At the June 6-8, 2007, G-8 summit in Heiligendamm, Germany, the governments of Russia, the United States, and the other member states issued a “Statement on Non-Proliferation” in which they called for further development and broadening of the membership of the Global Initiative (GI) to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, which Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin launched on the sidelines of the G-8 summit in St. Petersburg the previous year. In particular, the statement invited “all EU member states to join the initiative” and “the EU institutions to join the initiative as observers.” It also “call[ed] on all states to endorse the Statement of Principles adopted at the Initiative's meeting in Rabat on October 30-31, 2006, and join in strengthening our preparedness and defenses against this threat, consistent with national legal authorities and obligations under relevant international legal frameworks.” [1]




On June 11-12, 2007, the government of Kazakhstan hosted the most recent major international assembly of the countries participating in the GI. Representatives from 38 countries (out of a total of 51 GI partner nations) attended that gathering in the Kazakh capital of Astana, while the European Union and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) sent observers. [2] At the session, co-chaired by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Kislyak and U.S. Assistant Secretary of State of the Bureau of Information Security and Nonproliferation John C. Rood, the participants reviewed recent progress, addressed implementation problems, and discussed how to further integrate the new partners into GI projects.

The participating governments agreed to sponsor almost 20 activities during the next two years as part of their revised work plan. [3] Priorities include safeguarding nuclear material from terrorists; improving the capabilities of participating nations to detect, search for, and prevent trafficking in such materials; promoting information sharing and law enforcement cooperation; establishing appropriate legal and regulatory frameworks; minimizing the use of highly enriched uranium and plutonium in civilian facilities and activities; denying safe haven and financial resources to terrorists; and strengthening the GI participants’ response capabilities to minimize the impact of any nuclear terrorist attack. [4]

The Russian government hailed the progress achieved at the meeting. At a press conference following the gathering, Kislyak said: “The conference in Astana closed the books on developing and launching the Global Initiative as a multilateral interaction mechanism to combat international terrorism.” He ascribed his optimism to the fact that, “We have many collective plans. Many countries participating in the initiative have proposed taking various measures to fine-tune practical work in the area in order to deprive terrorists of every chance to use nuclear energy in criminal interests.” [5]

The Russian news agency ITAR-TASS cited an unnamed Russian Foreign Ministry official as saying that, “The permanently growing number of participants…proves the seriousness of the global community’s intention to fight nuclear terrorism and the readiness to prevent situations where nuclear materials and technologies may fall into terrorists’ hands.” [6]

GI Background
When introducing the GI at the July 2006 G-8 summit, Bush and Putin described the initiative as “designed to improve implementation and coordination of existing national and multinational programs aimed at countering nuclear trafficking while avoiding unnecessary duplication with these programs.” [7] The most prominent of these existing activities include those occurring under the auspices of the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540, and the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. [8]

The initial July 2006 Bush-Putin joint statement called on governments both to strengthen their enforcement of existing nonproliferation agreements and to adopt additional measures to combat nuclear terrorism. In particular, the declaration urged countries to “ensure that law enforcement takes all possible measures to deny safe haven to terrorists seeking to acquire or use nuclear materials” and to “strengthen our respective national legal frameworks to ensure the effective prosecution of, and the certainty of punishment for, terrorists and those who facilitate such acts.” [9] The legal thrust of the initiative has resulted in law enforcement agencies participating in its activities alongside nuclear experts, members of national intelligence communities, and representatives of national militaries.

Although the GI embraces the Proliferation Security Initiative’s (PSI’s) objective of limiting the illicit transnational movement of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery, its programs aim primarily to improve the safety and security of nuclear materials within countries. [10] Unlike existing threat reduction programs, moreover, the GI focuses on safeguarding civilian rather than military nuclear facilities, though some of its programs may have the ancillary benefit of enhancing the security of the latter. [11]

The GI aspires to contribute to all activities that can limit terrorist access to nuclear capabilities. These include programs aimed at protecting nuclear material, detecting illicit nuclear trafficking, interdicting and recovering diverted nuclear commodities, and responding to nuclear terrorist incidents (e.g., through measures aimed at emergency response, consequence management, and identifying and bringing to justice those responsible for actual or attempted nuclear terrorism). Participants plan to work closely with private sector civilian nuclear power producers, as well as with the IAEA, and other multilateral institutions seeking to enhance the safety and security of nuclear materials. Through the GI’s various activities, governments are to exchange technologies and best practices to enhance their ability to deter, detect, prevent, and respond to threats of nuclear terrorism.

GI Implementation
From October 30-31, 2006, representatives from Russia, the United States, and 11 other countries convened in Rabat, Morocco, where they adopted a Statement of Principles to govern the GI. [12] The participating governments also established an Implementation and Assessment Group (IAG), co-chaired by Russia and the United States, to coordinate the GI’s implementation. The IAG’s members provide assistance to other governments seeking to implement the Statement of Principles and have organized activities designed to advance these principles. The IAG also helps to develop the work plan and measures of effectiveness for these activities. The current IAG members are the United States, Russia, Australia, Canada, China, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. [13]

On February 12-13, 2007, the 13 participating nations held a set of meetings at the Turkish Foreign Ministry in Ankara. Participants included representatives from all G-8 members and from Australia, China, Kazakhstan, Morocco, and host-nation Turkey, as well as observers from the IAEA. [14] The fact that all five countries recognized as nuclear weapons states under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) – Britain, China, France, Russia, and the United States – sent delegates underscores the official attention received by the initiative.

The participation of the Chinese government in the Global Initiative is especially notable in that Beijing refuses to back the PSI. Unlike the more controversial PSI, which focuses on interdictions to impede the transfer of dangerous weapons and materials to rogue states like China’s historic ally North Korea, the Global Initiative aims primarily to deny terrorists access to nuclear materials – ­ an objective that Beijing fully endorses. Indeed, in recent years, Chinese security experts have voiced concern that terrorists might acquire a North Korean nuclear weapon and use it inside China. [15]

The Ankara attendees adopted a work plan to guide implementation of the GI Statement of Principles and discussed which concrete activities to pursue under the GI during 2007-2008. [16] The envisaged activities included international exercises, expert-level meetings and exchanges designed to share best practices, and other forms of mutual assistance intended to enhance accountability concerning the location of nuclear materials, bolster security at nuclear facilities, and combat financial activities related to nuclear trafficking. [17]

Growing International Support
Japan and Australia subsequently completed the first two GI “capacity-building activities” in accord with the Ankara work plan. [18] In early May 2007, Japan hosted an Experts Seminar at which representatives of 15 countries discussed how to promote and assist efforts to sign, ratify, and implement conventions and protocols against terrorism. [19] At the June 2007 meeting in Kazakhstan, the Japanese delegation delivered a briefing on Japanese measures to counter nuclear terrorist threats in Asia and announced a new grant to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund to promote such measures. [20]

Although the GI grew out of a bilateral Russian-American initiative that subsequently won broader G-8 approval, it has since gained widespread international support. Thanks to strong support by Washington and Moscow, the GI has secured its status as a major nuclear nonproliferation institution. [21] More than 50 countries joined the Global Initiative in its first year. [22] In principle, membership in the initiative is open to any country or organization committed to combating the proliferation of nuclear materials and reducing the risks of nuclear terrorism. [23] Participation in any particular activity, or involvement in the GI as a whole, is voluntary. [24]

Many governments have used their accession as an opportunity to affirm their commitment to combating nuclear proliferation, terrorism, and other threats to international security. For example, the government of Pakistan, a state possessing nuclear weapons and which is sometimes criticized for having lax nuclear safety and security policies, as well as for refusing to join the NPT, issued a statement upon joining the GI that the country’s participation reflects the “fact that nuclear security and export control measures in Pakistan are at par with the latest international standards.” In addition, the declaration stated that Pakistan’s participation in the GI is “recognition of the important role being played by Pakistan as a partner in the global efforts against nuclear proliferation and possible nuclear terrorism.” The Pakistani statement did note, however, that the provisions of the GI apply solely to a country’s civilian nuclear facilities, and that military facilities do not fall under its jurisdiction. [25]

In welcoming the June 2007 GI meeting in Astana, Kazakhstani Foreign Minister Marat Tazhin reaffirmed his country’s “determination to actively combat terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. . . . The adoption of effective measures to counter and prevent terrorism is a priority of Kazakhstan’s internal and external policies.” [26]

The Sri Lankan government also cited its commitment to opposing terrorism in all its forms when it entered the GI in May 2007. [27] In contrast, the government of South Korea cited more practical benefits when it joined the GI. Its May 23, 2007, statement noted that participating in the GI would help improve security at its civilian nuclear facilities and foster information exchanges with key nuclear states. [28]

June 2007 Conference on Nuclear Terrorism Law Enforcement
One of the most recent GI activities occurred at the same time as the plenary session in Kazakhstan. From June 11-15, 2007, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) hosted a conference on International Nuclear Terrorism Law Enforcement in Miami, Florida. This conference, the first of its kind, aimed to support several GI objectives, but most specifically the seventh item in the GI Statement of Principles, which was on improving the response, mitigation, and investigation capabilities available for countering nuclear terrorism. The Miami conference featured several days of briefings, workshops, multinational exercises, and expert-level meetings. Specific subjects addressed included trends in nuclear smuggling, strengthening international and national legal frameworks for preventing nuclear terrorism, and sharing technical tools and best practices. [29]

The Miami meeting consciously sought to promote contacts among professional communities (diplomats, WMD technical experts, and homeland security and law enforcement personnel) that have few opportunities to interact at the international level. Participants included representatives from more than 20 countries, both existing GI member states and potential partner nations. A variety of U.S. federal, state, and local agencies sent representatives. On June 13, these agencies provided a “dynamic demonstration” in the Orange Bowl stadium of their ability to respond to a WMD incident. [30] More than 40 companies exhibited detection devices and other technologies suitable for law enforcement activities aimed at countering nuclear terrorism. U.S. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales affirmed that public-private partnerships between government agencies and private sector businesses and scientists were essential for identifying proliferation threats. [31]

FBI Director Robert Mueller delivered a keynote speech in Miami in which he stressed the Bureau’s commitment to cooperating with foreign governments to prevent nuclear terrorism: “We must stand strong together, for nuclear terrorism is a global threat that requires a global response.” Mueller observed that, under the International Counterproliferation Program run jointly by the FBI, the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the United States had trained more than 5,000 foreign personnel, from approximately two dozen countries, in such subjects as WMD detection, border security, undercover investigations, nuclear forensics, and crisis management. [32]

Vladimir Bulavin, the Deputy Director of the Russian Federal Security Bureau (FSB), also delivered a major speech in which he called nuclear terrorism “the main threat of every country.” [33] Underscoring that point, a few days before in Moscow, FSB Director Nikolai Patrushev warned that Russia’s National Anti-Terrorism Committee had intelligence, including some provided by Russia’s foreign partners, that terrorists were seeking to gain access to Russia’s WMD and the technologies used to produce them. [34]

Conclusion
Although welcome, the recent surge in GI membership could make it more difficult for the GI to achieve collective agreement on the source, magnitude, and appropriate response measures for WMD terrorist threats. In addition, the diversity of members could complicate efforts to ensure that activities under the GI make tailored contributions to each participating country’s unique security needs.

Richard Weitz – Hudson Institute