Part I of this Special Report focuses on the views of Eastern European nations (“The View from Eastern Europe”).

Initially, the U.S. plans to deploy BMD systems in east-central Europe did not attract significant attention in Western Europe. A major reason was that the proposed deployments involved mostly bilateral discussions between the United States and each potential host country. The harsh Russian denunciations of the initiative, however, have led West European governments to become more concerned about the issue.

Germany
In recent weeks, German political leaders have engaged in an extensive debate on the European BMD issue. Germany now holds the presidency of both the European Union and the G-8, giving the country more influence on the European BMD deliberations than perhaps otherwise might have been the case. Germany’s status also has encouraged its government to try to promote continental solidarity on the issue and avoid the kind of divisiveness that characterized the European response to the decision to invade Iraq, where NATO’s newest members supported the Anglo-American intervention more enthusiastically than many older NATO members, such as France and Germany.

Germany’s major political parties have offered divergent responses to the planned BMD deployment. These differences are notable even within the governing coalition, which includes the center-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU) party, its smaller and more conservative Christian Social Union (CSU) affiliate, and the center-left Social Democratic Party (SDP).

Chancellor Angela Merkel of the CDU has insisted that her government does not want the BMD issue to disrupt relations with Moscow or become intertwined with the energy supply questions that have divided Russia and the EU countries. She has urged the Russian government, however, not to censure the United States or other countries in addressing the issue. She also has maintained that the planned U.S BMD systems “are purely defensive weapons that in no way are directed against Russia.” Chancellor Merkel argues that additional discussions within the framework of the NATO-Russia Council (which includes all NATO members and Russia) would offer the best way to resolve the U.S.-Russian dispute over European BMD. [1]

German Defense Minister Franz Josef Jung, who also belongs to the CDU, has argued that NATO, a multilateral institution, should have the lead role in developing any BMD system based in Europe. After an EU defense ministers meeting, he told the press, “I think it would be smart to integrate this whole [U.S.] system into NATO.” [2] He has also called discussions within the NATO-Russia Council the “right way” to address Russian concerns about BMD issues in Europe. [3] Jung stressed that Germany considered it very important to maintain its security partnership with Russia “given our common security interests.” [4] Defense Ministry spokesperson Thomas Raabe accepted that Europe eventually would need defenses
against long-range missile attacks, but argued that NATO would provide the best mechanism to manage this “long-term project.” [5]

In contrast, German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, who belongs to the SDP, has explicitly faulted U.S. policies for escalating the crisis. In particular, he argues that American policy makers should have considered Moscow’s concerns more seriously before announcing the planned deployment. [6] Steinmeier also agrees with Russian commentators that Iran lacks the technology to develop ballistic missiles capable of threatening Europe. [7] He has called for extensive discussions within NATO and the EU, and with the Russian government to resolve the issue. [8] Nevertheless, Steinmeier requested that Russia engage in the dialogue “without anti-American insinuations” and not take measures that could damage European arms control processes. [9]

The leader of the SDP, Kurt Beck, has said such talks are essential for preventing a Cold-War type confrontation with Moscow. [10] He has called on Merkel to oppose the planned deployment because “Europe must not follow the prerogatives of the expansive security policy of George W. Bush.” [11] He also complained about perceived unilateral decision-making on the part of certain EU governments: “The issue must be discussed in the European Council, because it is a central theme for the EU. We can forget our goal of a uniform European foreign and security policy if we ignore solo actions, such as the willingness of the Czech Republic, Poland, and Great Britain to approve the stationing.” [12]

Edmund Stoiber, the head of the CSU, has urged the German government to take the Russian concerns into account. Although the CSU is traditionally strongly pro-American and pro-NATO, Stoiber has said: “We as Europeans should not reject from the start the concerns of Moscow. . . . It must not happen that Europe’s relations with Russia are harmed for the missile defense against Iran and North Korea.” [13] Stoiber has also stressed the necessity of conducting an extensive dialogue with Moscow to overcome Russian anxieties on this issue. [14] At home, he has insisted that the issue’s importance requires that all three coalition partners discuss the issue before Merkel announces Germany’s position. [15]

United Kingdom
The British Labor Party government of Prime Minister Tony Blair has long supported U.S. BMD efforts. In 2003, the British government agreed that the United States could pay to modernize the early-warning radar facility at the Royal Air Force base at Fylingdales, in Yorkshire, to enhance its ability to detect ballistic missile launches. The upgrade should be completed in 2007.

According to the British media, the Blair Administration is much more interested in expanding Britain’s participation in the planned U.S. global missile defense architecture than the government has indicated in its public comments. The Economist describes the prime minister as waging a months-long campaign to persuade the Bush Administration to deploy some BMD interceptor missiles on British soil. [16] The Financial Times quotes an unnamed British official as confirming that Blair shares U.S. concerns that countries of proliferation concern will soon threaten Europe with ballistic missile strikes and that emerging BMD technologies might help counter this threat. A British defense official told the paper, “In the face of rogue states, this is something that can assist in Britain’s defense.” [17]

Leaders of the opposition Conservative Party have made clear that they would not support stationing U.S. BMD on British territory without additional information about what precisely the Blair government had in mind. The Conservative spokesperson on defense, Liam Fox, stated that the Labor government needed “to be more honest with the opposition” before the Conservatives would support a possible U.S. BMD deployment in Britain. [18]

British analysts see certain advantages of having U.S. BMD interceptors based in the United Kingdom rather than Eastern Europe. First, their increased physical distance from Russia would presumably reduce the risks of Russia’s early-warning systems mistaking their launch as an offensive missile strike against Russia. Second, their non-deployment in the former Soviet republics could also reduce Russians’ perceptions of encirclement by an expanding NATO military infrastructure. Third, the British public has long become accustomed to hosting U.S. military bases in Europe. As a result, popular protests against the deployments might not be as vocal for a “defensive” weapon system as they were for the controversial U.S. cruise missiles deployed in Britain during the 1980s. Finally, Britain’s geographic setting would allow for lengthy tracking of a ballistic missile in flight from the Middle East to North America. [19]

In early March, however, the head of the U.S. Missile Defense Agency, Lt. Gen. Henry Obering, cautioned that placing missile interceptors in the United Kingdom would actually present a greater threat to Russian ICBMs in flight than those planned for Poland because “we probably could catch them from a UK launch site.” Lt. Gen. Obering argued that a British-based system would provide the U.S.-UK defenders more time to track and target Russian strategic missiles heading toward the United States. [20]

France
Until recently, the French government had adopted an uncharacteristically low profile regarding the European BMD issue, perhaps reflecting an ambivalent official attitude toward the American initiative. On the one hand, President Jacques Chirac has made clear his growing discomfort with Iran’s missile and WMD programs. In his major statement on France’s nuclear policy, which he delivered in January 2006, Chirac described BMD as helping supplement traditional nuclear deterrent strategies. [21] On the other hand, French security experts have traditionally distanced themselves from U.S. defense programs. The prominent French daily Le Monde reflected this ambiguity in a February 23 editorial. The paper agreed that it was desirable for Europe to be protected by BMD, but lamented that, by failing to spend sufficiently to develop their own continental BMD architecture, the Europeans were perpetuating their security dependence on the United States. [22]

At a February 21 press conference in Moscow, France’s Defense Minister, Michele Alliot-Marie echoed other West European policy-makers in calling for greater “dialogue and transparency” between NATO and Russia to overcome Russian misgivings about the planned deployments. The French minister took pains to distinguish, however, between theater missile defenses, “on which we cooperate,” and the U.S. plans for creating a large-scale national missile defense, which she acknowledged was creating the most unease in Russia. [23] Two days later, French Foreign Ministry spokesperson Jean-Baptiste Mattei, while affirming the right of Poland and the Czech Republic to reach bilateral understandings on BMD deployments with the United States, nevertheless warned that the initiatives could damage Russia-NATO relations. He also stated that France would not directly participate in these programs. [24]

At a press conference that ended a European summit on March 9, Chirac offered his first detailed public comments on the planned U.S. deployments. He told the media that the planned deployments raised numerous questions that required detailed analysis. As part of this process, Chirac urged Europe and the United States to give due attention to Russia’s concerns regarding the deployment to avoid “encouraging the creation of a new dividing line in Europe or a return of the order of the past.” [25] Minister Alliot-Marie reiterated these concerns in mid-March, while calling on the United States to show “greater transparency” regarding its BMD plans. [26]

Although Chirac announced two days later that he would not seek reelection, the leading candidate to succeed him, Nicolas Sarkozy, called for Europeans to adopt a unified position on the proposed BMD deployments. Describing his defense program to a conference organized by his ruling conservative Union for a Popular Movement party, Sarkozy argued that the issue must be considered from a pan-European perspective. Sarkozy explained that he does not “see how one can say that it is simply the problem of the Czech Republic or Poland and that it’s not a problem for all of Europe, unless that is, we give up all ambition for a European defense policy.” [27]

Other National Responses
Luxembourg’s Foreign Minister Jean Asselborn offered perhaps the most critical assessment of American policies from a senior European government official. He characterized the U.S. deployment plan as “incomprehensible” and a waste of money that could better be spent elsewhere. Asselborn told the media: “We will have no stability in Europe if we push the Russians into a corner.” He called on other governments to “help the Poles and the Czechs to show solidarity with a European position.” [28]

The media in several smaller European countries objected to the manner in which the Czech, Polish, and U.S. governments have pursued bilateral initiatives when the security issues concern all European countries. In Denmark, which has agreed to permit an upgrade to the missile early-warning radar at Thule in Greenland, the Jyllands-Posten complained that the Americans’ “single-handed approach, which involves negotiating with individual European states, could divide Europe.” [29] In The Netherlands, Trouw stated that, “Poland and the Czech Republic would have been better off choosing a European security policy” through the EU or NATO. [30]

NATO and the EU
On February 20, NATO spokesperson James Appathurai reacted sharply to Russian threats to target any U.S. military facilities in Poland and the Czech Republic, two members of the alliance. He issued a statement warning that, “The days of talk of targeting NATO territory or vice versa are long past us. This kind of extreme language is out of date and uncalled for.” [31] In early March, Appathurai insisted that the United States has shown “full transparency” in describing its BMD plans in Europe and had informed the members of the NATO-Russia Council about its plans in advance. [32]

Although Appathurai stated the following week that the alliance would continue to address collective BMD issues, he added that, NATO “has no role . . . and does not wish to have a role” in the bilateral talks between the United States and the Polish and Czech governments. [33] He explained that the member governments still had to come to an agreement regarding the nature of the threat and how to counter it: “The challenge is a), to get a common view and, b), to see how we can potentially complement this [U.S.] initiative.” [34]

NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer likewise told the press that, in the area of BMD in Europe, NATO, in general, and the United States, in particular, had proceeded with “maximum transparency” toward Russia. [35] When Czech Prime Minister Mirek Topolanek visited NATO headquarters on March 5, Scheffer affirmed that the U.S.-Czech discussions over the planned BMD deployments were “a bilateral issue to be worked out between the Czech Republic and the United States” that was not directed against Russia. [36]

Scheffer has also expressed concern about upholding the principle of the indivisibility of defense within NATO. The Secretary General has called for a comprehensive BMD architecture so that, “When it comes to missile defense, there shouldn’t be an A-league and a B-league within NATO.” [37] Scheffer said that NATO could develop tighter linkages among its various BMD initiatives to help close this gap, particularly between the NATO system under development to defend deployed forces from ballistic missiles and the U.S. BMD systems intended to protect population centers: “There could be at a later stage a relationship between the two systems.” [38] NATO officials suggest that shorter-range missile defenses – such as Patriot missiles and BMD-equipped Aegis ships – could cover those parts of southeastern Europe whose location close to Iran would make it difficult to defend them using interceptors based in Poland. [39]

The European Union foreign policy chief, Javier Solana, has expressed skepticism about the need for European missile defenses given the absence of an immediate threat to the continent. He also stated, however, that the EU as a collective institution had taken no position regarding missile defense in general or the proposed U.S. systems in particular because the issue “is for every country to decide.” The EU, he added, might address the question of missile defenses for its members later. [40] Martin Schulz, the German head of the Social Democratic faction in the European Parliament, has called for the European Council – consisting of the heads of the EU member governments, and currently chaired by Chancellor Merkel – to discuss the planned deployments “because it is a central issue for the EU.” [41]

Conclusion
Thus far, the debate on the proposed BMD deployments has largely stayed at the governmental and expert level. Popular opposition to the proposed deployments remains much less than that which characterized the European missile crisis of the early 1980s. At the time, millions of protesters engaged in mass protests in an effort to derail the planned deployment of U.S. nuclear-armed Pershing and ground-launched cruise missiles in several West European countries.

At the expert level, some European defense analysts have begun to raise technical issues regarding how to integrate the three largely separate NATO BMD initiatives. For example, they have questioned how to share assets and technologies among the NATO and U.S. systems, as well as how to develop mechanisms to
harmonize their command and control procedures. [42] Although most European governments are just beginning to formulate their preferences, these technical questions may become more prominent in future U.S.-European-Russian deliberations on the European BMD issue.

Richard Weitz – Hudson Institute