This article is based on research conducted by Sammy Salama and Nilsu Goren at the Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies.

In the two years since the operations of the nuclear smuggling network led by Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan were publicly revealed, law enforcement agencies around the globe have pursued investigations and prosecutions against more than thirty individuals involved in the illicit trafficking effort. Results have varied widely, with a seven-year prison term meted out by a German court being the most severe punishment imposed to date. Most alleged participants in the enterprise, however, have suffered limited penalties, if any, for their efforts to provide assistance to nuclear weapon programs in Pakistan, Iran, Libya, and North Korea.

Secret Imports, Then Exports
The network was built upon a set of contacts and clandestine smuggling operations that Khan had developed since 1976, after he returned to Pakistan from the Netherlands. With him, he brought plans for uranium centrifuges used at a Dutch enrichment facility at Almelo and lists of component suppliers for that installation. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons production capability is based on this Dutch centrifuge technology. [1]

By 1987, Khan, relying on equipment and materials provided by his “incoming” nuclear smuggling network, had succeeded in producing highly enriched uranium for the Pakistani nuclear weapon program and began to exploit the same channels to establish an “outgoing” network to support nuclear weapon programs elsewhere. Equipment provided by the network, apparently beginning with shipments to Iran in 1987, included designs for uranium enrichment centrifuges; obsolete equipment from Pakistan’s own enrichment program; components for the manufacture of large numbers of centrifuges; and the design of a nuclear weapon (purportedly provided to Pakistan by China), along with detailed notations on how to machine and assemble its parts. [2] Uranium enrichment centrifuges can be used to produce low-enriched uranium for nuclear power plant fuel, but can also be used to produce highly enriched uranium suitable for use in nuclear weapons.

Although many details remain unclear, Khan appears to have gradually modified the range of matériel provided in order to suit the needs of his customers. According to published sources, Khan sold Iran a basic package of centrifuge blueprints and sample pieces of obsolete equipment from the Pakistani program, along with the nuclear weapon design. He then provided at least comparable assistance to North Korea, probably beginning sometime in the mid- to late-1990s. In 2000 or shortly thereafter, he also offered Libya a nearly complete uranium enrichment plant, fabricated abroad, together with the weapon design. (The scale of the assistance to Libya was exposed with the September 2003 detaining in Italy of the BCC China, en route to Libya, which carried much of this equipment.) Meanwhile, Khan continued to utilize the incoming operations of his smuggling effort to maintain and expand Pakistan’s own enrichment capabilities.

Geographic Scope
Over time, Khan also expanded his network geographically. During the initial incoming phase, its hub was at Khan’s headquarters near Islamabad, with the major spokes radiating to Western European equipment producers through trusted European go-betweens, including those in Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the UK. Turkey and a number of other locales served as intermediate transshipping points. As the outgoing network grew, the hub appears to have divided, with important financing and organizational operations established in Dubai. From here, Buhary Syed Abu Tahir, a Sri Lankan businessman, arranged acquisitions for and transfers to Khan’s new customers. Pre-existing connections to Europe were maintained, those in Turkey were expanded, and new spokes were added to South Africa and Malaysia, where, as in Turkey, Khan’s intermediaries arranged for certain components to be manufactured. South Africa and Turkey also served as transshipment points for items acquired from the United States. In East Asia, firms in Japan, South Korea, and Singapore contributed high-tech equipment to the enterprise, in some cases without knowing its ultimate purpose or destination.

Alleged Perpetrators and Law Enforcement Results
Khan’s efforts to jump-start nuclear weapon programs in three new states involved numerous actors in a wide range of countries.

Pakistan
At the core of Khan’s dealings with Iran, North Korea, and Libya was the transfer of technology that comprised the essence of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent capability, presumably some of that country’s most prized and closely guarded state secrets. Several levels of officials in the Pakistani nuclear and military hierarchy have been investigated by Pakistani authorities. No prosecutions are known to have been brought, but a number of individuals, some of whom were held for “debriefings” for as long as six months, remain under house arrest and one appears to be in the indefinite custody of Pakistani authorities.

A.Q. Khan
Khan is believed to be under house arrest in Islamabad, following his detailed disclosures in early 2004 to Pakistani authorities regarding his activities, his public apology on February 4 of that year, and his pardon immediately afterwards by Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf.

Khan’s immediate subordinates at the Khan Research Laboratories (KRL)
At least 15 officials linked to KRL were questioned by Pakistani authorities in early 2004. Most were released in several weeks or less, but three were held in custody for six months and then placed under house arrest, Maj. (ret.) Islam al-Haq (Khan’s personal staff officer), Nazeer Ahmed (Director-General of Science and Technology at KRL), and Brig. General (ret.) Sajawal Khan Malik (head of security at KRL). Only one KRL official, Mohammed Farooq, A.Q. Khan’s principal deputy, is thought to remain in detention at this time. [3]

Senior members of the Pakistan military
Three former Chiefs of Army Staff (COAS), Mirza Aslam Beg (COAS from August 1988 to August 1991), Abdul Wahid Kakar (COAS from January 1993-January 1996) and Jehangir Karamat (COAS from January 1996 to October 1998), have been accused in various reports of being involved in the affair, as either knowledgeable of and acquiescing in Khan’s activities, or actively facilitating them. [4] Beg and Karamat were reportedly questioned by Pakistani authorities but were not charged with any wrong-doing. Karamat is currently Pakistan’s ambassador to the United States. President Pervez Musharraf, who has served as COAS since October 1998, is also alleged to have been knowledgeable about the Khan network, but denies this was the case. [5]

Malaysia
This was the site of SCOPE, a subsidiary of the SCOMI Group BHD, one of the Khan network’s off-shore machining and manufacturing shops, which produced an array of aluminum components for the Libyan centrifuge enrichment program, including casings, end-caps, and baffles. The unit was set up by Tahir, but owned by a company controlled by Kamaluddin Abdullah, son of Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi. [6] Presumably a number of other business persons and technicians would have been involved in the effort.

Buhary Syed Abu Tahir
After being cleared of violating Malaysian criminal law, Tahir was arrested on May 28, 2004, under Malaysia’s internal security law, and remains in detention. [7]

Kamaluddin Abdullah, and other officers/employees of SCOPE
No charges are known to have been filed against these individuals.

Western Europe
At least nine individuals from Western European states have been identified in press accounts or official sources as assisting in illicit procurement activities in support of A.Q. Khan’s efforts to assist Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program and/or nuclear programs elsewhere. Several of these individuals participated by assisting manufacturing and machining operations in Malaysia, South Africa, or Turkey relevant to the production of uranium enrichment equipment. The group includes three Swiss citizens, Friederich Tinner and his sons Urs and Marco; a Dutch citizen, Henk Slebos; a citizen of unidentified nationality, Zoran Filipovic; a British citizen, Abu Siddiqui; and German citizens Gotthard Lerch, Rainer Vollmerich, and Heinz Mebus (deceased). The Tinners, personnally and through companies they owned or operated in Europe (including CETEC and Traco), are alleged to have provided technical support in setting up and operating production lines for SCOPE in Malaysia. Marco Tinner is alleged to have used Turkish firms to manufacture centrifuge parts, which were then exported to SCOPE for further modification. Henk Slebos is reported to have sent dual-use equipment to Pakistan and to be part owner of ETI Elektroteknik, a Turkish firm that also allegedly supported the Khan network (see below). Zoran Filipovic is said to have worked with Slebos, helping to smuggle nuclear relevant dual-use goods out of the Netherlands. Abu Siddiqui did the same from England. Gotthard Lerch is reported to have assisted Libya in developing an advanced machine shop to support its planned uranium enrichment activities and to have arranged for the production of centrifuge parts in South Africa for the Libyan program. (Another individual, Peter Griffin, is said to have supported the outfitting of the Libyan machine shop; he successfully sued the Guardian (London) for libel for falsely alleging that Malaysian authorities found him guilty of providing assistance to Libya’s nuclear program. His son Paul Griffin is discussed below.) Rainer Vollmerich procured items related to uranium enrichment for nuclear facilities in Pakistan.

Friederich Tinner
In custody of Swiss authorities. [8]

Urs Tinner
In custody of Swiss authorities, since November 2005, awaiting trial. [9]

Marco Tinner
In custody of Swiss authorities; under investigation in Turkey. [10]

Henk Slebos
Convicted in the Netherlands on charges related to smuggling nuclear components to Pakistan. Received 12 month sentence, (8 months suspended, 4 months served); ordered to personally pay a fine of 100,000 euros (US$120,000). [11]

Zoran Filipovic
Convicted in the Netherlands of exporting controlled items to Pakistan. Sentenced to 180 days of community service and fine of 5,000 euro. [12]

Abu Siddiqui
Convicted in the UK of illegally evading British export laws by shipping nuclear dual-use items to Khan’s lab in Pakistan. Received a 12-month suspended sentence and a £6,000 fine. [13]

Gotthard Lerch
Charged with violating German export laws; arrested in November 2005, but not currently in custody. [14]

Rainer Vollmerich
Convicted of illegally procuring and exporting controlled nuclear materials to Pakistan. Sentenced to prison term of 7 years and three months. [15]

Investigations in France and Spain
According to two leading U.S. experts on the Khan affair, David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, investigations are also being pursued in France and Spain. None has resulted in arrests or prosecutions as of this writing. It has not been possible to obtain additional details of these developments.

South Africa
Johan Meyer, founder of Trade Fin Engineering, and Gerhard Wisser, owner of Kirsch Engineering, are alleged to have supported the Khan enterprise along two tracks, reportedly working with Tahir. First, they received and transshipped sensitive goods needed for Libya’s uranium enrichment program and, second, engaged in the manufacture of components for that program, in particular, vacuum pumps and equipment for handling uranium in gaseous form.

Johan Meyer
South African authorities indicted Meyer, but dismissed the charges against him after he agreed to testify against Wisser. [16]

Gerhard Wisser (and his employee Daniel Geiges)
Awaiting trial in Pretoria. [17]

Turkey
Khan’s network operated in Turkey along the same tracks as in South Africa, with several key firms supporting Khan’s sale of a uranium enrichment plant to Libya by receiving and transshipping dual-use goods and by manufacturing components needed in the gas centrifuge uranium enrichment process, in particular electronic components. The key individuals and firms alleged to be involved are Gunes Cire (sometimes, spelled Gunas Jireh), director of ETI Elektroteknik, and Selim Alguadis, President of EKA, also a firm specializing in electronics, as well as several of Alguadis’s business partners.

Gunes Cire
Arrested and detained in Turkey. Died in 2004. [18]

Selim Alguadis
Under investigation by Turkish authorities; potential penalties of up to 20 years imprisonment.

Zubeyir Baybars Cayci, Ertugrul Sonmez
Turkish authorities said to be seeking indictments against these individuals who are partners of Alguadis; potential penalties of up to 20 years imprisonment. [19]

Dubai
Tahir worked out of Dubai, where he was Managing Director of SMB Group, and Freiderich Tinner, Peter Griffin, and others are alleged to have used this locale extensively as a transshipment point to disguise the ultimate destination of sensitive equipment. Griffin’s son, Paul, managed the Dubai-based company Gulf Technical Industries (GTI), reported to be a frequently used cut-out for the network. [20] The co-director of GTI, Ahmad Hassan Rashid Ahmad al Abbar, was the local sponsor of the company. [21] It does not appear that authorities in Dubai are pursuing charges against any individuals associated with the Khan network.

Paul Griffin
Not known to be currently the subject of investigation; has denied allegations of wrong-doing.

Ahmad Hassan Rashid Ahmad al Abbar
Not known to be the subject of investigation.

Singapore
Some of the materials used by SCOPE to manufacture 300 metric tons of aluminum tubing were purchased from Bikar Metalle Asia, a Singapore subsidiary of the German company Bikar Metalle. This tubing was sent through Dubai. There is no indication that Bikar Metalle Asia was aware of the purpose to which the material was to be used. [22]

Bikar Metalle Asia
Management was not prosecuted; found not to have committed a crime or to have hidden its involvement. [23]

South Korea
The Khan network acquired specialized balancing machines from South Korea. The manufacturer of the machines, Hanbando, Inc., has not been accused of wrong-doing, but the exporting company, known in court records only as “D” was the subject of law enforcement efforts.

“D” Corporation
Prosecuted in late 2004 and acquitted by a South Korean court because of lack of evidence of intent to break South Korean export control laws. Prosecuted for a second violation and acquitted on the same grounds. South Korean Ministry of Commerce and Industry, however, imposed a one-year ban on import and export activities by the organization. [24]

Japan
Specialized Japanese three-dimensional measuring machines, needed to build uranium enrichment centrifuges with the necessary precision, were found by the IAEA in Libya during inspections as that country dismantled its nuclear weapons program. On February 13, 2006, Japanese authorities raided the Mitutoyo Corp., outside Tokyo, manufacturer of the machines, which were shipped to Tripoli via Dubai by Scomi Precision Engineering. [25]

Mitutoyo Corp.
Under investigation.

Patterns of Punishment
With a number of investigations and prosecutions still pending and others possibly in the planning stage, it is premature to draw firm conclusions regarding the international response to A.Q. Khan’s illicit nuclear trafficking. Nonetheless, certain patterns appear to be emerging.

First, it appears that political realities in Pakistan, Malaysia, and, possibly Dubai have shaped
decisions regarding which actors to pursue and how to punish them. Even in these settings, however, penalties of some severity have been meted out. A.Q. Khan is under indefinite house arrest, disgraced, deprived of his ability to speak publicly, and deprived of enjoyment of the fortune he built from his crimes. His principal deputies, Mohammed Farooq and B.S.A. Tahir, are in custody, indefinitely, without the benefit of trial. Three Khan KRL subordinates were held for “debriefings” that lasted six months and then placed under house arrest. However, other figures in these countries, some of whom may have played important roles in the Khan enterprise, have avoided prosecution and penalties of any kind.

Second, in Western Europe, prosecutions have had uneven success. Rainer Vollmerich’s seven-year prison sentence imposed by a German court is substantial, but the light punishments meted out in the Netherlands to Henk Slebos and Zoran Filipovic seem unlikely to serve as a deterrent to future export control violations. It remains to be seen how South African, Swiss, and Turkish courts will deal with individuals facing charges for nuclear export control violations in those countries.

As in combating international terrorism, it is likely that in seeking to thwart A.Q. Khan’s activities, interested governments have confronted difficult choices between pursuing intelligence gathering opportunities and bringing individuals to justice. Former Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers, for example, has stated that in 1975 and 1986, the CIA requested that Dutch authorities not detain A.Q. Khan so that his activities could be monitored and other elements of this network, and their customers, identified. [26] Similarly, the presence of Dutch intelligence officers at the search of the offices of Henk Slebos is said to have tainted his prosecution and led to a reduced sentence. [27] In addition, the need to protect intelligence-gathering sources and methods can preclude the use of certain evidence in criminal proceedings, increasing challenges for prosecutors.

Finally, interested governments have yet to take action against freight forwarders, financial institutions, and other facilitators of Khan’s nuclear smuggling operations. [28] Many such parties were likely innocent of any knowledge of the transactions they were assisting, but others may have been fully cognizant of the role they were playing and deserve to be pursued by the appropriate authorities.

Despite the on-going efforts to roll up the A.Q. Khan network, smuggling in support of nuclear weapon programs continues. Iran may well have developed its own network independent of Khan – and Pakistan, itself, can be expected to continue to import sensitive goods for its nuclear deterrent. [29] [30] Aggressive pursuit and prosecution of wrong-doers and more substantial penalties for those convicted may help to deter future smuggling operations, but the erratic record to date, with its strong tilt towards leniency, suggests that much remains to be done to achieve such results.

Leonard S. Spector, Nilsu Goren, Sammy Salama – Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies