On May 29, 2006, Indian Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee and Chinese Defense Minister General Cao Gangchuan signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Defense Cooperation, the first such agreement between the two states and an important sign of the improving relations between them. The MOU establishes a framework for:

• frequent exchanges between the leaders and high-level functionaries of the defense ministries and the armed forces of India and China;
  
• an Annual Defense Dialogue at a mutually agreed level to be hosted alternatively by the two sides;
  joint military exercises and/or training programs in the fields of search and rescue, anti-piracy, counter-terrorism, and other areas of mutual interest, including facilitating the exchange of military observers to witness designated military exercises; and
  
• a mechanism for the exchange of military officers and relevant civilian officials for study tours, seminars, and extended study at their counterpart military academies. [1]

Reaction to the initiative was highly favorable in the Chinese media, which also took note, however, of factors likely to limit the future extent of military ties between Beijing and New Delhi. The Indian media was also generally positive in describing the MOU and its implications, although some observers were more guarded about China’s motives for promoting the agreement.

China
Indian Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee’s May 28-June 2 visit to China has received favorable media coverage in that country. Chinese commentators considered the visit a major milestone in Sino-Indian defense ties, in that the two militaries are beginning to institutionalize bilateral military relations. The most noticeable achievement in this regard is the signing of the Sino-Indian Memorandum of Understanding on Defense Cooperation. In addition to meeting Chinese leaders and his counterpart General Cao Gangchuan, Mukherjee also visited a number of cities and military facilities during his visit, including the Lanzhou Military Region, the first foreign defense minister to do so. [2]

Chinese media pointed out that Mukherjee’s visit was notable in a number of respects. The first is that it builds upon the overall improvement in bilateral political and economic ties of the past several years. Indeed, since the historic visit of Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes to China in April 2003, the Chinese Defense Minister and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) General Chief of Staff have both visited India. Second, media analysts noted that the visit represented one of a series of efforts by defense officials in both countries to strengthen military confidence building measures, which to date has included two maritime joint exercises. These efforts were seen as promoting mutual understanding and contributing to regional peace and stability. Third, commentators stressed, the signing of the MOU on Defense Cooperation indicates that the military relationship between the two countries has moved from the general and declaratory phase to the more specific cooperation in functional areas, such as joint anti-terrorist operations, search and rescue, and, in the future, possibly joint air force exercises. [3]

While the Sino-Indian MOU on Defense Cooperation is a major step in bilateral relations, Chinese commentators were also realistic about the limitation of bilateral military ties. Links between the two militaries remain limited in both scope and depth, and the two countries have yet to resolve their territorial disputes. Furthermore, the U.S.-India nuclear deal, China’s continuing defense assistance to Pakistan, and the changing East Asian and South Asian strategic landscapes will likely lead both Beijing and New Delhi to proceed cautiously in building their strategic relationship, which, in turn, will affect the extent of their bilateral military engagement. Meanwhile, Chinese analysts remain mindful of India’s efforts to achieve great power status and of its defense modernization programs, which aim to enhance the Indian military’s force projection and oceanic combat capabilities, and are seen by the Chinese as clear evidence of New Delhi’s strategic ambitions. [4]

India
Against the backdrop of the “China–India Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Security,” agreed upon by both sides during the April 2005 visit of Premier Wen Jiabao to New Delhi, the signing of the first-ever MOU between the Defense Ministries of China and India marked a high point in the intensified strategic and cooperative relations between the two neighboring nations. [5] Following closely on the heels of President A.P.J. Kalam’s visit to Singapore in February 2006, where Kalam stated that the wound caused by the 1962 conflict between India and China had healed and that “our national aim is the coming together of the two Asian powers,” the signing of the China-India MOU on Defense Cooperation effectively rounds out the bilateral diplomatic dialogue between the two countries. This dialogue encompasses economic (including information technology) cooperation, energy security, transport and communication linkages, functional cooperation in agriculture, cultural and political relations, confidence-building talks on border issues and, now, military cooperation. [6]

The MOU between China and India has generally been received in a positive light by much of India’s mainstream strategic community. What is most widely recognized is that, at least for the near future, the MOU serves the national and strategic interests of China and India by fostering a favorable security environment that allows both states to concentrate on sustaining domestic economic growth. [7] The MOU makes particular reference to curbing piracy and terrorism among a number of other regional security challenges. One retired Indian senior naval officer suggested that, when taken in light of previous joint-naval exercises between the two countries, it appeared that the MOU was also aimed at protecting overland routes (i.e., through Central Asia) and sea lanes (i.e., Straits of Malacca) to help ensure unfettered access to energy resources and trading partners. He also suggested that the MOU had an implicit goal of reducing U.S. dominance in the Asia-Pacific region. [8]

While the positive aspects of the MOU were widely noted, some in the mainstream Indian strategic community believed that it was largely a Chinese initiative through which Beijing hoped to counter growing U.S.-India ties and gain a better understanding of the Indian armed forces. They argued that over the long term, China intends to assert its political and military dominance over the region. This line of reasoning is supported by China’s growing influence in Central Asia and the neighboring region through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (a regional grouping composed of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan). [9]

Writing in 2002, one Indian analyst suggested that relations among China, India, and the United States represented a “soft balance of power system in the making.” [10] The China-India MOU on Defense Cooperation is the latest element in this evolving arrangement, adding one more strand of confidence building that may help moderate regional frictions.

Jing-Dong Yuan, Arjun Dutta - Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies