As the crisis over the Iranian nuclear program enters the final run-up to the March 6, 2006, meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors, Russia is beginning to contemplate its course of action in the event Iran refuses to forgo uranium enrichment activities. Such activities could enable Iran to develop the capability to improve uranium to the highly enriched level needed for nuclear weapons – and to produce such weapons, if it were to renounce its obligations under the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Early optimism in Moscow that it might achieve success in negotiating an end to Iranian enrichment work, where others had failed, has been replaced with pessimism and near-resignation that American military action against Iran is becoming increasingly inevitable.

Moscow will soon confront difficult choices with regard to its position vis-à-vis both the United States and Iran, first and foremost whether it will support in coming months the expected U.S. proposals at the UN Security Council to introduce sanctions against Tehran. The first victim of these sanctions would be a Russian arms sale contract with Iran, worth $1 billion, and perhaps the Russian contract for the construction of Iran’s Bushehr nuclear power plant, now nearing completion, and for the supply of its low-enriched uranium fuel.

Changing Attitude Toward Iran
By the time of the special meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors in early February 2006 to consider Iran’s refusal to halt its uranium enrichment program, the attitude toward Iran in the Russian government, among Russian non-governmental experts, and even among the public at large had taken a decidedly negative turn. A public opinion survey by the All-Russia Center for the Study of Public Opinion (VTsIOM) in July 2005, for example, had shown that 51 percent of respondents did not object to the enlargement of the group of nuclear weapon states, a scenario that included Iran, whereas only 29 percent objected. Six months later, however, in January 2006, only 39 percent were ready to accept Iran as a new nuclear weapon state, while the number of those opposed had increased to 36 percent of those sampled. (Thirty-six percent of those polled also said that Russia should not interfere in a conflict between the West and Iran.) [1] According to the survey, the key variable in the changed Russian attitude toward Iran was Tehran’s refusal to accept Russia’s proposed compromise solution to the crisis, under which two key stages of the nuclear fuel cycle – enrichment of uranium to produce fresh fuel for Iran and reprocessing of Iranian spent fuel – would be conducted exclusively on Russian territory and at a Russian or, possibly, a joint-owned facility.

In the wake of the February 4, 2006, IAEA Board meeting, which voted to report Iran’s non-compliance with its IAEA inspection obligations to the UN Security Council, Iran’s leaders made clear that Tehran was not prepared to seriously entertain Russia’s proposal. Iran’s president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, openly declared that he did not believe in Iran’s nuclear fuel being enriched exclusively outside of Iran: what would happen, he asked rhetorically, if the enriching country suddenly refused to supply new fuel? [2] Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov immediately characterized that statement as “not serious,” especially where it cast doubt on Russia’s reliability as a supplier of nuclear fuel. [3] Lavrov made it clear that such disparagement was regarded as an undeserved slight from a country that Russia had regarded as a future strategic partner.

Almost inevitably, Russian analysts drew parallels between Russia’s failing diplomacy in the Iranian nuclear crisis and earlier Russian initiatives involving Slobodan Milosevic, in Serbia, and Saddam Hussein, in Iraq, where Russian diplomatic efforts to head off U.S.-led military interventions ultimately proved futile. Russian observers noted that both Milosevic and Hussein, instead of following Russia’s advice and using its assistance to facilitate negotiations, had intentionally aggravated tensions with the United States and eventually suffered crushing military defeats by U.S.-led forces. “In the last six months,” noted one Russian observer, “Iran has made so many sharp statements and has pursued such an inflexible policy that it seemed firmly bent on giving every possible moral justification for an American invasion.” [4]

Earlier Iranian statements of interest in the Russian uranium enrichment and fuel reprocessing proposal and of Tehran’s willingness to pursue it further are apparently now given little credence in Moscow. The Director of the Institute of Middle Eastern Studies, Yevgeni Satanovski, for example, opined in mid-February that “Iran simply does not want negotiations with Russia. Iran demonstrates that it wants conflict [with the West].” [5] A professor at the prestigious Moscow State Institute (University) of International Relations (MGIMO), Aleksei Bogaturov, similarly believed that the so-called “U.S.-led anti-Iranian coalition” was created by Iran itself, as the result of its intransigent attitude. [6]

Widespread dissatisfaction in Moscow with Iran’s behavior became particularly apparent when Iran’s ambassador to Russia held a closed-door meeting at the Duma, the lower chamber of the Russian parliament, in mid-February. Legislators did not conceal their deep dissatisfaction with his explanation of Tehran’s foreign and nuclear policies, in particular, his highly inflammatory statements with regard to Israel and his unyielding stance that his country had the right to pursue all aspects of nuclear energy. [7] The parliamentarians’ negative assessments of Iran’s attitudes stood in stark contrast to their generally positive attitude toward that country only a month earlier.

Iranian Delegation Visits Moscow
A somber mood dominated the Moscow scene during the run-up to the February 20 visit of an Iranian nuclear delegation to Moscow, which was to continue consultations on the Russian nuclear proposal begun during a Russian delegation visit to Tehran in early January 2006. Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov openly admitted prior to the start of the February negotiations that Russian expectations were “modest.” [8]

Spurring concerns in Moscow were Iranian hints that the Russian proposal had to be “changed” or “adapted” to reflect “new circumstances”; indeed, during the talks, the Iranians insisted that the location of the enriched uranium fuel-producing facility, to be a joint venture involving Russia, Iran, and possibly other partners, and the list of participants were both subject to discussion. [9] Moreover, even if fuel production was to be conducted on Russian territory, Iranians insisted that they receive full access to the sensitive technologies and equipment that the enterprise would employ. Anton Khlopkov, deputy director of the Moscow-based PIR Center, who is considered highly knowledgeable about official Russian views, said that this demand would be unacceptable, since Russia unequivocally adheres to a ban on the transfer of enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing technology. [10]

Just prior to the meeting, moreover, Moscow faced another unpleasant surprise, when IAEA Director General Mohammad ElBaradei announced a new proposal that envisioned the acceptance of limited-scale uranium enrichment activities in Iran – an approach that was directly at odds with Russia’s proposal, which would have banned such activities on Iranian soil. “The IAEA … has put today’s Russian-Iranian negotiations at the verge of failure,” a Russian commentator observed. Equally irritating to Russia were Iranian consultations in Brussels with the European Union, which were conducted simultaneously with the visit to Moscow. It was suspected that Iran’s four-day postponement of the Moscow negotiations from their originally scheduled date was made deliberately so that the two different, competing rounds of consultations would be held in parallel, reducing the salience of the Moscow talks. [11]

A close look at Russian official statements and media commentaries suggests that Moscow is increasingly resigned to the failure of its efforts to find a successful diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear confrontation. It seems that Moscow’s last hope rests on possible changes in Iran’s domestic politics. It has been suggested, for example, that the spiritual leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and former Iranian president Ali Hashemi Rafsajani might force President Ahmadinejad to soften his radical “pro-nuclear” position. [12] Moscow commentators also saw the possibility of more moderate players gaining influence in Tehran when Golamreza Aga-Zade, Iran’s vice president and chief of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, declared that Iran did not plan to withdraw from the NPT and was prepared to continue discussions of the Russian proposal. [13] Unless such political shifts take hold, however, the view from Moscow is that the chances for a diplomatic solution to the nuclear crisis are close to nil.

UN Sanctions
Thus a growing question for Russian policy makers seems to be what to do when negotiations in the run-up to the March 6, 2006, meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors fail and the UN Security Council takes up the issue of imposing sanctions against Tehran. The original prediction of Russian analysts was that Moscow would either support sanctions or, if the United States undertook military action, Russia would step aside and would support neither the United States, nor Iran. It was also predicted that China would take a similar position. [14]

It seems, however, that the Kremlin has decided to actively oppose economic sanctions. In early February, Minister of Defense Sergey Ivanov declared that although Russia voted at the IAEA on February 4 to report the Iranian case to the UN Security Council, he hoped it would be possible to continue working the issue within the IAEA. [15] Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov declared on the same day that the Iranian case should remain within the purview of the IAEA and that the UN Security Council should only be kept informed about, but should not take any action on, the matter. [16] Two weeks later, Lavrov amplified his statement by saying that not only Russia, but also China and a number of European countries opposed the introduction of sanctions and favored continued negotiations within the IAEA framework. [17]

The latter statement suggests not only that the Kremlin has already made a decision with regard to its position in the UN Security Council, but that it is also actively sounding out the positions of other countries and is laying the groundwork for a coalition to oppose the anticipated American proposal for economic sanctions. Perhaps reflecting this attitude, Mikhail Margelov, Chairman of the International Relations Committee of the Federation Council (the upper chamber of the Russian parliament), said that Iran was purposefully creating a highly charged political atmosphere and that the West should weigh its policy calmly, without giving in to provocation. [18]

Another difficult issue anticipated by Moscow is the future of the Russian-supplied Bushehr nuclear power plant, whose construction is expected to be completed in 2006. Minister of Defense Sergey Ivanov insisted that Bushehr and the crisis over the nuclear program were not related. [19] A similar position was voiced by the chief of the Russian Atomic Energy Agency (Rosatom), Sergey Kiriyenko: “Nothing prevents us from completing the Bushehr station,” he declared. “The international community does not have any questions about that project.” [20] These statements seem to reflect a fallback position: namely, that if Moscow is unable to completely avoid the introduction of sanctions, it will at least seek to protect its biggest project in Iran.

U.S. Military Action
A more challenging issue is how Russia should react in the case of American military action. That the United States will sooner or later use force to destroy the Iranian nuclear program is virtually a foregone conclusion in media and official circles in Moscow: the question is when and how, not whether. [21] In contrast to other recent instances of U.S. use of force, this time virtually no one in Moscow predicts that the target would be able to resist United States military action or that the United States would sustain significant losses during such an operation. After three recent wars (Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq), it seems few doubts remain in Moscow about the extent of American power.

In view of these expectations, Russian policymakers seem to be preoccupied with more practical issues. Among the biggest concerns is the possibility that the United States might use the territories of Georgia and Azerbaijan for an attack against Iranian nuclear facilities.

Russian-Georgian relations are now at their lowest level since the break-up of the Soviet Union. The government in Tbilisi has never concealed its desire to join NATO, and recently, Georgian president Mikhail Saakashvili, openly expressed his conviction that soon “dozens of NATO warplanes” would protect his country against Russia. Moscow fears that U.S. military operations against Iran would provide Georgia with a convenient pretext to have its wish. [22]

In the last two years Moscow has tried hard to improve its relations with Azerbaijan and worries that these efforts will be derailed if that country, too, becomes the staging ground for American action against Iran. Also of considerable concern is the prospect of destabilization of Azerbaijan. As Russian experts have noted, 20 million Azeris live in Iran compared to 8.2 million in Azerbaijan proper, giving Iran ample opportunity to provoke unrest in that country. [23]

Finally, an American military presence in the South Caucasus and a military campaign against Iran could doom Russian efforts to strengthen its hold on the Caspian Sea. As one observer noted, Moscow does not want “a second Iraq” on the Caspian Sea and U.S. military action against Iran could hurt Russian interests as much as Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons. [24] In other words, if the Iran nuclear crisis continues to escalate, Moscow is likely to be in a losing position, however events unfold.

Nikolai Sokov -- Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies