This article is the second in a series on North Korea’s science and technology development policy and its implications for the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The first article in the series, DPRK Relying on Multiple Approaches to Acquire Foreign Technology, appeared in the March 2006 issue of WMD Insights. Additional articles in the series will appear in future issues of WMD Insights.

Information technology (IT) is an important component of North Korea’s pursuit of science and technology. Under the leadership of Kim Jong Il, North Korea is aggressively pushing IT development as necessary for economic advancement and as an important pillar of the country’s asymmetric warfare capability.

According to North Korea’s Science and Technology Act, which was enacted in 1988, and revised in 1999, IT is a strategic technology targeted for state development. [1] The five-year S&T Development Plans of 1998 and 2003 focused heavily on IT development and “informatization” as the driving force behind the automation and advancement of all North Korea’s key industries. [2] [3] The importance of this focus has been underscored in Kyŏngje Yŏn’gu [Economic Research], a North Korean quarterly, which often carries articles with references to information technology and its role in increasing productivity. [4] Another measure of the importance of this field to Pyongyang is that, during his visit to China in January, which focused on steps to modernize and reform the North Korean economy, Kim Jong-Il reportedly visited nine Chinese IT and communications equipment companies. [5]

According to a recent study sponsored by the (South) Korean Development Bank, North Korea’s IT industry is almost 20 years behind that of South Korea. [6] But now, North Korea hopes to follow the examples of India and China to catch up in the IT sector. In particular, Pyongyang would like to emulate China, seeking to enjoy the economic benefits of a modern IT industry while managing the inflow of ideas and information that might weaken the Kim regime’s control over North Korean society.

Procurement and Data Collection from Abroad
Foreign technology, components, and materials have all played important roles in North Korea’s WMD and missile programs, and IT has made it easier for North Korea to gain access to these resources. According to the Korea Association of Science and Technology, a pro-Pyongyang group in Japan, the Internet has been very useful in accessing technology and transferring it to Pyongyang. [7] In addition, the Internet has become a conduit for distribution of products and information from abroad. The High-Technology Service Center, in Pyongyang, established in April 2004, provides IT merchandise and services to domestic consumers through North Korea’s national computer network. [8]

North Korea does not allow private citizens to have access to the Internet, but a domestic network has been established for government agencies, research institutes, educational organizations, and other entities. The High-Technology Service Center appears to be a central node that serves as a clearing house for domestic consumers of foreign technology and high-tech products, including those in the realm of biotechnology and nanotechnology. It is unclear if any of the information or items acquired by the High-Technology Service Center have been delivered to WMD-related entities in North Korea, but it is possible that this center, or a similar, clandestine computer center, has been or will be used for Pyongyang’s WMD and asymmetric warfare efforts.

Cyber Warfare
As with conventional warfare, cyber warfare is designed to compel an opponent to bend to the will of the acting party. Cyber warfare or cyber attacks may include acts of infiltration, manipulation, assault, or raid by exploiting software, networks, and their supporting infrastructures. [9] Modern weapons systems and basic command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) increasingly rely on information technology. Therefore, military forces are investing additional resources to develop the computer capabilities to attack information networks and systems software of the adversary.

At South Korea’s Defense Information Protection Conferences in 2003 and 2004, Lt. Gen. Song Yŏng-gŭn, commander of the Defense Security Command (DSC), claimed that North Korea has been operating a computer hacking unit on orders from National Defense Commission Chairman Kim Jong Il. [10] [11] At the same conference in 2005, Dr. Pyŏn Chae-jong of the Agency for Defense Development gave a presentation where he argued that North Korea’s information warfare capabilities, which are often overlooked and underestimated, could significantly degrade or compromise the U.S. Pacific Command’s computer networks. [12]

Separately, in July 2004, South Korea’s National Intelligence Service (NIS) revealed that 278 computers in ten government organizations—including the Korea Institute for Defense Analysis, the Agency for Defense Development, the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, and the National Assembly—were found to be infected by malicious hacking programs. [13] The cyber attacks were traced to China, but South Korean authorities suspected that the attacks originated in North Korea. [13]

Lt. Gen. Song and other South Korean defense officials have claimed that North Korea has been training about 100 “IT warriors” per year at IT colleges for its military hacking units since as early as 1981, and that North Korea has between 500 to 600 hacking specialists. [14] According to North Korean defector Kim Chŏl-su (alias), who is reported to have intimate knowledge of North Korean hacking abilities, about 500 hackers belong to the army’s 121st sŏ unit. [15] Other reports claim that there are five IT colleges training elite students: the College of Engineering at Kim Il Sung University, the University of Computer Science, Kim Ch’aek University of Technology, the University of Information Technology, and the Pyongyang University of Computer Technology. And, starting in 2003, Pyongyang is said to have begun special computer technology education programs for select “gifted” children at Mangyondae Children’s Palace, Pyongyang Children’s Palace, and Kŭmsŏng First and Second Junior High Schools, which previously offered special programs only in traditional subjects such as music, arts, and sports. [16]

In addition, since 1999, “bright science students” have been exempt from North Korea’s mandatory military conscription so that they can be engaged fully in the development of firewalls, viruses, and hacking programs. North Korean hackers analyze multiple operating systems such as Windows, Unix, and Linux, all for the study of hacking to collect military information and to downgrade adversaries’ military command and communication networks. [17]

There are significant disagreements concerning North Korea’s cyber warfare programs and capabilities because of North Korea’s secrecy and isolation. Most South Korean sources agree that, as stated above, about 100 North Korean IT specialists have been trained annually since sometime in the 1980s and that there are a total of over 500 hackers. However, little detail has been made public about the training programs and the assignments of other IT specialists. U.S. Defense and State Department officials, however, have either not confirmed these claims, or have asserted that the South Korean government is exaggerating the North Korean cyber threat. [18] Citing extremely poor technology resources, cultural and economic isolation, and lack of applied experience, U.S. experts are skeptical that North Korea has advanced cyber warfare capabilities.

Cyber warfare traditionally has been considered a component of broader military operations, but it can also be part of asymmetric warfare or cyber terrorism. Software-run power grids, telecommunication systems, and financial institutions are just a few examples of systems that are vulnerable to cyber attacks. At the extreme, some claim that cyber warfare can devastate economies and civilizations. [19] Moreover, whether cyber attacks are employed during war or as acts of terrorism, North Korean defector Kim Chŏl-su points out that there is an inherent difficulty in deterring cyber attacks with the threat of retaliation because it is often impossible to determine who launched an attack. [20]

Propaganda and Psychological Warfare
North Korea also uses cyberspace for its propaganda campaigns. At the North-South military talks in June 2004, both sides agreed to remove all forms of propaganda along the Demilitarized Zone separating the two Koreas. However, the Internet offers Pyongyang a much larger stage for its psychological warfare efforts. [20] South Korea is considered to have one of the highest rates of Internet usage, which makes the country an attractive target for Pyongyang’s propaganda dissemination. [21] Due to the inherent nature of the Internet, it is difficult to verify the accuracy of information or trace it back to North Korea, enabling Pyongyang to disseminate information and propaganda anonymously.

According to South Korea’s Defense Security Command, in 2004 North Korea was directly operating eight websites and indirectly operating 26 pro-Pyongyang websites. [22] While accounts vary slightly, some estimates have suggested pro-DPRK websites managed from China, Japan, and South Korea may number close to one hundred or more. [23] In November 2004, the South Korean Ministry of Information and Communication decided to require Internet service providers to restrict access to thirty-one pro-DPRK websites. [24] However, their content is still accessible via other media and outlets, and South Korea’s Ministry of National Defense estimated more than 30,000 people within its borders may have viewed North Korean propaganda in the latter months of 2004. Some analysts believe that North Korean propaganda may have an impact on growing anti-U.S. sentiments in South Korea. [25] (See related article, South Korean Opinion Polls: Majority Favors Nuclear Weapons; 1980s Generation Questions U.S. Ties, in the December 2005/January 2006 issue of WMD Insights.)

While North Korea denies Internet access to its own citizens, Pyongyang is able to use cyberspace to bombard South Korea and the world with its propaganda to denounce the United States, to evoke a spirit of Korean nationalism, and to promote North-South cooperation to the benefit of Pyongyang. In sum, North Korea’s psychological warfare in cyber-space is a one-way, “asymmetrical” engagement.

IT Industry and International Collaboration
In November 1999, the DPRK established the Ministry of Electronic Industries to manage and promote the electronics and information technology sectors. The ministry has also been tasked to track important international trends in IT. [26] Other institutions leading North Korea’s IT efforts include the National Academy of Science, the Pyongyang Informatics Center (PIC), and the Korea Computer Center (KCC).
Among others, the Academy of Science’s Institute of Computer Science is touted to have researched parallel computing, program development theories and tools, and artificial intelligence. [27]

PIC, which is believed to have been established in 1986 with the support of ethnic Koreans in Japan, is credited with having developed several multilingual software programs for various operating systems. [28] KCC was established in October 1990, with the aid of the pro-Pyongyang General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (GAKRJ). [29] At its opening ceremony, both Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il reportedly decided to name KCC as the primary computer center to launch North Korea’s IT industry.

North Korean efforts have succeeded in drawing South Korea’s attention. In March 2000, Samsung Electronics paired up with KCC to a launch a software development center in Beijing. The joint software development effort subsequently produced multiple programs, including word processing, multimedia, and entertainment programs, and the two firms are in the process of developing additional software. [30] Throughout 2001, numerous South Korean IT firms visited North Korea and struck deals with North Korean companies and organizations, as North Korea progressed from software development to telecommunications and the Internet. By December 2003, Seoul had approved a total of six inter-Korean IT projects amounting to $93 million in investments. [31]

Tokyo-based CGS — a software developer and retailer with links to KCC and the pro-Pyongyang GAKRJ — reportedly endeavors to be a leading provider of Korean language software and information technology products. [32] A pro-Pyongyang newspaper in Tokyo stated that CGS and KCC jointly produced a Korean input method editor (IME) for the Japanese market, and the two groups exchange software engineers each year. [33] CGS also reportedly claims to have several prominent Japanese, Chinese, and North Korean clients and partners, earning nearly $2.3 million by as early as 1999. [34] In July 2000, CGS joined with South Korean IMRI to form Unikotech.

Even though economic relations between U.S. and North Korean firms are virtually nonexistent, Syracuse University and Kim Ch’aek University of Technology have had eight research exchanges in the field of IT since 2002. [35] The projects include the designing and building of twin labs in Pyongyang and Syracuse, software specifications, correctness and conformity of programs and data standards, and other academic research. Syracuse University is said to have submitted a license application to the U.S. Department of Commerce requesting approval for the export of required technical equipment to the Pyongyang lab. [35]

Conclusion
Notwithstanding North Korea’s extreme isolation, it appears to be using increasingly up-to-date IT capabilities to its advantage in several areas. It is bolstering its weak economy by using IT as a conduit for the procurement of foreign technology and equipment, and as a vehicle for revenue-generating collaborations with foreign partners. In addition, Pyongyang is exploiting IT to advance its strategic interests by developing a cyber warfare capability (albeit of uncertain effectiveness) and to expand its propaganda efforts. Given its substantial investment in the field, particularly in training, and the apparent readiness of foreign entities in China, Japan, and elsewhere to work with North Korea on IT projects, Pyongyang’s growing capabilities in this arena will merit close monitoring.

Dave H. Kim – Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies