Allegations that Iranian specialists were present at North Korea’s July 5, 2006, (local time) missile firings and revelations during the mid-July to mid-August Israeli-Hezbollah conflict that Iran had supplied Hezbollah with a much more extensive missile arsenal than previously believed have underscored the growing proliferation threats posed by Iran’s missile capabilities. The first incident served as a reminder that North Korea and Iran are thought to be collaborating on very long-range missiles and that their long-standing partnership in this strategic area might have parallels in the nuclear realm, where the two states are thought to be pursuing the same technology capable of enriching uranium to the levels needed for nuclear weapons. Iranian missile transfers to Hezbollah represent the first time non-state actors have received surface-to-surface rockets with ranges of up to 200 kilometers, as well as cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), from a state. Iran’s support for Hezbollah raises the possibility that it might transfer even more advanced capabilities in the future in a bid to deter Israeli military intervention in southern Lebanon.

This issue of WMD Insights will examine these challenges of Iranian missile proliferation in two parts:
“Part I – Partnership with North Korea" and "Part II – Assistance to Hezbollah.”

PART I – PARTNERSHIP WITH NORTH KOREA

Background
Iranian and North Korean missile cooperation reportedly began in 1985, through an agreement under which Iran helped finance North Korea’s production of the 300-kilometer range Scud-B missile, in return for receiving the technology for manufacturing the system and the option to purchase complete Scud-Bs from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) once they were available. In 1987, Iran is reported to have purchased 100 Scud-Bs for use in the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War. [1]

The relationship subsequently expanded with Iran and North Korea cooperating on the joint development of the Iranian Shahab missile series, closely based on the DPRK’s nuclear-capable, Nodong missile. The Congressional Research Service estimates that the Nodong has range of 1,000 to 1,300 kilometers and a payload of 1,000 kilograms and that the Shahab-3 has a range of 1,300 to 1,500 kilometers and payload of 750 kilograms, making the range-payload capabilities of the two systems roughly comparable. Both are single stage, liquid-fueled missiles. [2]

Iran allegedly purchased 12 medium-range Nodong ballistic missile engines from North Korea in November 1999 for use in the Iranian Shahab-3. [3] This transfer was significant because the “engines are critical to the Taepodong (long-range missile) program … and they would be critical to the Shahab-3 program and any extensions of the Shahab-3 program,” according to Congressional testimony presented in 2000, by then-National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs Robert Walpole. [4] An additional transfer of missile components and technology thought to be intended for Iran’s Shahab-3 program occurred in late March 2001. [5] Iran is believed to have inducted the system into its military in 2003, presumably armed with non-nuclear warheads. [6]

More recently, the two states are thought to be collaborating in the development of nuclear-capable inter-continental ballistic missile systems, the North Korean Taepodong-2 (known in North Korea as the Paektusan-2) and the Iranian Shahab-6, gen-erally both listed as having a 5,000-6,000 kilometer range. [7] In May 2004, Pyongyang was reported to be negotiating the sale of the Taepodong-2 missile to Tehran, although it is not clear whether the purchase was approved and completed. [8] [9] It has also been reported that Iran may have purchased the hardware and technology for the Taepodong-2 in the second half of 2005. [10] Such activities would be consistent with a 2001 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate, which projected that Iran would attempt to launch an intercontinental ballistic missile by the end of the decade. [11]

Also during this period, from the mid-1980s to the present, North Korea has pursued a program to produce nuclear weapons, announcing its possession of such weapons in February 2005. This period also coincided with Iran’s secret pursuit of a capability to enrich uranium, a technology that can be used to produce weapons-usable highly enriched uranium (HEU). This history of secrecy has raised widespread international concern that Iran is seeking to develop nuclear arms.

Proxy Missile Flight Tests
As part of their missile collaboration, Tehran and Pyongyang have reportedly partnered closely on missile flight testing, a relationship that is said to have included proxy testing of North Korean systems in Iran and data exchanges. In September 1999, North Korea agreed to a moratorium on long-range missile tests, increasing the need for proxy testing of such systems. It accepted this restraint to avoid the imposition of U.S. sanctions following North Korea’s August 31, 1998, test of the long-range Taepodong-1 missile – configured as a satellite launch vehicle with a third stage and small payload intended for earth orbit. The missile flew over northern Japan into the Pacific, triggering intense international criticism. [12] In May 2004, an unnamed senior U.S. official indicated that Iran was probably giving North Korea telemetry and other data from missile tests, which the DPRK was using to improve its own missile systems. [13] In return, Pyongyang allegedly has been providing Tehran with on-site engineering consultation for future Iranian missile tests. [14]

In August 2004, it was reported that Iran was performing proxy testing of a new class of North Korean ballistic missiles derived from the Soviet SS-N-6 missile (an obsolete submarine-launched ballistic missile). Iran is alleged to have tested the SS-N-6 variant at least once again, on January 17, 2006. Iran also reportedly received 18 SS-N-6-variants from North Korea at roughly this time. [15] There is considerable uncertainty regarding this North Korean missile system, however, inasmuch as its existence has not been publicly confirmed by any U.S. official.

Finally, at least one detailed open source report states that the two countries are jointly developing a reentry vehicle for the Nodong/Shahab-3, intended to carry a nuclear warhead, which Iran flight tested in 2004:

Iran Reported to Observe July 5 DPRK Tests
Until North Korea’s September 1999 moratorium on the testing of long-range missiles, press accounts state that Iran regularly sent technical teams with missile telemetry and monitoring equipment to DPRK missile launches, and Iranian specialists are believed to have been present for the Taepodong-1 missile test in 1998. [17] [18]

Given this background, it would not be surprising if Iranians were present to observe the seven North Korean missile tests that took place on July 5, 2006, breaking the September 1999 moratorium. The test firings included the first ever Taepodong-2 missile launch, which failed after 40 seconds, and launches of two Nodongs and four Scud variants. [19] Indeed, several reports have placed Iranians at the DPRK missile launches, with a Japanese paper indicating that 10 Iranians were invited to the tests and an anonymous South Korean military expert stating that he had heard that “Iranians were stationed at two launch sites along North Korea’s east coast and on a boat in the Sea of Japan.” [20] Testifying before a U.S. Congressional committee on July 20, 2006, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill stated that Iranians were present at the tests, but later his office said it could not confirm this statement, although it did not declare the comment to be erroneous. [21]

Numerous Nonproliferation Issues Raised
Missile Technology Control Regime
The close collaboration between Iran and North Korea in providing each other with crucial missile technology and equipment has greatly reduced the effectiveness of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the system of parallel export controls adopted by 34 participating nations that seeks to curb the spread of missiles able to carry weapons of mass destruction (WMD). [22] In addition, Iran has independently managed to circumvent MTCR restrictions using diversion methods, such as front companies and intermediaries to transship key subcomponents and materials. [23] Some of these illicitly obtained commodities may have found their way to the DPRK, which, like Iran, is an implicit target of the MTCR.

Flight Test Moratorium
Proxy testing in Iran of jointly-developed missiles would have allowed North Korea, after September 1999, to appear to be restraining its missile development activities by accepting a moratorium on long-range missile tests, when, in fact, the moratorium may have had little impact, if any, on slowing its missile advances. Moreover, since the United States agreed to lift certain sanctions against North Korea in return for its accepting the moratorium, Pyongyang’s apparent ploy of moving its missile tests to Iran raises questions about the credibility of North Korea as a negotiating partner and about the effectiveness of U.S. diplomacy, both in negotiating the moratorium arrangement and in continuing to adhere to the U.S. side of the bargain even as evidence of North Korea’s stratagem apparently emerged. Similarly, Iran’s apparent readiness to help North Korea circumvent its widely publicized flight test moratorium would raise issues about its regard for international nonproliferation undertakings.

Enforcement of UN Security Council Resolution 1695
On July 15, 2006, roughly two weeks after North Korea’s resumption of long-range missile flight tests, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1695. The key section of the Resolution states that the Council:

Given the history of Iran-DPRK collaboration in the missile sphere, it is likely that Iran is, or may soon be, in violation of the resolution by transferring “missile-related items, materials, goods and technology” to DPRK missile or WMD programs; procuring such items or complete missiles from North Korea; and/or transferring “financial resources” to the North Korean missile program for missile-related purchases. If unambiguous evidence of such transactions emerges, this could pose an early test of the Security Council’s determination in enforcing Resolution 1695.

Possible Nuclear Collaboration
Particularly troubling is the possibility that the two countries have secretly adopted a parallel approach for sharing nuclear weapons technology. Both North Korea and Iran received significant clandestine assistance from the nuclear smuggling network established in the late 1980s by Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan. [25] According to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection reports and other reliable information, the Khan network secretly shared blueprints and components for Pakistan’s high-speed uranium enrichment centrifuges, completed centrifuges, and centrifuge components with Iran, beginning in the late-1980s, and shared virtually identical technology and equipment with North Korea beginning in the mid-1990s. [26] (See “Special Report: The A. Q. Khan Network: Crime…and Punishment?” in the March 2006 issue of WMD Insights, http://www.wmdinsights.com/I3/G1_SR_AQK_Network.htm.)

Iran is known to be manufacturing centrifuges based on the Pakistani design, and operating a small number of such centrifuges, while it readies a larger centrifuge enrichment facility. This activity is under IAEA inspection, as required by Iran’s status as a non-nuclear weapon state party to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), nevertheless, there is widespread international concern that once Iran has mastered this technology, it might build a secret, uninspected uranium enrichment facility for the purpose of producing nuclear weapons, or might withdraw from the Treaty, which would make it free to openly pursue the enrichment of uranium for weapons purposes. The United States government believes that North Korea, which withdrew from the NPT in January 2003, is also building a uranium enrichment facility at an unknown location for the purpose of enlarging its nuclear weapons program. [27] (North Korea currently is thought to possess sufficient stocks of nuclear weapons-usable plutonium for approximately 10 nuclear devices; a uranium enrichment capability would enable it to enlarge and diversify its arsenal.) [28]

In addition, Khan is known to have supplied similar items to Libya and, as part of this transaction, also provided detailed information concerning the design of a nuclear weapon using highly enriched uranium. It is widely speculated that Khan also provided this information to Iran and North Korea. [29]

As a result, Iran and the DPRK might be developing similar, if not identical, uranium enrichment capabilities and nuclear weapon designs at this time. Given the extensive history of cooperation between Tehran and Pyongyang on nuclear-capable missiles, which, according to one report, includes collaboration on reentry vehicles, it is reasonable to hypothesize that the two states may be pooling efforts to advance their respective capabilities for producing nuclear arms. [30]

At present, the UN Security Council, pursuant to Council Resolution 1696, is considering the imposition of sanctions against Iran because of its refusal to suspend sensitive aspects of its nuclear program, including its uranium enrichment activities, and because of its rejection of IAEA monitoring arrangements that would reduce suspicions regarding Iran’s intentions for its nuclear program. The history of using proxy missile flight tests in Iran to circumvent restrictions on such tests in North Korea under the 1999 moratorium, however, raises the possibility that the two states might collaborate to circumvent restrictions on the Iranian nuclear program. Such restrictions would include IAEA monitoring of the Iranian program under the NPT and any added requirements, such as a suspension of Iranian uranium enrichment activities that might be imposed by the UN Security Council. Iran might avoid all of these by pursuing its activities jointly with DPRK specialists in North Korea, which, as noted, is outside the NPT and not subject to IAEA monitoring.

Conclusion
The links between the Iranian and North Korean missile programs pose extremely difficult challenges for the United States as it attempts to constrain these capabilities and also halt nuclear proliferation in both countries. In the missile sphere, the Pyongyang-Tehran axis of interests has exploited the reciprocal technical strengths of the two states, Iran’s financial power, and the disparity in the nonproliferation controls covering Iran and North Korea, in order to build nuclear-capable missiles for their arsenals. These systems threaten major regional U.S. allies today and may threaten the U.S. homeland and additional U.S. European allies tomorrow. With both countries pursuing identical uranium enrichment technologies and enjoying a disparity in applicable nonproliferation controls because North Korea is outside the NPT, it is all too possible that they will make common cause in developing this technology to produce nuclear weapons.

Currently, UN Security Council Resolution 1695 demands that North Korea halt the testing of long-range missiles and that all countries (including Iran) cease any sharing of technology or financing to support North Korean missile or WMD programs, while UN Security Council Resolution 1696, demands that Iran suspend sensitive aspects of its nuclear activities. In coming months, gaining international support to enforce these measures effectively may well emerge as one of the most important goals of U.S. diplomacy.

Jennifer Kline – Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies*
* Ms. Kline, who prepared this piece while at the Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies, joined the Computer Sciences Corporation on September 1, 2006.