Despite strong popular support in Iran for the country’s nuclear program, the recent escalation of international pressure on Tehran to end its pursuit of sensitive nuclear technology has produced fissures within Iran’s political leadership. Amidst growing dissent over President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s overall confrontational approach to the West, Iranian reformists, former ministers, and student groups have openly expressed concern that Ahmadinejad’s management of the nuclear issue is putting Iran on a perilous path.

Highlighting growing concerns within Iran over Ahmadinejad’s defiant approach to dealing with the United States and its European allies, in late March 2006, a number of Iranian reformists, including several ministers in the government of former president Mohammed Khatami, wrote a letter of concern to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The letter warned him of the “dangerous politics” being pursued by Ahmadinejad and of the potentially grave implications of his actions for Iran. [1] The letter also criticized the increased censorship of media outlets and called for more transparency within the government, stating that increased transparency would create unity among the Iranian people and would allow them to better defend themselves against the West. [2] One reformist warned that Ahmadinejad’s provocative statements, such as those calling for the elimination of Israel and questioning the reality of the Holocaust, would lead Iran to a destructive confrontation with the United States and NATO. [3] (The reformist faction in Iranian politics, in general, seeks to strengthen democratic institutions and reduce the role of Iran’s non-elected fundamentalist religious leaders.) Even some Iranian conservatives, however, have apparently expressed concern about Ahmadinejad’s “extremist politics.” [4]

Against this background, following Ahmadinejad’s public announcement on April 11, 2006, that Iran had “joined the club of nuclear countries” by enriching uranium for the first time, an Iranian pro-reform student group, the Office to Foster Unity, called upon the government to postpone its nuclear activities, arguing that the manner in which the nuclear issue was being handled endangered Iran’s national security. [5] The spokesman for the group, Saber Sheykhlou, stated: “The irrational and confrontational behavior of those who are in power has put the country and the nation on the threshold of war or devastating sanctions; the referral of Iran’s nuclear case to the UN Security Council [on February 4, 2006] was the result of Iran’s biggest foreign-policy mistake.” [6] Sheykhlou went on to say that “the spending of billions of dollars for nuclear purposes is contrary to Iran’s national interests.” [7]

Sheykhlou’s remarks came little more than a month after former Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Mohsen Aminzadeh criticized Ahmadinejad’s management of the nuclear crisis. In his March 7, 2006, comments, Aminzadeh stressed that Iran needed foreign cooperation to advance its nuclear industry because it lacked sufficient domestic uranium deposits. [See “Former Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Reveals Weaknesses in Iran’s Nuclear Program, Dissension Among Iran Elite” in the April 2006 Issue of WMD Insights.]

In another dissenting commentary, on April 20, the former chief Iranian nuclear negotiator, Hasan Rowhani, declared at a gathering of the opposition Moderation and Development Party that Iranian policy-makers should be more rational in their decision-making about the nuclear issue and argued that Iran’s cynicism towards the West in such sensitive situations could be counter-productive. Noting that many of the country’s nuclear achievements had been accomplished under former presidents Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani and Mohammed Khatami, he emphasized that as nuclear chief he was close to reaching a comprehensive understanding with British, French, and German negotiators that could have resolved the confrontation over Iran’s nuclear activities. Unfortunately, he stated, because of the more confrontational tactics of President Ahmadinejad, Iran has had to pay a “heavy price.” [8] Rowhani had also served as Secretary of the powerful Supreme National Security Council, but was removed in August 2005 by Supreme Leader Khamenei, after Ahmadinejad took office following Iran’s June 2005 elections.

These dissents were strongly reinforced on April 25, when Hashemi Rafsanjani, the current head of the powerful Iranian Expediency Council and former President of the Islamic Republic told an
international conference in Tehran on Iran’s nuclear technology, “I can clearly see that Iran’s nuclear dossier is not on the right track. This deviation has created a series of problems for us and will distress others in the future.” Although he did not publicly criticize current Iranian President Ahmadinejad, to whom he lost the 2005 Iranian presidential election, and blamed the United States for its long-term animosity against Iran, Rafsanjani’s statement highlights the growing dissatisfaction in important political circles with the direction of Iranian nuclear diplomacy. [9]

More recently, in mid-May 2006, similar sentiments were voiced by prominent opposition member Ibrahim Yazdi, who currently leads the Iran Freedom Movement. Mr. Yazdi was an aide to the founder of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and Iran’s first foreign minister following the 1979 Revolution. Mr. Yazdi stated that Iran should forgo uranium enrichment to avoid further complications and should not rely on a Russian or Chinese veto to save it from punitive actions by the UN Security Council. [10] He argued that in order to avoid economic sanctions or even potential military strikes, Tehran should accept Russia’s offer under which Iran would end its enrichment activities and Russia would meet Iran’s nuclear fuel needs by enriching uranium on Russian soil. Although Iran has the right to enrich uranium, he continued, it must first safeguard its national interest, which at this time mandates that Iran abandon enrichment activities. [11]

Commenting on the current state of Iranian nuclear politics during a recent talk in Washington, D.C., a foreign diplomat based in Tehran argued that Supreme Leader Khamenei is supporting Ahmadinejad’s hard line for the time being. But, he said, if Iran suffered significant setbacks as a result of the latter’s policies – such as strong action against it at the UN Security Council – Khamenei would likely intervene and move the nuclear portfolio to more pragmatic managers, oriented toward compromise. [12]

These developments do not appear to have diminished the considerable popular support for Iran’s nuclear program. Although many Iranians may worry about the possible imposition of sanctions against the Islamic Republic in the aftermath of the referral of the nuclear controversy to the UN Security Council, a recent poll by Iranian Radio Farda indicates that 75 percent of Iranian citizens continue to support the expansion of the country’s nuclear program. [13] On the other hand, the tough stance taken by the International Atomic Energy Agency, the United States, and its European partners and the referral of the matter to the UN Security Council appear to have had an impact in Tehran and to have caused some Iranian political figures to doubt Ahmadinejad’s management of this crisis. It remains to be seen whether such dissention will increase in the future and what impact it will have, if any, on the direction of Iran’s nuclear policy.

Sammy Salama, Gina Cabrera-Farraj - Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies