When the Russian government signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in January 1993, it declared possession of approximately 40,000 metric tons of chemical weapons (CW), the largest stockpile in the world. [1] On April 7, 2007, the Russian government indicated that it had completed the second of the four CW demilitarization stages established under the CWC by eliminating 20 percent (8,000 tons) of this total. [2] Russian officials cited this achievement as evidence of the country’s intention to destroy its remaining CW stockpile by April 2012, the extended elimination deadline approved last year by the CWC state parties. In the assessment of most observers, however, a number of problems could keep Russia from meeting this ambitious goal. (Note: For additional information on the CWC, see “Chemical Weapons Convention Celebrates 10th Anniversary,” in this issue of WMD Insights.)

Past Achievements
Although the Russian government signed the CWC in 1993 and became a state party to the treaty in 1997, Moscow policymakers did little during the 1990s to address the huge CW arsenal they inherited from the Soviet Union. It was only in 2001 that the Russian Federation eliminated all its Category 3 CW (unfilled munitions and related equipment). By March 2002, Russia had destroyed all its Category 2 CW (artillery weapons containing phosgene). However, the Russian government did not begin eliminating large quantities of its most deadly Category 1 CW until December 2002. In that month, a chemical weapons elimination facility began operating near the village of Gorny, in Saratov Oblast. In April 2003, Russia achieved its most significant CW elimination milestone to that date, when the Gorny complex destroyed 400 tons of chemical agents, or 1 percent of Russia’s total declared stockpile. [3]

In October 2005, the Russian government revised its official CW elimination plan to accelerate its destruction schedule. [4] At the end of 2006, Russia completed the elimination of all chemical weapons stored at Gorny – a total of 1,143 metric tons of blister agents (lewisite, mustard gas, and mixtures of these two agents). Meanwhile, in March 2005, Russia began destroying blister agents at a facility in the city of Kambarka. [5] In September 2006, the Russian government opened a third CW destruction facility at Maradykovsky. [6] Unlike the first two facilities, which process blister agents, the complex at Maradykovsky neutralizes more dangerous nerve agents, specifically large air-delivered bombs filled with VX-type gases. [7] The complex is also unique in that its construction was undertaken exclusively with Russian funds, while other elimination facilities had been supported by a number of Western governments. [8] As of April 7, 2007, the Russian government had destroyed 3,692 metric tons of VX weapons at Maradykovsky. [9]

Russia’s CW elimination activities are monitored by inspectors from the Organization for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the institution based in The Hague that is charged with overseeing implementation of the CWC. OPCW personnel inspect Russia’s CW storage facilities once a year and its now dismantled CW production facilities one to two times a year. A team of full-time inspectors monitors the elimination process at Russia’s two currently operating CW elimination facilities. The OPCW inspectors withdrew from Gorny after confirming that all the CW there had been eliminated. [10] Although generally satisfied with the inspection process, Russian officials complain about the expenses involved when large OPCW inspection teams arrive. [11]

Increased Russian Funding for CW Elimination
Like other governments, Moscow derives a variety of benefits from its spending on CW destruction. Above all, CW disposition helps remove a potential threat to the health of the Russian population. When visiting a Russian CW elimination facility in early May 2007, First Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov explained that Russia would honor the CWC “because the stockpiling of 50-year-old munitions is unsafe.” [12] In addition, CW elimination spending creates jobs and spurs funding for the construction of such social infrastructure as schools, roads, and medical centers. [13] (The affected communities, supported by requirements in Russian law, typically will only allow a CW destruction facility to operate in their localities if it also entails government funding to address the social and environmental problems resulting from past and present CW-related activities.) [14] In theory, moreover, a Russian failure to abide by the CWC could subject Russian chemical companies, which export billions of dollars worth of fertilizers annually, to international trade sanctions.

Following years of unexpectedly low foreign support for its CW elimination programs, Russian officials changed their formula for funding CW disposition. The Russian government’s improving fiscal situation has allowed it to spend more on CW disposition projects, and it now regularly increases its own CW elimination expenditures whenever external support falls short of expectations, as is typical. In 2005, the federal budget doubled allocations for chemical weapons destruction to almost $400 million. [15] In 2006, the government allocated $718 million for this purpose. The figure for 2007 will reach almost $1 billion. [16] Most experts conclude, however, that the Russian government will still require substantial foreign assistance to complete the elimination of its CW stockpile by 2012.

Problems with Foreign Assistance
The Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction has served as the main multilateral framework through which foreign governments support, primarily through bilateral programs, CW elimination and other threat reduction activities in Russia. Launched by the Group of Eight (G-8) leading economic powers at their June 2002 summit in Kananaskis, Canada, the Global Partnership seeks to strengthen international efforts to combat the proliferation of dangerous chemical, biological, and nuclear materials, as well as missiles and related technologies, by expanding the scale and improving the coordination of national programs aimed at limiting these threats. [17] The United States has pledged $10 billion to the initiative over a 10-year period, and the other G-8 members have promised a comparable amount (a set of commitments commonly known as “10+10 over 10”).

Although the Global Partnership can, in principle, support any WMD-related project, in practice the 22 countries now participating in the initiative continue to direct most funding towards eliminating Russia’s chemical weapons and dismantling its retired general purpose nuclear submarines. [18] This distribution corresponds to the preferences of the Russian government. [19] From 2002 through early 2006, foreign governments contributed almost $2 billion to Russian CW elimination programs, with the United States providing over half that total. [20] Similarly, although the donor governments have authorized the use of Global Partnership funds for other WMD nonproliferation measures outside Russia, at the July 2006 G-8 summit in St. Petersburg, the assembled governments reaffirmed their intent to concentrate on threat reduction projects in Russia.

In the area of Russian CW elimination, Britain has assumed the lead role in coordinating assistance provided by Canada and EU governments to the Shchuchye project in Siberia, a facility designed to eliminate 5,400 tons of nerve agent. [21] Germany is also a major contributor to Russian CW demilitarization efforts, having already provided approximately 200 million euros for Russian CW elimination and announced plans to contribute as much as 140 million euros in additional funding. [22] Furthermore, the Russian government has pledged to spend $2 billion on threat reduction activities, primarily for CW elimination, as part of its Global Partnership contribution during the 10-year period of the initiative, 2002-2012. [23]

Nonetheless, the Global Partnership urgently needs to secure additional contributions to reach its $20 billion requirement and, more importantly, to convert more pledges into actual projects. In December 2006, the Russian government’s Audit Chamber cautioned that the continued delays and shortfalls in the receipt of foreign funding pledges could again set back the realization of Russia’s CW destruction program. [24] In May 2007, Ivanov estimated that, at present levels, foreign assistance would at best cover 10 to 15 percent of the funds needed to eliminate Russia’s remaining stockpile of toxic agents. [25] Foreign sources usually cite higher aid figures, noting that the Russian totals often do not include funds provided directly from foreign governments to non-Russian firms that purchase CW elimination equipment and act as general contractors.

Russian officials anticipate that the country’s CW-related funding requirements will grow exponentially between 2007 and 2009. According to current plans, Russia will need to continue destruction operations at the plants in Kambarka and Maradykovsky and commence operations at the CW destruction facilities currently under construction at Leonidovka and Shchuchye. [26]

Difficulties at Shchuchye
From the point of view of international collaboration, the most problematic of these planned facilities has been the envisaged CW elimination facility at Shchuchye. American and Russian officials originally intended the complex to be Russia’s first operational destruction facility for nerve agents. To save money, the United States initially insisted that Russia relocate all it nerve agents to Shchuchye and destroy them there rather than construct additional nerve agent elimination complexes. Many other foreign governments – including Canada, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom – are also providing funds for the Shchuchye facility. [27] The international community considers the Shchuchye complex, which is designed to destroy large quantities of munitions that carry small quantities of nerve agent, essential for enabling Russia to meet its 2012 extended CWC elimination deadline.

Despite these contributions, the Shchuchye facility has been plagued by problems, for which Russian and U.S. officials have held each other’s governments largely responsible. According to Western sources, complicated Russian visa-granting and value added tax (VAT)-waiver procedures, frequent regulatory revisions by Russian agencies, and disputes over the selection of Russian subcontractors and other issues severely delayed construction at the complex, which was supposed to come into operation in 2005. [28] Russian observers claim that U.S. officials have used a variety of pretexts to avoid fulfilling their pledges of financial and material assistance to Shchuchye. They argue, for example, that U.S. officials unilaterally tied such assistance to the Russian government’s granting access to its sensitive biological research facilities and to Moscow’s providing additional information about its binary chemical weapons. [29] Years of delay persuaded Russian authorities to build additional nerve agent elimination facilities elsewhere (e.g., at Maradykovsky).

It remains unclear whether Shchuchye will begin operating by 2009. [30] The project still retains some support within the American and Russian legislatures. Although the Bush Administration’s most recent federal budget submission did not include a request for additional funding, in early May 2007, the House Armed Services Committee approved $42.7 million in funding for the site in its proposed FY 2008 defense budget. [31] In addition, the Russian Duma is currently considering whether to approve a new Cooperative Threat Reduction umbrella agreement that, at the insistence of U.S. negotiators, will continue to hold Russia liable for most incidents related to U.S.-funded threat reduction programs, including those involving CW elimination. [32] One reason why Duma members might approve the accord, which enjoys the backing of the Putin Administration, is that its enactment could result in the release of $270 million in unspent U.S. funds that accumulated in 2005-2007, because of the disputes over the management of the project. [33]

Future Prospects
Despite substantial foreign assistance and the Russian government’s own improving financial position, most analysts expect that these problems will prevent Russia from eliminating all its chemical weapons by 2012. In addition to the many financial shortfalls, the Audit Chamber noted that the Russian State Commission for Chemical Disarmament, tasked with promoting cooperation between the federal government and Russia’s regional and local authorities, never met in 2005 or 2006. The Chamber also found that many questions relating to the organizational and legal basis for Russia’s CW elimination facilities remain unanswered. [34]

Nevertheless, the Russian government has accelerated its CW dismantlement program in recent years and should complete the elimination process sometime in the next decade. Russian officials have reaffirmed their adherence to the CWC, even while questioning a number of Moscow’s other arms control commitments, with Ivanov explaining that, “These are different treaties.” [35] On May 14, Russia’s Audit Chamber even appealed directly to the U.S. Government Accountability Office for assistance in resolving funding issues related to the construction of the Shchuchye complex. [36]

Moscow’s next CW milestone will occur on April 29, 2009, when Russia will need to have eliminated 45 percent (18,000 metric tons) of its CW stocks to meet its third phase CWC obligation. Since other countries, above all the United States, are also experiencing problems destroying their CW stockpiles, most members of the international community seem willing to grant Russia additional extensions to fulfill its CWC obligations, without threatening penalties or demanding major concessions in return. [37]


Richard Weitz – Hudson Institute