The Strategic Arms Reduction Agreement (START I) was signed by George H.W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev in August 1991. The treaty expires in December 2009, unless it is extended for a five-year period or replaced by another treaty. According to Article XVII (2) of the accord, “No later than one year before the expiration of the 15-year period [during which START I will remain in force], the Parties shall meet to consider whether this Treaty will be extended. If the Parties so decide, this Treaty will be extended for a period of five years unless it is superseded before the expiration of that period by a subsequent agreement on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms.”

Russian President Vladimir Putin announced on June 27, 2006, that Russia plans to negotiate a new treaty with the United States that will supersede START I, which expires in 2009. Russian analysts indicate that Putin’s goal is to gain new flexibility in managing Russia’s strategic nuclear deployments, while maintaining START I’s verification and transparency measures, with modest reforms that will reduce the expense and cumbersome nature of some requirements. The new pact might also incorporate and supersede the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, also known as the Moscow Treaty, which is due to expire in 2012.

Putin revealed his goal of developing a new treaty during remarks at a June 27 conference of Russia’s ambassadors, declaring: “The stagnation we see today in the area of disarmament is of particular concern. Russia is not responsible for this situation. We support renewed dialogue on the main disarmament issues. Above all, we propose to our American partners that we launch negotiations to replace the START Treaty, which expires in 2009.” [1] Three days later, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Kislyak disclosed at a press conference that the United States and Russia were already engaged in discussions on a new START accord. [2] According to Sergey Prikhodko, Presidential Aide to Vladimir Putin and Chairman of the Russian G-8 Presidency 2006 Organizing Committee, Putin discussed the issue with President George W. Bush at the G-8 Summit in St. Petersburg on July 14, 2006, and the two leaders “decided what had to be done.” [3]

The key phrase in Putin’s June 27 statement was “replace the START Treaty.” It is one indication that the Russian government does not want to retain START I in its present form, but also does not want to see the essence of the treaty completely eliminated. Rather, Moscow hopes to replace the pact with an updated version. With the United States now apparently engaged in discussions on the future of the treaty, key questions are how much of START I Russia and the United States may want to preserve, change, or add.

START I and the Moscow Treaty
START I limits to approximately 6,000 the number of nuclear warheads that the United States and Russia may each deploy on long-range, or “strategic,” land-based missiles, submarine-launched missiles, and bombers. The treaty contains strict sub-limits for different categories of strategic launchers, as well as complex accounting rules. It also provides for elaborate inspections and other verification procedures to provide confidence to each party that the other is complying with these requirements.

The Moscow Treaty, signed by the United States and Russia in 2002, adopted a very different approach that reflected the change in U.S.-Russian relations after the Cold War and the desire of both sides to maximize flexibility in planning their respective strategic postures. It limits the number of nuclear warheads each side may deploy on strategic offensive systems to between 2,200 and 1,700 by the end of 2012, when the treaty is set to expire, although it contains no restrictions on the types of strategic systems that can be deployed or the number of warheads per missile or bomber. However, as both sides reconfigure their nuclear arsenals under the Moscow Treaty, they must continue to comply with rules set out in START I, which remains in force. The Moscow Treaty also contains no verification measures; instead, the United States and Russia have taken advantage of the pre-existing START I verification system to provide confidence that the other side is moving towards the reductions that must be in place in 2012 under the Moscow Treaty.

Multiple Warheads for the Topol-M
The inter-relationships between the requirements of the two treaties have raised a number of issues that Russia hopes to address through a replacement treaty to START I. One such issue, singled out by a number of Russian experts, is ensuring that Russia has the right to deploy multiple, independently-targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs) on its new Topol-M intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), in lieu of the single warhead the system now carries. One well known Russian expert, Aleksei Arbatov, has noted that if Russia is limited to placing only a single warhead on the Topol-M, it will have a difficult time deploying the quota of warheads allowed under the Moscow Treaty after two of its older, multi-warhead ICBMs (knows as the SS-18 and SS-19) reach the end of their service lives around 2015. [4] Vladimir Dvorkin, the former director of the 4th Research Institute of the Strategic Rocket Forces, confirmed that after the end of service lives of these existing types of ICBMs, it will be essential for Russia to have the option of MIRVing the Topol-M. [5] Russia appears to be actively preparing for this alternative. [See “Russia to Deploy Defense-Penetrating ICBM,” in the December 2005/January 2006 issue of WMD Insights, http://www.wmdinsights.com/I1/R1_RussiatoDeploy.htm.] START I, however, would prohibit this configuration because of its rule banning increases in the number of warheads deployed on existing types of missiles, a category that includes the Topol-M. Merely extending START I in 2009, without change, would therefore deprive Moscow of the opportunity to place multiple warheads on this system.

Arbatov has suggested that Russia could, in exchange for the elimination of this rule, agree to relax START I limits on “downloading,” or reducing the number of warheads on existing types of missiles. Downloading is a primary means of reductions for the United States under the 2002 Moscow Treaty, but START I establishes rather strict limits on this practice because of concerns that downloaded missiles might be rapidly refitted with additional warheads in a crisis.

Some Russian military experts have proposed going further to ensure Russia will have the legal right to place multiple warheads on the Topol-M, advocating that country withdraw from START I altogether. [6] The decision of the Russian government to seek the replacement of START I, however, seems to indicate that this more radical view has been rejected.

Verification
Key Russian officials, including Lt. Gen. Nikolai Artuykhin, Chief of the Department on Control over Treaty Implementation of the Ministry of Defense, believe that a key benefit of START I that should be preserved is its well-developed transparency and verification system. [7] The desire to maintain this system seems to be an important motive behind Russia’s decision to preserve some of the elements of the old treaty in a modified form. It should be noted, however, that many in Moscow believe that the START I verification system is cumbersome and expensive and could be simplified in ways that would uphold the degree of transparency afforded by the original treaty, while reducing the burden, in particular, of mutual short-notice inspections. (It is also worth noting that START I’s rigid verification rules, intended to confirm compliance with various ceilings, sub-limits, and the like, do not fit well with the more flexible approach of the Moscow Treaty towards strategic launcher and warhead deployments. Thus, if a START I replacement treaty were to adopt the flexible character of the Moscow Treaty, it is possible that the two sides would consider more extensive revisions in the original START I verification mechanisms.)

Vladimir Dvorkin has also called for simplification of START I’s dismantlement and conversion procedures. Dvorkin notes, for example, that strategic submarines have to be physically dismantled in order to be removed from accounting under the treaty, but it would be more logical to allow their conversion for use with shorter range, non-nuclear cruise missiles. The same problem arises with respect to heavy bombers, which could also make a substantial contribution to Russia’s conventional forces if instead of requiring dismantlement, conversion of the systems were allowed. [8]

Parties
Another issue that the two sides will need to address before they engage in formal negotiations is how many states will be party to a START I replacement treaty. START I was originally concluded as a bilateral treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union, but after the Soviet disintegration in December 1991, four newly independent states had strategic weapons in their territories. START I was then revised to include all four countries. Today, however, of the four, only Russia remains a nuclear weapon state, with strategic launch platforms. It seems logical that Russia will want the replacement to START I to be formulated as a bilateral U.S.-Russia document, but Russian officials have not commented on this publicly. Such a change in START I would mean, however, that as a legal matter, the replacement treaty will be a completely new agreement and not an amended version of START I.

Time Ripe for Negotiations
Although the issue of MIRVing Topol-Ms has been on the agenda of the Russian military for some time, the Russian government has refrained from raising it in exchanges with the United States on the implementation of START I, because to increase the number of warheads carried by the Topol-M would have required an amendment to the treaty. Some issues, including simplification of the treaty’s verification system, were on the agenda of the START III consultations in 1997-2000, but those negotiations were never completed. The impending expiration of START I offers a convenient opportunity to raise all issues of concern.

The Future Outlook
How the United States will react to Russian initiatives in the areas of new warhead deployment, verification, and downloading remains to be seen. The United States will undoubtedly have issues of its own that it hopes to address in the negotiations on the future of START I, perhaps including transparency requirements for non-strategic nuclear weapons.

Both sides also will most certainly be mindful of domestic political processes and their impact on the negotiations. Russia holds its next presidential election in the spring of 2008, and the United States in November 2008. Neither President Putin nor President Bush is eligible to run for reelection. To preserve their roles in the strategic arms reduction process, however, both leaders have strong incentives to press forward with negotiations on a START I replacement treaty, possibly one that might incorporate and supercede the 2002 Moscow Treaty, and set out a long-term road map for the bilateral nuclear arms reduction process.

Nikolai Sokov – Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies