Chinese media is paying growing attention to Japanese satellites. On January 24, a Japanese Advanced Land Observation Satellite named “Daichi” (Earth) was launched by an H-2A rocket from the Yoshinobu space complex on Tanegashima Island. A second satellite, the multi-purpose unit MTSAT-2, was scheduled for launch in mid-February but a malfunction has forced its postponement. While Tokyo emphasizes that the Daichi satellite is for traditional earth observation missions, such as terrain mapping, Chinese media consider it to be a spy satellite, citing U.S. news sources that the satellite carries three high-performance sensors that can detect objects of 2.5-meter diameter size on earth and can observe the entire Asia-Pacific region 24 hours a day. [1]

Japan launched its first two earth observation satellites in March 2003, initially prompted largely by the desire to have its own intelligence in response to growing concerns over North Korea’s nuclear and missile developments. Indeed, according to one Chinese news source, a satellite intelligence center was set up within the Japanese Self-Defense Agency (JDSA) in early 2001, as the first step in the country’s intelligence satellite program. [2] Despite (and perhaps because of) the setback in late 2003 when two Japanese satellites broke apart soon after launch and a further disappointment in 2005 when launch of Daichi had to be postponed, Tokyo appeared to reaffirm its determination to acquire advanced intelligence gathering and reconnaissance capabilities via satellites by allocating over 61 billion yen (approx $5.2 billion) in a special appropriation in 2006 for satellite launches and maintenance. [3]

Chinese analyses have focused on three worrisome trends in Japanese space policy as reflected in its satellite endeavors. The first is the Japanese government’s effort to modify existing domestic regulations governing the peaceful use of space, which were promulgated in 1969. Chinese observers note that a special committee on space policy was established within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party to reassess current policy and make recommendations to the government for any necessary changes. The 1969 regulations prohibit the Japanese Self-Defense Force from developing or using satellites for missile defense early warning purposes. One major change will be to modify the current, complete ban on the military use of space to allow so-called “non-offensive military use” of this environment. The change would explicitly authorize the Japanese Self-Defense Force to develop and use space assets for defensive military purposes, including intelligence gathering. [4]

The second trend of concern to Chinese observers is Japan’s interest in developing its military space capabilities to enable the Self-Defense Force to increase the number and expand the scope of missions overseas. Chinese analysts believe Japan is contemplating revising Article 9 of its constitution to pave the way for rebuilding itself into a major military power. This would require it to develop its own military surveillance, reconnaissance, intelligence gathering, and communications capabilities. At the moment, Japan depends on the United States for support in these areas, due to Japan’s lack of indigenous capabilities. [5]

Third, to Chinese observers, Japan’s satellite program is strongly driven by Tokyo’s vision of a future rivalry with the region’s other major powers, China in particular. While Tokyo justifies its program as driven by concerns over North Korea’s nuclear and missile developments, Chinese observers believe in reality Japan is seeking to develop capabilities to counter China, through satellites that can gather military intelligence using high-resolution imagery and early warning of missile launches in support of Japan’s emerging missile defense systems. Over time, Chinese analysts argue, Japan hopes to enhance its capabilities in the areas of force projection, precision positioning and targeting, and military surveillance. [6]

Jing-Dong Yuan – Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies