As noted in Part I of this WMD Insights analysis of new dimensions of Iranian missile proliferation, alleged Iranian missile transfers to Hezbollah in recent years would represent the first time a national government had given non-state actors surface-to-surface rockets with ranges up to 200 kilometers, as well as highly accurate cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Iran’s reported provision of such systems to Hezbollah not only raises serious proliferation concerns in itself, but also raises the possibility that Tehran might transfer even more advanced capabilities to Hezbollah in a bid to deter future Israeli military intervention in southern Lebanon.

Hezbollah was formed in the 1980s, with the assistance of followers of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the leader of the Iranian Revolution, and the organization has since enjoyed a close relationship with Tehran. Iran has allegedly provided considerable financial backing to Hezbollah, possibly as much as $60 to $100 million a year, and has become a major supplier of increasingly advanced weapons and training to Hezbollah militants. [1] It has been reported that Hezbollah has received between 10,000 and 15,000 rockets and missiles of various types from Iran and that some 3,000 Hezbollah militants have been trained by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards in the launching of these systems and in the operation of unmanned aerial drones, among other military skills. [2]

Missile Arsenal
Tehran has reportedly supplied Hezbollah with over 40 types of missiles and rockets since 1992. The vast majority of Hezbollah’s missile stockpile consists of unguided Katyusha rockets with limited range (25km) and accuracy, but in recent years, Iran reportedly has begun to provide considerably more sophisticated missiles and missile systems to Hezbollah. According to published sources, by 2004, Hezbollah stocks also included approximately 500 Fajr-3 and Fajr-5 missiles – unguided systems with ranges of 45 kilometers and 75 kilometers, respectively – and several dozen 200-kilometer range Zelzal-2 rockets able to carry 650 kilogram payloads. [3] These systems have substantially increased the reach and payload capacity of Hezbollah’s arsenal.

It has been reported that since Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon on May 24, 2000, there has been a dramatic increase in Iranian weapon and weapon system shipments to Hezbollah through Syria, with transfers continuing even after the outbreak of recent hostilities with Israel on July 12, 2006. [4] According to press reports, Iranian authorities promised in late July 2006 to supply Hezbollah with additional weapon systems in subsequent months, including surface-to-air and anti-ship missiles, to further fortify Hezbollah against Israeli forces. [5]

Although Hezbollah did not utilize any Zelzal-2s during the 34 days of Hezbollah-Israeli hostilities, it fired several 75-kilometer range Fajr-5 rockets, reaching as far as Hadera, 40 kilometers north of Tel Aviv. [6] Reports in the Israeli and U.S. press suggest that Israel was successful in attacking and destroying many Fajr-5s and Zelzal-2s before they could be launched; Israel also believes that Hezbollah did not fully utilize the systems because Iran refused it permission to do so. [7] Separately, according to Yossi Kuperwasser, a retired senior Israeli military intelligence officer, Iran has supplied Hezbollah with “some of the most advanced anti-tank missiles in the world,” weapons which have proven to be among the deadliest in Hezbollah’s arsenal. [8]

The increasing capabilities of Hezbollah’s surface-to-surface unguided rocket arsenal appears to have been augmented with far more accurate Iranian anti-ship cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to create a technologically advanced non-state actor whose war-making capabilities in certain respects rival those of some states. Indeed, Hezbollah’s technological prowess was, by many accounts, underestimated by both U.S. and Israeli intelligence, as became clear on July 14, 2006, when Hezbollah severely damaged the Spear, an Israeli Saar-5 class missile ship, with an Iranian-made
C-802 cruise missile. At the time, the Spear was enforcing Israel’s blockade of Lebanon. Although it was widely reported that Iran had imported Chinese C-802 anti-ship cruise missiles from 1991-1996 and had started a joint effort with North Korea to develop an advanced version of the C-802 missile in 2000, Western intelligence was unaware, according to press accounts, that Iran had transferred the radar-guided C-802 to Hezbollah. [9] As a result, the Israeli warship had not activated its missile defense system to counter such an advanced attack, although the strong anti-jamming capability and low-altitude approach of the C-802 would have made it difficult to intercept in any case. [10]

The attack on the Spear was initially presumed to have been carried out by a UAV armed with explosives that rammed into the ship, because Hezbollah had previously announced that it had flown UAVs over Israeli territory in November 2004 and April 2005 without detection and thus was known to have UAV capabilities. [11] Hezbollah is reported to have acquired eight Mohajer-4 Iranian UAVs in August 2004, according to a senior Revolutionary Guards officer, and the system is thought to be the basis for Hezbollah’s Mirsad-1 UAV, although there are some analysts who believe the Mirsad-1 is based on the Iranian Ababil UAV. [12] The Mirsad-1 is thought to be used predominantly for surveillance, although it could be used to carry a 40-45 kilogram payload of explosives to a maximum range of 150 kilometers or more, depending on the capabilities of the particular prototype on which it is based. [13] It is suspected
that Mirsad-1 can be guided remotely from the ground or using an internal GPS system, which increases its accuracy over that of Hezbollah’s unguided missiles, adding yet another important capability to Hezbollah’s armory. [14]

In anticipation of this threat, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) deployed its air-defense capabilities heavily along the Lebanese border during the July and August hostilities and was able to shoot down three Hezbollah UAVs. [15] The IAF downed a Mirsad-1 presumed to be collecting intelligence over the Mediterranean on August 7, 2006, and destroyed two Hezbollah UAVs thought to be carrying explosives over the Lebanese city of Tyre and the Israeli Kibbutz Cabri region on August 13, 2006. [16]


Proliferation Trends, UN Security Council Resolution 1540
The reported Iranian missile supplies to Hezbollah are particularly noteworthy because they highlight the proliferation of cruise missiles and UAVs as attractive alternatives to more expensive and complex ballistic missile systems, especially for a non-state actor. Cruise missiles and UAVs use readily available technology and parts; are inexpensive to build and small enough to transport easily; and can be designed to fly low enough to evade radar and infrared-detection networks. [17]

A particular danger posed by the proliferation of cruise missiles and UAVs is that they are superior to ballistic missiles in delivering chemical weapons (CW) and biological weapons (BW). The cruise missile’s “steady horizontal flight pattern permits release of the agent along a line of contamination … and enables the cruise missile to release and spray agent … upwind of the target area, greatly increasing dissemination efficiency” for CW and BW. [18] Although Iran is a party to both the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention, the United States believes that Tehran maintains offensive chemical and biological weapons programs and is in violation of both treaties. [19] If this is the case, Tehran would be in a position to share CW or BW with Hezbollah for use on its cruise missiles or UAVs. To date, there are no reports of Iran supporting or engaging in such transfers. (The issue of a Hezbollah chemical attack against Israel has, however, arisen in a different context: according to Hezbollah leader Hasan Nasrallah, the organization had the ability to strike a major chemical plant in Haifa during the July - August 2006 conflict, but rejected this option for the time being.) [20]

UN Security Council Resolution 1540, which is binding on all UN member states, expressly prohibits these states from assisting non-state actors in acquiring, developing, or using WMD, or “their means of delivery.” [21] The latter term is defined as “missiles, rockets and other unmanned systems capable of delivering nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons that are specially designed for such use.” Although it is not clear whether Iran has supplied Hezbollah with ballistic or cruise missiles or UAVs specially designed to carry WMD, were it to supply such technology or to assist Hezbollah “in any way” in developing this capability, the action would violate Resolution 1540.

Conclusions
In view of international efforts, including the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Wassenaar Arrangement, which seek to curb the spread of advanced delivery systems, especially those capable of carrying WMD, Iran’s reported transfer of such systems to a non-state actor is a significant proliferation milestone and a major departure from global nonproliferation norms. [22] A particular concern is that Iran’s alleged actions could lead to the transfer of increasingly sophisticated weaponry to Hezbollah. No less troubling is the possibility that Iran’s reported actions may set a precedent for transfers by Iran or others of powerful delivery systems to non-state actors engaged in armed conflicts elsewhere. Unfortunately, as dangerous as the systems acquired by Hezbollah may be, it is extremely difficult to interrupt trafficking in these capabilities, particularly in the case of smaller weapons and weapon systems, such as cruise missiles and UAVs. This could greatly add to the difficulty of enforcing compliance with the UN Security Council Resolution 1540.

Iran has proven exceptionally adept at proliferating powerful missile and unmanned air systems. Through a complex web of cooperation, Iran has reportedly managed to transfer not only technology and goods to Hezbollah, but also tacit knowledge, using training and engineering consultations to so. Tehran appears to have gained increased power and prestige in the process, both regionally and internationally, creating strong concern that Iranian proliferation will continue to be a destabilizing force in the Middle East and possibly beyond.

Jennifer Kline – Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies*
* Ms. Kline, who prepared this piece while at the Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies, joined the Computer Sciences Corporation on September 1, 2006.