On April 13, 2007, the Jerusalem Post, citing Israeli intelligence sources, reported that Syria had deployed 300 short-range (300-km) Scud missiles just north of the Golan Heights demilitarized zone. Furthermore, the report stated that Syria had built a massive missile production facility at al-Hamma, “surrounded by more than 30 hardened concrete bunkers that house multiple launchers and missiles.” [1] The report continued that a second missile site at Homs houses a “previously undisclosed chemical warhead facility” and a facility where these warheads can be rapidly placed on Syrian missiles. [2]

Arye Egozi, the aviation affairs correspondent for the Israeli daily Yediot Aharonot provided additional details in a report on April 30. He reported that Syria had constructed a huge, underground missile complex, which he referred to as a “missile city.” Apparently referring to the al-Hamma site, he stated that the complex allegedly houses hundreds of ballistic missiles and their launchers, as well as “30 reinforced underground concrete bunkers, production facilities, development laboratories, and command posts.” [3] Egozi reported that the “city” holds 200 340-km-range Scud-B missiles, 60 600-km-range Scud-C missiles, and an unspecified number of North Korean-made 700-km-range Scud-D missiles. [4] (Israeli intelligence sources are reported to have determined that Syria successfully test-fired a Scud-D missile in the northeastern part of that country in late January 2007.) [5] Consistent with the Jerusalem Post description of the chemical warhead site at Homs, Egozi also reported that Syria possesses chemical agent warheads for some or all of the missiles, which, he assessed, are stored separately from the missiles themselves, outside the “missile city” complex. [6] Syria has been alleged to possess chemical warheads for its missiles since the 1980s. [7]

The two stories were published at a time of growing Israeli concern over Syrian military capabilities. In early May, for example, Israeli Deputy Defense Minister Ephraim Sneh warned a conference in Washington, D.C., sponsored by the American Jewish Committee, that Syria was intensively arming and buying weapons at an unprecedented rate from Russia, its traditional supplier, which provided Syria with the highly accurate 75-km-range SS-21 missile in the 1980s. [8] Israeli Ambassador to the United States Sallai Meridor similarly commented that the scale of recent Syrian military purchases was unprecedented and that Israel is now confronting the “biggest military buildup by Syria along its border with Israel since the 1973 Yom Kippur War.” [9] In a separate interview, he warned that “Syria had missiles aimed at every part of Israel.” [10]

In addition to Syria’s growing arsenal of guided missiles, the Israeli press has also highlighted Syria’s unguided rocket capabilities. Specifically, Syria is believed to have a long-range rocket brigade, “a Syrian invention using Chinese and Russian 220mm rockets with a range of 35 km, and 302mm rockets with a range of 115 km.” [11] Syrian rocket production has increased dramatically in the last year, enhancing the arsenal by several thousands. These rockets are allegedly situated in “the ‘Iron Triangle,’ – an arid area between al-Qutayfah and Tall Karrathin located northeast of Damascus.” [12] In order to inflict damage on Israeli population centers with these rockets, however, Syria would have to deploy them closer to the front than its longer range systems, according to Israeli analysts. It should be noted that Syria supplied many of the 4,000 rockets Hezbollah fired against Israel in the July-August 2006 War. [13] This is an indication of the scale of Syria’s likely rocket stockpile, which presumably could also number in the thousands. Yiftah Shapir, an analyst at the Institute for National Security Studies at Tel Aviv University, has predicted that Syria would use a combination of short-range rockets and longer-range Scuds in any future conflict with Israel. [14]

Apart from bunkering many of its offensive missiles in the al-Hamma underground “missile city,” Syria is working to protect them from attack by Israeli forces through more active means. Specifically, in what is said to be a $1.5 billion deal with Moscow, Israeli reports indicate that Syria will acquire the surface-to-air SA-17 (known to NATO countries as “the Grizzly”), a missile equipped with sophisticated tracking and homing devices that can travel up to 50 km. [15] Syria’s air defense acquisitions have led one Israeli expert to assert that Syria’s defense system has become “one of the densest in the world [with] about 200 anti-aircraft batteries of various types – ranging from long-range SA-5s to the missile that the Syrians were reportedly interested in, or have already acquired from Russia [the SA-17], to the S-10 [SA-10], which is the Russian equivalent of the U.S. Patriot.” [16]

Syria is also reported to have “purchased a large number of advanced anti-tank missiles from the Russians.” [17] If an Israeli ground invasion were to occur, Syria would now plan to respond with a “heavy, dense lineup of anti-tank weapons,” according to Alex Fishman, defense correspondent from Yediot Aharonot. [18] Complementing these anti-tank capabilities, the Israeli press has emphasized that Syria is believed to have created “new commando units” and to have “increased urban and guerilla warfare training” in the aftermath of the July-August 2006 War. [19]

Additionally, the Israeli press is reporting on what it views as a worrisome revitalization of the Syrian Navy. One Israeli TV report stated “…the Syrian Navy, which was neglected for many years, is in the midst of an impressive procurement process. Iran will provide Syria with a large number of advanced missile boats within the very near future…. Iran will also provide Syria with C-802 [cruise] missiles, the same kind that hit the Israeli Navy vessel Ahi Hanit during the July 2006 War. This definitely constitutes a revolutionary change.” [20] Yediot Aharonot reported that Iran had already transferred 100 C-802 missiles to Syria. [21]

Offensive or Defensive Intent?
Israeli and Arab analysts alike are divided on whether Syria’s buildup of missiles and related capabilities is intended for offensive or defensive purposes.

Anshel Pfeffer, an Israeli analyst for the Jerusalem Post, expressed his concern in an April 7, 2007, article over a hypothetical scenario that would be initiated by Syria with “a sneak attack on the Golan Heights, before the IDF [Israeli Defense Forces] has time to mobilize,” which would be “designed to grab just enough territory to buy [Syrian President Bashar] Assad a seat at the negotiating table while his missiles target Israeli cities.” [22] In an April 13 article in the Jerusalem Post, Yaakov Katz reported that after the July 2006 War, Israeli Military Intelligence declared that Syria felt “empowered by Hezbollah’s surprising success last summer and Damascus now believes it can use Hezbollah-like tactics in a future confrontation with Israel and possibly even defeat the once-thought-to-be invincible IDF.” [23] Indeed, two days after the end of the July-August 2006 War, Assad announced that there are “other options” besides diplomatic ones to recover the Golan Heights. [24] Concerns over Syria’s growing capabilities were underscored by a top Israeli military official in late April 2007, who declared, “For years we thought that the IDF had a clear upper hand over Syria’s military…. After the war in Lebanon we now know that this assumption was not accurate.” [25]

In an April 27 article, Katz speculated that President Assad might be motivated to start hostilities “in an effort to retrieve the Golan Heights, either by initiating a surprise attack to capture one or two Israeli communities or by firing long-range ballistic missiles at the home front.” [26] In this fictitious scenario, a Syrian offensive would begin with the massing of tanks on Israel’s border. Then, he continues,

Syrian soldiers sweep across the Israeli side of the border, taking over the northern community of Merom Golan with an elite commando unit from the 14th Special Forces Division of the Syrian Armed Forces. Simultaneously, Syrian Chief of Staff Gen. Ali Habib gives the order and hundreds of T-72 tanks from the Damascus-based Republican Guard Mechanized Division – alongside thousands of commandos and infantry troops – begin deploying alongside the Syrian side of the border, ready for a broad offensive. The Syrian ballistic missile division goes into high alert and coordinates are set for the long-range Scud D, capable of hitting any target inside Israel. [27]

Israeli leaders are determined to meet the Syrian challenge. According to Yo’az Hendel of Maqor Rishon, “Since the war [in the summer of 2006], the IDF has been conducting exercises at an unprecedented pace, closing gaps, training commanders and reservists.” [37]

Additionally, Israel has completed exercises to determine its “defensive capabilities and its ability to repel large scale attacks and missile attacks on all fronts.” These exercises were reported in the Syrian paper Al-Watan by Layn Hashim, who quoted Israeli authorities as stating, “These exercises, that went on for two days and included 132 cities and towns, are the largest of their kind since Israel was established in 1948.” [38] Specifically, the story continued:

The exercises called for a scenario of being subjected to attacks from missiles equipped with chemical warheads launched by Syria at Tel Aviv, along with Palestinian rocket attacks on a power station in Ashkelon, an attack on a school, and the hunt for a suicide bomber. The hospitals practiced to receive 5,000 victims…. The scenario also included demonstrations at Al-Aqsa Square in East Jerusalem and demonstration by Israeli Arabs in Jaffa, in addition to rocket attacks on Ben-Gurion Airport in order to paralyze air traffic there... a conventional missile attack on a Haifa hospital, and the penetration of Israeli airspace by a Hizballah unmanned aerial vehicle coming from Lebanon. Some 5,000 policeman and 1,000 soldiers took part…along with 140 ambulances and hundreds of doctors, nurses, medics, and firemen. [39]

It is not clear how effective Israeli missile defenses, based on the Israeli-built Arrow and the U.S. Patriot, might be in meeting the combined Syrian missile and rocket threat. A report in one Arab daily claims that Syrian missiles can deliver a payload of up to 500 kilograms of explosives or chemical agents, the generally accepted payload for the Scud. In addition, it states that the Israeli anti-missile systems have only a maximum 90-second-window of opportunity to destroy an incoming missile, which significantly reduces the margin for error. [40] Given the scale of the Syrian missile force, Syria might attempt to overwhelm Israeli defenses through coordinated launches of dozens of Scuds; any successful penetration could cause significant damage.

Moreover, the data collected by the Israelis after the Syrian January Scud-D test mentioned above revealed that the Syrians have made that system less prone to being intercepted and have upgraded its accuracy to the point that 50 percent of missiles launched could be expected to land within “several dozens meters” of their target. [41] With such capabilities, Syrian missile forces might be able to attack Israeli civilian and military airfields, thus denying Israel the advantage of its powerful air force, according to an anonymous Syrian military expert. [42] Also, Syrian missiles could be used to target high value Israeli economic sites. [43]

Regarding Syria’s short-range rockets, political and military analyst Sameh Rashid wrote in the pro-government Egyptian monthly Assyasa Dawliya in July 2006 that Israel was unable to intercept and destroy the rockets launched by Hezbollah because they had a very short range and flew at a low altitude, which blunted the utility of the Arrow and the Patriot. [44] He quoted Uzi Rubin as stating that the former system, for example, is designed to destroy missiles with a range of at least 200 km. [45]

Israel did effectively prevent Hezbollah from using its longer-range rockets by ground and air attacks focused on the truck-borne launchers for these systems. [46] Specifically, another Israeli analyst wrote that the Syrians observed, “While Israeli aircraft succeeded at the start of the war in destroying Hezbollah’s mobile launchers, Israel did not have as great success in dealing with the threat posed by Katyusha rockets concealed in bunkers.” [47]