NATO governments are divided over several important questions as the allies prepare to gather for a summit in Bucharest from April 2-4. Although the most contentious debates could be over whether to further expand NATO membership and NATO’s role in Afghanistan, important issues related to European ballistic missile defense (BMD) also remain unresolved.

At present, NATO countries are engaged in three separate but related multilateral BMD initiatives. First, in March 2005, NATO announced its decision to develop an Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) system by 2010. Its purpose is to protect NATO military forces and installations deployed on military operations from short- and medium-range ballistic missile attacks. On February 14, 2008, NATO Assistant Secretary General for Defence Investment, Peter Flory, inaugurated the alliance’s “integration test bed” for assessing the compatibility of U.S. and NATO BMD technologies. The intent is to create an integrated NATO “theatre missile defence” architecture for allied forces conducting military operations. Flory characterized the facility as “the linchpin of the project” because the test bed “allows us to determine whether we actually can get the different components to work together, and work together rapidly enough to counter one or several missile attacks.” [1]

Second, the allied governments are considering establishing a BMD architecture to protect the national territories and population centers of NATO’s European members from missile attacks. In May 2006, a NATO Missile Defence Feasibility Study concluded that the alliance could construct a BMD system capable of defending European countries against growing missile threats from Iran, Syria, and North Korea. In Flory’s words, this 18-month-long study resulted in “a very, very long document but the key finding was missile defence is feasible within the assumptions and limitations of the study. It was a basic finding that NATO that, yes, this is something that can be done.” [2]

Third, the United States is pursuing bilateral initiatives with certain NATO members — currently Poland and the Czech Republic — to deploy forward elements of its national missile defense system in Europe. (See, “Special Report: The European Ballistic Missile Defense Dispute,” WMD Insights, April 2007.) This “third site” would complement the existing U.S. BMD deployments at Vandenberg Air Force Base, in California, and Fort Greeley, in Alaska. Although the initial purpose of the European deployment of the U.S. system was to defend the United States from a long-range missile attack by Iran or another potential Middle Eastern adversary, many U.S. BMD assets in Europe might also help protect other NATO countries from such attacks.

U.S. Government Presses for Summit BMD Endorsement
The immediate debate concerns the third of the above systems. Washington is currently negotiating with Warsaw to deploy 10 interceptor missiles in Poland and with Prague to place an advanced BMD battle management radar on Czech territory. The United States would fund the entire cost of developing, deploying, and operating these systems. Other NATO governments have not actively participated in any of these bilateral negotiations.

In their pre-summit declarations, U.S. officials have stressed the contribution that these BMD assets will make to NATO’s collective defense. On February 29, Kurt Volker, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, acknowledged that missile defense remains a contentious issue in Europe, but argued that, “Article 5 of the NATO Treaty basically says that NATO is supposed to protect its territory and its populations against threats. We have a collective defense commitment. It doesn’t say that we’ll protect ourselves from everything except missiles.” [3]

At a March 20, 2008 presentation to the National Press Club in Washington, DC, Volker insisted that, “We do see an increase in missile threats that can reach the territory of NATO members, and it’s perfectly appropriate for NATO to recognize that these threats are growing and to welcome the contribution of the U.S. and others toward a missile defense system that can protect alliance territories and population, and to task further work.…So I think NATO taking some steps forward on the issue of missile defense will also be part of what comes out of the Summit.” [4]

Collective Defense and the Bolt-On System
Contrasting somewhat with Volker’s enthusiasm for the U.S. deployments, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer has long stressed the need for the allies to develop closer linkages among various NATO BMD initiatives to create a comprehensive BMD architecture that would avoid potential security inequities among members. Most recently, on March 19, 2008, de Hoop Scheffer reassured a group of Turkish reporters that, “We have the sacred principle in NATO of the principle of indivisibility of security,” which means that, “we have no A league or B league in NATO. Every NATO ally is entitled to the same kind of protection.” [5] The previous March, the Secretary General had also insisted that, “When it comes to missile defence, there shouldn’t be an A-league and a B-league within NATO.” [6]

At the June 2007 NATO Defense Ministers’ meeting in Brussels, the other allied governments refrained from challenging the desirability or feasibility of U.S. plans to deploy missile defense systems in Poland and the Czech Republic. Instead of endorsing or opposing the bilateral U.S. BMD initiative, the allies launched a comprehensive study designed to assess how the American systems, if deployed, might affect NATO’s own separate multilateral BMD initiatives.

In line with de Hoop Scheffer’s concerns, an important purpose of the study was to develop options for a possible additional short-range missile defense system to protect members located in southeastern Europe. [7] Due to the anticipated capabilities of the planned systems, as well as time and distance factors, the BMD assets envisaged for Poland and the Czech Republic might not be able to identify, track, and intercept sufficiently rapidly a ballistic missile launched by Iran directed at NATO allies, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, and Turkey, located in southeast Europe. [8]

The governments of these countries have repeatedly called on other NATO members to help protect them from missile threats. When President Bush visited Bulgaria in June 2007, Bulgarian President Georgi Parvanov said his country would support any European BMD architecture that would guarantee “the indivisibility of the Euro-Atlantic space.” [9] Last summer, moreover, the Turkish government inquired about purchasing medium-range BMD systems from the United States. During his February 2008 trip to Turkey, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates advised Ankara to coordinate its missile defense plans with those of other NATO countries. [10]

At the same National Press Club session at which Volker urged the allies to commit to missile defense at the Bucharest summit, Adrian Vierita, Romanian Ambassador to the United States, told the audience that, “Missile defense is also very important for Romania based on the principles of solidarity and the indivisibility of security among allies. We would like to see a NATO BMD system complementary to the U.S. one, and I think this could also be something that the allies may wish to debate” at Bucharest. [11]

European Concerns
For the past year, NATO allies have sought to address this security indivisibility issue by assessing how to deploy shorter-range BMD systems which, if located closer to Iran, would provide protective cover for these southeastern NATO members. De Hoop Scheffer referred to this as a possible “bolt-on” to “the U.S. third site” (i.e., in addition to the two existing U.S. national missile defense sites in Alaska and California). [12]

Last summer, NATO officials had anticipated that the Allied governments would use the findings of the study commissioned at the June 2007 Defense Ministers’ meeting to decide at the April 2008 NATO summit how to achieve their preferred European BMD architecture. [13] NATO officials had hoped that the short-range BMD “bolt-on,” which most likely would be a modified land- or sea-based version of the planned ALTBMD, could achieve initial operational capacity in 2010 and full capacity by 2015. [14] Three weeks before the Bucharest summit, however, Peter Flory told reporters that, “I don’t think we are going to see a decision there. I don’t see any nation pushing for a decision on an actual procurement program.” [15]

At present, NATO governments and defense experts continue to raise a number of questions regarding the proposed “bolt-on” system. Further research apparently will be necessary before the allies commit to its procurement. According to Flory, areas under study include: “The usual questions of cost efficient effectiveness against things like counter measures, debris, implications for arms control and non-proliferation measures…basically, questions that have been part of debate on missile defence for a number of years.” [16]

At the end of the informal meeting of NATO defense ministers in Vilnius, de Hoop Scheffer stated that the allies were also weighing political, as well as technical considerations: “We are working at a technical level to answer a number of technical questions, but we are also of course discussing this at the political level in answering the question how NATO responsibility for missile defence relates to the so-called U.S. third site.” [17]

Sharing the financial costs of NATO programs that appear to provide unequal benefits to member governments has always proved difficult within the alliance. In the case of the bolt-on system, several European officials located far from Iran object to paying to develop, deploy, and operate an expensive BMD system that would protect only NATO’s members in southeast Europe. A number of European governments anticipate that the costs of a “bolt-on” system would substantially exceed the one billion euro figure, spread over 20 years, offered by some defense experts. [18] Yet, other analysts maintain that integrating NATO’s European BMD architecture with the U.S. national missile defense system could result in substantial cost savings. [19]

In addition, some NATO governments favor deferring a commitment to deploy an alliance-sponsored collective BMD system until a more opportune time. Doubts persist regarding whether U.S. plans for European BMD will be implemented. The two remaining Democratic presidential candidates, members of Congress, and prominent American security experts have sought to suspend funding for these systems.

Furthermore, the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the governments of Poland and the Czech Republic remain unresolved. These discussions involve complex legal, financial, and political-military questions, including how much influence the host governments would have on missile interceptor launch decisions, the appropriate legal status of the American personnel working at the bases, and monetary and other compensation to the host nation.

Popular opposition to the planned deployments remains strong in both countries. In Poland, 52 percent of the respondents in a recent survey opposed the deployment and only 33 percent endorsed the U.S. plans. [20] In the Czech Republic, a recent survey found even higher levels of opposition, with 70 percent of those asked about the planned radar expressing disapproval. [21] Polish and Czech officials have indicated they would like to receive formal NATO approval of the planned U.S. BMD deployments in the hopes that this endorsement would increase popular support for hosting the systems. [22]

In this regard, the new government of Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk has evinced much less enthusiasm for hosting U.S. missile interceptors than its more conservative predecessor, led by Jaroslaw Kaczynski. Whereas Kaczynski declined to request direct compensation for the planned deployments, the Tusk administration has called on the United States to provide enhanced bilateral security guarantees, supplementing the imprecise multilateral security commitments Poland receives through NATO, and bolstering Poland’s defense capabilities. [23] Defense Minister Bogdan Klich said that Poland expected Washington to help fund the modernization of the Polish armed forces in return for Poland’s acceptance of increased security risks that could result from hosting a U.S. BMD base. [24] Klich specifically cited Poland’s interest in obtaining the U.S.-manufactured Patriot short-range defense missile or the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile to bolster Poland’s air defense capabilities. [25]

American officials are currently negotiating with their Polish counterparts on how to meet these requirements. Both U.S. and Polish observers believe that the two governments made considerable progress in meeting Polish conditions when Tusk spoke with Bush at the White House on March 10. The U.S. President assured the Polish Prime Minister that, “Before my watch is over, we will have assessed those needs and come up with a modernization plan that’s concrete and tangible.” [26]

In addition, Daniel Fried, Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 11 that the administration had addressed the earlier concerns of several NATO governments and members of Congress regarding the U.S. BMD systems proposed for Europe: “NATO has been studying missile defense for years, and we expect that at the Bucharest Summit, NATO will take further steps to acknowledge growing missile threats, welcome U.S. contributions to the defense of Alliance territory, and task further work in strengthening NATO’s defenses against these new threats. We have taken on board advice from some in Congress, and some of our Allies, as we have advanced a more NATO-integrated approach to missile defense.” [27]

U.S. negotiations with the Czech Republic have made greater progress than those with Poland. Despite lack of public support, press reports indicate that an agreement on the deployment of the U.S. radars and battle management center might be signed as early as April 28, 2008, though the Czech parliament would still need to ratify any agreement. [28]

Nevertheless, it remains unclear whether Fried’s arguments, as well as other U.S. reassurances, will overcome allied uncertainties in time for the Bucharest summit. These doubts invariably increase Allied reluctance to commit to a short-range BMD system whose purpose would be to supplement longer-range systems that might not be deployed.

In any case, some Allied governments do not yet consider missile defenses optimal for meeting contemporary and emerging threats to NATO. Common concerns include continuing reservations about the technical capabilities of the planned systems; a belief that threats of retaliation will deter any attack against NATO, making defenses unnecessary; an expectation that diplomatic or economic instruments will suffice to avert the advent of an Iranian missile threat to Europe; and worries about further damaging Russian-NATO relations over this issue.

Russian Resistance
In his March 12 press briefing, Flory acknowledged that Russian opposition to the deployment of NATO BMD systems near its borders is “an element in our discussion.” [29] NATO-Russian relations have become increasingly strained since the United States began actively pursuing the option of deploying BMD systems in Poland and the Czech Republic. Russian policy makers have also complained about the continuing expansion of NATO’s membership, the allies’ failure to ratify the updated Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, and other issues.

NATO members have invited Russian President Vladimir Putin to attend the Bucharest summit. Alliance officials evidently would prefer not to have the BMD issue dominate the NATO-Russian dialogue at the gathering. Instead, NATO governments hope to reaffirm common NATO-Russian opposition to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, as well as deepen joint cooperation on other areas of mutual concern, such as countering the Taliban insurgency and narco-trafficking in Afghanistan.

Conclusion
During meetings held on March 17-18, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyuko in their latest round of “2+2” talks in Moscow. The two sides exchanged ideas on what kind of confidence-building and transparency measures might make the Russian government more comfortable with the planned BMD deployments. Although Lavrov said the Russian side would study the American proposals, Serdyuko said that neither side had yet changed its basic position.

According to Secretary Rice, the two sides made more progress in drafting a “joint strategic framework document,” which would identify the main issues affecting the Russian-American relationship. Many of these items concern WMD-related subjects, Rice noted: “In some cases, this document would reflect agreements that we have already made or that we are trying to further develop; for instance, concerning global nuclear terrorism, concerning the two presidents’ interests in developing a way to get assured [nuclear] fuel supply for countries that may wish to have civil nuclear power without the proliferation risk of [indigenous] enriching and reprocessing [plutonium separation]. We would also expect to address the desire of both sides to have a post-START framework and to build upon the Moscow Treaty...as well as to talk about the missile defense issue.” [30]

Presidents Bush and Putin will now have an opportunity to reconcile their differing perspectives at both the NATO summit in Bucharest and their planned bilateral meeting in Sochi on April 6.

Note: At the summit, NATO members endorsed plans for the U.S. BMD deployments in Poland and the Czech Republic, declaring in the summit’s Bucharest Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government on April 3, 2008 that, given the “increasing threat to Allies’ forces, territory and populations” from the proliferation of ballistic missiles: “We therefore recognise the substantial contribution to the protection of Allies from long range ballistic missiles to be provided by the planned deployment of European based United States missile defence assets.” The declaration also said that, “Bearing in mind the principle of the indivisibility of Allied security as well as NATO solidarity, we task the Council in Permanent Session to develop options for a comprehensive missile defence architecture to extend coverage to all Allied territory and populations not otherwise covered by the United States system for review at our 2009 Summit....” WMD Insights will report more extensively on this subject and Russian reaction in its next issue.


Richard Weitz – Hudson Institute