In the run-up to a visit to Kyrgyzstan by Sergey Kiriyenko, head of the Russian Atomic Energy Agency (Rosatom), local news sources anticipated that Russia might use the visit to propose establishment of a joint venture for the extraction of uranium ore. Kyrgyzstan was a major source of uranium for the Soviet nuclear program, but extraction at several sites, such as Minkush, Aktyuz, Kadjisay, and Maylysu, has stopped because of excessively high cost. The Kyrgyz information agency Kabar disclosed, however, that operations at these sites have been only suspended and could be restarted, if necessary. [1] Mining and concentration of uranium ore in Kyrgyzstan is currently undertaken only at Kara-Balta.

If true, reports about Rosatom’s plan to enter into some form of agreement with Kyrgyzstan on uranium production would fit into a broader Russian strategy aimed at securing reliable sources of natural uranium, which are lacking in Russia. In a broader sense, this plan reflects a recent statement by Sergey Kiriyenko to “restore the technological complex of MinSredMash,” referring to the Ministry of Medium Machine-Building, the Soviet governmental agency that oversaw the entire Soviet nuclear industry and was the precursor of Russia’s Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom), which is now Rosatom. [2]

The new ties between Russia and Kyrgyzstan in the area of uranium are an important sign of the growing ties between these two countries after a period of more difficult relations. The ouster of Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev in the March 2005 Tulip Revolution was initially seen by Moscow as another example, together with the 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia and the 2004-2005 Orange Revolution in Ukraine, of Western-supported democracy movements displacing leaders sympathetic to Russia. Russia has perceived these developments as significantly eroding its leverage in nearby states and fears that the pattern may spread to additional states in the region. Kyrgyzstan, however, is one case in which initial Russian concerns proved overblown. The new Kyrgyz government, for example, has allowed Moscow to expand the Russian Air Force base at Kant and at the same time has demanded dramatically increased fees from the United States for the continued use of the Manas Air Base. Indeed, Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiev even threatened to close the base if the United States did not agree to the higher rent. The possible agreement on uranium supply is likely to solidify further the already strong influence of Moscow in this Central Asian country.

Nikolai Sokov - Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies