IRAN STEPS UP ITS NUCLEAR TRAINING
March 2006 Issue
 

As Iran has pursued the construction of additional nuclear facilities, the country has also been working to establish an improved infrastructure to train its nuclear scientists and technicians. A large number of workers will be needed to achieve the government’s stated objective of generating 20,000MW(e) of power from nuclear reactors over the next 20 years. [1] More specialized training and research institutions, perhaps compartmentalized and separate from other training centers, would also be needed if Iran were to sustain a nuclear weapons development program.

In Search of Nuclear Specialists
In December 2004, Mohammad Sai’di, Deputy for International Affairs of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), said that over the next five years, approximately 5,000 new specialists in the field of nuclear technology would be trained in Iran, and that over the next 50 years the country would need to be able to manufacture its own nuclear reactors to become self-sufficient. [2] Dr. Sai’di also said that the average age of Iranian nuclear scientists was 26. This suggests that a young and inexperienced technical staff is currently tending to Iran’s nuclear program. In fact, in 2000, a visiting Iranian fellow at the Abdus Salam International Center for Theoretical Physics estimated that there were only about 350 physicists with Ph.D.s in all of Iran. [3]

To enhance the country’s scientific expertise, according to several recent reports, the AEOI may be establishing a secret nuclear training center in an area northeast of Tehran, known as the “Institute for Applied Nuclear Technology.” [4] According to recent press reports, this institute is to develop nuclear technologies, possibly for a weapons program. The institute will apparently be part of a prominent university, such as the University of Tehran, but additional nuclear institutions may also be established at other universities. During a November 2005 talk at Amir Kabir University, Dr. Sai’di said negotiations were underway with Sharif Industrial University (thought to be the same as Sharif University of Technology) to build a “nuclear college.” [5] He also alluded to the development of similar institutes in other Iranian universities, such as Amir Kabir. [6] Thus, the Institute for Applied Nuclear Technology may represent the first of a series of new nuclear centers being established to train specialists and conduct research.

According to a January 2006 article in Speigel Online, (on-line outlet of the respected newsweekly Der Speigel) the newly launched Institute for Applied Nuclear Technology is only partially complete, with some of its laboratories still under construction. However, the article states that the completed facilities at the institute currently support 50 working scientists, who are experimenting with P-2 centrifuges—the advanced uranium centrifuge design provided by Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan during the 1990s. [7] The Pakistani P-2 is believed to be based upon the German G-2 centrifuge—or possibly other centrifuge designs—that Khan is known to have stolen during his employment in the Netherlands in the 1970s. [8] According to the latest International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reporting on P-2s in Iran, Iran has asserted that no work was carried out on this technology after 2003. [9] In February 2006, however, Nuclear Fuel reported that the IAEA, “currently suspects that there may be a parallel P-2 development program in Iran that has not been declared…and relies on supplies of materials and equipment provided by parts of its procurement network that have not thus far been shut down.” [10] Successful deployment of the P-2 would permit Iran to accelerate the production of highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons. Under ideal circumstances, a cascade of 1,000 P-2 centrifuges, running 24 hours a day, could produce approximately 25 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU), the amount necessary to produce one nuclear weapon, in as little as 15 months. [11]

Existing Academic Infrastructure
Although Iran has numerous universities with physics, chemistry, and related nuclear programs, these academic institutions may not be sufficiently specialized to meet the political and military objectives of the Iranian leadership. Nonetheless, relevant training capabilities now in place at a number of Iranian universities are not insignificant. The University of Tehran (UT) is considered Iran’s top university; it is also the nation’s largest, with over 32,000 students. [12] It has various nuclear-related programs and experienced faculty. These programs are located in UT’s Faculty of Science, which includes the departments of chemistry, geology, computer science, mathematics, and physics. The school has about 2,400 students enrolled in these departments and 120 teaching and research staff. [13] The university also runs a Faculty of Engineering that trains students in electrical, mechanical, and process engineering. Together, these two faculties help to provide a useful education in nuclear related science and engineering. The following table highlights courses relevant to training a wide range of nuclear specialists.

In the past, UT has supported the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran’s nuclear activities. For example, in 1999, the staff at the AEOI’s Laser Research Center and scientists at UT’s Iran Polymer Institute and Department of Chemistry collaborated on experiments to assess the effects of CO2 pulse laser irradiation of polyethylene terephthalate surfaces. Although not directly related to nuclear energy, the project illustrates links between the two organizations that could help in the future development of lasers potentially usable for the enrichment of uranium. [14] In 1987, scientists from the AOEI and UT Physics Laboratory conducted calculations of the Tehran Research Reactor core to convert its fuel from highly enriched uranium, which is potentially usable for nuclear weapons, to low-enriched uranium, which cannot be used for this purpose.

Nuclear Related Schools in the Faculty (College) of Science at the University of Tehran
All Schools Offer Undergraduate, Masters,
and Ph.D. degrees.
Nuclear Related Schools
Probable Nuclear-Related Courses Offered
School of Mathematics

  Complex Analytic Spaces
  Non-Linear Functional Analysis
  Distribution Theory
  Geometry Functional Analysis and     Application

School of Geology

 ● Geology of Iran and Neighboring    Countries
 ● Sedimentary Ore Deposits Geology    Geochemistry
 ● Magnetism and Metamorphism in    Iran
 ● Analytical Tectonics
 ● Isotope Geology
 ● Mineral Separation
 ● Hydrothermal Ore Deposits    Geochemistry

School of Chemistry

 ● Physical Chemistry I
 ● Physical Chemistry I: Laboratory
 ● Physical Chemistry II
 ● Physical Chemistry II: Laboratory
 ● Nuclear Chemistry
 ● Industrial Chemistry I
 ● Industrial Chemistry II
 ● Industrial Chemistry: Laboratory

School of Physics

 ● Advanced Statistical Mechanics I
 ● Advanced Solid State Physics I
 ● Computational Physics
 ● Advanced Physics: Laboratory
 ● Advanced Nuclear Physics I
 ● Advanced Optics
 ● Advanced Quantum Mechanics I
 ● Advanced Quantum Mechanics II
 ● Laser
 ● Advanced Reactor Theory
 ● Elementary Particles Physics I
 ● Surface Physics
 ● Quantum Mechanical Techniques    in Atomic Physics

Source: “Course Information” University of Tehran,
Faculty of Science, Updated 2004, http://www.fos.ut.ac.ir/semestral/course.html


Sharif University of Technology, which may have been modeled after the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and other Iranian universities reportedly have been used over the years as a front for procuring and exploiting nuclear-related materials and equipment to further Iran’s nuclear ambitions. [15] [16] Sharif also has several programs that would have direct relevance to an Iranian nuclear weapons program, such as that in metallurgy. Sharif’s School of Materials Science & Engineering has 16 laboratories that are equipped to conduct research in metallurgy, metal forming, and polymer engineering activities. [17] The school has 29 full-time instructors, including those who have experience in metal rolling and modeling. [18]

One additional university worth noting is the Institute of Physics and Mathematics (IPM), headed by Mohammad Javad Larijani. Larijani is the brother of Ali Larijani, currently the chief Iranian nuclear negotiator and outspoken advocate of Iran’s nuclear development. Mohammad Larijani is also a member of the powerful Expediency Council, and a foreign affairs advisor to the chief of Iran’s judiciary, Ayatollah Hashemi-Shahroudi. [19] (The Expediency Council serves as an advisory body to the Supreme Leader and mediates disputes between the Majles (Iranian Parliament) and the Council of Guardians, which ensures legislation complies with Islamic law.) IPM is one of the best equipped and staffed academic institutions in Iran, a status it is likely to maintain, given the influence of its leader. According to Shapour Etemad, director of the National Research Institute for Science Policy in Tehran, IPM “should continue to fare well under president Ahmadinejad.” [20]

Who Controls?
Which organization in Iran will control the new Institute for Applied Nuclear Technology remains uncertain. It appears, however, that Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, through the University of Tehran, may have overall control of the institute’s work program and budget. According to Speigel, President Ahmadinejad has appointed Abbasil Amid Sandshani [Zanjani], “a former secret service man and member of the leadership of the …Revolutionary Guards,” as the new president of the University of Tehran, where the institute reportedly is being established. [21] Zanjani apparently lacks academic qualifications and was endorsed by Iran’s Minister of Science, Mohammad Mehdi Zehdi, also a former commander of the Revolutionary Guard. [22] All UT presidents preceding Zanjani were elected by the university’s faculty. [23] Another indicator of the Revolutionary Guard’s involvement is the security vetting that each student who attends the institute will have to undergo. [24] According to Speigel, President Ahmadinejad will play a leading role in the new institute’s activities, and possibly will coordinate funding through the recently established “Control Center for the Production of Weapons.” [25]

If the suspicions surrounding Iran’s nuclear weapons ambitions prove to be well-founded, it would appear that the country has made only modest progress towards developing nuclear weapons despite more than 20 years of effort. One reason for this slow pace may have been a shortage of well trained scientists and technicians, a gap the government now appears intent on filling. Thus, in building a projection of Iran’s future nuclear capabilities, it will be useful to monitor the evolution of Iran’s nuclear training programs, in addition to tracking its nuclear-related procurement and construction activities. Clearer assessments of Iran’s nuclear trajectory can, in turn, help U.S. and other decision-makers evaluate how much time may remain for diplomacy or coercive actions to deter Iran from the path of nuclear weapons development.

Jack Boureston – FirstWatch International (FWI)

 


SOURCES:
[1] “MP Says Iran Targeting 20MW of Electricity From Nuclear Power,” IRNA, February 22, 2006, FBIS document ID IAP2006022201.
[2] “Training of 5,000 nuclear expert in Iran,” Tehran Keyhan, December 12, 2004, FBIS document IAP20041213000126.
[3] “Journey to Iran,” News from ICTP, No. 93, Summer 2000, ICTP website, http://www.ictp.trieste.it/~sci_info/News_from_ICTP/News_93/features_Iran.html. [View Article] In contrast, the United States with roughly five times the population of Iran graduated 1106 Ph. D.s in physics in 2003, alone, roughly 550 of them U.S. nationals. “The American Institute of Physics Bulletin of Science Policy News August 26, 2005, Physics Enrollments and Degrees Growing,” August 19-26, 2005, http://www.aip.org/fyi/2005/125.html.
[View Article]
[4] “How Iran Produces Nuclear Weapons,” Spiegel Online, January 26, 2006, FBIS document EUP20060125085004; Con Coughlin, “Iran Plans Secret Nuclear University, To Train Scientists,” The Sunday Telegraph, March 20, 2005, FBIS document EUP200532000048; also available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2005/03/20/wiran20.xml. [View Article]
[5] “Establishing Nuclear Faculties in the Country,” Tehran Siyasat-e Ruz, November 1, 2005, FBIS document IAP2005110030110104.
[6] Ibid.
[7] “How Iran Produces Nuclear Weapons,” Spiegel Online, January 26, 2006, FBIS document EUP20060125085004; “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” February 24, 2004, p. 8, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/gov2004-11_derestrict.pdf; [View Article] David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, “The Centrifuge Connection,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists¸ March/April 2004, http://www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art_ofn=ma04albright. [View Article]
[8] David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, “The Centrifuge Connection.”
[9] “Developments in the Implementation Of The NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Agency Verification of Iran’s Suspension of Enrichment-related and Reprocessing Activities: Update Brief by the Deputy Director General For Safeguards,” International Atomic Energy Agency, January 31, 2006.
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/DDGs/2006/heinonen31012006.pdf. [View Article]
[10] Mark Hibbs, “Iranians Claimed Bearing Impasse Halted Work on P-2 Centrifuge,” Nuclear Fuel, February 27, 2006, p. 3.
[11] This estimate is an extrapolation from the capability of 1,000 P-1 machines with the ability to produce 25Kg HEU with .4 percent tails in 2.2 years, if conditions are optimal. For a discussion of centrifuge capabilities and factors affecting production outcome, see Gary Samore, Iran’s Strategic Weapons Programme:, A Net Assessment (Routlage London) 2005, pp. 53-54.
[12] “University of Tehran Overview page” http://www.ut.ac.ir/en/main-links/overview.htm. [View Article]
[13] “General Information,” Tehran University Faculty of Science, Updated 2005.
[14] M. Dadsetan, H. Mirzadeh and N. Sharifi “Effect of CO2 laser radiation on the surface properties of polyethylene terephthalate,” Radiation Physics and Chemistry, Vol.56, Issues 5-6 (12 November 1999), pp.597-604, http://www.elsevier.com/. [View Article]
[15] “Higher Education in Iran,” Wikipedia.org, Updated.
[16] For example, by Rodney W. Jones, Mark G. McDonough, Toby Dalton, and Gregory Koblentz, “Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A Guide in Maps and Charts,” CIAONET, 1998, [http://www.ciaonet.org/book/jones/jones07b.html]; see also David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, “The Centrifuge Connection.”
[17] “Laboratories and Facilities,” Sharif University of Technology Home Page, Updated 2005, http://sharif.ir/~mtlinfo/Lab.htm. [View Article]
[18] “Materials Science & Engineering,” Updated 2005, Sharif University of Technology Home Page, http://sharif.ir/~mtlinfo/. [View Article]
[19] Abbas William Samii, “The Iranian Nuclear Issue and Informal Networks,” Naval War College Review, Winter 2006, Vol. 59, No. 1, p. 84.
[20] Richard Stone, “An Islamic Science Revolution?” Science, September 16, 2005, Vol. 309, p. 1803.
[21] “How Iran Produces Nuclear Weapons,” Spiegel Online, January 26, 2006, FBIS document EUP20060125085004.
[22] “18 of Iran’s 21 New Ministers Hail From Revolutionary Guards, Secret Police,” Iran Focus, August 14, 2005, [http://www.iranfocus.com/modules/news/article.php?storyid=3315].
[23] “Abbasali Amid Zanjani,” Wikipedia.org, Updated 2005, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abbasali_Amid_Zanjani.
[View Article]
[24] Con Coughlin, “Iran Plans Secret Nuclear University to Train Scientists.”
[25] Ibid.