On Sunday, April 20, 2008, an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) belonging to the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) was shot down while performing a reconnaissance mission over Georgia’s breakaway region of Abkhazia. Initially the Georgian government denied the incident, but on Monday, April 21, the MIA released video footage taken by the UAV camera moments before it was downed by what appeared to be an air-to-air missile fired by a jet fighter. [1] Tbilisi seized the opportunity to accuse Moscow of violating Georgian airspace and destroying its drone, while the Russian Air Force dismissed the accusations and insisted that the UAV was downed by the Abkhaz Air Force. [2] As tensions surrounding the incident mounted, the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) assembled an expert Fact-Finding Team (FFT) to conduct a thorough investigation.

On Monday, May 26, the UNOMIG issued the FFT’s findings, which were based on witness accounts, analysis of the video footage and radar records provided by the Georgian side, and an examination of debris collected at the crash site by Abkhaz separatists. According to the UNOMIG report, the fighter jet responsible for downing the Georgian UAV was either a MiG-29 “Fulcrum” or a Su-27 “Flanker,” while the air-to-air missile that was used was an AA-11 Archer (Russian military designation: Vympel R-73). [3] Furthermore, the flight pattern recorded by the Georgian radars showed that after successfully engaging the UAV, the fighter jet headed north toward the Russian Federation. The FFT concluded, therefore, that “the aircraft belonged to the Russian air force.” [4] The FFT members were able to identify the downed UAV as a Hermes 450, which was corroborated by statements of Abkhaz officials, who added that it was produced by the Israeli company Elbit Systems in 2006. [5]

Both Georgia and Russia violated the 1994 Moscow Agreement on Ceasefire and Separation of Forces, which calls for all sides to “scrupulously observe the ceasefire on land, at sea and in the air and…refrain from all military actions against each other.” [6] The UNOMIG informed the Georgian government that because the UAV’s reconnaissance mission constituted a military action, Tbilisi had violated the terms of the ceasefire agreement. At the same time, UNOMIG categorized the violation of Georgian airspace by the Russian fighter as “fundamentally inconsistent” with the ceasefire agreement and warned Moscow that “aside from possible considerations under international law” such unilateral enforcement action “undercuts the ceasefire and separation of forces regime.” [7]

In April of this year, the Georgian government publicly acknowledged that it had UAVs in its inventory. Prior to that, in November 2007, then Minister of Foreign Affairs Gela Bezhuashvili told the Jamestown Foundation that Georgia had acquired some Israeli-made UAVs, but President Mikheil Saakashvili refused to provide additional details. [8] On April 21, 2008, in a phone interview with New York Times journalist C.J.Chivers, President Saakashvili revealed that Georgia had a fleet of 40 reconnaissance drones that had been purchased from Israel. The UAVs, which President Saakashvili described as “a very handy thing in a mountainous country,” are distributed between the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Ministry of Defense. [9] It appears that the Georgian government continues to view the use of UAVs for reconnaissance missions over Abkhazia as a closely guarded secret. This explains why Georgia still denies two similar incidents (on March 18 and May 12, 2008 and both involving Hermes 450 UAV) that have been investigated and confirmed by the UNOMIG. It should be noted that the Abkhaz side also reported sixteen Georgian UAV overflights to UNOMIG since August of last year. [10]

The acquisition of Israeli UAVs by Georgia, which could have been accomplished with the assistance of the private Israeli advisors retained by the Georgian government, has also produced interest from Georgia’s neighbor Azerbaijan. In early June the Azeri news media reported that the Ministry of Defense of Azerbaijan intended to purchase 10 Hermes 450 UAVs from the Israeli company Silver Arrow (a subsidiary of Elbit Systems). In late June the Azerbaijani MOD was reportedly negotiating the lease of two UAVs from its Georgian counterpart, which it plans to use to conduct reconnaissance of territories occupied by Armenian forces. [11] Thus, the introduction of UAVs to Azerbaijan may now foreshadow escalation of tensions over the Armenian-occupied areas as well as the breakaway Nagorny-Karabakh region.

These examples demonstrate that UAVs are gradually becoming integral components of national militaries in countries that have never before had such technology. According to a 2002 analytical report produced by the Second Central Scientific-Research Institute of the Russian Ministry of Defense, as of early 2001, 53 companies from 13 countries were developing and manufacturing 143 types of UAVs. [12] By 2006, an open source survey of foreign UAVs by the National Intelligence Council’s Scientific and Technical Intelligence Committee (STIC) concluded that 33 countries were developing and manufacturing UAVs. Of these, Israel, China and France accounted for 78 of the 195 UAV systems in production. Apart from UAV-producing nations, 41 countries are known to operate UAVs. Furthermore, the STIC estimated that about 90 percent of expenditures on UAVs worldwide go to military programs, while approximately 90 to 95 percent of existing UAV models are designed for military applications, including intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR). [13]

The rapid spread of UAV technology raises proliferation concerns because UAVs can be used for delivery of non-conventional payloads, including chemical, biological, radioactive and nuclear materials by states as well as international terrorist organizations. The multilateral export control regimes, such as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Wassenaar Arrangement, are supposed to control the global transfers of UAV technology and know-how. Key UAV manufacturing countries, including Israel, Pakistan and China, are members of neither regime. Even among the states participating in or adhering to the norms of the multilateral export control regimes, constant technological advances make some crucial components of UAV systems such as global positioning systems or lightweight engines widely available. This significantly complicates the task of end-user verification in myriads of commercial transactions. As the U.S. Government Accountability Office reported in 2004, “Government officials in France, Italy, and the United Kingdom stated that their respective governments generally do not verify conditions on cruise missile and UAV transfers and conduct few PSV [post-shipment verification] visits of such exports.” [14]

Of particular proliferation concern is the Iranian UAV program given Tehran’s track record in
supplying UAVs and related know-how and technology to Hezbollah in Lebanon. (For details, see the October 2006 issue of WMD Insights.) [15] It should be recalled here that Hezbollah unsuccessfully deployed four Iranian-supplied Ababil UAVs (Hezbollah designation Mirsad-1) during the 2006 conflict with Israel. [16] The Iranian UAV program dates back to the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988, when Tehran used its nascent UAV capabilities to offset the superiority of the Iraqi Air Force. At present, the Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Company (known under its Farsi abbreviation as HESA) and Qods Aviation Industries – located in Shahin Shahr and Tehran respectively – are Iran’s main UAV manufacturing enterprises. [17] While HESA specializes in the production of the Ababil series of UAVs, Qods Aviation Industries manufactures a wider range, including the Talash, Sa’eqeh, and Mohajer series. [18] The technical characteristics of these UAVs vary and their functions differ from reconnaissance and surveillance (Ababil, Mohajer) to training (Talash) and target practice (Sa’eqeh). [19] In June 2008, Venezuela reportedly acquired a dozen Ababil and Mohajer UAVs from Iran under the provisions of the Venezuelan-Iranian agreement on military-technical cooperation signed in 2007. Reportedly, Caracas intends to use the Iranian UAVs for reconnaissance, border surveillance, and environmental control missions. [20]

Considering the bewildering variety of existing UAV models – between 250 and 300 – and their corresponding performance characteristics, the STIC report provides a useful methodology for categorizing threats posed by UAVs. The STIC threat assessment matrix is comprised of basic UAV performance characteristics presented against specific threat areas. The UAV performance characteristics include stealth, range, payload, speed, maneuverability, autonomy, operating altitude, launch and recovery options. The threat areas consist of electronic warfare, psychological operations, logistics support, direct attack, ordnance delivery, decoy, ISTAR, communications relay, and nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) dispersal. [21]

From the proliferation perspective, the most alarming of these threat areas are the NBC dispersal and ordnance delivery capabilities. For instance, Yamaha’s Rmax UAV helicopter has been used for crop dusting in rural areas of Japan since the early 1980s; after conversion it can probably be used for airborne dispersal of pathogenic microorganisms or toxic chemical agents. However, success in delivering a chemical or biological weapon using a UAV is far from certain because, apart from the dispersal itself, the quality of the CBW payload, atmospheric conditions, and terrain are important factors influencing the outcome. It is also possible to envision a number of scenarios in which a UAV could deliver a radiological dispersal device (RDD) or spread radioactive materials in powder form in densely populated urban areas. Finally, any UAV with sufficient payload capacity could be loaded with conventional explosives for direct delivery to a selected target. Upon homing in on a target, an explosive-laden UAV could then either carry out a one-way kamikaze mission or drop off its deadly delivery. Targets could include, for example, toxic chemical production plants or other CBRN-related facilities or critical infrastructure components more generally.

The STIC study identifies autonomy and anonymity as two UAV qualities that pose the greatest threat. [22] Autonomy is afforded by the fact that the majority of modern UAVs can be preprogrammed; once launched they can carry out a mission independently from an operator at a ground control station. Anonymity flows from this autonomy because, if a UAV is intercepted or shot down, it is very difficult to trace it to its original point of departure. This is especially crucial when contemplating the potential use of UAVs as WMD delivery vehicles because it allows for highly plausible deniability.

Conclusions
Existing multilateral export control regimes are lagging behind the technological advances in UAV technology while the interest in acquisition of UAV know-how is growing exponentially worldwide. The relentless pace of breakthroughs in communications, computer software, sensors, lightweight composite materials, data links, and component miniaturization makes efforts to control the commercial flow of these items extremely problematic. The STIC report concludes that “reducing the potential threat of UASs [unmanned aircraft systems] must be met by means other than imposition of technology controls, such as those contained under the Missile Technology Control Regime.” [23] Although formally thought to adhere to the MTCR principles, Israel, the undisputed leader in UAV development, remains outside the regime and continues to sell sophisticated UAV platforms around the world. One indication of widespread commercial availability of UAVs is the fact that even Georgia, which is by no means a rich country, can now afford them.

The global diffusion of UAV technology will only continue, raising two important implications. First, the introduction of UAV technology could become a potentially destabilizing factor in situations in which fragile or weak states are locked in territorial disputes over contended regions with separatist ethnic minorities, neighboring countries, or both. The UAV incident in Georgia suggests that the possession of UAV technology puts one side in the conflict at a distinct advantage as it enables conduct of ISTAR or other missions, thereby upsetting the established military balance (however precarious this balance may be).

Second, international terrorist organizations could acquire UAVs to carry out attacks. That rogue states can and will provide UAVs to non-state actors is evident from Iran’s transfers of UAVs and related know-how to Hezbollah before, during, and after the 2006 war against Israel in Lebanon. The very qualities of UAVs that make them indispensable in pursuit of the war on terror – such as in the tribal areas of Pakistan – will also enhance terrorist capabilities if they master this technology. Even if terrorist efforts to use UAVs for delivery of non-conventional payloads fail, they could still have a deep psychological impact, which will be magnified by the 24-hour news cycle. Thus, the growing availability of UAVs could pose a considerable asymmetrical threat to the United States and its friends and allies in years to come.

Alexander Melikishvili – Monterey Institute James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies