On February 22, 2007, IAEA Director General Mohammed ElBaradei issued a report concluding that Iran had not suspended it uranium enrichment and plutonium-production related activities as required by UN Security Council Resolution 1737 adopted in late December 2006. Three days earlier, in anticipation of the report, Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad had announced that Iran would suspend its uranium enrichment program only if Western countries did the same to facilitate negotiations on halting Iran’s sensitive nuclear activities. [1]

Although Ahmadinejad has maintained a defiant stance toward the UN mandate, recent events hint that domestic and foreign criticisms of Ahmadinejad’s aggressive stance on Iran’s nuclear program have led other powerful players in Iran to begin to constrain his influence and moderate Iran’s official nuclear policies. Russia's growing impatience with Iran's intransigence on the nuclear issue may be contributing to this trend.

Domestic Criticism Intensifies After UN Imposes Sanctions
In January 2007, criticisms of Ahmadinejad within the Iranian political elite sharpened considerably after the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1737, imposing sanction on Iran for failing to halt its sensitive nuclear activities. [2] According to reports in the Arab press, Ali Akbar Velayati, who served as foreign affairs minister under former president Rafsanjani and who supports a more pragmatic approach to the nuclear stand-off than that being taken by Ahmadinejad, is gaining influence. The moderate, London-based daily al-Hayat reported that Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamene’i’, supported Velayati during a meeting Khamene’i convened in mid-January 2007 to develop Iran’s response to UN Security Council Resolution 1737. The meeting concluded with Khamene’i’s call to implement Velayati’s position that “Iran must seriously consider finding a solution to its stand-off with the U.S.” [3] At the meeting, whose precise date was not given, Velayati was reported to have stated that, “Iran may be compelled to suspend its nuclear program before the 60-day deadline set by the Security Council,” and to have stressed “Iran’s need to take practical measures to prevent the Security Council from intensifying economic sanctions.” [4]

If Khamene’i had opted for moderation, the decision was not in evidence on January 22, 2007, when the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps held military exercises in the Garmsar region, 100 kilometers east of Tehran. The exercises were intended to demonstrate Iran’s missile capabilities and test the performance of two powerful Iranian-made artillery rockets, the Zelzal and Fajr-5. [5] The Zelzal, in its various configurations, has a range of between 100 to 200 kilometers, and the Fajr-5 has a range of approximately 75 kilometers. [6] The missile tests, which were a show of force apparently aimed at both domestic and foreign audiences, were covered extensively in the Iranian media and internationally. On the following day (January 23), in a clear departure from decisions reportedly taken by Khamene’i, less than a week earlier, Ahmadinejad declared that Iran would not be affected by the UN sanctions. He stated that Iran was strong enough to stand up to any threats from the United States, and that the United States would thus be deterred from attacking the nation. [7]

Contrary to their intended effect, however, the well publicized missile tests and the president’s declaration seemed to galvanize Ahmadinejad’s critics. On January 24, the day after Ahmadinejad’s defiant interview, the former commander of the Revolutionary Guards, Mohsen Reza’i, contradicted the Iranian president, declaring on a state-owned television station that Iran faces a serious military threat, if not war, from the United States. [8] The fact that Reza’i’s pessimistic statements were broadcast on state television highlighted the divisions within Iran’s political elite. Similarly, the following day, Hashemi Rafsanjani, the Chairman of the Expediency Council, an executive body designed to mediate tensions between branches of the government, told members of the Iranian parliament that Ayatollah Khamene'i had expressed concern over the stance Ahmadinejad took in his January 23 interview. Rafsanjani declared that the Supreme Leader believed, contrary to Ahmadinejad, that possible “threats” facing Iran were “serious.” Members of Iran’s parliament argued that sanctions were indeed having an effect on the nation’s economy and urged Rafsanjani to intervene and help develop a less confrontational diplomatic strategy on the nuclear issue. [9]

More disarray was seen on January 27, 2007, when the head of the Iranian parliamentary commission on national security and foreign affairs, Aladdin Broujerdi, announced that Iran was commencing construction of 3,000 new uranium enrichment centrifuges in Natanz. The announcement was promptly contradicted by the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization, whose spokesman declared, "There will be no new centrifuges installed at Natanz." [10]

A retrospective February 1 article by one of the few Western correspondents based in Iran described the tense relationship between the Supreme Leader and the Iranian president: “In recent days, there has been speculation that Ayatollah Khamene’i is refusing even to see the president as a signal of his disquiet at Iran's growing isolation.” [11] This rift may explain a statement by Ahmadinejad on January 30, 2007, made in seeming deference to the Supreme Leader, in which he declared that the nation’s nuclear policy is set by Ayatollah Khamene’i. Ahmadinejad continued that his own role – substantial, but clearly subordinate – was to “follow up on the issue and proclaim the country's nuclear stances.” [12]

On February 4, another critic emerged from the ranks of Iran’s political parties. Rasul Montajabnia, a leader in the National Trust Party, in an interview with the daily Aftab, declared that a “mistake” had been made in the way that certain members of the Iranian government handled the nuclear issue. He argued for more government transparency in dealing with the nuclear issue and for more participation by Iran’s political elite, including scientists and independent analysts, in order for decisions to have more legitimacy. Montajabnia pointed out that rather than engaging these elites, the government has belittled them, labeling them “cowards” for expressing views that contradict those of Ahmadinejad’s supporters. [13]

Russian Response to Iranian Divisions on Nuclear Issues
Russia, which is building Iran’s first nuclear power plant, at Bushehr, and is a major supplier of arms to Tehran, has noted the apparent divisions within Iranian governing circles over the nuclear issue. During a visit to Tehran on January 28, 2007, Secretary of the Russian Security Council Igor Ivanov separately visited Ayatollah Khamene’i and President Ahmadinejad, bringing personal letters from President Vladimir Putin to both Iranian leaders. [14] Notably, Khamene’i had a meeting with Ivanov outside his visit’s formal program, during which the Iranian leader proposed that Iran and Russia, being the two largest natural gas extracting countries in the world, coordinate their policies governing exports of this commodity. (Putin, during a subsequent visit to Qatar, unexpectedly expressed qualified support for the idea, which had initially received a cool reception from the Russian gas monopoly, Gazprom. [15])

Russia continues to adhere to its official public position that while Iran is entitled to a peaceful nuclear program, it should resolve its outstanding issues with the IAEA. Igor Ivanov unequivocally communicated this position during his visit to Tehran. [16] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reemphasized the point to Ali Akbar Velayati, when he visited Moscow on February 8 and 9, 2007. Lavrov called upon Iran to show its goodwill and give a "positive response" to help resolve the nuclear dispute. [17]

Putin subsequently underscored this request in a speech in Munich on February 10, when he stated that he “could not understand why the Iranian side has not reacted positively and constructively to [the IAEA’s] concerns.” [18] At the same time, Putin also insisted that the best path to follow in the ongoing crisis over the Iranian nuclear program is to “demonstrate to the Iranian leadership that cooperation with the international community is much better than confrontation.” Putin’s recent statements seem to suggest that much broader cooperation between the two countries would be possible once the “nuclear issue” is resolved. Moscow has often noted that Iran’s aggressive nuclear policy upsets the broad, long-term Russian strategy in the region.

Indeed, Russia has indicated its tentative support for Iran by continuing to build the Bushehr nuclear power plant and even managing to exempt it from UN Security Council Resolution 1737. Russia also remains a major weapons supplier to Iran as the transfer of Tor-M1 air-defense systems in January 2007 demonstrated. Russia went ahead with the transfer in spite of widely anticipated U.S. sanctions against Russian companies involved in that deal. (See “Russia Deplores U.S. Sanctions; Declares They Will Not Affect Arms Trade with Tehran,” in this issue of WMD Insights.) In a late-breaking development that offered a further hint of Russian displeasure with Iran, Moscow announced that it would slow work on the Bushehr nuclear power plant, ostensibly because Tehran was behind in its payments for the facility. [19]

Domestic Debate, International Criticism May be Tempering Iran’s Nuclear Stance
Recent events suggest that domestic and international criticism of Ahmadinejad could be moderating his conduct and Iran’s negotiating position. Specifically, while the plan to install 3,000 centrifuges at Iran’s Nantaz facilities has been mentioned in the Iranian and foreign media, there has been no official confirmation of the installation. Ahmadinejad had hinted that this announcement would be made during the “Ten Days of Dawn,” the celebration of the 28th anniversary of the Iranian Islamic Revolution, February 1-11, 2007. [20] However, in a speech marking that occasion, the Iranian president made no reference to the centrifuges, which is perhaps an indication that he had decided to tone down his confrontational rhetoric. Instead, he declared that Iran intends to stay in the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and would continue to cooperate with the IAEA. [21]

The activities of Ali Larijani, the head of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council and the nation’s nuclear negotiator, provide additional evidence that Iran may be attempting to pursue a more pragmatic and conciliatory course on the nuclear issue. Larijani delivered a statement at the Munich Security Conference on February 11 that he later softened in media interviews. In the conference speech, he dealt only briefly with the nuclear issue, declaring: “But the irrational preconditions such as suspension of uranium enrichment set for the resumption of negotiations are standing practically as an obstacle in the way of the settlement of this issue.” He argued that this “misguided approach” was launched with “some other motives,” apparently alluding to American pressures to isolate Iran. However, in his comments to the German media, Larijani stressed Iran’s desire for new negotiations on uranium enrichment and proposed to hold meetings with European nations to break this impasse. [22] In an interview with a Munich newspaper, for example, he said that Iran is “prepared to give all conceivable guarantees” that it will never use nuclear energy to develop weapons. He also added that Iran may make some concessions in future negotiations:

We can find a solution that makes all misuse of peaceful technologies for military purposes impossible. There are proposals that we operate centrifuges which can only process low-enriched uranium, meaning up to four percent. That would be one approach. To be sure it’s not fair, because other countries do very high-level enrichment. But we would be prepared for this concession. [23] 

Larijani’s February 11 comments may have been intended as a conciliatory gesture in response to a January 29 initiative by IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei proposing that Iran suspend its sensitive nuclear activities in return for a suspension of UN sanctions and that talks on permanent arrangements follow without further pre-conditions. [24] Indeed, on February 14, Ali Akbar Velayati appeared to cautiously support this approach, stating, “Tehran may study the suspension of nuclear activities for the sake of a peaceful solution to the on-going crisis between Iran and the Security Council.” [25]

Whether caused by domestic pressures, foreign criticism, or a combination of the two, changes in Iran’s nuclear rhetoric and policy may be under way. Ironically, the backlash against Ahmadinejad’s aggressive nuclear posturing has brought together rival reformists and conservatives, whose collective efforts to have Iran adopt a more pragmatic nuclear policy may be starting to bear fruit.


Ibrahim Al-Marashi – Koc University, and Nikolai Sokov – Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies