Reports of Iranian efforts to expand its missile capabilities continue, with allegations that it may be seeking Russian S-300P air defense systems via Belarus and using Austria as a smuggling hub for procuring dual-use missile technology.

S-300P Controversy
A report in the April 14, 2006, issue of Jane’s Intelligence Digest states that Belarus may be preparing to export advanced Russian-supplied S-300P air defense missiles to Iran. [1] The systems could help defend sensitive Iranian installations and embody technology potentially useful for Iranian offensive missiles.

In April 2006, Russia transferred an unknown number of S-300P surface-to-air missile systems to Brest, Belarus, under an agreement signed in September 2005. [2] The declared purpose of the missile transfer to Belarus is to support the Joint Russia-Belarusian Air Defense Group, strengthening air defense systems against potential threats, presumably from NATO. [3]

The Jane’s report, however, suggested that the actual reason behind the transfer was to permit Russia to supply the systems to Iran without doing so openly. The air defense missiles, according to Jane’s, would then be used by Iran to defend against possible U.S. or Israeli air strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities. [4] Iran acquired an unknown number of an earlier version of the S-300P (the S-300PMU-1) from Russia in 1993, and in 2003-2004, Iran and other Middle Eastern nations reportedly acquired additional unspecified quantities of the Russian-made S-300s. [5]

Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov rejected the Jane’s report three days after its publication. In comments to the Russian INTERFAX news service, he declared, “The reports in some U.S. media outlets saying that the Russian S-300 anti-aircraft missile systems shipped to Belarus will allegedly be subsequently sold to Iran have nothing to do with reality.…The anti-aircraft systems are sent to Belarus within the framework of the Joint Air Defense Group of the [combined Russia-Belarus] Union State and, in accordance with the agreements, cannot be transferred to third states.” [6]

On April 17, the Belarusian Ministry of Defense similarly denied the claims in the Jane’s report and declared that the missiles were being supplied to re-equip the 115th Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade (headquartered in Brest). [7] Reinforcing the point, Belarusian Defense Minister Leonid Maltsev was quoted as stating that the missiles are part of a “unified air defense system” that does not involve Iran. Moreover, he continued, “under the contract for the delivery of the S-300s from Russia, Belarus does not have the right to transfer these systems anywhere else.” [8] The Belarusian government news agency also noted that, earlier in May while visiting Minsk, the commander-in-chief of the Russian Air Force, Army General Vladimir Mikhaylov, had explained the purpose of the missile transfer in a similar way. [9]

During an April 22, 2006, visit to Minsk, Belarus, to strengthen Iranian-Belarusian economic ties, Iranian Commerce Minister Masud Mir-Kazemi was asked to comment on the Jane’s article. He replied that “from the viewpoint of military technology, we are self-sufficient and there is no need for us to consider buying weapons abroad.” [10] [Editor’s note: In December 2005, Russia and Iran signed an agreement under which Iran will purchase $1 billion in Russian arms, the latest in a series of such agreements dating back to the mid-1990s.] [11]

According to published sources, the S-300P is designed to detect, track, and destroy incoming ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and low-flying aircraft. The most recently upgraded configuration of the system uses new single-stage, solid-fuel propelled defensive missiles and has the capability to shoot down targets at ranges of 5-150 kilometers and at altitudes between 10-27,000 meters. [12]

Apart from the defensive capabilities that the missiles would provide Iran if transferred, they might also contain technology that could permit Iran to advance its own offensive missile capabilities. Reportedly, the United States was concerned about this possibility when Russia sold large numbers of the S-300 to China in the early 1990s. [13]

Jane’s offered no specific evidence to support its claim that Russia’s sale of S-300Ps to Belarus was intended to disguise a sale of the system to Iran that Russia did not wish to acknowledge, but rumors of the possible sale of the system to Iran have circulated for some time. [14] Moreover, Russia has shown itself to be sensitive to international criticism of sales of similar systems to Iran, suggesting it would have reason for seeking to mask any sale of the S-300P. Specifically, apparently in response to U.S. pressure, Russia has delayed deliveries to Iran of a second, 25-kilometer-range, advanced air defense system, the Tor-M1 – which could be used to defend Iranian nuclear sites associated with its development of a nuclear weapon capability. [15] On April 19, Russian army chief of staff Yuri Baluyevsky insisted that Russia would fully implement the contract to supply Tor-M1 system to Iran; he declined, however, to state precisely when Russia would do so. [16]

A U.S. Department of State report to the U.S. Congress, issued on March 16, 2006, highlights the context in which the Jane’s allegations arise. It points to a history of Belarusian arms transfers to Iran and other states of concern. In a section entitled, “Arms Sales to State Sponsors of Terrorism,” the report states:

There have been numerous reports of Belarusian sales or delivery of weapons or weapons-related technologies to states of concern, including state sponsors of terrorism. In April and September 2004, the United States imposed sanctions on a Belarusian entity, Belvneshpromservice, pursuant to the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 for the transfer to Iran of items on a multilateral export control list or items having the potential of making a material contribution to WMD or cruise or ballistic missile systems.…

According to the U.N. Register of Conventional Arms for 2004, the most recent year available, Belarus…in 2002 sold large weapons systems to Iran. There may be other sales that Belarus has not included on the list….

There are signs that Belarusian authorities are undertaking efforts to expand relations with some countries of concern. This seemed clearest in [Belarusian President Alyaksandr] Lukashenka’s short visit to the U.N. General Assembly in September 2005, where he met with Iranian President Ahmadinejad.… In September 2004, then-Iranian President Mohammed Khatami came to Belarus, where Lukashenka welcomed him by declaring Belarus was ready to cooperate “in all directions.” During the visit, Belarusian and Iranian representatives signed seven agreements on cooperation in customs, security, agriculture, and other areas….

The Belarusian Parliament ratified a security cooperation agreement with Iran in May 2005. Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister and Special Presidential Envoy Mehdi Safari visited Belarus in November 2005, gaining public Belarusian support for Iran’s position on the nuclear issue in the International Atomic Energy Agency. The Speaker of the Iranian Parliament led a delegation to Minsk in December 2005, publicly suggesting that Belarus and Iran increase their nuclear cooperation. [17]