At the end of June 2006, the Military-Industrial Commission (MIC) of Russia, speaking on behalf of the Russian government, published a White Paper on nonproliferation, formally titled, “The Russian Federation and the Situation with Nonproliferation of WMD and Means of Their Delivery: Threats, Assessments, Tasks, and Methods of Implementation.” [1]
In many respects, the 25-page document parallels U.S. policy statements on the subject in that it strongly endorses all of the major international efforts to limit the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, as well as missile delivery systems. The document supports not only the formal elements of the global nonproliferation regimes, including treaties, international inspections, and supplier group organizations, but also major associated initiatives, such as UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (requiring states to control weapons of mass destruction (WMD) commodities), the Proliferation Security Initiative (aimed at interdicting illicit transfers of WMD and missiles), and U.S. and international cooperative threat reduction programs to secure WMD stocks, particularly in Russia.
In other respects, however, the Russian report departs markedly from U.S. views, sometimes directly taking issue with U.S. approaches to the proliferation challenge. Differences are particularly acute regarding the use of military measures to combat proliferation and the nature of the nuclear terrorism threat.
This article will highlight particularly noteworthy points in the Russian White Paper and its
differences with U.S. government thinking.
Introduction
The MIC was created in March 2006 and is “attached” to the Russian government rather than a part of its formal bureaucratic structure. It is responsible for coordinating defense production in Russia, an activity now dispersed among numerous, competing private and quasi-private enterprises; it also manages Russian arms export activities. [2] Although the organization has no direct responsibility for developing or implementing Russian nonproliferation policy, the MIC is headed by Sergey Ivanov, the Russian Minister of Defense, who was also recently appointed Deputy Prime Minister, and the White Paper declares that it authoritatively represents the views of the Russian government.
In addition to a preface and a brief concluding section, the paper is divided into five chapters dealing with broad trends in proliferation; international responses (focused on treaties and other regime elements); Russian policy (focused on Russia’s support for international regimes and its efforts to implement their requirements domestically); export controls; and practical steps Russia has taken to reduce, eliminate, and protect WMD.
A notable statement appears at the outset of the document: “The transparency of any state regarding its priorities in the sphere of international security is the most important means of strengthening confidence, increasing predictability in international affairs, and facilitating multilateral solutions to
difficult problems.” [3] It represents a significant departure from the past Russian and Soviet preference for secrecy and suggests that a
new openness in Russia’s formulation and implementation of its foreign policy may be underway.
Restrained Tone
In comparison to the urgency reflected in a comparable U.S. document, the December 2002 “National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction,” the Russian White Paper is more muted and descriptive. Its opening characterizations of the proliferation danger are sober, but do little to concretize the threat:
Proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, as well as their missile delivery systems, is one of the major factors determining the nature of the threats to the national security of the Russian Federation, taking into account its geographical location and the length of its borders. The Russian leadership is paying particular attention to this question. [4]
Proliferation of WMD is one of the main threats to Russian national security. An increase in the number of countries possessing WMD, particularly when these states are in regions bordering Russia, unquestionably presents a major threat to Russian security. [5]
For the foreseeable future, the greatest threat faced by Russia and other states in the area of nonproliferation will emanate from the possible use by terrorists of some type of WMD. [6]
In contrast, a parallel passage in the U.S. National Strategy states:
Weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—nuclear, biological, and chemical—in the possession of hostile states and terrorists represent one of the greatest security challenges facing the United States.
Weapons of mass destruction could enable adversaries to inflict massive harm on the United States, our military forces at home and abroad, and our friends and allies. Some states, including several that have supported and continue to support terrorism, already possess WMD and are seeking even greater capabilities, as tools of coercion and intimidation. For them, these are not weapons of last resort, but militarily useful weapons of choice intended to overcome our nation’s advantages in conventional forces and to deter us from responding to aggression against our friends and allies in regions of vital interest. In addition, terrorist groups are seeking to acquire WMD with the stated purpose of killing large numbers of our people and those of friends and allies—without compunction and without warning.
We will not permit the world’s most dangerous regimes and terrorists to threaten us with the world’s most destructive weapons. [7]
The Russian White Paper lacks the acute sense of potential vulnerability – and the assertive response – seen in the U.S. document.
Opposition to Military Measures
Although the Russian White Paper was prepared under the leadership of the Russian Defense Minister, the document is also notable for its rejection of the use of military measures to restrain proliferation. The point is made repeatedly in the document either directly or by contrasting the Russian approach to that of other nations.
At the outset of Chapter I, which reviews proliferation trends, the White Paper states, for example:
It must be emphasized that during the last 10-15 years, approaches to nonproliferation have become ever more politicized. The assessment of proliferation threats largely depends on the geopolitical posture of a given state, its relations with its allies, economic interests, and historical experience. Therefore, depending on their understanding of this term, individual states employ political, economic, diplomatic, and at times even force to achieve their WMD nonproliferation goals.
The Russian Federation remains committed to solving these questions primarily by political and diplomatic means. It considers the use of force an extreme measure that can only be employed on the basis of a UN Security Council resolution. [8]
Several paragraphs later the document explicitly opposes key elements of U.S. counterproliferation strategy, although without mentioning the United States. Specifically:
At the global level there is a clear weakening of the guarantee of national sovereignty, and [there is] interference, including by force, into the internal affairs of other countries, sometimes under the pretext of solving nonproliferation problems. There have also been dangerous attempts to justify the possible use of nuclear weapons in a “non-nuclear” conflict to strike “hard and deeply buried targets.” Under these circumstances, some states are beginning to contemplate the nuclear choice as a means of deterring aggression, as a factor that would enhance their international status, and as a tool for attaining superiority over their neighbors and reaping economic benefits. [9]
The White Paper makes an implicit, but nevertheless clear distinction between nonproliferation regimes based on international agreements and counterproliferation activities, which include more proactive measures, often outside the framework of established multilateral agreements. It is noteworthy that the White Paper never uses the term “counterproliferation,” which is a hallmark of U.S. strategy under the Bush Administration.
The document also repeatedly emphasizes Russia’s commitment to diplomatic measures, rather than military alternatives, in combating proliferation. In a particularly strong statement on the subject, the White Paper quotes from the The Russian Foreign Policy Concept, published in 2000, which declares:
Russia reaffirms its unswerving course toward participating jointly with other states in averting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction and means of their delivery, as well as related materials and technologies. The Russian Federation is an ardent supporter of strengthening and developing relevant nonproliferation regimes. [10]
Terrorist Nuclear Explosive Discounted
The White Paper’s characterization of the threat of nuclear terrorism is another area that appears to diverge significantly from U.S. thinking. Although a close reading of the document suggests that Russia is more concerned about state-driven proliferation than proliferation by non-state actors, the document speaks frequently of the WMD terrorist threat, indicating that Moscow, like Washington, is devoting considerable attention to this problem.
One passage in the White Paper regarding nuclear terrorism, however, implies that Russia continues to minimize the danger that a terrorist group might actually build and detonate a nuclear explosive device:
Although the probability of independent production of nuclear explosive devices by terrorists is low, given its technical complexity, it is possible that terrorists might develop primitive weapons using radioactive materials (so-called “dirty bombs”). [11]
In the United States, by contrast, it is widely feared that a well-funded, international terrorist group, such as al-Qaeda, could fabricate a device with a true nuclear yield, if it gained access to highly enriched uranium. (This material can be detonated using a relative simple “gun-type” design, which is far less complex than the “implosion-type” device that would be needed to detonate a weapon using plutonium for its core.) [12]
The White Paper’s downplaying of this aspect of the nuclear terror threat is surprising given the fact that Russia and the United States are engaged in a number of major programs to limit the use of highly enriched uranium for civilian purposes and to reduce the number of sites holding stocks of the material because of concerns about nuclear terrorism. Many of these programs are mentioned positively in other sections of the White Paper.
On the other hand, the White Paper gives considerable attention to another facet of the non-state actor nuclear proliferation threat: the potential of international networks of private individuals and organizations to spread relevant technology and know-how among would-be state proliferators. In this regard, the document specifically notes the dangers posed by the network established by Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan. The strong focus on this issue suggests that the White Paper’s authors consider the danger of non-state actors’ facilitation of state proliferation to be a more urgent threat than non-state terrorist organizations’ acquisition of nuclear weapons for themselves.
Other Russian Complaints – and Compliments
A number of additional Russian concerns regarding U.S. policy are noted in passing
throughout the report, again usually without mentioning the United States by name.
- Russian discomfort with the continued presence of U.S. nuclear forces in Europe is alluded to in the report’s discussion of proliferation trends: “There are still nuclear weapons on the territory of several non-nuclear states that do not formally possess such weapons, particularly in Europe. This situation cannot but elicit disquiet from the standpoint of nuclear weapons proliferation.” [13]
- In describing the background for current proliferation trends, the White Paper appears to have the United States in mind when it states that after the Cold War, “Instead of opposing blocs, there are now numerous crises and conflicts caused, among other reasons, by the tendency of certain countries to act hastily, without consideration for the global community and its universally recognized institutions.” [14]
- In discussing missile proliferation, the report cites U.S. military programs in space as a challenge: “U.S. research plans for the creation of space weapons are also a source of concern. These plans could provoke a number of states to acquire 'cheaper' counterweapons, including WMD.” [15]
- The document also takes issue with the opposition of the United States to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). After declaring that the Treaty, which was opened for signature in 1996, “made a significant contribution to the strengthening of the nuclear nonproliferation regime,” the White Paper states that the U.S. stance hurts prospects for the treaty:
Of the 44 states which must adhere to the CTBT for it to enter into force, it has not been ratified by China, Columbia, the DPRK, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, and the United States. The position of the United States, which has refused to ratify the treaty, is not helping accelerate the entry of the CTBT into force. [16]
On the more complimentary side, the report notes the contributions of many countries, including the United States, to programs to enhance WMD security in Russia and reduce WMD stocks there. It also endorses the Proliferation Security Initiative, which was launched in May 2003 by the United States and which Russia joined a year later, after initially shunning the effort. In addition, the document speaks positively about the START I and the Moscow Treaty (also known as the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, or SORT), but notes that: “The START treaty will expire on December 5, 2009. The U.S. and Russia face challenges connected with meeting the deadline requirements of the SORT and START treaties. This situation calls for the adoption of mutually agreed solutions.” [17] (On Russian views concerning the future of START I, see related article in this issue of WMD Insights.)
Export Control: Praise for Russian Achievements, Complaints About the United States
The White Paper regards national systems of export control as a particularly important barrier to proliferation of WMD and delivery systems. It assesses the Russian export control system as “reliable and mature,” highlights its achievements, and identifies only one area for further improvement – closer interaction with former Soviet states within the framework of the Collective Security Treaty (also known as Tashkent Treaty), the Eurasian Economic Community, and the Common Economic Space. These treaties and organizations have overlapping membership of various former Soviet republics, although none includes the Baltic states, Ukraine, Moldova, or Georgia.
The White Paper takes a different tack when it speaks about the United States, however. It emphasizes that: “Multilateral export control regimes must not be used to impose unfair terms of competition and force competitors out of
international markets in weapons and high technology. [18] This comment refers to the widespread perception in Russia that the United States – and sometimes U.S. allies, as well – use WMD nonproliferation as a pretext to limit the access of Russian high-technology companies to international markets. The best known example of this perception is the belief that U.S. opposition to Russian construction of the Bushehr nuclear power station in Iran was motivated not by nonproliferation concerns, but by the desire of U.S. firms to prevent the Russian nuclear industry from competing effectively in the international market for nuclear power reactors. The recent introduction of sanctions by the United States against two major Russian companies for allegedly selling sensitive products to Iran is a more recent example. These sanctions were widely regarded in Russia as “punishment” for the recently signed large-scale arms sales agreements with Venezuela. [19]
CBW Comments Recall Challenges
The White Paper’s discussion of chemical
weapon proliferation notes that: “New risks are appearing in connection with research and development of so-called non-lethal chemical weapons.” [20] Although apparently aimed elsewhere, the comments call to mind that Russia, itself, has developed such weapons, and used them in October 2002 against the terrorists who held hundreds hostage in a Moscow theater. Since the use of such assets for police purposes of this kind is not prohibited by the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the White Paper appears to be concerned about their use on the battlefield by other states possessing or acquiring these agents; however, it leaves unclear which states may be the focus of this point.
Similarly, the report notes that a particular challenge in the area of chemical weapons proliferation is that the CWC is not yet universally ratified. It further states that “implementation of its provisions at the national level leaves much to be desired.” Although the White Paper authors presumably had other states in mind, this comment is a reminder of Russia’s difficulties in implementing the CWC’s provisions for the destruction of existing CW stockpiles. Indeed, while its program has gained considerable momentum and while Russia has been granted an extension of the relevant CWC deadlines, of all CWC parties that have acknowledged possessing such weapons, Russia still has the farthest to go in destroying its chemical weapon stocks. [21] The United States, it may be noted, has also encountered problems in its program and has received an extension of time for the destruction of its chemical weapon stocks.
Two statements in the White Paper beginning the discussion of biological weapons proliferation deserve careful consideration. Here the report declares:
During the 30 years of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BWC) not one state has declared its possession of such weapons. However, there is also no reliable information demonstrating the complete cessation of work on biological weapons (BW). [22]
The statements invite attention because they gloss over the fact Russia has acknowledged that, after the Soviet Union had joined the BWC in 1972, it developed biological weapons. The acknowledgement was made in May 1992 by President Boris Yeltsin, who stated in a newspaper interview that the 1979 anthrax outbreak in Sverdlovsk had not been a natural event, but an accidental release from a BW facility. [23] Yeltsin had issued a decree in April 1992 banning any offensive biological weapons work in Russia. Similarly, the White Paper’s statement on the difficulty of confirming the cessation of offensive biological weapons work fails to acknowledge that the United States has publicly accused Russia of continuing elements of the offensive biological weapons program pursued by the Soviet Union. [24] It is not clear what states the authors of the White Paper may have had in mind in making this comment. Rather, in view of the difficulties in ensuring compliance with the BWC, the White Paper emphasizes the need for developing a verification mechanism for the treaty. It notes, however, that the effort to develop such a mechanism was blocked by the United States in July 2001.
Although this analysis has given particular attention to aspects of the White Paper that diverge from U.S. views, the White Paper in toto strongly supports international efforts to curb the spread of WMD and advanced delivery systems. It also identifies extensive work by Russia to fortify its own nonproliferation activities. A further positive dimension of the report is that it identifies a wide number of pathways through which states and terrorist organizations might seek to develop WMD and missiles, indicating where initiatives to curb such activities need to be focused. On balance, the White Paper appears to reflect Russia’s growing engagement and activism in global nonproliferation affairs, but with caveats indicating that significant differences continue with the United States on these matters.
Nikolai Sokov and Leonard S. Spector – Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies
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 SOURCES AND NOTES
[1] “Rossiiskaya Federatsiya i Situatsiya v Oblasti Nerasprostraneniya Oruzhiya Massovogo Unichtozheniya i Sredstv Yego Dostavki: Ugrozy, Otsenki, Zadachi i Puti ikh Realizatsii,” [The Russian Federation and Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Delivery Systems: Threats, Assessments, Problems and Solutions], an English translation is available at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/other/rusfed.htm. [View Article]
[2] Pavel K. Baev, “Ivanov Takes Charge of Russian Military-Industrial Conglomerate,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, March 28, 2006, http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2370920. [View Article]
[3] See White Paper, Preface, opening paragraph. Because the translation of the White Paper is not paginated, the notes will refer to the section number within the document and/or the paragraphs where quoted material appears.
[4] See White Paper, Preface, first paragraph.
[5] White Paper, Chapter 1, first paragraph.
[6] White Paper, Chapter 1, sixth paragrah.
[7] The White House, National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, December 2002, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/16092.pdf. [View Article]
[8] White Paper, Chapter 1, fourth and fifth paragraphs.
[9] White Paper, Section 1.1, second paragraph.
[10] White Paper, Section 3.1, third paragraph.
[11] White Paper, Section 1.1.1, final paragraph.
[12] See, e.g., William C. Potter and Charles D. Ferguson, The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism, (London: Routledge, 2005).
[13] White Paper, Chapter 1, third paragraph.
[14] White Paper, Section 1.1, first paragraph.
[15] White Paper, Section 1.1.4, final paragraph.
[16] White Paper, Section 2.1, seventh paragraph.
[17] White Paper, Section 5.1, ninth paragraph.
[18] White Paper, Conclusion, second paragraph.
[19] Sergei Blagov, “Russia Lashes Out at U.S. Sanctions on Arms Deal with Iran, CNSNEWS.com, August 7, 2006, http://www.cnsnews.com/ViewForeignBureaus.asp?Page=/ForeignBureaus/archive/200608/INT20060807b.html.
[View Article]
[20] White Paper, Section 1.1.2, third paragraph.
[21] White Paper, Section 1.1.2, first paragraph.
[22] White Paper, Section 1.1.3, first paragraph.
[23] R. Jeffrey Smith, “Yeltsin Blames ’79 Anthrax On Germ Warfare Efforts,” Washington Post, June 16, 1992. The United States has publicly declared that Yeltsin admitted the existence of the program. In a statement to the Fourth Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, for example, U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control John D. Holum stated, “In 1992… President Yeltsin publicly and bravely acknowledged and then renounced the massive biological weapons program Russia had inherited from the Soviet Union.” Cited in Michael Moodie, “The Soviet Union, Russia, and the Biological and Toxin Weapon Convention,” Nonproliferation Review, (Spring 2001), p. 65.
[24] U.S. Department of State, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control and Nonproliferation Agreements and Commitments, 2005, http://www.state.gov/t/vci/rls/rpt/c15720.htm. [View Article] The report states, in particular, that ” some key components of the former Soviet program may remain largely intact and may support a mobilization capability for the production of biological agents and delivery systems.”
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