As the deadline for Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment and plutonium production activities drew to a close on May 24, 2007, there was little expectation that Iran would comply with the renewed demands of Security Council Resolution 1747, adopted on March 27. Iran had already rejected the premise of the resolution at the same meeting in which it was adopted, and Iranian officials continually issued statements during the 60-day timeframe which asserted that Iran would not take any steps to reverse its sensitive fuel-cycle activities. Moreover, the report issued by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) the day prior to the deadline indicated that Iran’s progress in installing centrifuges at its Natanz enrichment plant had proceeded at a fairly rapid pace. [1] In light of this deteriorating situation, proposals to consider less stringent alternatives than the full suspension of Iran’s nuclear fuel cycle activities called for by the Security Council appear to be discussed far more openly. Such considerations are likely to fracture the already tenuous agreement of the P-6 (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and United States – the five permanent members of the Security Council – plus Germany), and could undermine what has been a fairly unified stand between the United States and France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (known as the EU-3).

Under Resolution 1747, the Council “affirmed” that it would take additional sanctions-related measures should Iran fail to comply with its demands to halt all enrichment-related and plutonium production activities. The United States has made clear that it hopes to see the Council impose additional sanctions as outlined by the resolution. Responding to the IAEA report on Iran in May, U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Zalmay Khalilzad stated that, “The time has come to look at additional pressure…to bring about a change in Iranian calculations.” [2] This intention appeared to have the support of the rest of the Group of Eight (G-8) as well. [3] At its June summit in Heiligendamm, Germany, the G-8 issued a statement on nonproliferation that deplored Iran’s failure to meet the Security Council’s demands and supported “adopting further measures” if Iran does not comply with the Council’s requirements. [4] Harsher sanction measures have reportedly been drafted by the United States and the United Kingdom.

Recently however, Russia has qualified its support for additional sanctions against Iran. In a press conference on June 20, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated that, “A Security Council resolution will be adopted only after the [IAEA] Director General reports that the possibility of resolving some of the remaining issues has been exhausted,” adding that the issue should be resolved in the framework of Iran-IAEA cooperation. [5] The “possibility” for that resolution appeared to have emerged with a June 22 announcement by IAEA Director General Mohammed ElBaradei and Iran’s lead nuclear negotiator, Ali Larijani, that work would begin on an “action plan” to resolve the outstanding issues regarding Iran’s nuclear program. In the meantime, however, Moscow has delayed the shipment of uranium fuel for the nearly complete Bushehr reactor, which Russia is building in Iran. Ostensibly the reason for the delay is that Iran is in arrears in its payments for the facility, but many believe Russia is withholding the fuel as a means of intensifying pressure on Iran to slow its more sensitive enrichment and plutonium production activities. [6]

In the context of the IAEA, those outstanding issues refer to the longstanding questions regarding certain suspicious nuclear activities that Iran has yet to clarify in the five years since inspections began. However, perhaps more importantly, this “action plan” is intended to be part of a “broader political understanding” to be discussed between Larijani and EU High Representative Javier Solana. Recent meetings between Solana and Larijani in late May and June have been characterized as “constructive,” but the only outcomes so far have been agreements to continue meeting.

Because Iran has continually declared that it will not suspend its nuclear fuel cycle activities, the substance of any negotiations between the EU and Iran to allow this “action plan” to move forward would most likely entail exploring a number of alternatives less than a full suspension in compliance with Security Council demands.

Considerations for Partial Suspension
The alternative to full suspension that has received the most attention was one reiterated by IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei at the end of the June meeting of the Agency’s Board of Governors. Echoing earlier calls for a “timeout” of enrichment work and sanctions, ElBaradei proposed a compromise “freeze for freeze” agreement, in which Iran would cease expansion of its enrichment capabilities (but not a complete shut-down of its centrifuges) as a confidence-building measure, and the Security Council would suspend its sanctions in order to allow negotiations to begin. [7] The U.S. spokesman in Vienna responded by reiterating Washington’s previous objections to such a proposal on the grounds that the Security Council and the G-8 have previously demanded that Iran unconditionally suspend all enrichment and reprocessing activities. [8] Aside from the noncommittal response of Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov, who, according to Iranian press sources, indicated that he respects the proposal and believes that talks should continue, reactions to ElBaradei’s re-proposed “timeout” by other states engaged in the issue have been muted. [9] Tehran’s reaction was also welcoming, but noncommittal. Iranian Foreign Minister Manushhar Muttaki indicated that Iran held a “positive attitude” towards the proposal. [10]

In spite of the lukewarm response to ElBaradei’s initiative, efforts appear to have already been in the works by Switzerland to work out such an arrangement with Iran. While unconfirmed by the Swiss Foreign Ministry, the Swiss reportedly have a proposal involving a 30-day moratorium on both the expansion of Iran’s enrichment capabilities (but again, not a full suspension) as well as the Security Council-imposed sanctions, essentially mirroring ElBaradei’s “timeout” plan. The Swiss have been engaged with Iran on the nuclear issue since 2006 through informal meetings in Geneva; however, in the second quarter of 2007, Swiss Foreign Minister Micheline Calmy-Rey met twice with Ali Larijani on the nuclear issue. [11] Following their most recent meeting in May, Larijani indicated that the Swiss proposal was not acceptable to Iran, but “could be amended.”

Perhaps more importantly, the EU-3 appear to have been considering a proposal which would allow Iran to place its centrifuges on “stand-by,” thereby permitting Iran to maintain some element of its enrichment activities but prohibiting Tehran from making further progress in installing or running its centrifuges. [12] Press accounts have suggested that this proposal primarily has support among European governments, and Germany in particular, as a possible “redefinition” of the suspension mandated by the Security Council. [13]

The current situation is similar to the conditions created three years ago in which the EU was reluctant to agree to strong language in IAEA Board of Governors resolutions as long as negotiations continued on suspension. The last such suspension agreement, reached in November 2004, collapsed several months later when Iran resumed its work on uranium conversion. Currently, as long as Iran continues to proffer suggestions that a negotiated resolution is close at hand, the P-6 appear unlikely to agree to additional sanctions. In the meantime, Iran continues to expand its enrichment capabilities beyond the 3,000 centrifuges already installed, undoubtedly with the hope of presenting the world with a fait accompli, and making the basis behind a suspension – to stop Iran from continuing to learn about the process of enrichment – a moot point.

Peter Crail – Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies