Judging from the extensive coverage of the issue in the Chinese media, Beijing is taking a keen interest in the intensification of U.S.-Japan cooperation on missile defenses following North Korea’s July 5, 2006 (local time), missile flight tests. The Chinese media has focused its analyses most sharply on the implications of ever closer cooperation between Tokyo and Washington, as they knit together missile defense networks and move toward implementation of the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment to achieve closer operational coordination and improved inter-operability between the U.S. Forces in Japan and the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF).

Chinese commentators have particularly scrutinized four sets of developments, possibly, because they are seen as reflecting not only Tokyo’s sense of urgency in quickly deploying a working missile defense system, but also, in the view of these commentators, a carefully thought-out, long-term plan to transform Japan into a country with a “normal” military and political presence in global affairs. Chinese commentators fear that Japan may be gradually chipping away at the constitutional and political obstacles to acquiring the customary trappings of military power.

The key developments receiving attention are:

• Japan’s dramatically increased funding for missile defense development and deployment, including purchases of both land-based and sea-based missile interceptors;
• an accelerated deployment time-table that aims to establish an effective missile defense system ahead of previously announced schedules;
• the development and establishment of joint U.S.-Japan information and intelligence sharing efforts; and
• the growing integration of U.S. and Japanese military activities, seen in Japan’s active participation in U.S.-led missile defense exercises and the two states’ movement toward establishing closer operational coordination and improved inter-operability.

Japan’s Increased Funding
Japan’s Defense Agency (JDA) has requested 219 billion yen ($1.87 billion) in funding for missile defenses for the 2007 fiscal year, an increase of more than 56 percent over the current spending, albeit in the context of an overall defense budget that is little changed. The money will be used for purchases and early deployment of both the land-based U.S. Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) anti-missile system and the sea-based U.S. Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptor. It will also be used for improvements in Japan’s early warning systems, such as electronic surveillance and the introduction of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The sale to Japan of SM-3s, worth $458 million, will be the first such U.S. sale to a foreign country. In June 2006, the Aegis-equipped cruiser U.S.S. Shiloh successfully intercepted a medium-range missile using a SM-3 during the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercises off Hawaii, in which Japan participated. [1] The United States reportedly will also provide 80 PAC-3 interceptors to Japan, although this has not been confirmed by JDA. [2] Chinese media note that JDA cites both the July North Korean missile tests and the Sino-Japanese territorial disputes as the impetus for the funding increase. [3]

Accelerated Deployment Schedule
A second major development being watched by Chinese analysts is the acceleration of Japan’s missile defense deployment schedule, apparently prompted by North Korea’s July missile tests. The United States and Japan had originally set 2011 as the year for deployment in Japan of defenses against theater-range missiles, although both countries have also viewed 2006 as a critical year for aggressively advancing the joint missile defense efforts. Japan for its part has decided to move its originally scheduled deployment of March 2008 ahead by several months to the end of 2007, with the initial units of PAC-3 interceptors deployed in four bases around the Tokyo metropolitan area. [4] Meanwhile, in the immediate aftermath of the July 5 tests, the United States has also sped up deployment of sea-based missile defense systems to the region, assigning two additional Aegis-class vessels, a destroyer and a cruiser, equipped with the SM-3 missile interceptors to Yokosuka, which will bring the total of Aegis-class ships assigned there to eight. [5]

Development of Joint Center
The Chinese media has also focused on the U.S.-Japan agreement to develop a joint center for missile defense intelligence gathering and information sharing, seeing it as an important new military link between the two countries. Once operational, it will become a core component of the U.S.-Japan missile defense system, which will monitor and evaluate events such as future North Korean missile tests. When Pyongyang conducted its missile tests in July 2006, the United States and Japan gathered and processed information independently, with little coordination. [6]

More Active Participation in Military Exercises
Finally, Chinese commentators have focused on Japan’s more active participation in U.S.-led military exercises, the most recent being the June 2006 RIMPAC exercise. In the maneuvers, the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyer Kirishima, equipped with the Aegis radar system, took part in a missile intercept by tracking the target missile. Meanwhile, the Chinese media have perceived Washington and Tokyo as moving closer toward development of “unified military commands.” [7]

For the time being, Beijing is less concerned with the effectiveness of these emerging missile defense capabilities than with what these developments indicate about the future direction of Japan’s security policy and U.S. strategic intentions. Chinese People’s Liberation Army analysts, for example, are taking pains to underscore the advantage, or “edge,” that offensive ballistic missiles – meaning Chinese missiles – will hold over missile defenses, even as they seek to gauge the long-term implications of U.S.-Japan missile defense programs and recent deployments. [8] At the same time, Beijing is following the discussion, however speculative, by certain individuals in the Japanese political elite that Japan should consider acquiring an independent nuclear deterrent as a complement to its growing sophistication in the realm of missile defense. Indeed, Chinese analysts point out that Japan has the necessary nuclear technologies, large quantities of plutonium potentially usable in nuclear weapons, and computer simulation techniques to design such weapons, which together would allow Japan to manufacture them at short notice. For many Chinese observers, this is only a matter of time. Recent comments by former Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone that Japan needs to consider the nuclear option further reinforce Chinese beliefs. [9]

Chinese analysts point out Japan has undergone major changes in its attitude toward missile defense, from a hesitant and lukewarm initial reception of the concept, to active participation and enthusiastic support. [10] They suggest that Japan’s failure to secure a permanent seat on the UN Security Council in 2005 reinforced both the need for continued support from the United States and Tokyo’s view that missile defense is a valuable means of reinforcing alliance cohesion. At the same time, Chinese analysts argue, Japan appreciates that missile defenses can protect it not only from North Korean missiles, but also Russian and Chinese systems. [11]

Indeed, Chinese analysts argue that Japan’s core interest in speeding up missile defense deployment is directed toward China, despite Japan’s claims that its objective is to defend itself against North Korea. Chinese commentators argue that Japan plans to deploy defenses on Okinawa, noting that this would make them particularly useful in protecting Japanese Self-Defense Forces in their operations in the East China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Island area, with China obviously in mind. [12] (In fact, the defensive systems will be deployed by the United States on U.S. bases on Okinawa, rather than by Japan, although they still could be employed to protect Japanese Self-Defense Forces in the theaters noted by the Chinese commentators.)

Japan’s interest in accelerated missile defense deployments, its growing integration into related U.S. military operations, and its active participation with the United States in joint research and development activities raise serious questions, Chinese analysts say, about Tokyo’s intentions. They see these actions as reinforcing Japanese reconsideration of the long-standing restrictive interpretation of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, which limits its right to collective self-defense, and as leading Tokyo to reexamine its ban on arms transfers to states that could become involved in regional conflicts, in particular missile-defense related technology transfers to the United States (which could potentially become involved in a conflict in the Taiwan Strait). Most troubling for Chinese analysts, it appears, is the possibility that Tokyo’s missile defense activities could set the stage for Japanese involvement in a future conflict over Taiwan, with Japan’s sea-based missile defense systems deployed to support Taiwan’s defenses, as a counter to Chinese short-range missiles. [13]

Jing-dong Yuan – Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies