At their April 5-6, 2008 Sochi summit meeting, then-Russian President Vladimir Putin and U.S. President George W. Bush appeared to have reached an understanding that their governments would agree to disagree about U.S. plans to deploy ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems in Poland and the Czech Republic by 2013. Even before the August 2008 Georgia War, it was evident that Russian and U.S. officials continued to differ sharply over a global missile defense architecture. The war, however, promoted growing East European acceptance of the desirability of the proposed BMD deployments, despite continuing Russian protests, threats, and diplomatic initiatives.

The Sochi Statements
During their joint press conference at the Sochi summit’s conclusion, Putin declared for the first time that Washington’s reassurances could help decrease Russian anxieties about the proposed U.S. BMD systems. “We have been offered a set of confidence-building and transparency measures in the field of missile defense, and we can feel that the President of the United States takes a very serious approach here and is sincerely willing to resolve this problem,” Putin observed, “We do support this approach, and certainly, in principle, adequate measures of confidence-building and transparency can be found.” [1] The U.S.-Russia Strategic Framework Declaration issued by Bush and Putin at Sochi repeated this balanced language: “The Russian side has made clear that it does not agree with the decision to establish sites in Poland and the Czech Republic and reiterated its proposed alternative. Yet, it appreciates the measures that the U.S. has proposed and declared that if agreed and implemented such measures will be important and useful in assuaging Russian concerns.” [2]

In the months before the summit, U.S. and Russian officials discussed a number of U.S. proposals to mitigate Moscow’s security concerns about the proposed “third site” of the ground-based mid-course defense (GMD) element of the U.S. global missile defense network (in addition to sites in Alaska and California). In particular, U.S. officials offered a series of confidence-building measures that would increase the ability of the Russian government to monitor the operations of the facilities.

According to Russian and U.S. sources, Washington proposed that, with the approval of the Czech and Polish governments, Russian personnel could inspect operations at the bases. In addition, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said that the United States would not “operationalize the sites until we had had flight testing from Iran that showed a capability to threaten Europe.” [3] U.S. officials also indicated they would negotiate limits on Washington’s missile deployments at the sites to overcome Moscow’s worries about “a breakout” during which the United States might vastly increase its BMD systems near Russia. [4] U.S. negotiators also reviewed possible constraints on the capabilities and operation of the BMD systems to reduce the possible threat they could pose to Russia’s strategic nuclear missiles. National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley told reporters that the two countries were seeking concrete measures “to reassure Russia that the radar and missile installation that is planned in Poland and the Czech Republic… [is] not aimed at Russia.” [5]

Post-Sochi Uncertainties
During his Sochi press conference with Bush, Putin cautioned that reaching an agreement would require extensive expert-level discussions to transform the proffered assurances into concrete security measures. Though professing “cautious optimism” about eventually reaching an agreement over European BMD, Putin added, “the devil is in the details.” [6]

Putin’s warning was on target. Russian officials subsequently complained that their U.S. counterparts were backtracking on previous offers. On September 11, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov claimed, “We are still awaiting concrete proposals from our U.S. colleagues.” [7] For their part, some U.S. policy makers concluded that Russian negotiators were simply biding time until the Bush administration left office. Other observers have interpreted Russian opposition as an attempt to exploit differences between the United States and its European allies over missile defense issues. [8]

The issue of what role Moscow should have in deciding whether Iran is capable of threatening Europe with missile attacks, which would justify activating the missile interceptors in Poland, proved exceptionally difficult. Another sticking point was Moscow’s insistence that Russian personnel be allowed a permanent monitoring presence at any BMD facilities in Poland and the Czech Republic, a position rejected by Polish and Czech leaders. Instead, the Poles and Czechs offered to consider granting Russian monitors temporary access to the BMD facilities on their territory, but only on a reciprocal basis. [9] At the end of September, the Russian Foreign Ministry formally ruled out giving either country’s representatives access to Russian defense sites, even for short-term inspections. [10] Finally, it has proven difficult to specify how Washington might overcome Russian fears about a BMD breakout. Russian leaders have expressed concerns about what they see as the uncertain scale of possible U.S. BMD deployments, alluding to media and other reports that U.S. officials are considering BMD sites in Lithuania, Ukraine, and various Asian localities. [11]

The Polish Reversal
The United States formally opened negotiations with Poland and the Czech Republic about the proposed BMD deployments in early 2007. On July 8, 2008, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Czech Foreign Minister Karel Schwarzenberg signed a bilateral accord on establishing a U.S. BMD radar site in the Czech Republic. According to the agreement, which has yet to be ratified by the Czech parliament, the United States will pay all costs for constructing, operating, and maintaining the base, which will be situated in the country’s Brdy Military Area. In addition, though the Czech government will retain full sovereignty over the facility, up to 250 U.S. personnel will be stationed at the site and have exclusive control of its operation. Nevertheless, the United States must promptly inform the Czech government of any “engagements” involving the radar. The Czech Republic will station a small liaison team on base and must approve the presence of all third-country nationals (e.g., any possible Russian on-site inspectors). Both militaries will provide for the facility’s physical security. [12]

On September 19, Defense Secretary Gates and Czech Defense Minister Vlasta Parkanova signed a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) for U.S. military personnel at the BMD radar station, which the Czech parliament must ratify before it can be signed by Czech President Vaclav Klaus. [13] Polls show the proposal remains unpopular, with considerable public and parliamentary opposition. [14] However, Czech leaders have cited the Russian attack on Georgia to support the deployment. “Russian tanks on the streets of Georgian towns remind us…of the invasion of 1968,” Prime Minister Mirek Topolanek wrote in the largest Czech newspaper. “It is still, even now, a relevant question whether we will or will not belong to the sphere of Russian influence.” [15]

On October 31, 2008, U.S. Missile Defense Agency head Henry Obering and Czech First Deputy Foreign Minister Martin Bartak signed a further framework agreement outlining terms of deployment of the planned radar station. In addition to terms already announced, the United States also agreed to provide $600,000 for Czech research in exchange for its agreement to host the station. [16] This agreement, too, must be ratified by the Czech parliament, and some debate exists as to whether that ratification should be delayed until a new U.S. administration takes office. In light of concerns that President-elect Barack Obama may be less predisposed to the deployment, Czech Prime Minister Mirek Topolanek argued, “We want a delay to make sure about the attitude of the new American administration.” [17]

The negotiations between Poland and the United States proved to be more difficult. A change in government in Warsaw last November resulted in a substantial hardening of the Polish negotiating position. The previous Polish government, led by Jaroslaw Kaczynski of the Law and Justice Party, had strongly endorsed Washington’s BMD plans, despite escalating Russian threats. Kaczynski accused Moscow of seeking to define Poland as once again falling within Moscow’s zone of control: “We are talking about the status of Poland and Russia’s hopes that Poland will once again come under its sphere of influence.” [18] The Prime Minister endorsed the deployments on the grounds that, “following the deployment of a missile defense base here, the chances of such undue influence arising will be greatly reduced for at least several decades.” [19]

After assuming office in early November 2007, the new Polish Prime Minister, Donald Tusk, declared improving Polish-Russian relations an important goal of his government. [20] He also made clear that he would not necessarily follow Washington’s policies regarding missile defense. Tusk pointedly stated that he was “responsible for the safety of the Poles, and not the safety of the United States.” [21] The new Foreign Minister, Radoslaw Sikorski, described his government’s hosting a controversial U.S. military facility on its territory as doing Washington a favor: “This is an American, not a Polish project,” he told the daily Gazeta Wyborcza in an interview. “We feel no threat from Iran.” [22]

The Polish public shared the new government’s views. Opinion polls found that most Poles consistently opposed the proposed deployments. [23] Moreover, many Poles believe they received inadequate reward for their unconditional support of the United States on the Iraq War and other controversial issues. Among other costs, this stance strained Poland’s relations with both Russia and with fellow European Union and NATO members, such as France and Germany.

The new Polish government adopted a noticeably more demanding position in the bilateral negotiations with Washington over the proposed deployments. The Tusk administration, for example, called on the United States to bolster Poland’s defense capabilities and provide enhanced bilateral security guarantees, supplementing the imprecise multilateral security commitments Poland receives through NATO. [24] In addition, Sikorski called on U.S. officials to specify how Poland would benefit from the proposed BMD deployment, and the manner in which the financial and other costs of the system would be shared between Warsaw and Washington. [25] Poland’s new defense minister, Bogdan Klich, told a Polish newspaper that Warsaw would expect the United States to help fund the modernization of the Polish armed forces in return for Poland’s acceptance of increased security risks—he mentioned terrorism rather than Russia as a major concern—which could result from hosting a U.S. BMD base. [26] Klich specifically cited Poland’s interest in obtaining Patriot or Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missiles to bolster Poland’s defenses against attacks from combat aircraft and short-range missiles. [27]

On August 20, Washington and Warsaw suddenly announced that they had reached an agreement on the proposed BMD deployments. Both Polish and U.S. officials formally denied that the Russian military operations in Georgia had induced their agreement. Sikorski stated that the negotiations had been completed a week earlier, “before the events in Georgia, and because of the U.S. [election] calendar,” which imparted “some urgency” to their talks. [28] Secretary Rice stated that, “the timing, of course, is simply the timing of when the agreement was completed.” [29]

Yet, other public comments by Polish and U.S. officials give a different impression. Tusk said that the Georgia War provided the catalyst for inducing Washington to yield to Warsaw’s demands regarding air defense systems: “Today, after what has happened in the Caucasus, it can be clearly seen that real security guarantees that would not leave Poland just with the installation are essential….It seems such arguments are taken more seriously now by the U.S.” [30] Polls showed a surge in popular support for the planned U.S. missile base in Poland following the outbreak of the war between Russia and Georgia. For example, a survey published in the daily Rzeczpospolita found that 58% of the respondents backed the proposed BMD deployments, approximately double the level of support evidenced in previous polls. [31]

Certain provisions of the U.S.-Polish BMD deal, the full details of which have not been made public, seem designed specifically to help Poland deter a Russian military threat. [32] First, the United States has pledged to come to Poland’s immediate defense should it be attacked by another country. Alluding to events in Georgia, Tusk underscored the importance of this point: “Poland and the Poles do not want to be in alliances in which assistance comes at some point later—it is no good when assistance comes to dead people.” [33] The Declaration of Strategic Cooperation issued on August 20 also discusses a range of other bilateral defense and security cooperation initiatives. [34]

Second, U.S. and Polish officials have confirmed that, under the proposed arrangement, a battery of advanced Patriot PAC-3 air and missile interceptors, with a crew of approximately one hundred soldiers, would relocate to Poland (probably from Germany). The U.S. personnel will run the Patriot facility until Polish troops have been sufficiently trained to operate it. Thus Washington reversed its long-standing position that Poland did not need the advanced Patriot system. [35] Among other objections, the U.S. had argued that the system’s only plausible use would be against attacking Russian warplanes and short-range missiles. Polish negotiators proved reluctant to accept the U.S. BMD deployments without it.

Polish officials stressed the significance of this double concession from Washington: providing Poland the most advanced U.S. short-range air defense system and establishing, at least for awhile, two U.S. bases on Polish territory, one of which will be devoted to defending Poland against more plausible threats than Iran. According to Sikorski, “we will have in Poland, not one American garrison, but two American garrisons. We will have one base used to protect the whole of NATO against long-range ballistic missiles, and we will also have a battery of 96 Patriot missiles located in a spot chosen by Poland according to our defense needs.” [36] The two bases will reinforce the security commitment by making it more credible. The U.S. military personnel at both the BMD and Patriot bases (approximately 500 people combined) will essentially serve as a tripwire for increasing the prospects of U.S. military intervention on Poland’s behalf in a future war with Russia since any Russian attack on the BMD system would probably kill many Americans.

Polish President Kaczynski has pressed the parliament to ratify the agreement “as soon as possible.” Still, Washington is concerned about what it sees as the slow pace of the ratification process in Warsaw. In late October, Missile Defense Agency chief Obering noted the impact of delays, arguing, “If we get ratification by the end of the year, we will still not be able to put an interceptor on the ground in Poland until 2012…The radar will be ready in 2013…So the more we delay that, the longer it takes to have the defense, and the more opportunity there would be for Iran to emerge” as a significant missile threat. [37]

BMD Gains Support in Other Countries
Washington’s deals with Poland and the Czech Republic were not the only major BMD-related development since the Georgia War erupted on August 8. Press coverage also increased about U.S.-Israeli BMD cooperation against Iran. Most noticeably, more reports emerged about plans to deploy, for the first time, U.S. military personnel in Israel to operate an X-Band radar system in the country’s southern Negev desert region. The radar would reportedly provide targeting and battle management information to both U.S. and Israeli BMD interceptors. [38]

On August 11, the Turkish Defense Ministry also announced plans to purchase eight missile defense systems from foreign governments in order to establish shields around Ankara and Istanbul by 2010. The Ministry representative announced that Turkey was currently considering missile defense systems from China, Israel, Russia, and the United States. [39] The candidates appear to be the Russian S-400 “Triumph” (NATO-codenamed SA-21 “Growler”), the Israeli-U.S. Arrow, the Chinese HQ-9, and the U.S. Patriot systems. [40] U.S. officials have warned Turkey that adopting the Russian-made systems could create interoperability problems with other NATO missile and air defense components. [41] Yet, the Russian government has offered a more generous technology transfer package than its competitors. [42] The Turkish government might also choose to purchase at least some Russian systems to sustain good security relations with Moscow.

Less welcome to Russian leaders was the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry announcement on August 16 that Kiev was now open to cooperating with Western governments on missile defense. [43] In January of this year, citing the application of the Ukrainian government to join NATO, the Russian parliament had voted to end a 1992 bilateral defense cooperation agreement under which Ukraine’s two early warning radars exchanged data with Russia’s early warning system. [44] The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry stated, “The fact that Ukraine is no longer a party to the 1992 Agreement allows it to launch active cooperation with European countries to integrate its information,” especially by integrating Ukraine’s early warning and satellite tracking systems with those of NATO members, which Ukrainian officials indicated could include the United States.

Russia’s Response
Russian leaders have responded to these developments with an uneasy combination of threatening statements, diplomatic initiatives, and military efforts. In an August 15 news conference in Sochi, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev asserted that, “The deployment of the new missile defense forces in Europe is aimed at Russia” no matter what Washington, Warsaw, and other NATO governments claimed. “So, fairy tales about deterring some rogue states with the help of these facilities do not work.” [45] In late August, Medvedev stated that Russia would have no choice but to respond to the Polish and Czech governments’ decisions to accept the planned U.S. BMD deployments. “These missiles are close to our borders and constitute a threat to us,” he explained to Al-Jazeera television. “This will create additional tension and we will have to respond to it in some way, naturally using military means.” [46] He also told the Russia Today news channel that, “We are not afraid of anything, including the prospect of a new Cold War, but we don’t want one, and in this situation everything depends on the position of our partners.” [47]

When Foreign Minister Lavrov visited Poland in mid-September 2008, he said that the Russian government was willing to explore Warsaw’s suggestions of mutual consultations aimed at confidence-building and promoting transparency regarding missile defense and other security issues. Yet, he also warned Poles that they have perhaps unwittingly “become a party to a very dangerous game.” [48] If it were not for the planned U.S. BMD deployments, he explained, Russian defense planners would not consider Poland a threat to Russia: “…we perceive no threat to Russia from Poland. But we cannot fail to see the risks resulting for…the security of the Russian Federation from parts of the U.S. strategic forces being brought close to our borders.” In response, “we will do everything necessary to ensure that the rapidly crumbling global parity in strategic and offensive arms does not lead to any impairment of the security of the Russian Federation.” [49]

Russian military leaders issued similar threats. Col. Gen. Nikolai Solovtsov, head of Russia’s Strategic Missile Forces, said that, should the governments of Poland, the Czech Republic, or other neighboring countries agree to host U.S. BMD facilities, Russia would “have to take appropriate action.” He explained that, “I cannot rule out that, should the country’s military-political leadership make such a decision, some of our ICBMs could be targeted at missile defense sites in Poland and the Czech Republic, and subsequently at other such facilities.” [50]

Some Russian defense commentators and experts have called on Russia to deploy 450-km range Iskander missiles with nuclear warheads in Russia’s Baltic enclave of Kaliningrad, where they would be able to attack targets in Poland and the Czech Republic. [51] The head of the defense committee of the Russian Duma, Viktor Zavarzin, vaguely claimed that Russia was prepared to deploy “new weapons types…near regions in Poland.” [52] A “senior military source in Moscow” told the London Sunday Times that Russia was considering rearming its Baltic fleet, based in Kaliningrad, with nuclear weapons. [53]

Russian leaders have also sought to secure diplomatic support for their efforts. For example, missile defense issues occupied a surprisingly prominent place in the May 2008 summit between Chinese President Hu Jintao and Russian President Medvedev. Their joint statement declared that, “The parties believe that the construction of a global missile defense system, including the deployment of such a system in some regions of the world...does not contribute to maintaining a strategic balance and stability, and runs counter to international efforts to control arms and non-proliferation.” [54] The two presidents also called for relying on political and diplomatic means to counter the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery, and they emphasized the necessity of such an approach particularly with regard to Iran: “China and Russia propose the Iranian nuclear issue be resolved through dialogue and equal consultation… All parties should consider global and regional security, make diplomatic efforts, refrain from military and extreme means, cautiously resort to sanctions and take into account the interests of the country involved.” [55]

Russia also secured endorsement of its BMD position at the August 2008 annual leadership
summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) of which both Russia and China are full members, as are Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. (India, Iran, Pakistan, and Mongolia have observer status.) Their joint statement said in part, “The member states of the SCO believe that in modern circumstances international security must be built on the principles of mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation. The creation of a global antimissile defense system does not assist the maintenance of strategic balance, international efforts on weapons control and nuclear non-proliferation, strengthening of trust among states and regional stability.” [56]

Finally, the Russian government has continued its active research, development, testing, and deployment of new offensive strategic systems designed to overcome U.S. missile defenses. On September 18, the Russian Navy successfully test launched the heretofore troubled SS-NX-30 Bulava missile. Each Bulava is designed to deliver up to 10 nuclear warheads at a maximum range of 8,000 kilometers. [57] A senior Russian Navy official announced that sometime next year the service intended to commission the first Borey-class Project 955 strategic nuclear submarine (SSBN), which has been designed specifically to carry up to 16 Bulava missiles. [58] The Russian government intends to build at least seven of these fourth-generation Borey-class SSBNs by 2015, at an individual cost of almost $900 million, making the Borey-Bulava complex the main component of Russia’s future maritime nuclear deterrent forces for the next few decades. [59]

On September 26, in a speech to Russian military commanders after observing what may have been the largest live-fire exercises in the country’s post-Soviet history, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said that the Georgia War justified accelerating Russia’s military modernization program. [60] The drills were part of “Stability-2008,” a month-long series of exercises in several regions of Belarus and Russia involving various combat arms, including Russia’s nuclear forces, rehearsing the defense of Russian border regions from external aggression. [61] Medvedev explicitly cited the need to strengthen Russia’s nuclear deterrent: “By 2020 we must guarantee our capacities of nuclear deterrence in various military and political conditions, in various military and political situations, as well as ensure the comprehensive provision of new types of weapons and means of gathering intelligence.” [62]

Unlike the United States, which has not fielded a new nuclear delivery system in over a decade and has no firm plans to build a new platform soon, the Russian military is acquiring several new strategic offensive systems. By the end of 2008, Russia expects to deploy 65 single-warhead Topol-M Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) systems. Although most of these 11,000 kilometer–range SS-X-27 ICBMs will be stationed in fixed silos, 15 will be deployed on harder-to-target road-mobile launchers. [63] In addition to the Bulava SLBM, the RS-24 ICBM (similar to the Topol-M but able to carry multiple warheads) is also undergoing comprehensive testing and should begin deployment in two to three years. Russian defense experts claim that all these new systems are specially equipped with countermeasures to overcome U.S. ballistic missile defenses. [64]

Concluding Observations
In public, senior U.S. political and military officials remain unperturbed by Moscow’s response to recent U.S. BMD gains. “The truth of the matter is Russia is not going to launch nuclear missiles at anybody,” Secretary Gates told ABC News in August. “The Poles know that, we know it.” [65] Secretary Rice added at the time that, “If the Russians intended this as intimidation, they have done nothing but harden the attitudes of the small states around them.” She explained to Fox News that, regardless of Russian objections, “We are moving forward on missile defense.” [66] When asked a month later about Medvedev’s statements regarding Russia’s nuclear rearmament plans, Rice replied that, “The balance of power in terms of nuclear deterrence is not going to be affected by those measures.” She added that “probably the Russians understand that the United States has an extremely capable, robust, broad, and indeed varied nuclear deterrent” and that “I’m quite certain that that is not lost on the General Staff.” [67]

On a less confrontational note, John Beyrle, the U.S. Ambassador to Russia, told Ekho Moskvy radio on September 11 that the United States was prepared to resume BMD talks with Russia later that month. [68] In a September 19 speech, Secretary Gates argued that, while Moscow seeks to have a dominant position in neighboring regions, Russia does not present “the existential and global threat the Soviet Union represented.” [69] The Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen, likewise characterized Russia’s defense modernization plans and the recent Russian military exercises as not constituting a threat since Russian military leaders had long made “very clear to me that their intention was to modernize their strategic forces.” [70]

In the end, it may not be Russian opposition to the administration’s plans to deploy U.S. BMD systems in Poland and the Czech Republic that undermines the effort but that of the U.S. Congress. Members have repeatedly cut Bush administration funding requests for missile defenses, and they have shown particular skepticism toward the proposed deployments in Eastern Europe . In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, the Congress limited funding for the new two-staged interceptors planned for Poland until the Secretary of Defense certifies that they have undergone tests to verify their operational effectiveness. (The U.S. interceptors already based in Alaska and California , though similar in many respects, have three stages.) Additionally, on November 8, President-Elect Obama’s foreign policy advisor stated that Obama’s view of missile defense remains – for now – the same as it was during his campaign, “he [Obama] supports deploying a missile defense system when the technology is proved to be workable.” As for the Russians, on November 5 President Medvedev announced that his country will deploy missiles in the Kaliningrad enclave near Poland in response to current U.S. missile defense plans. Based on these recent developments, it seems likely that further action on this issue will not take place until the Obama administration enters the White House in January 2009.

Richard Weitz – Hudson Institute