On July 9, 2006, the Government of Turkey formally adopted the instrument of ratification for the U.S.–Turkey Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy. [1] The underlying purpose of the agreement is to authorize and set the conditions for transfers to Turkey of U.S. civil nuclear technology, equipment, components, and material, including nuclear power reactors and their low enriched uranium fuel. [2] The agreement will take effect once the United States completes its formal process for approving the pact.

By 2015, Turkey expects to complete the construction of three nuclear power stations. These plans have generated controversy within the country among anti-nuclear activists and opposition members of the Turkish parliament. [3]

The U.S.-Turkey nuclear agreement will be receiving attention in Washington at the same time as the United States is negotiating a similar agreement with India, pursuant to the Joint Statement signed by President George W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on July 8, 2005. [4] Both agreements must comply with Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which states the terms that must be included in U.S. agreements for nuclear cooperation with other states, and it is likely that comparisons will be made between the texts of the two accords as they are considered by the U.S. Congress. [5]

U.S. Approval Delayed
The U.S.-Turkey nuclear agreement was signed on July 26, 2000, and approved by the Turkish parliament on January 14, 2005. [6] In the United States, the agreement is considered an executive agreement, rather than a treaty. This means that it will enter into force automatically, after 60 days during which Congress is in session – unless, during that 60-day period, both the House of Representatives and the Senate, by simple majorities, pass a joint resolution disapproving the pact. [7]

Although U.S. officials believe the agreement satisfies the terms of Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act, the Department of State, which was responsible for negotiating the agreement, has not yet presented it to President Bush to start the approval process. The reason for this delay has not been disclosed. Turkish firms, however, have been linked to the nuclear smuggling ring operated by Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan and have been implicated in supplying Iran’s suspect nuclear program. (See “Iran Exploited Turkish Trading Firm to Procure Dual-Use Goods From Western European, U.S. Companies,” in the July-August 2006 issue and “New Light Shed on Turkish, Sudanese Involvement in Nuclear Black Market Sales to Libya,” in the March 2006 issue of WMD Insights.) The United States is working with the Turkish government to end such trafficking and the two countries’ intelligence agencies have collaborated to block at least one nuclear smuggling operation. [8] In addition, in 2005, the two countries signed a cooperation agreement under which Turkey agreed to join the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), aimed at interdicting illicit weapons of mass destruction cargoes. The United States was keen to have Turkey take part in this Initiative, as a means of reinforcing efforts to prevent shipments of missile and nuclear technology from reaching neighboring Iran. In May 2006, Turkey held joint military exercises with the United States and other PSI participants in the eastern Mediterranean as part of this agreement. [9]

Given this background, it is possible that the approval of the nuclear cooperation agreement is being delayed in the United States until sufficient progress has been made on the trafficking issue to ensure the agreement will not lead to controversy when it is submitted to the U.S. Congress.

Reactions to Agreement in Turkey
The nuclear power program that the agreement would support has been the target of criticism within Turkey. The proposal to build one of Turkey’s three planned nuclear power reactors in Sinop, for example, a scenic town on the Black Sea, has elicited strong opposition from Turkish environmentalists, as well from the opposition party in the Turkish parliament, which opposes the efforts of the governing Justice and
Development Party (known as the “AK Party” in Turkish) to import nuclear technology. For its part, the AK Party has justified these efforts on the ground that Turkey’s demand for energy is growing but the country lacks natural energy resources to meet these needs.

A February 2006 report on the private Turkish news channel NTV quoted Engin Altay, a member of the parliamentary opposition as stating: “Construction of a nuclear plant is a catastrophic project with zero safety.” The lawmaker expressed concern that Turkey would become a “dumping ground” for third-rate nuclear technology that the United States and European countries had already abandoned. He accused the current government of giving in to “nuclear lobbies” and claimed that Turkey could increase electricity supplies by reducing unregistered electricity consumption. [10]

The U.S.-Turkey deal has received little attention elsewhere in the Middle East, overshadowed by other recent developments, including the conflict in southern Lebanon, Iraq, and growing international concern over the course of the Iranian nuclear program. However, the Qatar-based Al-Jazeera television station, which promotes “Arab nationalist” views, was critical of the agreement, declaring: “The Agreement is seen as a diplomatic triumph for the U.S., which seeks to bring Turkey’s nuclear program under its direct control and influence, whereas, for Turkey, it’s nothing but a weak attempt to develop civilian nuclear capabilities.” [11]

The Al-Jazeera report also quoted two opposing viewpoints within Turkey on the issue of Turkey’s future nuclear program. One source, Inci Gokmen, a chemistry professor at Ankara’s Middle East Technical University, was quoted as saying, “Except for Finland, no Western countries have established nuclear power plants since 1978.” She continued, “Nuclear plants contain extremely complicated technologies. Also, Turkey will have to import fuel for those power plants. . .We should benefit from domestic and
renewable energy sources instead.” [12] Al-Jazeera also quoted Zafer Caglayan,Chairman of the Ankara Chamber of Industry, who supported a future nuclear program stating: “Those who oppose the establishment of nuclear power plants in Turkey should not forget that there have already been plants (established) in neighboring countries. . .Nuclear power plants in Turkey will create a great atmosphere for investments.” [13]

The Turkish government has made its nuclear energy plans clear, basing its decisions on growing domestic energy consumption and the rise in global oil prices. [14] In addition to American assistance, during the initial stages of developing a nuclear regulatory framework and a nuclear safety regime, Turkey will also receive support from the IAEA in establishing safety standards and undertaking seismic studies. These cooperative efforts, however, seem unlikely to resolve the ongoing controversy raised by anti-nuclear activists and members of the leading opposition party.

Benchmark for U.S.-India Agreement
The text of the agreement has been published by the Turkish government, in Turkish, and the Turkish Official Gazette website has posted an unofficial translation in English. The U.S. government has not released the official English version of the text, following its long-standing practice of doing so only at the time of the President’s submission of such agreements to the Congress. The availability of the unofficial English text, however, makes it possible to identify how the Turkish agreement addresses two issues that are known to be contentious in the U.S.-India negotiation.

The first concerns reprocessing – the separation of plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. The activity is considered sensitive because plutonium is usable in nuclear weapons. Section 123(a)(7) of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act requires that U.S. agreements for cooperation specify that no U.S.-supplied nuclear materials, or nuclear materials produced through their use or through the use of U.S.-supplied reactors or other equipment, may be reprocessed without prior U.S. approval. The unofficial translation of Article VI of the
U.S.-Turkey agreement appears to address this point by stating that no materials falling into these
categories may be reprocessed “unless the parties agree,” thereby, providing the necessary U.S. veto over such activity. [15]

This topic is thought to be sensitive in the U.S.-India negotiations because, unlike Turkey, India hopes to recycle plutonium produced in its power reactors (including those purchased from the United States) for subsequent generations of fuel, a policy the United States has traditionally discouraged. [16] India is likely to be uncomfortable with the explicit language used in the U.S.-Turkey agreement on this point and can be expected to seek modifications or understandings that give the United States less control over reprocessing. Any deviation from the clear-cut approach of the U.S.-Turkey agreement, however, is likely to attract scrutiny as the U.S.-India agreement is reviewed by the U.S. Congress.

A second area of likely controversy concerns the right of the recipient of U.S. nuclear transfers to build up a strategic reserve of U.S.-supplied nuclear fuel. The U.S.-Turkey agreement appears to preclude Turkey’s acquisition of a large reserve (beyond limited buffer stocks) of such material. Article IV, paragraph 3 of the unofficial English translation of the U.S.-Turkey Agreement for Cooperation states that the amount of U.S. fuel provided “shall not at any time be in excess of that quantity that the parties agree is necessary for…the efficient and continuous operation of reactors….” [17]

India, however, has made clear that it wants to acquire such a reserve to help it weather any future fuel supply interruptions. The United States terminated nuclear fuel shipments to India in 1980 as a belated response to India’s 1974 nuclear test, and India fears that the United States might do so again, as would be required by current U.S. law if, for example, New Delhi conducted a future test, violated International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, or materially breached the U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement. [18] A large stockpile of fresh fuel would nullify the impact of such a fuel cut-off. India claims that the United States has agreed “to support India’s effort to develop a strategic fuel reserve to guard against any disruption of supply over the lifetime of India’s reactors.” [19] The Bush Administration, however, has stated that it would not support India’s stockpiling U.S. nuclear fuel in quantities sufficient to protect it from a cut-off triggered by an Indian nuclear test or other actions identified in U.S. law. [20] As in the case of reprocessing, the unambiguous language of the U.S.-Turkey agreement is likely to be used as a yardstick by the U.S. Congress for judging how this potential controversy is handled in the Indian case.

Conclusion
Although the U.S.-Turkey nuclear cooperation agreement is seemingly routine and is said by U.S. officials to be a model agreement that meets all U.S. requirements, the accord touches upon a number of important issues. When the agreement ultimately comes before the U.S. Congress, for example, that body, as part of its deliberations, will undoubtedly review the past involvement of Turkish firms in nuclear trafficking and the efforts of the Turkish government to combat such activities. As just noted, moreover, Congress is also likely use the U.S.-Turkey agreement as a reference point for reviewing the U.S.-India nuclear pact.

In addition, within Turkey, the agreement has already fanned debate over the future of nuclear energy in the country. So far, that debate has been framed in terms of the country’s energy needs and safety and environmental concerns. It is possible, however, that national security issues will also become a factor in the discussion, with some elements in Turkey arguing that mastering nuclear technology through a peaceful nuclear power program will provide an essential foundation upon which Turkey could build, if at some future time it became necessary for it to develop an independent deterrent to counter a nuclear-armed Iran. Such national security considerations, it may be noted, appear to be a factor motivating Egypt’s recently announced plans to restart its nuclear power program. (See “Renewed Egyptian Ambitions for a Peaceful Nuclear Program,” in this issue of WMD Insights.)

Ibrahim Al-Marashi – Koc University, Istanbul, and Nilsu Goren – Sabanci University, Istanbul