On January 15, 2008, the Associated Press announced that France and the United Arab
Emirates (UAE) had signed an agreement that establishes a framework for the construction of two nuclear reactors in the UAE. [1] The announcement follows a series of similar tentative agreements between France and other Arab states pledging nuclear cooperation, which have been signed since Nicolas Sarkozy assumed the French presidency in May 2007. In response to France’s newest agreement, many experts and politicians, including International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Mohamed ElBaradei, have issued statements warning that France’s aggressive efforts to provide nuclear technology may pose proliferation risks.

Background: Nuclear Technology in North Africa
The first nations that President Sarkozy approached in France’s bid to extend nuclear cooperation were in North Africa, a region in which France has historically played a significant role. Sarkozy has claimed that the nuclear energy agreements play a part in thwarting “terrorism and extremism.” [2]

Libya
The first and most controversial French offer of nuclear cooperation came during a state visit by Sarkozy to Tripoli in July 2007. During the visit, Sarkozy and Libyan leader Moammar Qaddafi signed a statement of intent to provide a French nuclear reactor to Libya for water desalination. In light of Libya’s 2003 confession that it had previously (and unsuccessfully) sought to acquire nuclear weapons, critics took exception to the agreement as an unnecessary proliferation risk. [3] (For an analysis of France’s nuclear deal with Libya, see “Franco-Libyan Nuclear Protocol Triggers Controversy,” WMD Insights, September 2007.) In December 2007, France and Libya followed the original memorandum of understanding in Tripoli with an accord signed in Paris outlining the sale of “one or more reactors” to Libya. [4] During the December meeting between Sarkozy and Qaddafi, French sources reported that the two discussed the possibility of “a complete nuclear system,” presumably a reference to France’s plans to provide fuel for the facility, not to offer Qadaffi the technology for enriching uranium or separating plutonium from spent reactor fuel, either of which could be used to produce material for nuclear weapons. [5]

Morocco
Undeterred by the criticism regarding France’s July nuclear agreement with Libya, in October 2007 Sarkozy traveled to Morocco to pitch a similar arrangement. During his visit, Sarkozy declared, “I would like Morocco to opt for French nuclear technology….France will be your partner, France is making this political choice and will support you on this path.” [6] Although discussions of the proposed project are ongoing, at the October meeting, France and Morocco reached a preliminary accord on nuclear cooperation, possibly including a nuclear desalination project. [7] Furthermore, during the same visit, Morocco and French nuclear energy conglomerate Areva agreed to launch a feasibility study for the construction of a complex in Morocco to mine and purify uranium from phosphates. [8]

Algeria
In December 2007, Sarkozy visited Algeria and signed an agreement on “the use and development of nuclear energy for peaceful ends.” [9] According to Egyptian sources, the deal focuses on the peaceful use of nuclear energy, technology transfer in the fields of research, electricity production, and the use of nuclear technology in agriculture, water desalination, and uranium exploration and exploitation. [10]

Nuclear Technology in the Middle East
Following the series of preliminary agreements reached with North African nations, France began to extend nuclear cooperation to nations in the Middle East. Anticipating a possible backlash, Sarkozy defended cooperation on civilian nuclear technology, arguing that “[t]he sharing of civilian nuclear [technology] will be one of the foundations of a pact of confidence which the West must forge with the Islamic world.” [11] In the Gulf, oil-exporting countries are concerned about developing their post-oil economies and, perhaps no less important, about developing a civilian nuclear infrastructure as a possible counter to Iran’s nuclear advances, which include pursuit of sensitive uranium enrichment and plutonium production capabilities. From the French perspective, the Gulf countries’ interest in nuclear power presents lucrative export opportunities for France’s nuclear giant, Areva. Although France has approached several Middle Eastern nations about the possibility of nuclear cooperation, the most receptive thus far has been the UAE.

United Arab Emirates
In January 2008, the Emirates News Agency announced that France and the UAE had signed a protocol to develop nuclear power. [12] According to this agreement, the UAE and France will form a joint commission to oversee their cooperation in the fields of power generation, desalination, research, agriculture, medicine, and industry. [13] Press reports stated that a consortium of three French companies, Areva, Suez, and Total, announced that they would collaborate to supply the UAE with two European Pressurized Water Reactors (EPR) for energy production and water desalination; however, on its website, Total stated that no proposal had been discussed with or approved by the UAE. [14]

According to Areva, these third-generation pressurized water reactors have a capacity of 1,600 megawatts and are designed for a 60-year service life. [15] For fuel, the EPR can use either slightly enriched uranium at five percent or mixed plutonium-uranium oxide (MOX) fuel. [16] While Areva has claimed the EPR to be “robust” against external attacks and “capable of withstanding…an aircraft crash,” the production and sale of the reactor have still raised security concerns. [17] In addition, some nuclear experts have cited long-term nonproliferation concerns, warning that France’s supplying plutonium-bearing MOX fuel would provide a source of weapons-usable nuclear material that might some day be misused for military purposes. An Areva spokesman, however, defended the MOX fuel aspect of the reactor design, arguing that the reactors would allow France to recycle potentially hazardous spent fuel, as well as excess stocks of plutonium. [18] In the end, critics of the EPR have agreed that the reactor is slightly safer and more secure than previous Areva reactor designs, but its design remains insufficient to quell many of their security concerns. [19]

Another unknown aspect of the proposed UAE agreement will be how it affects pan-Arab pursuit of peaceful nuclear technology. The UAE is a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), a regional bloc of Persian Gulf nations, which has recently decided to pursue peaceful nuclear technology. In addition to the UAE, GCC members are Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman. (For a history of the GCC’s pursuit of nuclear technology, see “Gulf Cooperation Council Moves Forward with Nuclear Energy Plans,” WMD Insights, April 2007.) The decision by the UAE to pursue a separate bilateral agreement with France has raised doubts about the UAE’s commitment to the GCC joint nuclear project and how the two separate programs may be harmonized.

To dispel any doubts regarding the UAE’s commitment to the joint GCC nuclear program, UAE foreign affairs minister, Sheikh Abdellah Ben Zayed Al Nahyan, stated that the bilateral nuclear agreement with France does not annul nuclear agreements that the UAE has signed with other GCC countries. [20] Furthermore, outside sources have speculated that the bilateral deal will be shelved pending GCC actions and that the agreement is merely intended to generate offers from other potential suppliers of civilian nuclear technology. [21] However, in March 2008, the UAE cabinet approved the French nuclear agreement, leading sources to speculate that not only will the UAE follow through, but that the two reactors could be operational by 2016. [22] The UAE’s willingness to contract for French nuclear technology may reflect its impatience with the GCC’s progress on its nuclear plans. [23]

Notably, the agreements between France and the UAE went beyond nuclear technology. During the same visit, France signed an agreement with the UAE to establish a permanent military base in the emirate of Abu Dhabi. According to Jacques Mazars, the French Admiral who conducted the military base negotiations, “The base, which will be operational next year, will host between 400 and 500 soldiers from the different French armed services.” [24] With this agreement, France will become the second state besides the United States with a permanent military installation in the Middle East. The new base will put French forces within reach of the strategic Hormuz Strait, through which 40 percent of the world’s oil transits. [25]

Other Middle Estern States
Sarkozy has also attempted to extend civilian nuclear cooperation to Egypt, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. In January 2008, the French press noted that France is willing to cooperate with Egypt in the development of its nuclear program. [26] This offer coincided with Egypt’s preparing to launch an international request for bids for the construction of a nuclear reactor in the region of Dabaa close to the city of Alexandria. [27] On January 7, Al Jazeera announced that France had signed a civilian nuclear cooperation protocol with Qatar. [28] Similarly, on January 13 during a visit to Saudi Arabia, President Sarkozy offered Saudi officials the opportunity to explore “a possible civilian nuclear energy program.” [29] No agreement between France and Saudi Arabia was reached during the visit, although the French press has speculated that deals may be reached “in the weeks and months ahead.” [30]

International Reaction
France’s recent determination to extend cooperation on civilian nuclear technology to states in the Middle East has not been free from criticism. In early March 2008, IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei, for example, expressed concern that France was moving “too fast” in its agreements to provide nuclear technology to states in the Middle East. [31] In Germany, Environmental Minister Sigmar Gabriel was among those who have expressed their opposition to France’s nuclear deals. In addition to criticizing France for exporting nuclear technology to states with poor records on human rights and democracy, Gabriel foresaw consequences for nonproliferation efforts: “Anyone who praises nuclear energy as a panacea to energy policy issues should not be surprised if there is a growing danger of the proliferation of atomic weapons.” [32]

In response to criticism, French officials were quick to declare that signing nuclear cooperation agreements with a number of Arab states does not necessarily mean supplying nuclear reactors to these countries. [33] In addition, the same sources added that those nuclear programs are long-term projects spanning over 20 years and requiring extensive investment in the turnkey plants, as well as in the human resources – the skilled technicians and experts needed to operate nuclear installations. [34]

Perhaps to appease some of the critics of the nuclear deals, on March 23, 2008, the UAE Cabinet approved a policy statement on a peaceful nuclear energy program that set out several nonproliferation measures. According to the new policy, the UAE will invest approximately $100 million to implement the IAEA’s recommendation that it establish a Nuclear Energy Implementation Organization. [35] The UAE policy also states that the country is committed to “complete operational transparency” and the highest nonproliferation and safety standards. According to a Gulfnews article, the policy provides that the UAE “will ratify additional non-proliferation instruments, including the IAEA Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement and the IAEA Amendment to the Convention on Physical Protection. It will also ratify international nuclear safety instruments, including the IAEA Convention on Nuclear Safety and the IAEA Joint Convention on Safety of Spent Fuel management….”[36] The UAE Cabinet also confirmed that the country does not plan to develop a uranium enrichment program, as Iran has, and it supports international nuclear fuel bank efforts.

Uncertain Future
All of the agreements France has signed to provide nuclear technology to states in North Africa and the Middle East are preliminary. While the bilateral deals establish a framework for future transfers of civilian nuclear technology, they do not guarantee that any such transfers will take place. In fact, there has been widespread speculation that the nuclear technology promised within the bilateral agreements could not be provided due to logistical constraints. Some analysts have cited Areva’s difficulties in constructing a third-generation EPR for Finland, where costs have greatly exceeded expectations, and the rising costs of nuclear reactors, more generally, as potential obstacles to exporting French nuclear technology into the Middle East and North Africa. [37] Others have pointed to the limitations of France’s nuclear workforce. According to reports, the aging of this workforce, combined with a lack of enthusiasm for the nuclear sector on the part of young engineers, threatens to produce worker shortages and become “a slowdown factor for the French nuclear” program. [38] Thus, it is difficult to ascertain not only when, but whether, France’s recent bilateral agreements will result in concrete steps toward providing civilian nuclear technology.

Conclusion
As was the case following France’s preliminary agreement with Libya, the recent wave of bilateral agreements on nuclear technology between France and other states in North Africa and the Middle East has sparked criticism from a number of European states and nonproliferation experts. With questions regarding Iran’s nuclear program continuing to remain unsettled, many have been hesitant to embrace the trade of civilian nuclear technology to a region with a history of proliferation. However, this concern has been tempered somewhat by the lack of indigenous enrichment or plutonium separation facilities in all of the nations approached by France. [39] Moreover, all potential buyers involved are members of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), although only Libya has ratified an Additional Protocol with the IAEA, giving the Agency broader inspection powers. The UAE has committed to ratifying an Additional Protocol, but has yet to implement that pledge. Eqypt, moreover, has declared it will not do so. [40] Given the remaining questions surrounding these possible deals, it is far from clear how France will ultimately balance its economic and political objectives with nonproliferation concerns, as it moves forward with its plans for to provide nuclear technology throughout the Middle East and North Africa.

Khalid Hilal – Consultant and Adam P. Williams – Monterey Institute James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies