On Wednesday, February 20, 2008 at 22:26 EST, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates ordered the U.S. military to destroy a non-functioning U.S. surveillance satellite, the USA-193/NROL-21. In the Pacific Ocean, the USS Lake Erie, a cruiser equipped with the Aegis air and missile defense battle management system, launched a single modified Lightweight Exo-Atmospheric Projectile (LEAP) SM-3 missile, equipped with a non-explosive kinetic warhead, against the satellite. On its first shot, the missile’s adjusted infrared targeting system scored a direct hit against the bus-sized, 5,000 pound satellite, which at the time was about 150 miles above the earth and moving at over 17,000 miles per hour. The National Reconnaissance Office satellite was launched on December 14, 2006, and, shortly after reaching initial orbit, it lost power, making it unresponsive to commands from the ground. Scientific calculations projected that, left unimpeded, USA-193 would have reentered the atmosphere in early March 2008.

The U.S. government justified the interception, code named Operation Burnt Frost, primarily on the grounds of ensuring environmental safety. On February 14, 2008, Deputy National Security Advisor James Jeffrey, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General James Cartwright, and NASA Administrator Michael Griffin conducted an extensive news conference at which they argued that the main consideration for destroying the satellite in orbit was “saving or reducing injury to human life.”[1] Most foreign commentators (and many American analysts) argued that other, less benign reasons either contributed to the American decision or determined it, while the health issue served only as a pretext. Common arguments included an alleged American desire to: destroy sensitive intelligence technologies contained in the satellite; demonstrate superior U.S. anti-satellite (ASAT) military capabilities; or exploit the occasion to conduct an operational test of the U.S. missile defense system.

Official U.S. Explanations
American government representatives justified the missile strike as a necessary safety measure to prevent the satellite’s fuel tank, carrying 1,000 pounds of toxic hydrazine, from landing in a populated area and potentially injuring or killing bystanders. Admiral Brad Hicks, program manager for Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense, told the media: “The rest of the satellite would have burned off. But the tank would have likely survived re-entry and hit the ground. This was a mission that had to be accomplished so there wouldn’t be a risk to people on the ground if it came down with that fuel tank intact.”[2] The government’s hope was that the interception would break the tank into smaller pieces less likely to survive atmospheric burning during reentry.

U.S. government officials denied that the interception had any ulterior purpose. Admiral Hicks insisted that “there was no underlying political message,” despite widespread domestic and international speculation to the contrary. General Cartwright rejected Russian accusations that the shoot-down was really a test of the U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) system: “The intent here was to preserve human life ... It was the hydrazine we were after.”[3] U.S. officials stated that hydrazine could induce blindness, seizures, and even death in people who suffered prolonged exposure to the ammonia-like chemical.

In an integrated civil-military operation, the State Department instructed all U.S. embassies to emphasize that, unlike last year’s Chinese ASAT test, the U.S. interception represented, in the words of spokesperson Sean McCormack, “an attempt to try to protect populations on the ground.”[4] Nevertheless, the operation was considered so controversial that it required President Bush’s approval, and Secretary Gates had to personally authorize each missile launch.

International Context
The satellite shoot-down came at a time when many observers perceived renewed global interest in ASAT technologies. During the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union demonstrated a capacity to destroy satellites. The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) last destroyed a satellite – using an air-launched missile – in 1985, though Congress terminated funding for the Air Force program shortly thereafter.[5] In 2004, the U.S. Air Force published a “Counterspace Operations” doctrine that called for ensuring American “space superiority” by developing the capacity to deny adversaries access to space when required.[6] The new National Space Policy approved by the Bush administration in 2006 affirmed the U.S. intent to protect American space capabilities by all means, including “deny[ing], if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to U.S. national interests.”[7]

Although the Defense Department has no dedicated ASAT weapons program listed in its latest unclassified budget, analysts calculate that the DoD spends over $12 billion each year on military technologies that could be employed on missiles entering or leaving space.[8] In destroying the USA-193, the U.S. military effectively demonstrated how it can easily employ advanced BMD technologies to attack low-altitude satellites.[9]

China and Russia also have technologies capable of destroying satellites. Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis, Thomas Fingar, stated when asked about Chinese and Russian capabilities that “it would not be that difficult to inflict significant, serious damage to our capabilities over [a] couple of days.”[10] The 2008 edition of the annual DoD report on Chinese military power emphasized China’s growing capabilities and interest in space warfare, including in the ASAT field.[11]

Many commentators speculated that the U.S. action represented a response to the January 11, 2007 test of an ASAT weapon by the Chinese government. In that case, the Chinese relied on a similar direct ascent technique to position an object to smash into and destroy a defunct weather satellite, the Feng Yun 1-C. The Chinese action, which broke a two-decades-long moratorium on such tests and occurred without any advanced warning, triggered an international outcry. (For international reaction to the Chinese test, see “Special Report: Chinese Anti-Satellite Weapon Test – The Shot Heard ‘Round the World,” WMD Insights, March 2007.) Although Chinese officials have refused to reveal their reasons for the test, or provide any other details, the Chinese had let it be known before the U.S. interception that China did not plan to conduct another ASAT test. Thus, the United States, through the destruction of the USA-193, has reminded Beijing that Chinese satellites are equally vulnerable.[12]

American officials took pains to distinguish their action from the Chinese test one year earlier. American officials pointed out that the U.S. government gave advanced indications of its plans and worked to minimize space debris by targeting the satellite as it neared the earth’s atmosphere, a cautionary move which resulted in the rapid burn up of many more of the satellite pieces than that which occurred with the higher-orbiting Chinese satellite. In contrast, China gave no notice of its shoot-down, stonewalled foreign inquiries for weeks following the operation, and destroyed the satellite in a much higher orbit, creating debris that will circle the earth for much longer. A day after the U.S. interception, General Kevin Chilton, head of the U.S. Strategic Command, insisted that, “There is absolutely no comparison with what China did and what the U.S. did” because “China’s sole purpose was to complete the development of an ASAT.”[13]

Another complicating issue was that, only a week before the U.S. anti-satellite operation, the Chinese and Russian governments had jointly introduced a draft treaty prohibiting the militarization of space at the U.N. Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov submitted the joint Russian-Chinese draft “Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects” on February 12.[14] Representatives from both countries have long complained that the United States is seeking to acquire the means to orchestrate attacks in space against Russian and Chinese reconnaissance satellites and long-range ballistic missiles, whose trajectories pass through the upper atmosphere. The Russian government even used the occasion of China’s January 2007 ASAT test to attack the United States for blocking progress on outer space arms control negotiations.[15]

The main arms agreement in this area, the 1967 “Outer Space Treaty,” bans the deployment of weapons of mass destruction in outer space, but does not restrict conventional offensive or defensive weapons or weapons of mass destruction carried aboard ballistic missiles that temporarily transit space along their ballistic trajectory. China, Russia, and other governments have sought to extend these prohibitions to additional weapons.

Critics of the Chinese-Russian draft treaty claim that its provisions would ban only certain types of weapons that operate in space, such as the U.S. BMD systems intended for Poland and the Czech Republic, or BMD systems that might require some kind of space-based component. They also claim that the treaty proposal would not restrict ground-based direct ascent ASAT interceptors, such as ground-based ballistic missiles that fly through space (like the missile used by the Chinese in January 2007), conventional satellites launched from the ground that can function as ramming weapons against other satellites, or future terrestrial-based weapons, such as directed-energy and electromagnetic attack systems.[16] Other analysts argue that the treaty covers ground-based interceptors, citing the draft treaty’s language that prohibits any use or threat of use of force against space objects.[17]

In any case, American officials have objected and have stated that binding space arms control agreements, such as the proposed Chinese-Russian treaty and other “prevention of an arms race in outer space” (PAROS) treaties, cannot overcome definitional, breakout, verification, and other inherent obstacles. U.S. authorities also deny the existence of an arms race in space, making elaborate steps unnecessary. Instead, Bush administration officials advocate so-called voluntary transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs), including means to enhance the security of satellites.[18]

China
The Chinese government responded to the announced plans for the U.S. shoot-down with clear unease, but China stopped short of open denunciations. A few days before the interception, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Liu Jianchao stated that his government “is highly concerned over the developments and has requested the U.S. to fulfill its international obligations in earnest and ensure that the security of outer space and relevant countries will not be undermined. Relevant Chinese authorities are closely following the situation and studying corresponding precautions.”[19] The day after the February 20 operation, Liu Jianchao affirmed that, “China is closely following the possible damage to the security of outer space and relevant countries by the U.S. move. China urges the U.S. to fulfill its international obligations in earnest and provide necessary information and relevant data to the international community promptly, so that relevant countries can take precautions accordingly.”[20] Secretary of Defense Gates subsequently stated that the DoD would provide the Chinese and other foreign governments with information about the interception to assuage their concerns about debris: “We’re prepared to share whatever, appropriately, we can.”[21]

Chinese expert and media commentaries were much more critical of the U.S. operation. For example, a commentary in the People’s Daily accused the United States of employing a double standard. The paper cited Washington’s tough stance against the Chinese ASAT test as inconsistent with the decision to conduct its own ASAT operation and, more generally, as allegedly blocking progress on space arms control.[22] Hong Yuan, Secretary General of the Arms Control and Proliferation Prevention Center of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, warned that the United States would share its new dual ASAT-BMD capabilities with Japan and other Asian allies.[23] Chinese Internet bulletin boards depicted the U.S. decision to destroy the satellite as an attempt to display America’s military power and deter Chinese military operations against Taiwan or in outer space.[24]

Russia
The Russian government was initially the most openly hostile to the U.S. action. Following the Pentagon’s announcement of the planned interception, the Russian Defense Ministry issued a statement accusing Washington of providing inadequate arguments to justify the shoot-down. Instead, the declaration indicated that the United States appeared to be seeking to exploit the satellite’s distress to gauge the capacity of its BMD technologies to destroy other countries’ satellites. The Ministry claimed that the fundamental similarities between the American operation and the Chinese ASAT test last year exposed the hypocrisy of U.S. space policy. The statement also asserted that the U.S. plan threatened most of the earth’s population since an unsuccessful interception attempt could produce collateral damage to space-based and terrestrial objects.[25]

The latter point was clarified when subsequent Russian media commentary cited Russian sources claiming that the satellite was nuclear powered and therefore contained dangerous radioactive substances. Igor Barinov, First Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Defense Committee, argued that Washington wanted to destroy the satellite in order to conceal this technology.[26]

On the other hand, Anatoly Perminov, head of the Russian Space Agency Roskosmos, approved of the interception because it decreased the chances that satellite remnants could survive reentry and hit a terrestrial target.[27] After the fact, the Russian Defense Ministry appeared to adopt a more relaxed tone. Col.-Gen. Anatoly Nogovitsyn, deputy Air Force commander, said that the Ministry would study the operation but added that, “The satellite’s trajectory was far from Russia and the Russian Federation was not threatened by the hit.”[28]

The Russian press was also critical of the U.S. operation and skeptical of its professed humanitarian motive. Yury Zaitsev, an analyst at the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Space Research, maintained that the United States aimed to both destroy the sensitive equipment on the satellite and test its new BMD capabilities.[29] Military analyst Vladimir Dernovoy cited the same two motives and warned that improving American missile defense capabilities would soon jeopardize China’s ability to conduct a missile strike against Taiwan and thereby disrupt the regional balance of power.[30] Military affairs reporter Viktor Myasnikov likewise asserted that the U.S. military had demonstrated its ability to shoot down a target whose weight and size resembled the payload of a ballistic missile, marking “a qualitative surge” in U.S. BMD capabilities.[31]

Europe
France
The French government formally accepted the Bush administration’s statement that the satellite had to be destroyed because of its toxic tank. Emmanuel Lenain, a French Embassy spokesperson in Washington, told the press that, “Obviously, we regret the circumstances, but we understand that these were exceptional circumstances, and we support the decision.”[32] In a February 21 briefing at the French Ministry of Defense, spokesperson Laurent Teisseire simply observed that the Americans were keeping the French fully informed about their intentions and methods of operation. According to Teisseire, this coordination would allow the French to minimize possible damage to their space-based assets and population centers. Teisseire also related that France possessed the same kind of tracking technologies as the United States and would use these to assess the post-impact debris field in space.[33]

Yet, an unnamed analyst with the French Defense Ministry contended that this action was calculated to “showcase the power” of the United States.[34] In addition, an anonymous government expert at the French space agency, CNES, argued that the shoot-down was unnecessary. He referenced examples of previous American spy satellites that, though supposedly even larger than the USA-193, were left to simply disintegrate during reentry.[35] The French expert also argued that even the extensive debris that fell to earth after the 2003 explosion of the Columbia shuttle did not inflict any human casualties because the toxic substances burned off before re-entry into the atmosphere, leaving only the metal remains. Marc Pircher, director of the space center at Toulouse, contended that the satellite’s hydrazine would burn up in the atmosphere.[36] Similarly, Xavier Pasco of the Strategic Research Foundation expressed incredulity about the alleged hydrazine threat.[37]

Several French newspapers offered openly critical assessments. In a commentary in the Figaro, Arnaud De La Grange mischievously observed, “It is amazing how many faulty satellites have had to be turned into military targets recently.” The author saw the test as “a signal of the United States’ resolve to implement the doctrine of ‘space dominance’ approved by George Bush in 2006” as well as justify the enormous expenditure on U.S. missile defense in recent years. De La Grange lamented that it would prove unsurprising if Moscow soon found it necessary to shoot down a wayward satellite as well.[38] Another Figaro contributor wrote that “the American motives remain questionable” because space experts believe that “the hydrazine contained in the tanks of USA-193 will be completely destroyed by the heat during the atmospheric re-entry.” For this reason, the author speculated that the real American motive in destroying the satellite was either to “protect technological secrets or to demonstrate the ability of the United States to destroy a satellite in space.”[39] Sylvestre Huet, writing in the newspaper Libération, was even more denunciatory of the destruction of the satellite. He accused the Pentagon of telling fables about supposedly toxic hydrazine in order to conduct an “exercise in precision shooting,” and he agreed with Putin in his claims that the operation allowed the United States to test its missile defense system, and to retaliate for the Chinese ASAT test of the previous year. Huet complained that, whatever the reason, “the consequences of this missile launch are clear: a further step towards the militarization of space.”[40]

French analyst Hervé Asquin wrote that the Americans probably had multiple goals in shooting down the satellite. First, they sought to demonstrate to Beijing that they possessed equal if not superior anti-satellite capabilities. Second, by taking pains to announce their plans beforehand and destroy the USA-193 at a low altitude, the Americans wanted to look like the “good guys,” in contrast to the Chinese, who destroyed their weather satellite without any advance warning and at a high altitude. This created much longer-lasting debris given the longer time required for it to descend to the atmosphere and burn up. Third, Washington wanted to demonstrate to the Poles and Czechs (as well as the Russians) that the BMD systems the U.S. planned to deploy in Eastern Europe would be very effective. Fourth, the U.S. intelligence community wanted reassurance that the sensitive surveillance technologies aboard the satellite would not somehow survive reentry and fall into foreign hands. Finally, the American military wanted to demonstrate that its expensive anti-missile systems worked.[41]

Germany
German commentators offered diverse views on the interception. Sascha Lange, a military expert at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs in Berlin, argued that the alleged dangers from the hydrazine were probably exaggerated given that nobody had been hurt by the hundreds of satellites that have reentered the earth’s atmosphere in recent years. Instead, Lange perceived the operation as motivated by a desire to demonstrate U.S. BMD capabilities and justify the billions of dollars spent on such systems.[42] Writing in Munich’s Sueddeutsche Zeitung, Kurt Kister likewise argued that the official safety reasons given for the interception “may be taken with a pinch of salt” and that Washington’s real motive was to prove the effectiveness of the billions of dollars spent on missile defenses.[43] A more supportive commentary appeared in the Frankfurter Allgemeine. Its author called the interception “a remarkable feat of engineering” that, even if motivated by military purposes, was justified to restore the balance disrupted by the January 2007 Chinese test.[44] The Social Democratic Party faction in the Bundestag lamented that the interception and plans to implement the 2006 U.S. space doctrine risked militarizing space.[45] Most critical was a commentator in Neues Deutschland, who described the interception as a step by the Bush administration towards integrating U.S. ASAT, BMD, and offensive space-based capabilities in the pursuit of global hegemony.[46]

Spain
The Spanish newspapers espoused the same skeptical position. A commentary in Madrid newspaper, the País, argued that, besides preventing human casualties from the falling satellite, the Pentagon also aimed to demonstrate to the international community – especially Beijing and Moscow – American superiority in anti-satellite weapons as well as the effectiveness of U.S. BMD technologies. Through this action, Washington aimed to deter other countries from either attacking American satellites, which are of vital importance to U.S. civilian and military life, or the United States directly with long-range ballistic missiles.[47]

Asia-Pacific
Australia
Australia was perhaps one of the countries whose territory was most at risk from falling debris due to its large size and location in the Pacific Ocean, the site of the missile interception. The country’s emergency management agencies were placed on elevated alert during the operation. A spokesperson for the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade justified the precautions on the grounds that “it is too early to predict where it might come down if the U.S. is not successful in destroying it in space.” The spokesperson said that Australian government officials “appreciate [American] openness on this.”[48] Nevertheless, when Secretary Gates visited Australia, Defense Minister Joel Fitzgibbon, whose new government is assessing the extent to which Canberra should cooperate with U.S. BMD efforts, praised the effectiveness of the satellite downing. At a joint news conference, he told Gates: “Bob, nice shot.”[49]

Japan
In Japan, the Kyodo news agency ran a commentary asserting that, in demonstrating its superior missile defense technologies, the Bush administration might have helped sustain flagging congressional support for BMD funding, perhaps even into the next U.S. administration, but at the risk of triggering an arms race in space.[50] An editorial in Tokyo’s Nihon Keizai Shimbun noted that, unlike the Chinese in 2007, the Americans provided advance notice of their interception and destroyed the satellite at a lower altitude, which generated less debris. Nevertheless, the paper warned that the U.S. action could lead to further militarization of space since the Americans used the occasion to conduct a practical drill for a robust satellite attack and missile interception. In addition, the U.S. interception may provide a precedent whereby other countries could now cite supposed safety reasons to justify destroying satellites.[51]

North Korea
In contrast to Japan and Australia, North Korea’s state-run press was perhaps the most critical of the shoot-down. For example, Pyongyang’s Rodong Sinmun, the newspaper of the Central Committee of the Workers Party of Korea, claimed that the American government ordered the satellite’s destruction in order to prevent adversaries from capturing its secrets and to prove “that the missile defense system it has been frantically accelerating up to now can really work.” The commentary added that the timing of the test, little over a week after China and Russia submitted their joint treaty, “cannot but be an open challenge, a provocation to the international effort to prevent a space arms race.” The author concluded that, since these two countries would invariably respond to the American act: “The United States has lit the fuse of a new space arms race by the satellite interception.” He also complained about “an unfair double standard for the United States to desperately challenge our legitimate missile launches while doing all manner of things itself.”[52] The North Korean government-run KCNA news agency similarly argued that, “In reality, the objective that the United States is pursuing through the interception of the reconnaissance satellite is nothing more than the one to contain China, Russia, and other countries and to gain military hegemony in space through the revival of the 1980s plan for ‘Star Wars’.”[53]

India
The Indian press’s coverage of the affair was perhaps the most diverse. After citing the various interpretations for the satellite interception, as offered by American and other foreign experts and governments, commentators then debated which ones were most important and how, if at all, the consequences of the shoot-down would affect Indian security.[54] For example, the Times of India ran an editorial endorsing the test as “a necessary step” to prevent “the disastrous consequences if the satellite had indeed fallen upon earth” and killed someone or released its toxic fuel. The paper dismissed Chinese objections as hypocritical given Beijing’s January 2007 ASAT test, noting that the American test generated far less debris. In addition, the editorial stressed that “shooting down a satellite on a predictable path is not the same as shooting down a missile, which would employ countermeasures and decoys. Conspiracy theories always sound attractive, but let’s sober up.”[55]

At the same time, the Times ran a “Counter View” by Tara Gupta, who argued that the United States was exploiting the occasion to “[flex] muscles in space.” The author argued that, since the satellite would have likely burned up upon reentry, “There was no reason, therefore, for the Pentagon to plan such an elaborate and complex mission, unless the exercise was motivated less by safety and more by politics.” In her assessment, “The crippled spy satellite offered Washington an opportunity to disguise a political statement, probably intended to ruffle Chinese and Russian feathers, as an exercise in safety.” Given that the Chinese ASAT purportedly alarmed U.S. policy makers about the security of their own satellites, she reasoned that the tumbling satellite “served as a chance to demonstrate to both China and Russia that America has the wherewithal to shoot down their missiles, if it needs to.” Nevertheless, Gupta concluded that “the U.S. has gone a step too far in attempting to militarize outer space.”[56]

Conclusion
Although the international community largely dismissed the official U.S. explanation that safety considerations required the satellite’s shoot-down, most of the open criticism was expressed by various media commentators rather than foreign governments. Even in the case of China and Russia, the American action did not induce an immediate change in either government’s policies. As in previous years, both nations continued to advocate additional arms control measures aimed at curbing the militarization of space, which again have met American objections on the basis that additional formal treaties and related steps in this area are unenforceable, unverifiable, and unnecessary. Nevertheless, analysts speculate that the recent U.S. satellite shoot-down will only increase global interest in acquiring ASAT capabilities. Theresa Hitchens, the Director of the Washington-based Center for Defense Information, was typical in observing that, “I don’t see how other nations don’t see this as an anti-satellite test. They’ll see it as the weaponization of space.”[57]

It is possible that, since no one had doubted that the United States possessed the capabilities to destroy a satellite (the U.S. military had accomplished this feat decades ago), foreign governments did not perceive the interception as marking a radical change in global power balances. Another reason for the international community’s generally restrained reaction to the U.S. interception might be its awareness of the Bush administration’s well-known commitment to missile defense and its opposition to space arms control. Those governments now opposing missile defense and supporting additional arms control measures were possibly thinking beyond the actions of the current U.S. government and concluding that the new administration that would assume office in under a year might pursue different policies.

Richard Weitz – Hudson Institute