On July 9, 2006, India conducted its first test of an intermediate-range ballistic missile, bringing it one step closer to joining the small group of states to possess such capabilities. Although the test was unsuccessful, the development of the missile, designated the Agni III (“fire” in Hindi), has considerable implications for the region. With an expected range of between 3,000 and 4,000 km, this nuclear-capable missile would put major cities in eastern China, including Beijing and Shanghai, within India’s reach for the first time. [1] In spite of such implications and the fact that the test came only five days after North Korea’s widely condemned firing of seven missiles, including the unsuccessful test of the 5,000-6,000 km range Taepodong II, the Agni III launch received little international attention and subdued official reaction from the few states that did comment on the development. The response highlighted the readiness of foreign governments to distinguish between military advances made by a state perceived to be a responsible member of the international community and those pursued by a nation perceived as a repeated violator of international norms. Within India, however, the failure of the Agni III test triggered extensive criticism among domestic observers.

Background
The Agni III is the latest component of India’s Integrated Guided Missile Program (IGMP), which began in 1983 and has been overseen by India’s Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO), a wing of the Indian Defense Ministry. The test of the missile was originally scheduled for November 2004. However, the launch was repeatedly postponed for technical and political reasons, most recently due to concerns that it might negatively affect the consideration by the U.S. Congress of a pending agreement, which was signed by President George W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on July 18, 2005, to reopen U.S. nuclear cooperation with India after a decades-long U.S. embargo. [2] According to Indian press accounts, however, the DRDO was given a “green light” for testing after both the visit to India of U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Peter Pace in June 2006, in which he declared that he did not see a test as destabilizing, and after favorable votes on the U.S.-India nuclear agreement in two key U.S. Congressional committees on June 27 and 29. [3]

While the launch of the Agni III missile began with a successful firing of its first stage, the missile’s second stage failed to separate shortly after lift-off, causing the missile to crash into the Bay of Bengal less than 1,000 km from its launch site. The exact reason for this failure has yet to be determined. DRDO scientists have highlighted that a number of new technologies were used in the missile, and it is possible that one or more of these may have been the cause of the failure. [4] The day after the test of the Agni III, India suffered a second setback when its launch of a Geostationary Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV), developed by the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO), failed. Both the launch vehicle, which is India’s most powerful civilian rocket, and the communications satellite it was attempting to place into orbit were destroyed by ground controllers when the GSLV veered off course shortly after launch. [5]

India and North Korea: A Tale of Two Tests
The July 9 Agni III test followed North Korea’s unsuccessful flight test on July 5 (local time, July 4 in the United States) of a similar system known as the Taepodong II, a long-range nuclear-capable missile, which is considered to have the potential to reach Hawaii, Alaska, and possibly the California coast. The North Korean test, which was accompanied by the firing of some six less capable missiles, including several short-range Scud C and medium-range Nodong missiles, was met with intense international criticism. Japan and the United States were particularly vocal in their condemnation of the North Korean firings, which appeared deliberately timed to coincide with the U.S. Independence Day holiday.

Contributing to concerns was that the test of the Taepodong II and launch of the Nodongs ended a voluntary moratorium that North Korea had adopted in 1998 on tests of its longer range missiles. In recognition of that moratorium, in 2000, the United States had lifted certain sanctions on North Korea including a travel ban, a broad trade ban, and restrictions on investment and remittances. [6]

The reaction to the North Korean tests led to an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council that resulted in a unanimous July 15, 2006, Security Council resolution demanding that North Korea halt its missile program. Security Council Resolution 1695 also imposed a mandatory ban on transfers by any UN member state of missile-related equipment or technology to North Korea and on the transfer of funds to that country intended to support the North Korean missile program. [7]

Although the Agni III launch, like that of the Taepodong II, was conducted by a state possessing nuclear weapons and involved a missile that could eventually pose a new threat to a potential adversary, the Indian launch inspired little comment.

Japan
Japan, which was at the forefront of the stern international reaction to the North Korean missile tests, was the only state to publicly express displeasure or concern over the Agni III launch. The day after that event, the deputy director of the Oceania Affairs Bureau of the Foreign Ministry of Japan informed the Indian embassy in Tokyo that India’s launch was contrary to international disarmament and nonproliferation efforts. He went on to state that, “It was especially regrettable that the test was conducted at a time when Japan and others in the international community have been working to secure regional peace and stability over North Korea’s missile launches.” [8]

Even this, however, was a mild rebuke. Japan, which has been a vocal proponent of disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament, had issued critical statements in response to India’s previous ballistic missile tests, as contrary to disarmament and non-proliferation norms. In this case, Japan’s expression of dismay appeared to be directed primarily at the timing of the test, rather than at India’s development of long-ranged ballistic missiles, per se. Japan undoubtedly feared that the Indian test might be taken as evidence that testing long-range nuclear-capable missiles was an acceptable practice, thereby undercutting Tokyo’s call to condemn North Korea’s tests as a “threat to international peace and security,” under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. Such a finding was needed to provide the legal basis for the imposition of mandatory UN sanctions against Pyongyang.

United States
The U.S. response to the Agni III test was equally muted. The Bush Administration did not issue a statement on the attempted launch, preferring to respond to queries from reporters, and avoiding criticism of the Indian test. White House Press Secretary Tony Snow, for example, responded to a question regarding the North Korean and Indian tests by stating:

There is a significant difference and a noteworthy difference between India and North Korea. India has pursued its program in such a way as not to be a threat or provocation to its neighbors.… North Korea, meanwhile, not only defied the express wishes of its neighbors and others in the neighborhood [who in the weeks prior to the Taepodong test had called on North Korea to desist], it also fired missiles as a provocation, without warning, to others, and therefore, has created the diplomatic activity that you now see. [9]

Australia adopted a stance in response to the Agni III test that balanced several factors. It urged restraint in the further testing of missiles in South Asia, but stressed that the Indian tests could not be equated with those conducted by North Korea. A spokesman for the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), stated, “We hope that India and Pakistan will exercise restraint in their ballistic missile program and continue the process of building confidence between them.” He also noted that India had notified Pakistan in advance of the test, in accordance to pre-existing bilateral confidence-building arrangements; North Korea did not provide pre-notification of its tests to any of its neighbors. In addition, the spokesman noted, “North Korea has been a leading supplier of missile-related exports to countries seeking to acquire ballistic missile capabilities. India, in contrast, has undertaken to implement missile export controls equivalent to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).” [12] Like Japan, Australia also recognized, however, that efforts to restrain the North Korean missile program may be undermined by testing elsewhere in Asia.

In commenting on the Agni III launch, Australian foreign affairs analyst Greg Sheridan highlighted that, “the proliferation of missiles in Asia is of first-order importance to Australia.” [13] While also noting that North Korea poses a particular proliferation challenge for both nuclear weapons and missiles, Sheridan pointed out that the increasing development of long-range missiles in Asia reduces the defensive benefit provided by Australia’s geographic distance from the states developing such technology. This consideration suggests that, regardless of the context, the development of long-range missiles in Australia’s neighboring region is still seen as a potential strategic challenge.

The countries most concerned with the further development of India’s ballistic missile capabilities are its regional strategic rivals, China and Pakistan. China in particular has a stake in the evolution of India’s Agni III program because, as noted, the missile would give India the ability for the first time to target certain key Chinese cities with nuclear weapons. While Indian defense analyst C. Uday Bhaskar rejected the notion that the Agni III is oriented towards China, stating that, “any strategic capability is not aimed at any particular nation,” another prominent Indian strategic analyst, K. Subramanyan, specifically described the Agni III as a deterrent against China. [14] [15] Subramanyan further asserted that building such a deterrent and building relations with China are not mutually exclusive endeavors: “If India were to borrow a lesson from China, it is possible to develop the Indian missile as well as improve relations with Beijing,” adding, “That is what the Chinese did vis-à-vis the U.S.” [16]

In spite of such strategic implications for China, Chinese analysts somewhat surprisingly have not reacted to the Agni III program with alarm, seeing it as a symbol of Indian prestige to demonstrate India’s emergence as a power with global ambitions and not simply as an anti-China weapon. The recent strengthening of Sino-Indian military confidence building measures, in particular the May 29, 2006, signing of a bilateral memorandum of understanding on defense, has also served to reduce tensions. [17] In the past, China has not issued strongly negative reactions to Indian missile tests, and the lack of any official response to the Agni III test beyond casual reporting in the official news media is not surprising in the context of delicate, but improving Sino-Indian relations. It is also possible that Beijing avoided comment on the Agni III to avoid elevating India’s importance by suggesting that China was concerned about New Delhi’s growing nuclear missile capabilities.

The official Pakistani reaction to the test was simply to confirm that India had provided notice of its intentions beforehand in accordance with a bilateral agreement on missile testing, signed in 2005. When asked whether the Indian test was discussed during a subsequent meeting between Pakistani Foreign Minister Khurshid Kasuri and U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice on July 10, 2006, Kasuri responded that the issue was not discussed because Pakistan, like India, considers itself free to conduct missile tests of its own, when necessary. [18]

Pakistani analysts, however, did seek to draw conclusions from India’s failed test. Dr. Samar Mubarikmund, the chair of Pakistan’s National Engineering and Science Commission (Nescom), which has been involved in the development of Pakistani missile systems, took the opportunity to deride India’s missile designers for their “incompetence,” claiming that Pakistan’s “indigenous” missile program maintained its superiority in South Asia. [19] This comment suggests that, as India’s deterrent capabilities improve, Pakistan may seek to compensate through improvements of its own strategic arsenal. The fact that Pakistan has been vulnerable to attack by India’s nuclear-capable shorter-range missiles, including the short-range Prithvi and the medium-range Agni I and II, may also have reduced the significance of the Agni III test for Islamabad.

In light of the failures in July of both the Agni III and GSLV launches, some Indian commentators have questioned whether India’s strategic technological capacity may be suffering from systemic problems. Indeed, in offering explanations for the failure of the Agni III test, DRDO chief M. Natarajan indicated that the departure of young scientists from the organization negatively affected the organization’s developing programs. [20] This sentiment has been echoed by Indian columnists who cite the outsourcing of Indian professionals to Western interests as a debilitating factor in the advancement of India’s strategic capabilities. Calling for India to focus its young talent on engineering and technology, one commentator wrote, “India has diverted most of its engineering and technology talents to MBA schools, call centers, data operations, and simple low revenue application software development…In the mean time Indian technology has gone no where.” [21] This internal “brain drain” of Indian technological talent has been an issue for a number of years—in 2004, for example, it was estimated that 78 percent of Indian engineers leave their fields after graduation to work for Western business-processing outsourcing (BPO) companies. [22] Thus, India’s ambitions to develop advanced weapons platforms, such as long-range ballistic missiles, may be hindered by a dearth of technical expertise.

The close proximity of the two unsuccessful launches also offered commentators and analysts the opportunity to compare the capabilities of the two organizations responsible for India’s space launch and missile programs, respectively. Many analysts point to the different organizational cultures of the two agencies as the reason for what, historically, have been divergent track records, with ISRO enjoying more consistent success than DRDO. These analysts highlight that, while ISRO operates on commercial principles, which necessitate competition in the globalizing space industry, DRDO is sheltered from accountability because of its place in the defense establishment. According to one press account:

ISRO and DRDO are actually studies in contrast, two high-profile organizations heavily funded by public money and trying to meet India’s goals of self-reliance in critical technology. The difference is, one [ISRO] has learnt from its failures and has a brilliant track record, while the other [DRDO] seems lost. [23]

The DRDO has consistently come under fire for cost over-runs and delays in its major projects, including the development of a main battle tank, a light combat aircraft, and two surface-to-air missile systems. Such problems have also strained relations between the DRDO and the military, with former chief of staff of the Indian Navy Admiral L. Ramdas commenting after the Agni III test: “The Indian armed services’ experience with DRDO-made armaments has not been a happy one,” adding that, “their reliability is often extremely poor.” [24] Dissatisfaction with DRDO was also expressed by members of the Indian Parliament, as well as Prime Minister Singh, who lamented the continual time and cost overruns facing the Indian defense industry, in a mid-May address at DRDO Headquarters. [25] During a previously scheduled meeting with Defense Minister Mukherjee on July 12, Indian parliamentarians indicated their concern over the failure of the Agni III test, as well as over continuing delays in other DRDO projects. Some parliamentarians suggested that the DRDO conduct an “introspective review” of its role and “redefine its strategy for the future.” [26]

The limitations facing the Indian aerospace complex also have implications for the U.S. agreement with India to explore civil space cooperation (signed July 18, 2005, along with the U.S.-India nuclear accord), as there is a possibility that technical assistance and cooperation provided by the United States might be used in India’s strategic missile programs. [27] While the DRDO has been the lead organization for the development of India’s ballistic missile arsenal, it has made use of components originally developed by ISRO for the Indian civil space program, including the booster rockets for the Agni I and II. [28] While the Agni III is believed to have used a newly-developed booster, continued problems with the missile, and/or with more advanced systems, such as the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) India is said to be developing, could tempt India to borrow technology and components directly from its civil space program.

India to Move Beyond Failed Test
India currently remains poised to continue testing and finalizing the development of the Agni III in the near future. The Indian government has approved at least two further tests to be conducted in late August 2006, and Defense Minister Mukherjee indicated that testing would continue until success was achieved. [29] Therefore, it may be only a matter of time before India joins the club of states possessing nuclear-armed intermediate-range ballistic missiles.

Nonetheless, as the cautious responses to the Agni III test demonstrate, so long as India continues to develop its missile capabilities in what the international community considers a responsible manner - in the context of confidence-building with its neighbors and abiding by non-proliferation norms regarding the transfer of sensitive technologies - it is unlikely to face the international pressure exerted on proliferators deemed to be more threatening, such as North Korea.

Peter Crail – Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies