium, many European governments issued statements calling on Russia to resume implementing the treaty pending its revision. For example, in a joint article published in Germany’s Frankfurter Allgemeine newspaper and France’s Le Figaro, German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier and his French counterpart Bernard Kouchner warned that, “An erosion of the CFE Treaty could spark new arms races and create new conflicts.” [23]

Some East Europeans, fearful that Russia’s foreign and defense policies have become more belligerent, expressed unease that Washington might make concessions concerning the CFE Treaty in return for Moscow’s showing greater flexibility regarding BMD and other issues. Zygimantas Pavilionis, Under Secretary of State at the Latvian Foreign Ministry, stated that, “It is of course very important that we have this dialogue with Russia on the treaty. But with all respect to the dialogue, it would be good if our American friends and the EU as a bloc would pay a bit more attention to what is happening in Russia’s neighborhood in the coming months. Global issues that dominate the agenda could be a distraction for real Russian interests in its neighborhood.” [24] In the past, some East Europeans also have complained about other governments’ insufficient support for the Polish and Czech BMD deployments.

Russian statements seek to exploit these concerns and divisions in attempting to induce certain European governments to moderate their positions regarding the CFE Treaty and, ideally, BMD as well. At an EU-Russian conference in Portugal in late October 2007, Putin remarked that the current European security environment resembled that which led to the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the most serious predicament of the Cold War. [25] General Baluyevsky observed that, given’s Russia’s extensive military power, “European states would suffer the most from the treaty’s demise.” [26] The Russian media also speculated that the Kremlin’s diplomacy aimed to take advantage of European fears of an escalating confrontation between Moscow and Washington to mobilize support against the planned BMD deployments. [27] Placing the CFE Treaty at risk would contribute to creating the requisite crisis atmosphere.

Russian officials also tried to influence Europeans by accusing Washington of forcing other NATO governments to adopt anti-Russian policies. A Russian Foreign Ministry official said that, “The United States, however, chose to blackmail Russia instead, forcing it to make concessions in matters that had nothing at all to do with the CFE Treaty. The Americans forced the Istanbul Accords on everyone and persuaded Europe to abstain from ratification of the CFE Treaty in the hope that Russia would succumb to the pressure.” [28] In the past, Russian leaders have also intimated that Washington forced European governments to support U.S. missile defense initiatives, regardless of the damage that such plans were inflicting on European security interests.

Although NATO governments have not broken ranks with Washington over either the CFE Treaty accord or BMD issues, many Europeans have eagerly sought compromises to avert escalating tensions with Moscow. In early October, Germany hosted a special meeting of all CFE Treaty signatories to resolve differences between Russia and Western governments. [29] At the conference, NATO representatives unsuccessfully offered to help finance Russia’s withdrawal from Georgia and Moldova and host expanded consultations in the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) on ways to facilitate the accession of Slovenia and the Baltic states to the CFE Treaty. [30]

U.S. officials have tried to disprove Russian claims, also made with regard to BMD, that Washington’s obstinacy was preventing an acceptable compromise to the CFE Treaty dispute. After the Russian government implemented its moratorium, State Department spokesperson Sean McCormack called the move the “wrong decision” because American officials had offered “constructive, generous” proposals and, in partnership with their NATO allies, “have been engaged for the last several months in an intensive dialogue with Russia to address the issues Moscow has raised.” [31]

Implications
The CFE Treaty crisis has occurred at a time when international security experts fear that the entire network of arms control treaties — including those limiting the size and deployment of unconventional weapons — established during the Cold War are in danger of collapse. Russia’s new ambassador to NATO, Dmitry Rogozin, told the first session of the NATO-Russia Council that he attended: “If the balance of powers changes in a way that could threaten our security, we as a sovereign and independent state could revise a number of other agreements, which are morally outdated and harm our security.” [32]

An analysis of Russia’s CFE Treaty moratorium suggests that Russian officials aimed to inflict sufficient shock to dismantle the old CFE Treaty structure and ideally induce NATO into abandoning its immediate BMD deployment plans, while still allowing for the emergence of a superior European conventional arms control regime in its place. Whether they have correctly calculated this precise balance remains to be seen.

At an emergency meeting on the CFE Treaty in June 2007 in Vienna, Foreign Ministry security and disarmament director Anatoly Antonov, who headed the Russian delegation, told the session that Russia remained committed to conventional arms control in Europe, but that “Europe has changed, and this circumstance necessitates a modernization of the set of tools used to achieve these goals.” [33] Although the Russian government declined to participate in the CFE Treaty’s mandatory year-end data exchange, which the States Parties use to establish their inspection quotas for the following year, it did submit a separate, if less detailed, report to the OSCE about its conventional military forces in Europe. [34] President Vladimir Putin has stated that, if NATO governments ratified and complied with the 1999 Amended Treaty, Russia “could” resume its CFE Treaty participation. Nevertheless he warned: “I would like to emphasize that we cannot wait forever.” [35]

In announcing its suspension decision, the Russian Foreign Ministry called on NATO to “enact the adapted version of the CFE Treaty as soon as possible and without artificial conditions and embark on its further modernization.” [36] Lieutenant General Yevgeny Buzhinsky, a senior Defense Ministry official, identified two paths for realizing these twin objectives. NATO governments could first ratify the adapted treaty. After it came into force, they could proceed to modify it further. Alternatively, NATO members could “make a political decision and draw up a new agreement” directly, effectively setting aside the 1999 draft [37]

According to Russian international security expert Alexei Arbatov, Russian policy makers do not consider the 1999 Adapted CFE Treaty Agreement as fully meeting their country’s security needs because “It is merely a step toward the formation of a more stable and equitable system of confidence and security in Europe.... If NATO countries ratified the adapted treaty as it is, these conditions could be discussed later.” Russian officials have already called on NATO to eliminate the flank limitations, commit not to establish permanent military bases outside NATO territory, and accept lower quotas to compensate for the additional military capacity NATO has acquired through its membership expansion. [38]

Most recently, NATO Ambassador Rogozin has said that the provisions of a revised CFE Treaty should extend to encompass navies because, “Naval forces in many NATO countries have considerable advantages over Russia’s navy.” He told the NRC that, “Its adapted version should counterbalance these advantages.” It is unclear how such an extension might affect the sea-based nuclear deterrents of NATO members Britain, France, and the United States — as well as the Russian Navy itself, whose own ballistic missile launching submarine fleet is undergoing a comprehensive modernization program. [39]

After the Russian CFE Treaty moratorium went into effect, NATO issued a statement calling the Russian decision “particularly disappointing” because Allied governments “have worked intensively with other Treaty partners over the past months to try to resolve the Russian Federation’s concerns constructively.” Yet, the alliance still insists that any compromise had to respect “the integrity of the Treaty regime with all its elements,” as well as to “fulfill remaining commitments reflected in the 1999 CFE Treaty Final Act with its Annexes, including those related to the Republic of Moldova and Georgia.” NATO governments said that, while they would not retaliate “in kind at this stage” to Russia’s suspension, they “will carefully monitor the Russian Federation’s compliance with its Treaty obligations” given that the “Allies’ proposals for parallel actions on outstanding issues are constructive, reasonable, and forward looking.” [40] U.S. officials said they would not cease to support NATO’s further expansion or the planned BMD deployments in Eastern Europe. [41]

Due to the implicit linkage among these various arms control issues, the manner in which Russia and other countries manage the CFE Treaty suspension will shed considerable light on the possible evolution of the BMD, INF, and additional European security issues. Senior Russian government officials and military officers have affirmed a strong desire to discard the constraints impeding Moscow’s development of a military force structure optimized for Russian security needs — both in the case of CFE Treaty and INF. Lavrov expressed the attitude of many people in Moscow (and Washington) when he suggested that, “Maybe we should stop playing these games. Let each country decide how it uses its own territory for deploying forces.” [42] The Russian government could easily apply this policy to other arms control issues, particularly since Putin, most famously in his Munich speech last year, has accused the United States of acting unilaterally on international security issues without regard for Russian opinion or international law.

The conflict over the CFE Treaty has already potentially damaged NATO-Russian cooperation on WMD issues. After returning from a December 8 NRC meeting, Lavrov claimed that the United States was blocking approval of the Council’s cooperation plan for 2008 until Russia met Washington’s demands regarding the CFE Treaty. The NRC annual work plan typically includes collaborative projects in such WMD-related areas as countering terrorism, theater missile defense, and chemical, biological, and nuclear nonproliferation. [43]

In addition, the CFE Treaty’s problems have also begun to affect American thinking about its European military requirements. U.S. Army generals have cited concerns about a “a resurgent Russia” as warranting keeping almost twice as many soldiers in Germany and Italy as the Pentagon had planned only two years ago. [44] These developments might also serve as an argument against reducing the U.S. tactical nuclear weapons available for use in European contingencies. NATO will likely address these issues more comprehensively at its April 2008 Bucharest summit.

Richard Weitz – Hudson Institute