A report by the Turkish Directorate General of Customs Control on November 29, 2005, has revealed new details on the extent of Turkish involvement in the nuclear black market network that supplied Libya with nuclear components. The report disclosed that two Turkish firms provided Libya with 10 million dollars’ worth of equipment intended for use in high-speed centrifuges for enriching uranium, potentially to the levels required for nuclear weapons. Once mated with equipment obtained from other sources, the Turkish items would have helped Libya establish a uranium enrichment capability sufficient for the production of seven nuclear weapons annually, according to an analysis by the U.S. Department of Energy. [1] The heads of the two implicated Turkish firms were known to have had ties to Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan, who, between 1988 and 2003, built and orchestrated a smuggling ring that provided sensitive nuclear technology and equipment to Iran and North Korea, in addition to Libya. [2] Separately, European investigators have confirmed that Sudan served as a transit point for illicit dual-use equipment trafficking apparently intended for Iran.

Following the initial revelations of Turkish involvement in the A.Q. Khan network, which occurred after Libya unilaterally dismantled its weapon of mass destruction programs in December 2003, the Turkish Directorate General of Customs Control launched an investigation into Turkish-Libyan nuclear sector links. The inquiry unraveled a number of complex nuclear trafficking deals carried out in Turkey, primarily by three Turkish firms: Tekno Elektrik Sanayi, (sometimes referred to as Eti Elektronik), owned by Gunes Cire; and EKA Elektronik and 3E Endustriyel Sanayi, both owned by Selim Alguadish. A final report compiling the results of the investigation was completed on November 29, 2005, and alleged that these firms shipped items produced in or shipped through Turkey to the firm of Gulf Technical Industries, in Dubai. Thereafter the goods were sent to Libya or Pakistan, sometimes with an intermediate stop in Malaysia, where additional work was performed on them. [3] Trafficked material included, but was not limited to the following: 95 frequency converters, each with the ability to operate 100 gas centrifuges; 6,992 centrifuge motors; 6,992 castings and starters; 912 centrifuge bottom caps; as well as 19,447 ring magnets (imported from Germany), used for centrifuge bearings. [4] [5] The 95 frequency converters were manufactured in Turkey by EKA Elektronik and the ring magnets were imported into Turkey from Germany; no other information on the origin of the remaining items was provided in press accounts of the Turkish Customs Control Directorate’s report.

The Turkish investigation sheds new light on one important aspect of the A.Q. Khan network — its exploitation of machining and manufacturing capabilities outside of highly industrialized states to provide equipment for emerging nuclear weapons programs. Previous investigations in Malaysia had revealed the use of such machining and manufacturing capabilities in that country for such purposes, but it is now clear that Khan and his team utilized this approach more extensively.

One of the implicated businessmen, Selim Alguadish, has denied the charges of illicit trafficking and has stated that “the equipment we sell has the same properties of materials sold worldwide. The fact that our power supply is sufficient to spin an enrichment centrifuge is another issue. One can floss his teeth with a pin and hurt himself.” [6] While Cire, the other implicated party, has passed away, Alguadish is currently under arrest in Germany and will be extradited to Turkey to stand trial for violating Article 65 of Turkish Law, which prohibits illicit trafficking of such materials. [7] Investigators also called for the indictment of two of his partners, Zubeyir Baybars Cayci and Ertugrul Sonmez, as well as Swiss businessman Marco Tinner.

Separately, in early January 2005, the Guardian (London) disclosed that “a European intelligence report” had concluded that Sudan was used as a warehouse from 1999 to 2001 to store hundreds of millions of dollars worth of advanced dual-use engineering equipment obtained from European sources and potentially useful in the uranium enrichment process and other nuclear weapon relevant purposes. [8] Because much of the equipment was too sophisticated for use in Sudan and because A.Q. Khan is known to have visited the country at least once between 1998 and 2002, some observers suspect that the country may have been part of his network, serving as a conduit for the subsequent transfer of the items to Libya, Iran, and/or North Korea. [9] However, none of the dual-use material that was sent to Sudan was found in Libya, leading other analysts surveyed in the Guardian article to suggest that the operation was part of an extensive smuggling network built up independently by Iran. Investigators found that sales of much of the equipment was denominated in Deutschmarks (before the introduction of the Euro), suggesting that a significant portion of the goods at issue originated in Germany. None of the equipment has been found.

Sammy Salama and Nilsu Goren – Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies