As the Iranian nuclear crisis evolves, sharp divisions have appeared within Egypt’s political elites and its academic community over the dangers posed by the Iranian nuclear program and the proper response of Egypt and other Arab states.

The Egyptian government on numerous occasions has emphasized its opposition to Iran’s potential acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability. This was best demonstrated on February 4, 2006, when Egypt voted in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors with the United States and the EU-3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) in favor of referring the Iranian nuclear file to the United Nations Security Council because of Iran’s non-compliance with its IAEA inspection agreement. [See “Non-Aligned Realigning to Confront Iran” in the March 2006 Issue of WMD Insights.]

Further elaborating the Egyptian government’s views, moreover, in March 2006, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, during a European tour, underscored the grave consequences that would result in the Middle East from any use of military force against Iran, emphasizing that the crisis should be resolved by diplomatic means. [1] He also stated, while speaking during a press conference with German Chancellor Angela Merkel, that “we cannot talk about only Iran’s nuclear commitment. We have to talk about the region in its entirety. We also have to talk about Israel.” [2]

In a similar vein, Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmad Abu al-Ghayt has stated, on multiple occasions, that while he supports Iran’s right to build a peaceful nuclear program, Iran should not be allowed to posses nuclear weapons. [3] He emphasized the need to create a WMD Free Zone in the Middle East, a long-standing Egyptian goal, which while pertinent to Iran’s aspirations, is largely aimed at eliminating Israel’s nuclear arsenal. [4]

The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the foremost Egyptian opposition group, has adopted a position that sharply contrasts with the official view. The Muslim Brotherhood won noteworthy gains in the recent Egyptian parliamentary elections and currently holds 76 seats in the 454-member Egyptian Parliament. When a prominent member of the Brotherhood was asked about the Iranian nuclear program, he stated that a nuclear weapon-armed Iran would not be harmful but instead would be helpful in establishing a balance between Israel and the Arab and Islamic world. [5] Asked if he welcomed the idea of a nuclear-armed Iran, he stated, “I don’t see the harm” and that he believed that the majority of the Egyptian people agree with the Brotherhood on this point. [6] Indeed, recent unofficial polls conducted by Arab news sources support this claim by the Muslim Brotherhood and suggest that, unlike their governments, a large majority of Arab citizens in the Middle East may support the Iranian nuclear program. [7]

Such views are also common among Egyptian intellectuals and security specialists. An Egyptian analyst, Muhammad Abdel Salam of the al-Ahram Center for Strategic Studies, explained in an interview that support for Iran’s nuclear weapon ambitions is quite prevalent in unofficial Arab circles: “Anything that bothers Israel and the U.S.,” he stated, “is perceived as good for the Arabs.” [8] Another prominent Egyptian analyst, Salama Ahmad Salama, suggested in a March 2006 opinion piece that since the 2003 war in Iraq, the Arabs have lost faith in U.S. foreign policy. He argued that Iran is not a threat to the Arab World and that Arabs are not afraid of a nuclear-armed Tehran. On the contrary, Salama stated, in a struggle between Iran and the United States, “the Arabs do not want to see Iran losing this fight.” [9] On the other hand, Salama asserted that Arab and Muslim states have not done anything to support Iran during this crisis: “Iran is fighting a battle. It is fighting a battle on behalf of the entire Third World, and it is standing alone…. As for our misfortunate region, more trouble is ahead.” [10]

Egytian nuclear scientist Dr. Abdullah Hilal took a similar stance during a live television broadcast on al-Jazeera, declaring that “the American-Zionist alliance has resorted to deceiving the Arabs into thinking that the Iranian position regarding nuclear weapons poses a danger and that this weapon will be specifically a threat to the Arabs. But is this really the case? Is an Iranian nuclear capability or even a nuclear weapon a threat to the Arabs?... All the Arab countries have failed in their strategic nuclear thinking despite the fact that the ‘Zionist Entity’ possesses a nuclear weapon and threatens everyone… Is it the right of the Arabs and Muslims to possess nuclear weapons? This is an important strategic question; as long as there remains an enemy that possesses a deadly arsenal…there must be a deterrent.” [11]

Egyptian analysts’ views are not monolithic, however. Commenting on a nuclear armed Iran, columnist Sajini Dolrimani stated in al-Ahram, Egypt’s foremost (and government-controlled) newspaper, that “Iran’s ending of the Israeli nuclear monopoly would prompt other Middle Eastern countries to strive to possess these weapons, whether by developing them or purchasing them, something which will make the region less secure and stable.” [12]

Dr. Mohammad Zahran, a former Egyptian delegate to UN organizations in Geneva and a prominent expert on nonproliferation, offered yet another view of the issue. In an interview with al-Ahram, he stated that he believed the Iranian issue had gained too much unnecessary publicity: “In reality the Iranian crisis has preoccupied world opinion more than necessary. This is a subject which is considered normal in the context of a developing country’s right to possess peaceful nuclear technology.” [13] When asked about his opinion regarding Iran’s enrichment capabilities, Zahran affirmed that “Iran’s success in uranium enrichment is considered a positive step in the right direction because Iran and other non-nuclear countries that joined the NPT are supposed to aspire to achieve economic and social development – among these countries is Egypt. That is our right.” [14] When asked if he considered Iran to be a new nuclear power in the Middle East region, Zahran explained: “This consideration is not exact. Iran itself confirmed that it is a party to the NPT, and it will not leave the treaty. It is not Iran’s intention to withdraw despite the fact that it is Iran’s right to withdraw.…What does it mean that Iran does not want to withdraw? It means that Iran is convinced to remain a guaranteed party of the non-nuclear weapons states.” [15] Dr. Zahran concluded, “I have heard of the GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council] fears, I think these fears were instilled by the U.S. and other Western nations who wish to portray Iran’s nuclear activities as a threat to the Gulf states.” [16]

These diverging views and debates within Egyptian society and elites are significant, given Egypt’s traditional role in the Arab world. As the largest and most powerful Arab country, opinions within Egypt are traditionally reflective of prevalent sentiments within the greater Arab community. Despite the Egyptian government’s solid stance against Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons, and its firm support for the United States and EU-3 in the IAEA Board of Governors, it appears that the view of the Egyptian government on this matter lacks wide support. It is also apparent that many Egyptian citizens and intellectuals do not accept Western arguments concerning Iran. For one, Western pressure on Iran is viewed as illegitimate since Iran is seen as having the right to pursue peaceful nuclear technology under the NPT. Perhaps more significantly, it appears that many Egyptians do not view a nuclear-armed Iran as a threat to their nation or to the Arab world in general. On the contrary, they sympathize with the view implicitly held by the Iranian government that the possession of such a capability would serve as a deterrent to Western hegemony in the region and as a counter-balance to the Israeli nuclear arsenal.

Sammy Salama, Gina Cabrera-Farraj - Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies