The meeting between the Russian president Vladimir Putin and the Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became the high point of the fifth annual summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), held in Shanghai, China, on June 15, 2006. (The SCO has six members:China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Iran participated as an observer state. Other observer states to the SCO are India, Pakistan, and Mongolia). It was widely hoped that Putin would use the encounter to convince the Iranian leader to accept a new package proposal by the Group of Six (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany) aimed at resolving the crisis over the Iranian nuclear program. [1] Although considered a success in most Russian media reports, Putin appears to have made little progress in gaining Iran’s acceptance of the Group of Six proposal. [For additional background on the crisis, see “Non-Aligned Realigning to Confront Iran” and “Russia Cools to Iran As Nuclear Crisis Deepens” in the March issue of WMD Insights.]

Under the proposal, the details of which have not been made public, Iran would curtail pursuit of those elements of nuclear energy production that could be most easily diverted to the manufacture of nuclear weapons (uranium enrichment and the separation of plutonium) in return for certain incentives, thought to include a pledge to sell Iran modern nuclear power reactors, along with assured supplies of low-enriched uranium fuel. Iran, which by late June 2006, had not provided a substantive response to the proposal, added an additional diplomatic complexity to the situation by insisting that it be able to negotiate directly with the United States on the resolution of the nuclear impasse. On May 31, 2006, the United States agreed to this, but only if Iran first suspended its work on uranium enrichment and other sensitive aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle. On June 27, Iran announced that it saw no benefit to be gained from discussions with the United States.

The SCO Meeting
Immediately prior to their meeting, Putin and Ahmadinejad spoke briefly to the press. Putin took a conciliatory tone on the nuclear issue, noting that he looked forward to discussing the Group of Six proposal and stressing that “Russia has always been Iran’s consistent, responsible partner.” Later in his remarks, he underscored Russia’s readiness to collaborate with Iran on nuclear energy and gave recognition to the right of all states to pursue advanced technologies for their development. Thus, he appeared to confirm Iran’s oft-repeated claim that it possessed the sovereign right to pursue a peaceful nuclear program, but failed to explicitly single out the dangers posed by Iran’s pursuit of enrichment and other sensitive nuclear technology. He did, however, add a gentle reminder of the need to ensure that pursuing high technology energy options does not contribute to proliferation:

Today we are probably the only country that cooperates actively and openly with Iran in the sphere of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and completely assumes its obligations. Moreover, we consider that all the countries in the world, including Iran, have the right to implement their plans in the field of high-tech and to use new technologies to promote their own development. But of course this must be done in such a way so that the international community has absolutely no worries about weapons proliferation. And in connection with this we [have] discussed Russia’s initiative whereby we would join forces with you, and even create joint ventures. I consider that we must continue even further in this direction. [2]

Russian commentators assessed that pronouncement as support for Iran’s position in the on-going controversy. [3]

Ahmadinejad was no less effusive in recognizing the support Iran had received from Russia. After noting the important Russo-Iranian collaboration on regional security issues and energy policy, Ahmadinejad expressed his appreciation for Russia’s stance on the nuclear issue, implying that Russia had been a virtual ally of Tehran in debates on managing the stand-off over its nuclear activities:

I would especially like to thank you for supporting our candidature to obtain the status of observer at the SCO and your position in the settlement of the Iranian nuclear dossier.
I think that you are completely up to date with respect to the nuclear dossier. [Russian Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister] Mr. Ivanov and [Russian Foreign Minister] Mr. Lavrov are in constant consultations with my colleagues. And we also discussed this issue in New York. We talked about it once over the phone. I think that our positions are very clear and quite close to one another.

Supporting each other is an integral part of our countries’ policies. [4]

Few details of the actual closed-door dialogue between the two leaders have emerged, but at a press conference at the close of the SCO summit, Putin offered a brief assessment of the session:

Regarding Iran, I see the meeting with the President of Iran as having been very positive. There are three important points I would note.

First, the Iranians have reacted positively to the proposals put forward by the six countries for ending the current crisis.

Second, our Iranian partners are ready to begin negotiations.

Third, I hope that the Iranians will formulate their position regarding the timeframe for the start of these negotiations in the nearest future. [5]

Putin’s comments did not indicate that Iran had agreed to alter the course of its nuclear activities, but only that it would begin negotiations on the matter at some future, soon-to-be-determined, time. Nonetheless, the outcome of the meeting resulted in considerable jubilation in Russia, because it was widely regarded as a demonstration of the country’s important status in the international system and of its indispensable role in solving the continuing impasse over the Iranian nuclear program. As the Russian media portrayed the meeting, Putin succeeded where all others had failed, although, judging from his own comments, it was by no means clear that the Russian president had done more than learn and report on Iranian decisions made before the Shanghai encounter. [6]

Only a Kommersant-Daily correspondent, who was present in Shanghai, offered a dissenting view that could be found. According to his assessment, Putin achieved virtually nothing: Ahmadinejad said only what he had planned to say before the session, while Putin assumed a passive stance and merely reiterated the new proposals of the Group of Six without actively lobbying for them. (The correspondent also claimed that, notwithstanding his conciliatory words, Putin appeared at pains to maintain a distance between his country and Iran.) [7]

For its part, Iran appeared to have enjoyed some success in Shanghai. It received reassuring words from Putin, whose tone implied Russia would intercede to ensure Iran was not subject to sanctions by the UN Security Council. Furthermore, Iran was commended by the Russian leader merely for agreeing to set a timetable for negotiations, without actually setting it, much less offering any substantive concessions regarding its nuclear program. Moreover, at least in his public remarks, Putin failed to mention the key condition that the United States attached to the negotiations on the package proposed by the Group of Six. That is, Iran would have to suspend all uranium enrichment activities for the duration of negotiations, if the United States were to participate in the talks. This omission was consistent with the position Iran had taken prior to the Shanghai meeting; almost immediately after the announcement of the new Group of Six proposal to Iran, Teheran had said it was ready to negotiate on the matter, but without any preconditions, indicating it was not prepared to suspend its enrichment activities.

Putin’s apparent unwillingness to pressure Iran to alter its nuclear course was consistent with official Russian pronouncements before and after the Shanghai meeting. Speaking in early June, shortly after the completion of negotiations among the Group of Six on a new package proposal to Iran, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov noted that the agreement precludes the use of force against Iran: “The agreements in the framework of the ‘six’ rule out the use of force under any scenarios,” he stated. [8] Similarly, a few days after the Shanghai summit, during a meeting with Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi, Putin embellished the soft line he took in Shanghai, stating that Moscow wanted to use the future negotiations between the Group of Six countries to return the issue of the Iranian nuclear program from the UN Security Council to the IAEA, a step strongly desired by Iran that would significantly reduce the likelihood that the Security Council might impose sanctions against it. [9]

The discussion of the nuclear program in Shanghai was held against the backdrop of what seemed to be even greater harmony on energy-related issues and the prospects for Russian investment in Iran. The latter proposed, among other things, that Moscow and Teheran coordinate their natural gas export policies. According to experts, such a cartel would control 43 percent of world natural gas reserves. [10] This proposal seemed in line with Putin’s separate initiative to create an “SCO energy club.” [11]

A week before the June 15 Putin-Ahmadinejad meeting, an element of intrigue was added by U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton, when he declared that there was “a real debate inside the Kremlin” about Russia’s policy on Iran and that the task of the United States was to help those in Moscow who worry about proliferation “prevail in those debates,” rather than those predominantly concerned about building bilateral political and economic ties with Tehran. [12] The outcome of the half-hour meeting between the Russian and Iranian leaders, however, seemed to leave little doubt that Bolton’s wish was not fulfilled.

Indeed, one Russian news analysis made clear that Bolton was in error in imagining that there was a clash of views on the Iran issue within official Russian circles. Anonymous sources in the Kremlin and the Russian Foreign Ministry told the Kommersant-Daily that this issue was one that generated almost no debate, unlike many other international problems. According to the newspaper, the only clash in Moscow with regard to the Iranian nuclear program was that between the Kremlin’s statements on Iran and its actions. The newspaper referred, in particular, to official Russian pronouncements in support of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, on the one hand, and Russia’s continuing close cooperation with Iran, on the other – cooperation that includes supplying modern arms to that country and trying to protect it from international sanctions. [13]

Over the past three to four months it appears that the Russia’s position on Iran’s nuclear program has stabilized and become focused on a central point – that Iran should resolve all outstanding issues with the IAEA, so that doubts about its current nuclear program can be removed. After that, Russia believes Iran’s nuclear program can be safely classified as civilian and Iran can reap the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy as described in Article IV of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. While Russia continues to promote its earlier proposal, under which Iran would abandon uranium enrichment domestically in favor of participating in an international uranium enrichment center in Russia, Moscow no longer appears to believe that this approach can eliminate Iran’s indigenous uranium enrichment program. Foreign Minister Lavrov recently noted that Iran’s acceptance of the Russian proposal on a Russian-Iranian uranium enrichment joint venture was not a precondition for a resolution of the current impasse. [14]

Indeed, the proposal for the creation of one or more uranium enrichment centers in Russia seems to have been merged into Russia’s bid to expand its penetration of global nuclear energy markets, an effort that Russia will pursue no matter how the Iranian nuclear issue is ultimately resolved. Speaking at a recent meeting with leaders of the Russian nuclear complex, Putin declared that nuclear energy is the path of the future for developing countries because it “can seriously reduce the level of energy deficit of developing states and create conditions for the social-economic progress and the improvement of living standards of millions of people.” [15] This amounted to a declaration that Russia was poised for the rapid expansion of nuclear cooperation with developing countries far beyond its current Bushehr project with Iran and the Kudankulam project with India.

Seen in this context, Russia has a strong interest in the elimination of the suspected Iranian nuclear weapons program not only as a matter of nonproliferation policy, but also to clear the path for Russia to exploit what it sees as an immensely lucrative global nuclear market.

Nikolai Sokov – Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies