As Iran expands its missile arsenal and advances its nuclear program, Turkey has struggled to balance its anxieties about Iran’s weapons of mass destruction activities with its economic and security ties to Tehran. For the moment, Ankara has successfully managed these competing interests, but this delicate equilibrium could be upset if Western-led efforts to constrain Iran’s nuclear ambitions lead to confrontation in coming months.

Well-Placed to Engage Iran
On March 9, 2006, as the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) moved the matter of the Iranian nuclear program to the UN Security Council, IAEA Director-General Mohammad ElBaradei urged Turkey to play a more active role in efforts to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue. “There are only a few countries,” he declared, “which understand the issue and at the same time have the confidence
of both the Western actors and Iran.” [1]

Long considered a bridge between the West and the East, particularly the Middle East, Turkey does, indeed, appear to be well suited to play a constructive role in the controversy. As a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member, co-chair of the U.S.-initiated Greater Middle East Initiative, an EU-aspirant, a majority Muslim country, and a neighbor trusted by Iran, Turkey has significant ties to most of the primary players in the dispute. Moreover, Turkey’s political and geographic position gives it a major stake in the outcome of the matter. Thus, while not a current member of either the IAEA Board of Governors or the Security Council, Turkey finds itself among those nations caught in a tug of war between the United States and Iran, in which the United States is seeking to intensify international pressure on Iran to freeze sensitive uranium enrichment and plutonium production, while Iran seeks to drive a wedge between the United States and its allies, as it presses forward to develop these capabilities.

Apprehension of a Nuclear Iran
Turkey’s official stance on Iran’s nuclear program has been fairly cautious. In early March, for example, Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul stated that, “The international community has not been satisfied with the cooperation shown by Iran. We also want Iran to be more transparent.” [2] This call built on a similar statement issued by the Turkish Foreign Ministry in January, which declared that, “Turkey hopes that Iran would immediately engage into a full and transparent cooperation with the tripartite European Union (EU) group and the International Atomic Energy Agency to overcome the crisis of confidence.” [3] Both
statements essentially mirror the text of thenrecent IAEA resolutions, thereby reflecting the current international consensus on the issue. Such a safe stance enables Ankara to support international efforts to constrain Iran’s nuclear activities without unduly antagonizing Tehran.

While Turkey’s official admonitions regarding Iran’s lack of transparency disclosed little about Ankara’s fears of a nuclear armed Iran, Turkey has been more candid in bilateral meetings with its strategic partners. In a meeting between members of the Turkish and Israeli military staffs in December 2005, for example, at which the Turkish side briefed the Israelis on its findings regarding Iran’s nuclear and missile programs, a high-level Turkish military source was quoted as declaring Tehran’s nuclear activities to be “suspicious” and “threatening.” [4]

Turkey’s seizure in early February 2006 of 3,233 kilograms of Italian-made heavy aluminum destined for Iran can only have reinforced these concerns. According to Turkey’s Atomic Energy Agency, the material can be used to manufacture centrifuges capable of producing nuclear weaponsusable highly enriched uranium. [5] The aluminum was being transported on a truck by two Iranian drivers across the Turkey-Iran border crossing at Gurbulak, when the shipment was stopped by Turkish authorities. The seizure, believed to have
been facilitated by information provided to Turkey by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, also points
to Turkey’s willingness to take at least limited actions to slow Iran’s nuclear program.

Turkish anxieties about Iranian missile capabilities are also growing, as evidenced by Ankara’s decision in late February to allocate $800 million towards the development of a longrange missile defense capability. [6] Turkish interest in a missile defense system dates back to the late 1990s, but as of 2001, the U.S.
Congressional Research Service concluded that Turkey “apparently sees the missile threat as a long-term concern and currently has higher defense priorities.” [7] The recent decision to allocate funding for missile defense suggests that the Iranian threat has become more immediate and concrete in Turkish thinking. As a Turkish press account describes, “Since instability in the region has continued and Iran has developed Sahap-3 [sic] missiles, which have a range reaching Istanbul, Turkey decided to possess its own defense systems as soon as possible.” [8] Reports that Iran conducted a number of missile tests earlier in 2006, including one of a modified Shahab-3 intermediate-range ballistic missile, likely influenced this decision. [9]

Neighborly Relations
At the same time as Turkey considers Iran to be a growing security concern, it has sought to maintain cordial relations with Tehran on a number of levels. Trade between the two countries has grown dramatically in recent years, from $1 billion in 2000 to an estimated $4 billion in 2005. [10] Moreover, for Turkey, as for many other states, energy purchases from Iran are a significant factor in bilateral relations. In 1996, Turkey and Iran signed a $20 billion deal for Iran to supply Turkey with natural gas over a period of 25 years. [11]
While this deal has been the subject of a number of disputes between the two countries, including an 80% reduction in Iran’s supply of gas to Turkey in January 2006, Iran is still set to supply one-fifth of the natural gas consumed by Turkey annually. [12]

Turkey and Iran also share concerns regarding activities by dissident groups along their 310- mile border. In February 2006, Turkey signed a memorandum of understanding with Iran on a number of securityrelated
issues, in particular on mutual cooperation against particular terrorist groups and illicit trafficking. [13]
This accord reinforces previous agreements between the two countries established in 1999 and 2004, which are all aimed principally at building cooperation in dealing with the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), a Kurdish
separatist organization of Turkish concern, and the Mujahedin-e-Khalq Organization (MKO), an Iranian
resistance organization. [14] [15] Both groups are considered to be terrorist organizations by the two
countries, as well as by the United States.

Short-Lived Proposal for Enrichment in Turkey
Director-General ElBaradei has not been the only official to recognize a possible Turkish role in the nuclear standoff with Iran. As Turkish concerns regarding the Iranian nuclear program have grown, at least one well-placed Iranian official has apparently sought to reassure Ankara by proposing that the enrichment of uranium for Iranian nuclear power plants be undertaken on Turkish soil. If such an initiative were to rule out all enrichment in Iran, it could significantly reduce the dangers posed by Iranian nuclear activities. In introducing the new Iranian proposal during an early March 2006 interview with the Turkish press, Iranian
Ambassador to Turkey Firouz Dowlatabadi said only that, “the discussion includes nuclear enrichment,
developing nuclear fuel, but isn’t limited to that. If any of this was done on Turkish soil, it would be better for us.” [16] He indicated that the details of such an effort would have to be further discussed by experts. This proposal, moreover, echoed a similar initiative, pursued by Russia over the past year, to undertake all enrichment of uranium for Iran on Russian territory. That initiative lost momentum after Iran declared that, while it was prepared to have uranium enriched in Russia, it was unwilling to end all domestic enrichment activities as part of the arrangement.

It appears however, that the proposal for enrichment in Turkey did not have Tehran’s full backing. A week after such collaboration with Turkey was broached, an Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman dismissed the idea, stating “it is certainly out of the question to engage in a joint venture with any country other than Russia in that country’s territory.” [17] The proposal was also discounted by Russia, which noted that Turkey does not have the technological capacity to conduct the relevant nuclear fuel cycle activities. [18]

Public Opinion; Opposition to Sanctions
In addition to Turkey’s competing diplomatic interests vis-à-vis Iran, as a democracy, Turkey must also consider domestic attitudes towards Tehran. According to a recent private Turkish poll commissioned by a Turkish newspaper, “three quarters of Turks see the U.S. as the biggest threat to world peace - in contrast to a mere two percent which see Iran as the major threat.” [19] While such attitudes may not alter the threat perceptions of Turkish leaders regarding Iran, they may nonetheless constrain how strongly Turkey can lend its support to Western efforts to pressure Iran into slowing its nuclear activities.

For the moment, Turkey appears to be comfortable with its alignment with the EU on the Iranian issue and with a position that echoes that of the IAEA and its Board of Governors. However, with the UN Security Council now beginning to take up the Iranian nuclear issue and the imposition of punitive measures an increasing possibility, Turkey could be asked to take a harsher line with Tehran.

Foreign Minister Gul has already indicated that Turkey would be reluctant to support punitive action against Iran through the UN Security Council because of the adverse impact it could have on Turkey. “Turkey will be deeply affected,” he noted, “by possible sanctions against Iran.” [20] Turkey is also likely to oppose military intervention against Iran, replaying the position it took prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, in which the Turkish Parliament rejected the proposed deployment of up to 62,000 US troops in Turkish territory as a
northern front against Iraq. [21]

Increasingly anxious about growing Iranian nuclear and missile capabilities, but dependent on trade and good relations with Tehran and fearful that sanctions against Iran will ultimately harm Turkey, Ankara will need to tread carefully in coming months. Turkey’s complex situation is also a consideration to be kept in mind by U.S. policymakers in order to maintain realistic expectations as to how forcefully Ankara will support tough American action against Tehran.

Peter Crail – Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation