On May 30, 2006, high-resolution satellite images of Saudi missile bases and details of Saudi ballistic missile capabilities were posted on the Islamist website al-Khayma. Although not the website of an operating Jihadi group, al-Khayma has in recent months posted numerous pro al-Qaeda communiqués and other material, including coverage of the abduction and execution of the Egyptian ambassador to Iraq and the death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. The presence of Saudi missile base information on an Islamist website may indicate future interest by Islamist groups in attacking such sites. [1]

The satellite images posted on al-Khayma were captured and translated mainly from non-governmental Western arms control websites. They were introduced with a verse from the Koran focusing on the necessity to build strength to face the enemy and a saying of the Prophet Mohammed stressing secrecy in whatever endeavors are undertaken. This is followed by a history of Saudi missile procurement and a description of the Saudi Arabia’s CSS-2 ballistic missile, including such technical aspects as its range, accuracy, payload, warhead type, guidance system, physical measurements, fuel type, and the time needed to launch the missile. All of this material is presented in Arabic. [2] This is followed by a number of detailed satellite images of the As Salil base in Saudi Arabia, about 500 km south of Riyadh, where some of the CSS-2s are housed.

Riyadh acquired several dozen CSS-2 “East Wind” missiles from China between 1986 and 1988, a purchase that was reportedly discovered by the United States in March of 1988. [3] The missiles, which have a range of 2,500 kilometers and a reported payload of 2,000 kilograms, are capable of hitting numerous targets in the Middle East, including Tel Aviv and Tehran, thus providing Saudi Arabia one of the most advanced missile capabilities in the region. Indeed, the CSS-2 is thought to be the longest range ballistic missile system in the Middle East, with the possible exception of Israel’s Jericho II system. The CSS-2 uses liquid fuel and has a launch preparation time of 120 to 150 minutes. [4] The relatively inaccurate system (with only a 50 percent likelihood of landing within 2.5 kilometers of its target) was designed for use with nuclear warheads. Saudi Arabia has declared, however, that its CSS-2s carry only conventional high explosives and has pledged not to manufacture nuclear weapons. Riyadh reinforced this pledge by joining the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1988.

It is important to clarify that this specific posting on al-Khayma did not advocate an attack on the Saudi missile bases. The posting is significant, nonetheless, because postings on Islamist websites have often followed a progression in the past where initially, informational text and pictures concerning a particular topic are posted and then, as the topic gains interest among the online Islamist community, subsequent postings evolve into elaborate Jihadi training manuals and/or overt calls for targeting relevant locations or capabilities.

A clear example of this progression can be seen in nuclear-weapon related postings on Islamist websites. For example, Al-Khayma was among the first to post an informational nuclear text in late 2004, which dealt with the history of nuclear weapons and included some rudimentary diagrams. It was mainly an Arabic translation of a document written by an individual or group with the online moniker “Outlaw Labs” that is currently posted on various American websites. [5] In the following months, numerous additional nuclear texts were gradually posted on other Islamist websites, each reflecting increased knowledge and displaying increased hostility. The most important nuclear posting is the “Nuclear Preparation Encyclopedia,” which was posted on al-Firdaws operational Jihadi website in October 2005. [See “Al-Qaeda Jihadi Website Publishes ‘Nuclear Preparation Encyclopedia,’” WMD Insights, January 2006, http://www.wmdinsights.com/I1/ME1_Al-Qaeda.htm]. This “encyclopedia,” which appeared more sophisticated than previous postings, included unverified information about critical mass and the amount of fissile material needed in the construction of nuclear weapons. Additionally, it provided various sketches and diagrams in English and Arabic of purported gun-type and implosion-type nuclear warheads, and declared the information was “a present to the Amir [Captain] of the Mujahideen Sheikh Usama Bin Laden, God bless him, for the Jihad in the path of God.” [6]

The posting concerning Saudi ballistic missiles on al-Khayma does not contain operational information regarding the possible vulnerabilities of these systems to attack and does not call for action to be taken against them. It would not be surprising, however, if this initial posting spurred increased interest in the topic and led to publication of more inflammatory commentary regarding the Saudi systems in the future on this website or others.

Nonetheless, it is important to note that in the past several years Saudi Arabia has endured domestic terrorist attacks on a variety of targets, including a series of bombings in May 2003 of residential areas housing foreign nationals; an attack in December 2004 on the U.S. consulate in Jeddah; and a thwarted attempt in February 2006 to severely damage the world’s largest oil refinery at al-Baqaiq [7]. Al-Qaeda has taken responsibility for each of these attacks. Some observers note that the attempted attack against the al-Baqaiq oil refinery constituted a shift in al-Qaeda’s strategy away from attacking Westerners and focusing instead high-visibility, “critical infrastructure” assets of the Saudi state.[8]

Given this apparent realignment, it is not unlikely that the network will attempt to attack additional symbols of Saudi power, possibly including military sites, in the hope of undermining Riyadh’s authority. In this context, al-Qaeda might consider the destruction of one or more CSS-2s at the As Salil missile base to be a particularly attractive objective, although defeating security at the site would likely pose significant challenges.

Sammy Salama, Khalid Hilal – Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies
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