Apparently applying the motto that the best defense is a good offense, Iran is seeking to deflect international pressure to halt its uranium enrichment program by pressing complaints about U.S. and Western behavior with respect to chemical weapons. Recent articles from official Iranian sources suggest that at the Second Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), to be held on April 7-18 in The Hague, Iran will argue that the United States and its allies have failed to comply with their CWC obligations.

The CWC outlaws the development, production, stockpiling, transfer, and use of chemical weapons. It entered into force on April 29, 1997, and currently has 183 parties. [1] The treaty is implemented by a dedicated international organization, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), headquartered in The Hague. At the upcoming Second Review Conference, member states are expected to discuss the implications for the CWC of advances in chemical science and technology, the monitoring of chemical industry facilities that could be diverted to chemical weapons production, and the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles, among other topics. [2]

In the year leading up to the Second Review Conference, Iran has repeatedly criticized the UN Security Council for failing to sanction Iraq for its use of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88), while contrasting that failure with the Security Council’s issuance of multiple resolutions condemning Iran’s uranium enrichment program. Tehran has also condemned the West’s past assistance to Saddam Hussein’s chemical weapons program and the slow pace of Washington’s ongoing effort to destroy the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile.

Saddam, Sanctions, and the Security Council
On May 9, 2007, the Iranian Mehr news agency reported on the International Seminar on the Consequences of Chemical Weapons Attacks against Iran, which was held in Tehran to mark the tenth anniversary of the CWC and to honor the Iranian soldiers and civilians who were killed and injured by Iraqi chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War. Iranian sources estimate that today, two decades after the war, between 50,000 and 60,000 Iranians suffer from chronic physical ailments and psychological trauma caused by chemical attacks. [3] (See box below)

Several of the statements from the seminar, as reported by the Iranian news agency, had decidedly political overtones. The Iranian Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee Chairman, Ala’eddin Borujerdi, lamented that “the international community turned a blind eye to the crimes of the Saddam Hussein regime and its supporters and even refused to issue any resolution [regarding Iraq’s use of chemical weapons].” [4] This criticism came in the midst of U.S. allegations that Iran was continuing to conceal nuclear weapons ambitions, a claim Tehran vehemently denies, and just months after the United Nations and the European Union imposed sanctions on Iran for refusing to halt its uranium enrichment program. (See related story in this issue of WMD Insights.)

Since the Tehran seminar, both the United States and the United Nations have adopted additional sanctions against Iran. On March 3, 2008, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1803, extending the sanctions imposed by two prior resolutions. Iran’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Mohammad Khaza’i, characterized the sanctions as hypocritical when compared to the Security Council’s failure to respond to Saddam Hussein’s large-scale use of chemical weapons. [5] Since Western nations have no way to rectify their inaction of two decades ago, Iran will likely continue to draw attention to the Security Council’s perceived bias as long as the confrontation over the Iranian nuclear program continues.

Western Complicity and the Australia Group
Iranian officials have reinforced their charges of Western hypocrisy with allegations of complicity in Saddam Hussein’s chemical weapons program. It is true that during the Iran-Iraq War, companies in Western countries sold Iraq the ingredients and equipment needed to produce chemical weapons. For instance, Alcolac International, a U.S. company then based in Baltimore, Maryland, pleaded guilty to illicit sales of the mustard-gas precursor thiodiglycol to Iraq during the 1980s. [6] On October 22, 2007, Iranian Foreign Minister Manuchehr Mottaki called on the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to indict the suppliers of chemical weapons precursors and equipment to Saddam Hussein’s regime: “Tehran requests the ICJ to take legal action against 400 companies which were involved in supplying Saddam regime [sic] with chemical weapons in 1980s [sic].” [7]

Iran has consistently refused to recognize that the West did take belated action to restrict illicit sales of chemical weapons precursors to Iraq through the creation of the Australia Group (AG). Formed in 1985, the AG is an informal forum of like-minded exporting countries that meet annually to harmonize their national export controls on chemical weapons-related materials and equipment. [8] Initially consisting of 15 countries and the European Commission, the AG today has 40 members. [9] During the mid-1980s, the AG sought to prevent both Iran and Iraq from importing chemical weapons precursors, and the restrictions on Iran continue to this day. The managing editor of the Iranian daily Kayhan, Hoseyn Shari’atmadari, who is also the representative of Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i, complained in 2003 that the AG has “prevented the Islamic Republic of Iran from exercising its right” under the CWC to “free commercial transactions of chemical compounds” by “[issuing] a resolution every year accusing Iran of seeking to acquire, or even manufacture, chemical weapons.” [10]

Deadlines and Double Standards
While the UN Security Council continues to express suspicion that the intent behind Iran’s uranium enrichment program is at odds with the country’s obligations under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran has countered by criticizing potential U.S. noncompliance with the CWC. The treaty initially called for the destruction of all declared chemical weapons stockpiles by April 29, 2007. At the 11th Conference of the States Parties in December of 2006, the United States asked for, and received, the maximum allowable extension of this deadline - five years. [11] Because of technical and political problems with the U.S. chemical demilitarization program, however, Washington is nearly certain to miss the extended destruction deadline of April 29, 2012. In April 2006, then Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld estimated that the United States would have destroyed only two-thirds of its chemical weapons stockpile by the extended deadline. [12]

On September 29, 2007, Iranian Foreign Minister Mottaki implicitly accused the United States of deliberate noncompliance with the CWC for its likely failure to meet the 2012 deadline: “As long as countries that have arsenals of chemical weapons . . . refuse to destroy these weapons and, through negligence and non-observance of the [stipulated] timetables [for their destruction], continue to have chemical weapons at their disposal, the threat to peace and international security will continue to exist.” [13] Mottaki later claimed that “the U.S. does not believe in annihilation of chemical weapons since it possesses the biggest arsenals of weapons of mass destruction, chemical and nuclear weapons.” [14]

Mottaki’s claim may be accepted by those who do not follow these matters closely, but the Russian Federation actually possesses the largest stockpiles of chemical and nuclear weapons. [15] Furthermore, although Russia claims it will eliminate its chemical weapons stockpile by April 2012, experts believe it will not do so until 2027. [16] However, Russia has been less critical of Iran than the United States and more reluctant, although ultimately willing, to support the Security Council resolutions regarding Iran’s nuclear program. [17] This difference may explain Iran’s criticism of U.S. implementation of the CWC and its silence regarding Russia.

Despite Iran’s claim that the delays in the U.S. destruction effort are deliberate, the evidence indicates that Washington has worked diligently to destroy its chemical arsenal, but that delays caused by state laws and research into safe disposal methods have slowed the program’s pace. In August 2007, OPCW Director-General Rogelio Pfirter stated that the United States had already spent $20 billion on the destruction of chemical weapons. [18] Three months later, on November 5, 2007, U.S. Ambassador Eric M. Javits reported to the 12th Conference of States Parties that the U.S. had “completed destruction of 45 percent of [its] stockpile six months ahead of the revised schedule.” [19] Since then, however, delays in building the last two chemical weapons destruction facilities at Pueblo, Colorado, and Bluegrass, Kentucky, have set back the program several years. In response to estimates that the United States would not complete destruction until 2023, Congress asked the Pentagon in 2008 to finish the job by 2017. [20] If (as appears likely) the United States does miss the 2012 deadline, the evidence indicates that this will be the result of technical problems and domestic politics, not willful disregard.

Conclusion
Iran has taken advantage of many opportunities over the past year to criticize the West’s shortcomings with regard to chemical arms control. Iran’s apparent strategy has been to deflect international criticism of its uranium enrichment program and suspected nuclear weapon ambitions by arguing that the United States is far from a model citizen with respect to its own compliance with the CWC destruction deadline. Iranian officials have also accused the United States and other Western countries of hypocrisy because of their complicity in Iraq’s chemical warfare program during the Iran-Iraq War and their failure to sanction Baghdad for its flagrant violations of the Geneva Protocol. If Iran’s previous statements are any indication, Tehran will almost certainly utilize the Second Review Conference of the CWC to reinforce this message.

Ben Radford - James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies