When first asked about news reports of China’s January 12, 2007, anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon test, Russian officials initially adopted the singular stance of denying that the test had occurred. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov remarked on Russian television: “I have heard such rather unsubstantiated reports, and I am afraid they are unfounded.” [1] He added that it was “a good thing” that such a test had not taken place and underscored that the Russian government remained opposed to the militarization of space. [2]

Russian Government Criticism of U.S. Space Policies
After the Chinese acknowledged the test, the Russian position shifted somewhat. Russian leaders described the test in negative terms, but tended to downplay its military significance. They also blamed American foreign and defense policies – especially U.S. military programs exploiting outer space – for causing China to test the ASAT weapon. On January 20, for example, an unnamed official from the Russian Ministry of Defense told journalists that the Chinese test “was a consequence of extremely aggressive U.S. policies” that had undermined international law and led to “a new arms race in which Russia has no intention of taking part.” [3]

Similarly, when a reporter subsequently asked Russian President Vladimir Putin about the test at a press conference during his late January 2007 visit to India, Putin responded by criticizing U.S. plans for space-based weapons, saying they were the reason behind the recent Chinese ASAT weapon test. At the January 25 press conference, Putin, alluding to earlier American and Soviet ASAT programs, also observed that China was not the first country to conduct such a test. After noting that “we should not let this genie out of the bottle,” Putin reaffirmed his support for negotiating an agreement banning all weapons from outer space. [4]

During his widely-reported February 10 speech at the Munich Security Conference, Putin devoted considerable time to criticizing various U.S. foreign policies. [5] He elaborated on the Russian position that the United States had to change its policies to avert an arms race in space, which he feared would be comparable to the U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms race. Such changes were imperative, the Russian president argued:

… to prevent a new area of confrontation, especially in outer space. As is well-known, “star wars” is no longer a fantasy – it is a reality. In the middle of the 1980s our American partners were already able to intercept their own satellites.

In Russia’s opinion, the militarization of outer space could have unpredictable consequences for the international community, and provoke nothing less than what occurred at the beginning of the nuclear era. And we have more than once proposed initiatives designed to prevent the use of weapons in outer space.

Today, I would like to inform you that we have prepared a plan for an agreement on preventing the deployment of weapons in outer space. And in the near future it will be sent to our partners as an official proposal. Let us work on this together. [6]

Russian Media and Other Nongovernmental Commentators Adopt Differing Views
Russian media coverage of the test offered more varying assessments, but commentators primarily criticized the United States rather than China for allegedly bringing an arms race to outer space. Ruslan Pukhov, director of the Moscow Center for Strategy and Technology Analysis, said that, “The Americans want their military alone to control outer space so that they can dominate space information technologies and launch rockets and advanced weapons from satellites, while others cannot.” [7] Michail Leontiev, a political commentator for Russian TV Channel One, likewise argued that, “We should be extremely grateful to the Chinese for showing the United States that nobody has the right to dictate the destiny of the international community.” [8]

A less vocal group of Russian commentators, however, attributed the test not to previous U.S. policies, but to China’s ambitions to become a space power. One commentator offered this assessment: “There is a reason behind the claims that the launch on January 12 was not connected at all with the American space initiatives…. Beijing has been playing its own game in space for a long time.” [9] A January 23 article in Moskovskiy Komsomolets warned: “The deployment of new military bases [by the United States and NATO] will upset the strategic balance of forces in Europe, and not in Russia’s favor. The other day China upset this balance still further. By destroying one of its old satellites with a ballistic missile, it announced to the entire world that it also possesses ABM [anti-ballistic missile] capability.” [10]

The focus on U.S. policies as provoking the Chinese response has tended to obscure the fact that the Soviet Union had a well-developed ASAT program and that no formal arms control agreement prohibits the Russian Federation from developing this legacy further. The extent to which the Russia Federation has maintained these Soviet-era ASAT capabilities remains unclear, however. [11]

Implications of Russian-Chinese Space Initiatives
The complex Russian reaction to the test reflected the competing pressures confronting Moscow. As in other areas, Russia and China have both parallel and conflicting interests in outer space.

The two governments have long been concerned by U.S. military programs in this realm. For example, when the Bush Administration finally published an unclassified version of its new National Space Policy in October 2006, it intensified Russian and Chinese fears that the United States intends to deploy weapons in space, such as interceptor missiles, orbiting lasers, and massive metal rods that could rain down upon earth-based targets (nicknamed “metallurgical nukes” by Chinese defense analysts and “rods from god” by American observers). In particular, Russian and Chinese officials have expressed alarm that the United States wants to acquire the means to orchestrate attacks in space against Russian and Chinese reconnaissance satellites and long-range ballistic missiles, whose trajectories take them through the upper atmosphere. [12]

In response, the Russian and Chinese governments have launched numerous multilateral disarmament initiatives to prevent the militarization of space. Building on earlier Soviet initiatives, the Russian and Chinese representatives have labored unsuccessfully for years, most visibly at the UN Conference on Disarmament, in Geneva, and the Committee for the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, in Vienna, to negotiate a treaty on the “Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space” (PAROS) that would seek to ban weapons in space. [13] The U.S. government opposes a formal arms control treaty for space as both unnecessary and probably ineffective.

In addition to these diplomatic initiatives, the Russian and Chinese governments have, independently, issued broad threats intended to dissuade the United States from actually deploying (as opposed to researching) weapons in space. For example, in June 2005, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov threatened “adequate retaliatory measures” against any country that deployed spaced-based weapons. [14] After the new U.S. space policy was first announced in September 2006, Vladimir Popovkin, the commander of Russian Space Forces, said Russia “must be ready to take adequate offensive and defensive measures” if other countries were to develop and deploy space-based weapons. [15] Vitaly Davydov, the deputy head of the Russian space agency Roskosmos, complained, “This document can be seen today as the first step toward a serious deepening of the military confrontation in space. Now the Americans are saying that they want . . . to dictate to others who else is allowed to go there.” [16]

Despite their overlapping interests in countering U.S. activities in space, Russia has thus far been circumspect in cooperating with China’s military space program. On December 26, 2006, Roskosmos head Anatoly Perminov acknowledged that the Russian Federation had an established policy of not sharing advanced space technologies with China for fear of creating a formidable future competitor. According to Perminov, although the Chinese space program lags decades behind that of the Russian and U.S. programs, and still employs Soviet-era technologies, it is “quickly catching up.” He said Russia would cooperate on joint projects, such as exploring the moon or supporting the International Space Station, but would not sell or otherwise transfer space-related technologies to China. [17]

The Russian position likely reflects recognition that many aerospace technologies have direct military applications. For example, China could use imported space technologies to develop improved military reconnaissance satellites or long-range ballistic missiles. In a future scenario, China might even use ASATs to threaten Russia's military assets in space. Alexander Khramchikhin, head of the analytical department at the Institute for Political and Military Analysis, interpreted the Chinese ASAT test as a threat to both Russia and the United States, since the Chinese were able to demonstrate a direct-ascent technology never tested by either Moscow or Washington. [18]

In early February, Ivanov indicated that Russia planned to renovate it military satellite architecture by launching four defense satellites in 2007. This strengthening of Russia’s space reconnaissance capabilities would complement Russia’s concurrent revitalization of its network of early warning radars. To further reduce the vulnerability of its military space assets, Ivanov indicated Russia will also expand the capacity of its Plesetsk launching complex in the Archangelsk region.  At present, the Russian government launches its so-called heavy satellites from the Baikonur Cosmodrome, located in Kazakhstan, which it rents from that country. [19]

Russian-U.S. Space Collaboration
Russian leaders also presumably do not want to jeopardize their country’s extensive collaboration with the United States in civilian space activities, as well as potential opportunities for cooperating with NATO countries on certain space defense issues. Russian officials are undoubtedly aware that the recent Chinese ASAT test has generated efforts, especially within the U.S. Congress, to tighten international restrictions on transfers of sensitive aerospace technologies to China. [20] The Chinese action could also weaken support for proposals to end the European Union’s ban on arms sales to China.

Some Russians perceive declining potential commercial and other benefits from cooperating with the United States in space, as Washington decreases its commitment to supporting multinational space projects. [21] When Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov returned from an early February 2007 visit to Washington, however, he stressed the Russian government’s continued interest in cooperating with the United States in space exploration, including implementing some bilateral agreements that “could be linked with plans on military use of space.” [22] After the Chinese ASAT test, Russian and American controllers jointly diverted the orbit of the International Space Station to maneuver it away from the debris cloud produced by the collision. [23] At present, neither Russia nor the United States appears eager to act on Chinese desires to join the consortium developing the International Space Station.

Conclusion
Although unsupportive of the Chinese ASAT test, Russian government officials, military leaders, and media commentators tended to blame U.S. policies – especially the American failure to support international arms control efforts seeking to ban weapons in space – for inducing the Chinese decision to break the decades-long moratorium on ASAT testing. Both the Russian and Chinese governments have launched numerous multilateral disarmament initiatives to prevent the militarization of space. Yet, many Russians engaged in space issues clearly do not desire China to develop the capacity to threaten Russia’s space-based assets. Nor do they want to risk damaging their own extensive space cooperation program with the United States and other countries. Whether Russia can successfully balance all of these competing interests remains to be seen.

Richard Weitz – Hudson Institute

Go to: Part I - U.S. Allies Criticize China's ASAT Weapon Test; Media Notes Concerns About U.S. Space Policies

Go to: Part III - India Reacts Cautiously to China's Anti-Satellite Weapon Test