In mid-May 2006, activity around North Korea’s missile test site at Musudan-ri, North Hamgyŏng Province, indicated that North Korea could be preparing to flight test a long-range ballistic missile. On June 14-15, unnamed U.S. officials began to warn that North Korea was loading liquid fuel into a missile, which they referred to as the Taepodong-2 and that a launch was possible within days. [1] Japan’s Sankei Shimbun reported that North Koreans were being instructed to fly the national flag at 2:00 PM on Sunday, June 18 and to watch the evening television news for a message, which many people believed would be the announcement of a satellite launch. [2] However, no launch occurred, and by June 19 divergent opinions emerged in Seoul and Washington regarding the fueling of the missile and whether Pyongyang was preparing to launch a missile or a space launch vehicle to place a satellite into orbit. Some South Korean government officials believed Washington and Tokyo were exaggerating the threat and that U.S. intelligence could be flawed. [3]

Divergent Views Over Possible Launch
On June 20, Kim Sŭng-gyu, Director of South Korea’s National Intelligence Service (NIS), told the Intelligence Committee of the South Korean National Assembly that approximately 40 containers of rocket fuel had been observed near the North Korean launch site and that the NIS estimated the containers would not be sufficient to complete the fueling of the missile. [4] The NIS report to the National Assembly also revealed that the name of the missile is Paektusan-2. It further noted that in mid-1999, while in negotiations with the United States over curbing the North Korean missile program, North Korea had erected a similar missile, then known as the Taepodong, on a launch pad. It removed the missile in September 1999, some 50 days later, after agreeing to implement a moratorium on flight tests of long-range missiles for the duration of talks with the United States aimed at halting North Korean missile program and improving relations between the two countries. [5]

On June 21, the Chosŏn Sinbo, a newspaper published by the pro-North Korean General Association of Korean Residents in Japan, published a report from Pyongyang that confirmed the missile’s name as the Paektusan-2 and claimed it would be configured to launch the satellite Kwangmyŏngsŏng-2. [6] The Chosŏn Sinbo reiterated Pyongyang’s sovereign right to launch satellites and to explore outer space. The publication also criticized the United States for “misrepresenting Pyongyang’s satellite launch preparations as a program to develop an intercontinental ballistic missile,” and claimed that a launch could come at any time, even “a month or a year later.” [7]

On June 22, the political debate in South Korea regarding the launch intensified when Minister of National Defense Yun Kwang-ung testified before the National Assembly’s National Defense Committee. Yun told lawmakers that “the Roh government had concluded that a launch was not imminent,” but when pressed by the opposition Grand National Party (GNP or “Hannaradang”) whether the Paektusan-2 was configured as a missile or as a space launch vehicle, Yun said the Defense Ministry was preparing to view it as a missile test but he could not rule out that it could have been configured to launch a satellite. [8] (A launch under either configuration would provide essential test data for a long-range missile, but lofting a satellite would be less provocative than firing an overtly military system.)

The divergent views over the rocket’s configuration and whether a launch was imminent led to a raucous debate and to sharp criticism of the Roh Moo-hyun government. Long associated with the Uri Party, President Roh has been weakened by the party’s crushing defeat in local elections that were held on May 31, 2006, and many National Assembly members were eager to exploit the steep drop in the government’s popularity. The South Korean Constitution prohibits Roh from seeking re-election in December 2007, and his lame duck status is now apparent, as Uri Party lawmakers have begun to distance themselves from him. [9]

In particular, opposition lawmakers pointed with alarm to reports that the United States had activated its ground-based missile defense interceptors in Alaska and California and placed them in operational mode, as well as to the apparent divergence in the assessments of the impending launch by the United States and the Roh government. At the same time, the Roh government gave the impression of being in some disarray regarding how it might respond to a North Korean flight test. Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Ban Ki-moon (Pan Ki-mun) has suggested that Seoul would respond to a launch with punitive measures in collaboration with Washington, Tokyo, and the international community, but that the details of a coordinated response remain under discussion. [10] Other South Korean officials appeared to favor a softer line. One government source declared that it would not be appropriate at this juncture to bring the issue before the United Nations Security Council. [11] Similarly, Minister of Unification Lee Jong-seok (Yi Chong-sŏk) has said Seoul would reply to a launch with only “limited sanctions” and that the inter-Korean Kaesŏng Industrial Complex in North Korea would not be affected. [12] Another South Korean government source said the Mount Kŭmgang Tourism project in North Korea would also be protected from any sanctions. [13] The formal position of the Roh government is that a launch would “make it difficult for the government to fulfill North Korea’s recent requests for additional fertilizer and food aid.” [14]

Roh government officials and Uri Party lawmakers stressed the need to cooperate with Washington in dealing with the North Korean missile issue, but the opposition GNP and conservative newspapers became highly critical of the Roh government when they learned that President Roh and President Bush have not spoken by telephone for nine months. Commentators in South Korea expressed dismay when White House spokesman Tony Snow said on June 20 that Bush had called a dozen heads of state to discuss the DPRK missile issue, but that Bush had not called Roh. [15] Critics were also quick to point out that there have been no phone calls or recent communications between U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and South Korean Defense Minister Yun Kwang-ung, but Yun told lawmakers on June 22 that the crisis had not reached the point where it was necessary to speak with Rumsfeld. [16] Roh government officials were left scrambling to explain the lack of high-level communication between Washington and Seoul, but on June 23, National Security Advisor Song Min-sun announced that Roh and Bush would hold a summit in Washington in September and that Song would travel to Washington in July to meet with his counterpart, U.S. National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley, to arrange the summit. [17]

South Korean Reliance on U.S. Intelligence
The commotion over North Korea’s missile launch preparation also brought attention to Seoul’s reliance upon Washington for key intelligence on North Korea. Some prominent South Korean lawmakers and advocates of a strong U.S.-South Korean alliance have viewed intelligence sharing as a cornerstone of bilateral trust. [18] However, some South Koreans have viewed the alliance as unbalanced and as an impediment to inter-Korean reconciliation. Anti-American groups, for example, are opposed to any U.S.-South Korean defense cooperation, including intelligence sharing. Ironically, recent events surrounding North Korea’s Paektusan-2 have led conservatives, who are normally advocates of tighter bilateral ties with the United States, to share the view of many leftists that Seoul needs to reduce its dependence on Washington for intelligence—although they hold this view for quite different reasons.

Conservative opposition lawmakers criticized Roh government officials by emphasizing that because Seoul lacks an independent intelligence capability, the government could not make key assessments as to whether the Paektusan-2 launch was imminent or whether the system was configured as a missile or space launch vehicle. They noted the government was especially dependent upon Washington for satellite imagery of the Musandan-ri test site on North Korea’s northeastern coast. Indeed, according to some South Korean media, over 90 percent of Seoul’s important intelligence information comes from the United States. [19] Critics claimed the Roh government should rapidly expand the country’s intelligence collection
capability and exert its independence from Washington in this critical area. [20]

The South Korean media emphasized that the U.S. KH-12 satellite has an optical camera with 10-centimeter resolution, but South Korea’s Arirang-1 Earth observation satellite has a resolution of only 6.6 meters at best. However, in July 2006, South Korea’s Arirang-2 will be launched from Russia and will have a resolution of one meter, greatly improving Seoul’s independent satellite imagery capability. [21] [See “South Korea to Launch First Military Communication Satellite and Improved Observation Satellite” in the April 2006 issue of WMD Insights.] South Korea plans to send its own satellite launch vehicle into space in 2007 from the South Korean Space Center in South Chŏlla Province. Although South Korea is an active member of the Missile Technology Control Regime and is therefore encouraged to exercise restraint in the development of space launch vehicles and ballistic missiles, many South Koreans feel the government should expand its space presence and establish a robust satellite launch capability for both commercial and military applications. The recent controversy surrounding Pyongyang’s Paektusan-2 has increased demands within South Korean society for a reassessment of Seoul’s programs in this sphere, as a hedge against potentially unstable relations with Washington and against an uncertain regional security environment.

Daniel A. Pinkston – Monterey Institute of International Studies