On September 8, 2006, five Central Asian countries – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan – signed a treaty to create a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region.

The treaty establishing the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (CANWFZ) was signed in Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan, the site of a former Soviet nuclear weapons testing range. Uzbekistan first proposed CANWFZ, the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Northern Hemisphere, in 1993. [1] Negotiations on the text began with the 1997 Declaration of five Central Asian presidents and required nearly nine years to complete. In addition to features common to other nuclear-weapon-free zones, CANWFZ has introduced something new – its members are legally bound to adhere to enhanced International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards (inspections and accounting arrangements) known as the Additional Protocol. (For additional history and analysis of the CANWFZ provision and the politics surrounding the establishment of the zone, see Scott Parrish and William Potter, “Central Asian States Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Despite U.S. Opposition,”
(http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/060905.htm.)

Among the five nuclear weapon states recognized by the NPT, only Russia and China gave full endorsement and support to CANWFZ. The Russian Foreign Ministry statement characterized it as “an important step strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime,” which “will facilitate the strengthening of peace and security in the Central Asian region and will make a substantial contribution to the struggle against international terrorism and the prevention of nuclear materials and technology falling into the hands of non-state actors.” [2]

In contrast, the United States, Great Britain, and France (the P-3) objected to two provisions of the CANWFZ Treaty. First, they took issue with a provision declaring that the Treaty does not affect the rights and obligations of the signatories under previous international agreements. This has the effect of leaving intact the rights and obligations of parties to the 1992 Treaty on Collective Security (also known as the Tashkent Treaty), to which four out of the five CANWFZ states, Russia, and a number of other Newly Independent States are party. [3] Article IV of the Treaty on Collective Security states that signatories will render each other “all necessary assistance, including military assistance,” in response to aggression. This could be interpreted to mean that Russia could, under certain circumstances, reintroduce nuclear weapons into the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, a step that would contradict what the P-3 consider to be the core purpose of such zones.

In addition, the P-3 have expressed concern that the Treaty allows transit of nuclear weapons through the nuclear-weapon-free zone it establishes, or, more precisely, that each state is allowed to make its own decision with regard to such transit; only Turkmenistan has made a unilateral declaration to ban all transit of WMD through its territory, a stance it announced in late 2005. State-signatories to CANWFZ at the last moment removed a third contentious provision to which the P-3 objected, namely, the provision that allowed expansion of CANWFZ to include other states.

The stark difference in the attitudes toward CANWFZ attracted the attention of a number of Russian experts, who offered a variety of explanations for U.S. concerns. Regarding the continued validity of the Treaty on Collective Security, one analyst argued that the United States was less concerned that integrity of CANWFZ might be violated by the introduction of nuclear weapons into the zone than it was about the fact that Russia will continue to provide a “nuclear umbrella” to Central Asian states and serve as the main guarantor of their security, including vis-à-vis the United States. The relationship will reinforce Moscow’s position in the region and make closer ties to the United States less likely, he argued. [4]

Another writer, Vladimir Zharikhin, deputy director of the Moscow-based Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Institute offered that Washington was unhappy with the establishment of the new nuclear-weapon-free zone because CANWFZ removes a possible pretext for the United States to interfere in Central Asia. He argued that, “The United States usually has two reasons for interference into internal affairs of other states – too little democracy or too many uranium enrichment centrifuges. As a result, Central Asian states, which are not among the most democratic in the world and also have enormous deposits of uranium ore, have decided to defend themselves from the United States by concluding a treaty on a nuclear-free zone.” [5]

Regarding U.S. objections to the expansion provision of the CANWFZ, one analysis suggested that the core U.S. concern was that Iran might join the zone. This would allow Iran to buttress its claim that it has no interest in acquiring nuclear weapons, at a time when the United States believes it is clandestinely pursuing this goal, and to strengthen ties in Central Asia, possibly gaining allies within international fora considering sanctions against it because of its nuclear activities. [6]

More generally, these authors saw the P-3 objections as having an ominous edge. For example, they pointed out that the United States had not raised objections to the transit of nuclear weapons through other nuclear-weapon-free zones. Similarly, the refusal of the P-3 to give guarantees against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons against the members of CANWFZ, as provided in a protocol to the Treaty, was taken as an implicit threat and as a means of pressuring the five Central Asian states to eliminate provisions in the CANWFZ Treaty that have caused displeasure in Washington. [7] One Russian expert opined, however, that the latter issue should not be a source of undue concern, since in the case of other nuclear-weapon-free zones it has sometimes taken a number of years for the nuclear weapon states to sign similar protocols. [8]

Although, overall, attention to the signing of CANWFZ has been limited in Russia, the majority of those who have addressed this development have tended to approach it primarily through the lens of the U.S.-Russian “great game” for influence in Central Asia. From this standpoint, the zone is considered a “win” for Russia because it did not diminish the role of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Russia-led regional security arrangement established in 2003 to implement the 1992 Tashkent Treaty. The perception was considerably strengthened when the United States, Great Britain, and France then refused to welcome the creation of the zone and to sign the protocol on security assurances. This was seen as evidence that the United States failed to “tear” the region from the Russian sphere of influence.

That “victory” has primarily political significance, however. The material consequences of the right to reintroduce nuclear weapons into Central Asia, for example, seem negligible because Russia has consistently argued in the international arena that nuclear weapon states should deploy nuclear weapons only in their own territories, a position designed to highlight the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe and ultimately achieve their withdrawal. Even the mere public assertion of a right to reintroduce nuclear weapons in Central Asia could undermine both Russia’s policy vis-à-vis U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe and its relations with its Central Asian allies.

Nikolai Sokov – Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies