In surprisingly candid comments during his May 10, 2006, address to the Federal Assembly (an analogue to the State of the Union Address in the United States), Russian President Vladimir Putin expressed concern that destabilizing U.S. strategic advances threatened to extend the Cold War era arms race. He declared, however, that because of other budgetary priorities, Russia would meet its fundamental defense requirements not by matching the United States capability for capability, but through an “asymmetrical” response based on “intellectual superiority,” that would increase the reliability and effectiveness of Russia’s nuclear forces. [1]
Putin devoted roughly one third of the May 10 address to defense policy, repeatedly invoking areas of disagreement with Washington, although rarely mentioning the United States by name. After stressing the dangers of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism, for example, Putin indirectly criticized the United States for its readiness to use means other than international diplomacy to address this problem:
We unambiguously support strengthening the non-proliferation regime, without any exceptions, on the basis of international law. We know that strong-arm methods rarely achieve the desired result and that their consequences can even be more terrible than the original threat.
Putin next emphasized that while concerns about terrorism are so acute that they have taken key disarmament issues off the international agenda, “it is too early to speak of an end of the arms race.” Indeed, he continued, “the arms race has entered a new spiral today with the achievement of new levels of technology that raise the danger of the emergence of a whole arsenal of so-called destabilizing weapons.” The examples of such weapons Putin provided are all clearly associated with the United States: possible deployment of nuclear weapons in outer space, possible development of low-yield nuclear weapons, and deployment of conventional warheads on strategic missiles. [See “Russia Weighing U.S. Plan to Put Non-Nuclear Warheads on Long-Range Missiles” in this issue of WMD Insights.]
To meet the challenges of terrorism, proliferation, and advanced, destabilizing weapons, he declared, is the responsibility of “the world’s leading powers, the countries that possess nuclear weapons and powerful levers of military and political influence.” This, he concluded, “is why the issue of modernizing Russia’s Armed Forces is extremely important today and is of such concern to Russian society.”
However, Putin then starkly laid out the limited budgetary resources at Russia’s disposal to achieve this goal, noting that the country’s defense expenditures were equal to those of France or Great Britain as a percentage of GDP, but represented less than half their expenditures in absolute terms. The U.S. military budget, he then pointed out, was 25 times greater than Russia’s. Noting that the United States had followed the Russian precept of making one’s home into one’s fortress, he declared that Russia must do the same, given the threats potentially confronting it. In a veiled reference to the United States, he continued:
How quickly all the pathos of the need to fight for human rights and democracy is laid aside the moment the need to realize one’s own interests comes to the fore. In the name of one’s own interests everything is possible, it turns out, and there are no limits.
Putin followed this expression of anxiety with the crucial point of his comments:
But though we realize the full seriousness of this problem, we must not repeat the mistakes of the Soviet Union, the mistakes of the Cold War era, neither in politics nor in defense strategy. We must not resolve our defense issues at the expense of economic and social development. This is a dead end road that ultimately leaves a country’s reserves exhausted. There is no future in it.
Accordingly, the Russian modernization programs Putin then reviewed are primarily in the area of strategic weapons. He promised that in the next five years, strategic forces would be equipped with new delivery vehicles and specifically mentioned the following: deployment of two new nuclear submarines with strategic missiles, deployments of the “Topol-M” strategic land-based missiles, and the induction of a maneuvering nuclear warhead capable of penetrating missile defenses. “Along with the means for overcoming anti-missile defenses that we already have,” he concluded, “these new types of arms will enable us to maintain what is definitely one of the most important guarantees of lasting peace, namely, the strategic balance of forces.”
Reiterating his theme that Russia must operate within the bounds of significant budgetary constraints, Putin then added:
We must take into account the plans and development vectors of other countries’ armed forces, and we must keep ourselves informed on promising developments, but we should not go after quantity and simply throw our money to the wind. Our responses must be based on intellectual superiority. They will be asymmetrical, not as costly, but they will unquestionably make our nuclear triad more reliable and effective.
Speech Reflects Recent Trends
To a certain extent, the attention Putin devoted to modernization of strategic weapons and the strategic balance with the United States may have been intended as an indirect response to an article in the February 2006 issue of the prestigious journal Foreign Affairs, which alleged that Russia was losing ability to deter the United States through an assured retaliatory strike capability. [See “Moscow Rejects U.S. Authors’ Claims Of U.S. First-Strike Capability, as Putin Protects Nuclear Weapons Infrastructure” in the May 2006 Issue of WMD Insights.] However, ensuring the effectiveness of Russia’s strategic deterrent had been a constant theme before the article was published in Russian official statements for many months, including those by Putin, himself, and appeared to reflect an underlying preoccupation with strategic balance issues, independent of the charges in the Foreign Affairs analysis. [2]
It appears, moreover, that Putin’s May 10 statement was not mere rhetoric, as Russia indeed seems to be moving at full steam with testing and deployment of new strategic weapons.
On April 22, 2006, about two weeks prior to Putin’s address to the Federal Assembly, Russia’s Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) conducted a new test of the maneuverable warhead designed to penetrate an American missile defense system. Like the previous test of the warhead in November 2005, this one was launched from the Kapustin Yar test range in central Russia, to the Sary Shagan test range in Kazakhstan, making it more difficult for the United States to monitor. Unlike last November, however, the test launch did not utilize a “Topol” ICBM; this time the SRF used a modification of the “Kosmos-3M” space launch vehicle that was specially designed for the testing of warheads. [3] An official spokesman for the SRF, Aleksandr Vovk, added that besides the warhead itself, the test also featured additional unidentified defense-penetration assets. [4] In mid-May, Chief of the General Staff Yuri Baluevski noted that defense-penetrating warheads could in the future be equipped with conventional explosives, as well as nuclear. [5]
On May 23, 2006, Vice Premier and Minister of Defense Sergey Ivanov announced that the test opened “state trials” for the new warhead – a process that precedes official adoption of a weapon for deployment – and that these trials should be completed in 2008. [6] He also emphasized the need to address the challenge of missile defenses in secret testimony the same day before the Duma (the lower house of the Russian parliament).
In parallel with these initiatives, in early May, Commander of the Russian Navy Vladimir Masorin announced that in the next five years, the bulk of funding for the Navy would be concentrated on strengthening its strategic component and only after that would monies be redirected at building conventional ships. [7] On May 24, as Ivanov was noting progress on Russia’s maneuverable warhead, Masorin announced that the new strategic nuclear submarine, Yuri Dolgoruki, which is the first SSBN in the “Borey” class, would begin sea trials this year and might be commissioned as early as 2007, provided sea trials are successful. [8] Experts believe that in terms of their deterrence value, the new “Borey” class submarines, three of which are now under construction, are twice as efficient as “Delta IV” class submarines, which were built in 1980s. According to Russian classification, the “Borey” class represents the third generation of nuclear submarines. [9]
Even if Russian resources are concentrated largely on strategic systems, however, holding costs down in line with Putin’s May 10 pronouncements may be challenging, because prices of these systems have been growing significantly. According to the Russian Ministry of Economic Development, the price of the second and the third strategic “Borey” class submarines has increased several times since the keel of the Yuri Dolgoruki was laid in the late 1990s. [10] Moreover, in just three years (2002-2005), according to the Ministry, the price of the new strategic land-based missile, “Topol-M,” tripled – although, Yuri Solomonov, Director and Chief Designer of the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology, which designed both “Topol-M” and “Bulava” strategic missiles, claims that during the same period the price of “Topol-M” missiles increased only two percent above inflation.
[11] [12]
In the end, it appears that Russia will have little choice but to adopt the strategy outlined by Putin on May 10 of managing a strategic capability that is asymmetrical to that of the United States. Whether cost increases will require greater asymmetry than Putin now envisions remains to be seen.
Nikolai Sokov – Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies
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 SOURCES AND NOTES
[1] This and other extracts from Putin’s address can be found in, Vladimir Putin, “Poslanie Federalnomu Sobraniyu Rossiiskoi Federatsii” [An Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation], May 10, 2006, text available at the official site of the President of the Russian Federation at http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2006/05/10/1823_type70029type82912_105566.shtml. [View Article]
[2] Based on tracking of Russian media reporting during 2006 by Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies staff.
[3] Ivan Safronov, “”Rossiya Skreshchivaet Boegolovki” [Russia Breeds Warheads], Kommersant-Daily, April 24, 2006.
[4] Dmitri Litovkin, “Shest Boegolovok na Odnu Raketu” [Six Warheads per Missile], Izvestiya, April 25, 2006.
[5] “Baluevski: Rossiiskie Rakety Budut Preodolevat Luybye PRO” [Baluevski: Russian Missiles Will Penetrate Any BMD], Strana.Ru, May 18, 2006.
[6] “Rossiiskie Raketnye Kompleksy Moderniziruyut” [Russian Missile Complexes Will Be Modernized], Strana.Ru, April 24, 2006.
[7] “VMF Zaimetsya Obnovleniem Podvodnogo Flota” [The Navy Will Concentrate on Modernizing the Submarine Fleet], Strana.Ru, May 3, 2006.
[8] “Noveishaya Strategicheskaya Submarina Vskore Poyavitsya u VMF” [The Navy Will Soon Have a New Strategic Submarine], Strana.Ru, May 25, 2006.
[9] “Tonnazh – Ne Glavnoe” [Tonnage is Not the Main Criterion], Vedomosti, May 5, 2006.
[10] Nikita Petrov, “Armiyu Perevooruzhat” [The Armed Forces Will Be Rearmed], Strana.Ru, May 6, 2006.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Aleksandr Babakin, “Otvetno-Vstrechnyi Udar Neizbezhen” [Strike on Warning is Unavoidable], Nezavisimoe Voenoe Obozrenie, May 19, 2006.
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