In mid-October 2007, Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Iran, marking the first visit of a Soviet or Russian leader to the country since 1943, when Josef Stalin traveled to Iran to participate in a “Big Three” summit with Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill. Moscow was wary about the October trip which came at the height of the escalating confrontation over Iran’s nuclear program, specifically its uranium enrichment program. Russia has walked a tightrope trying to maintain a fine balance between three elements of its foreign policy: promoting nuclear nonproliferation (first and foremost preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons); maintaining reasonably stable relations with the West; and pursuing its commercial and other interests in Iran. Recently, it has become increasingly difficult for Moscow to maintain that balance.

Several days before the visit, Putin’s deputy spokesman Dmitry Peskov explained the dilemmas faced by Russia with regard to the Iranian nuclear program. He said that Iran was a friend of Russia and Moscow wanted “to avoid a situation where a country is pushed into a corner.” At the same time, he continued, Iran was well aware that “Russia is determined to stay with the international community in ensuring nonproliferation and our own security.” [1] In other words, Russia has assumed a rather uncomfortable position of opposing both sides in the confrontation.

Russia has supported two consecutive UN Security Council resolutions that introduced progressively stricter economic sanctions against Iran in an attempt to force the nation to halt its uranium enrichment activities. [2] At the same time, Russia has resisted U.S. proposals for a tougher regime of sanctions and has refused to abandon the construction of a nuclear power plant (NPP) at Bushehr, a project that the United States has consistently opposed. Moscow also suspects that the United States may be planning an air strike – or perhaps even a full-scale military operation – against Iranian nuclear facilities. In September, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov commented that Russia was “concerned about the multiplying reports that some seriously consider military sanctions against Iran.” He also emphasized that “the IAEA is satisfied with how Iran is addressing the remaining problematic issues associated with its nuclear program,” making it clear that Russia did not see a legal basis for the use of force. [3]

Despite its efforts to limit the scope of international sanctions against Iran and to shield it from military intervention, Moscow’s relations with Iran are far from cordial. Even Moscow’s limited support for sanctions within the UN Security Council has strained Russian-Iranian ties. Moreover, Russia’s effective current freeze on the construction of the Bushehr NPP because of alleged financial and other irregularities has compounded bilateral tensions. (For more on the Bushehr controversy, see “The Bushehr Payment Dispute: Moscow Signals the Limits of its Support for Iran,” WMD Insights, May 2007.) Against this background, the Russian daily, Vremya Novostei, quoted an unnamed Iranian newspaper as stating: “Moscow has never been a reliable friend or partner to any country, especially to us. [The Russians’] words and promises are not worth even the paper on which they are written…If pressure increases, the Russians will most likely again betray Iran and vote together with Western countries in favor of the third punishing resolution against our people.” [4]

In the Russian media, expectations that Putin would find a solution to the “Iranian problem” competed with suspicions that he would “sell out” to Iran. Prior to his meeting in Tehran, Putin offered his own strategy on resolving issues with Iran; during a meeting with German Chancellor Angela Merkel, he declared, “Trying to scare the Iranian people is hopeless. [We] must be patient and look for a solution. Can one do it without talking to the Iranian leadership? I think this would be problematic.” Putin then invoked the example of North Korea, which agreed to roll back its nuclear weapons program after several years of painful but ultimately successful negotiations: “We were patient and consistently looked for a solution, and it looks like we are close to it.” [5] Putin urged that the same stance be adopted with respect to Iran.

Perhaps because of the tensions in Russian-Iranian relations, Putin chose to avoid a formal state visit. Instead, he traveled to Tehran to attend a Caspian Sea summit – a gathering of heads of state with access to the Caspian Sea: Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan. Russian officials met with Iranian leaders on the margins of that summit. Moreover, according to Russian sources, Moscow genuinely regarded the Caspian Sea summit as more important than bilateral meetings in Tehran because under President Ahmadinejad, the Iranian position on the delimitation of the Caspian Sea and the use of its resources had moved closer to the Russian position. [6]

Putin’s visit to Tehran was further complicated by rumors of a plot to assassinate him in Iran. A common perception in the Russia media was that the announcement regarding the plot was designed to draw attention away from the many thorny issues surrounding the summit. Rajab Safarov, Director of the Moscow-based Center for the Study of Contemporary Iran, even speculated that the alleged plot was a ploy to give Putin a pretext to cancel the visit. In the end, Putin announced he was not afraid of the threats and was going on with the trip. [7] Putin did, however, shorten his visit by a day, arriving in Tehran a day later than originally planned. After his departure, Russian media disclosed that information about the assassination threat originated from an anonymous call to the Russian embassy in Tehran. [8]

The meetings in Tehran turned out to be anticlimactic; Putin did not announce a major new initiative during his visit. Instead, Putin made two main points. First, he stated that Iran should cooperate with the international community and stop enrichment of uranium, at least temporarily, to allow the resumption of a meaningful dialogue with the group of six countries (five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany). Second, Putin made clear that Russia views the use of force against Iran or the imposition of unilateral sanctions outside of the UN Security Council framework as unacceptable means of halting Tehran’s nuclear program.

As a group, the states at the Caspian Sea summit indicated their support for Russia’s position that military force should not be used against Iran to stop its uranium enrichment program. The summit’s final declaration proclaimed that the Caspian Sea states would not allow their territories to be used for attack against other participants. Reportedly, Russia proposed this text. [9] The summit statement implicitly referred to Azerbaijan, which is widely regarded as a close friend of the United States and possible staging ground for a U.S. air strike against Iran. Putin did not miss an opportunity to take a jab at the United States; he repeated a favorite Russian thesis that a unipolar world is impossible: “No single state in the world, even the biggest one, can solve all global problems unilaterally; it just will not have enough resources – financial, economic, material, or political…The examples of Afghanistan and Iraq only confirm that.” [10]

While trying to protect Iran from military measures, Putin carefully avoided any indication of encouragement for Iran’s nuclear activities. Instead, he emphasized that Russia was providing more support to Iran’s civilian nuclear program than any other nation and that it could not be expected to increase its support. At two press conferences, Putin emphasized that Russia was the only country that had agreed to pick up the Bushehr project after it had been abandoned by Germany years earlier and that Russia had accepted many challenges when it agreed to build on the foundations and equipment Germany left in place. Putin charged that the delays in construction of the Bushehr NPP were caused by the requirement to adapt German equipment to the Russian reactor and by Iran’s insistence on purchasing a portion of the equipment for Bushehr from third countries. He noted that one such deal with South Korea was canceled under pressure from the United States. Putin insisted that only Russia firmly stood behind its obligations, stating, “We do not abrogate and do not intend to abrogate our commitments, especially since we have already signed an agreement with our Iranian partners on the return of spent fuel to Russia. We are fully satisfied with it.” He stated that, once the date for Bushehr’s completion is known, Russia would decide when fresh fuel for the facility would be shipped. [11]

During two meetings with Ahmadinejad, Putin refused to make any promises regarding the completion date for the Bushehr NPP or delivery of fuel for it. (According to official Russian sources, Putin’s second meeting with Ahmadinejad was devoted primarily to Bushehr). [12] The joint statement issued by the two presidents after the meeting noted only that nuclear energy cooperation between the two countries would continue in the framework of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and that the Bushehr NPP would be completed “in accordance with an agreed schedule.” [13]

At a subsequent press conference, Putin again refused to say more than that the two countries needed to complete the ongoing renegotiation of the original contract and that the amended contract would provide the new timeline for completion of the project. When pressed for a more definitive answer, he became visibly irritated and snapped that he was not making any promises: “I only made promises to my mother when I was a child.” [14] Some Russian media sources commented that Moscow had intentionally made Bushehr into a “project without an end” to keep a lever vis-à-vis Iran and at the same time have a bargaining chip vis-à-vis the West. [15] Since Putin had the authority to make a political decision on these deadlines if he had wanted to please his hosts, his attitude made clear that he would not make any concessions, whether substantial or symbolic, on the issue during the meetings.

In spite of Putin’s intransigence on progress at the Bushehr NPP, Ahmadinejad declared, as a send-off, that Iran was prepared to cooperate with Russia on construction of two additional reactors at the site. [16] Tehran has often used the promise of a contract for additional reactors to try to entice Russia to lend greater support for the Iranian nuclear program.

The only unexpected and somewhat mysterious part of the visit was a short meeting between Putin and Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i, Iran’s Supreme Leader, following his two meetings with Ahmadinejad. There have been no official releases of information regarding the substance of the meeting; however, Iran’s former chief nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani, widely considered a confidant of Khamene’i, revealed that Putin had offered a new solution to the conflict over Iran’s nuclear program. [17] The decision to propose a new solution directly to Khamene’i, if such a proposal was indeed made, reflected the widespread conviction among Russian experts that Khamene’i has considerably greater influence over decisions on the country’s nuclear program than Ahmadinejad. [18]

According to media reports, Putin asked Khamene’i to work more closely with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to resolve its remaining questions so that the international community would have evidence of the peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear program. Putin also reportedly pushed Iran to stop enrichment of uranium, at least temporarily, in exchange for a freeze on UN sanctions. The Russians reportedly argued that Iran’s halting uranium enrichment would defuse the ongoing confrontation with the UN and allow for a new attempt at negotiations. Such a move would also deflect U.S. efforts to impose additional sanctions against Iran and effectively rule out the possibility of a U.S. military strike. If this was indeed Putin’s proposal, his bid to persuade Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment activities was rejected; Iran, however, has attempted to cooperate with the IAEA to satisfy the agency’s demands for additional information about the Iranian nuclear program. [19]

Almost immediately after Putin’s departure from Tehran, Larijani resigned as Iran’s chief nuclear diplomat. [20] According to rumors, Larijani resigned when, after he disclosed that Putin had made a new proposal on the nuclear issue, Ahmadinejad openly contradicted him by denying that Putin had tabled such an initiative. (For an analysis of Larijani’s resignation, see “Iranian Chief Nuclear Negotiator Ali Larijani Resigns,” in this issue of WMD Insights.)

On October 31, two weeks after the conclusion of Putin’s short trip, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov unexpectedly visited Tehran. The visit was immediately connected in the press to the mysterious proposal that Putin allegedly made to Khamene’i. [21] According to a Russian Foreign Ministry source, Khamene’i and Putin “did not finish their conversation and it was decided that Lavrov and Ahmadinejad would complete the discussion.” [22] If, in fact, the two did discuss the Putin nuclear initiative, Lavrov, too, came away empty handed.

Conclusion
Putin’s trip to Tehran and his proposal to Khamene’i clearly represented an attempt to break out of the circle of escalating tension between the United States and Iran and to regain some space for diplomatic action. Despite the lack of a major success, Putin’s and Lavrov’s visits may have made some headway in convincing Iran to continue to cooperate with the IAEA.

Following the visits, in late October and early November, Iranian authorities provided more information and held discussions with the IAEA on Iran’s centrifuge enrichment program. In a November 15, 2007 report, the IAEA noted Iran’s willingness to provide requested information and access to certain individuals: “Iran has provided sufficient access to individuals and has responded in a timely manner to questions and provided clarifications and amplifications on issues raised in the context of the work plan.” [23] However, the IAEA concluded that while it could “verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran,” it “is not in a position to provide credible assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran without full implementation of the Additional Protocol,” a reference to strengthened inspection procedures included in a pending amendment to Iran’s basic inspection agreement with the agency. [24]

Although Iran continues to refuse to suspend enrichment activities as required by UN Security Council’s resolutions, Russia appears to be proceeding with plans to finish and fuel the Bushehr NPP. On November 26, IAEA inspectors arrived at a Siberian plant to inspect and seal the fuel to be sent to Bushehr. [25]

Nikolai Sokov – Monterey Institute James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies