In February 2006, U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Deputy Secretary Clay Sell announced the launch of a Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) as the key international component of President George W. Bush’s Advanced Energy Initiative (AEI). The AEI seeks to expand the use of climate friendly fuels – such as nuclear power, but also clean coal and renewable energy sources – to decrease U.S. reliance on vulnerable and expensive foreign oil supplies. [1] GNEP’s stated dual purpose is to promote nuclear energy abroad while preventing further nuclear weapons proliferation. GNEP, like nuclear energy in general, has proven controversial since its inception. Nonetheless, the U.S. initiative has overcome numerous challenges to gain considerable international support, with 21 countries having joined as full members. GNEP has achieved less success in the U.S. Congress, where many members worry about its high costs and potential contribution to additional nuclear proliferation.

Background
GNEP represents the international collaborative dimension of the Bush administration’s long-term vision for expanding the use of civilian nuclear energy while making it safer and more secure. [2] The DOE has outlined four overarching goals for the GNEP: (1) to decrease U.S. reliance on foreign energy sources without impeding U.S. economic growth; (2) to employ improved technologies to recover more energy and reduce waste when recycling spent nuclear fuel; (3) to encourage the use of energy sources that emit the least atmospheric greenhouse gasses; and (4) to reduce the threat of nuclear proliferation.

To achieve these objectives, GNEP aims to develop new recycling technologies in countries already possessing advanced civilian nuclear energy programs that would both discourage the production of new plutonium (potentially usable as the core of a nuclear weapon) and reduce already accumulated stockpiles of the material. [3] The envisaged advanced fuel separation and fuel fabrication techniques (known as NUEX, UREX-Plus, COEX, GANEX, etc.) would generate reduced nuclear waste and no additional pure plutonium. Instead, the new techniques would only partially separate plutonium from spent reactor fuel so that it would remain mixed with uranium and highly radioactive fission products and/or non-plutonium heavy metals. These combinations would render the product less suitable for nuclear weapons and allow for its use as nuclear fuel, augmenting supplies of traditional enriched uranium fuel. [4]

In this regard, the new spent fuel separation and fresh fuel fabrication technologies would create fuel suitable for fast neutron reactors, which are capable of fissioning a wider range of isotopes than traditional nuclear power reactors, known as light-water reactors. Although some countries have developed experimental fast reactors, their high costs versus the lower costs associated with traditional light-water units – which presently account for almost all commercial nuclear power generation – have thus far prevented them from becoming commercially viable. [5] The DOE is promoting development of a new generation of fast neutron reactors under the multinational Generation IV International Forum (GIF), which involves several leading GNEP partners. [6]

The “closed” nuclear fuel cycle favored by GNEP would also help consume the extensive global stockpile of already separated plutonium, thereby reducing the proliferation risks posed by this material. Although nonproliferation and other concerns led the United States to stop separating plutonium from spent nuclear fuel in 1977, the world has accumulated over 200 tons of separated plutonium from the reprocessing of spent nuclear power plant fuel, a quantity that is considerably larger than plutonium produced in military reactors for use in nuclear weapons. [7]

In order to improve the Department’s ability to recycle spent nuclear fuel and eliminate its long-lived radioactive components, the DOE plans to establish three special facilities: (1) a nuclear fuel recycling center, which would separate reusable and waste components from spent nuclear fuel and then use the reusable components to produce new fuel; (2) an advanced recycling reactor, which would use and eliminate materials derived from spent nuclear fuel that would otherwise have to be placed in long-term storage; and (3) an advanced spent fuel research facility, which would develop improved spent nuclear fuel recycling processes. [8]

GNEP also hopes to discourage the spread of uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing (plutonium separation) technologies – sensitive capabilities that can produce fuel for nuclear energy or fissile material for nuclear weapons – to additional countries through a fuel leasing arrangement. Under the scheme, a consortium of nuclear supplier states, working with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), would provide guaranteed supplies of fresh uranium fuel for civilian nuclear power plants located in user nations that agree to refrain from enrichment and reprocessing. The resulting spent fuel would be returned to the fuel supplier and recycled using a process that does not produce pure, separated plutonium. [9]

GNEP also aims to promote collaboration among advanced industrialized countries to develop new types of nuclear reactors designed especially for developing countries with rudimentary nuclear power programs, small-grid markets, and less well-developed technical infrastructures than found in advanced nuclear-power-using nations. The envisaged nuclear reactors would use standardized modular designs in the 50-350 megawatt range, in contrast to the 1,000-1,200 megawatt range seen in most commercial nuclear power plants today. They would also have specially tailored features such as low operating costs, long-life fuel supplies that ideally would not require replacement during the reactor’s operating span, as well as enhanced and simplified safeguards designed to counter the diversion of nuclear materials and technologies. [10]

GNEP’s architects expect that many of these advanced safeguard technologies would be incorporated into other elements of the international nuclear fuel cycle. Other sought-after nuclear technologies include more proliferation-resistant methods of storing and transporting nuclear materials, improved remote and unattended monitoring technologies, and enhanced monitoring and tracking sensors. According to the DOE: “Under GNEP, international safeguards will be an integral part of the global expansion of nuclear power, including the development of future proliferation-resistant fuel cycle and reactor technologies.” [11]

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a semi-autonomous entity within the DOE, leads this U.S. effort to reduce the dangers from the proliferation of nuclear weapons. [12] To date, under GNEP, the NNSA has encouraged expanded research, development, and dissemination of improved nuclear safeguards, while establishing more effective uranium fuel supply arrangements. NNSA characterizes GNEP as complementing its efforts to modernize the U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal. For example, in June 2007, Deputy Secretary Sell told the Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference that GNEP and the administration’s proposal to develop a Reliable Replacement Warhead “are in fact built on the same strategic foundation.” [13]

History
In January 2007, the DOE released its “Global Nuclear Energy Partnership Strategic Plan.” [14] The document describes the DOE’s ambitious program to develop advanced nuclear fuel cycle technologies. The text also specifies the technical, economic, and environmental criteria that will guide specific GNEP programs and policies.

On May 21, 2007, senior officials from Russia, France, Japan, and China met with American officials in Washington for the first meeting of GNEP. [15] According to their joint statement, the founding participants, whose governments all possess advanced nuclear power industries, as well as experience with spent fuel reprocessing, discussed how to ensure “the safe and secure expansion of civilian nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,” while discouraging “the spread of sensitive nuclear fuel cycle technologies.” [16]

A number of countries signed on to GNEP following this inaugural meeting. At the second ministerial meeting in Vienna on September 16, 2007, eleven additional states joined GNEP: Australia, Bulgaria, Ghana, Hungary, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, and Ukraine. Along with the original five GNEP partners, they signed GNEP Statement of Principles. [17] As a result, GNEP’s member countries now include the world’s leading nuclear energy service providers, suppliers of uranium, nuclear energy consumers, as well as states considering launching their own national nuclear power programs. [18]

The Vienna meeting was also noteworthy because of the large number of countries sending observers. [19] In addition to the 22 countries present, three multinational organizations were also represented. IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei welcomed GNEP as “a major initiative that is badly needed, therefore very timely.” He said that GNEP represented “a much more ambitious and comprehensive proposal” than other multinational fuel cycle initiatives “because it deals with all aspects of the fuel cycle, both the front end and the back end.” [20] Most of the alternative multilateral fuel-cycle efforts launched recently focus on the front end (limiting the spread of uranium enrichment technologies) rather than the “back end” (disposing of the spent fuel in a safe, secure, and proliferation-resistant manner). [21]

The governments of Italy and Canada, which had sent observers to the second ministerial meeting, became full GNEP members in November 2007. South Korea, which had already begun to receive GNEP industry awards, joined the following month, reinforcing GNEP’s strong representation among Asia’s leading nuclear energy producers – and their nuclear power companies. (China and Japan joined as original partners). Senegal joined on February 1, 2008, and most recently on February 26th, Britain signed on, bringing the total GNEP membership to 21 countries. [22]

GNEP managers have stressed the need to work closely with private industry to develop suitable nuclear technologies. In May 2007, Sell said that the DOE proposed to spend $60 million to obtain industry assistance in designing concepts for proposed GNEP facilities. On October 1, 2007, the DOE announced the first set of technical and conceptual design development awards – over $16.3 million to four multinational industry consortia led by Areva, EnergySolutions, GE-Hitachi Nuclear Americas, and General Atomics. In announcing the decision, Assistant Secretary of Nuclear Energy Dennis Spurgeon said that the grants “enable DOE to benefit from the vast technological and business experience of the private sector as we move towards the goal of closing the nuclear fuel cycle.” [23]

In December 2007, GNEP held its first Steering Group meeting. According to Spurgeon, the three-day session of the then 19 GNEP partners at the IAEA headquarters in Vienna achieved “measurable progress.” The attendees elected the United States to chair the Steering Group, with China, France, and Japan serving as vice-chairs, for a two-year term. [24]

The participants also adopted an Action Plan that outlined initial priorities, defined mechanisms for their future cooperation, and established select initial milestones for GNEP. The plan also created two working groups, the GNEP Working Group of Infrastructure Development and the GNEP Working Group on Reliable Nuclear Fuel Services. [25] The Infrastructure Development Work Group is addressing the financial, technical, and human resource issues involved in creating an international nuclear energy architecture based on GNEP’s Statement of Principles. The Nuclear Fuel Service Working Group is assessing how to design and implement an effective nuclear energy infrastructure employing fuel leasing and other economically viable and proliferation-secure arrangements. [26]

Current International Dimensions
Washington, Moscow, and other governments are currently pursuing parallel but largely independent initiatives to limit the spread of sensitive uranium enrichment technologies by establishing a multinational system that would guarantee nuclear fuel supplies to countries that forgo indigenous enrichment and reprocessing activities. At the June 6-8, 2007, G-8 summit in Heiligendamm, Germany, the participating governments expressed support for the Russian, American, and other proposals for “developing and implementing multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle as a possible alternative to pursuing national enrichment and reprocessing activities.” [27]

The expectation is that guaranteeing developing states the right to purchase and store fuel internationally at modest cost would make it unnecessary and uneconomical for them to pursue national uranium enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. Those countries that nevertheless sought to develop their own sensitive nuclear technologies would receive special scrutiny from the international community, since their pursuit of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities would raise concerns that non-market factors – specifically, a desire to acquire the capacity to manufacture nuclear weapons – were affecting their decision-making calculus.

Russia’s Pioneering Role
When launching GNEP in early 2006, American officials made clear they wanted to secure Russian participation in the endeavor. Washington and Moscow have since established several inter-departmental groups to discuss Russia’s possible involvement in GNEP and how best to reconcile the two governments’ slightly different proposals for internationalizing the nuclear fuel cycle. [28] At the time of GNEP’s launch, President Vladimir Putin had just announced an independent initiative to establish a network of international nuclear fuel-cycle centers that would provide uranium fuel and other nuclear services to countries seeking civilian nuclear power.

GNEP’s fuel-leasing arrangement also resembles Russia’s spent fuel take-back policy, which is part of its nuclear agreement with Iran for the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power reactor. Returning the spent fuel from Bushehr to Russia for storage and/or processing, ensures that Iran cannot reprocess the material to obtain its plutonium content. In the spring of 2007, the Russian government delayed providing the first load of uranium fuel for the Bushehr reactor, until Iran provided assurances that it would return the spent fuel to Russia.

Russian government representatives have expressed strong interest in using the GNEP framework to cooperate with the United States on civil nuclear energy. In December 2006, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that integrating GNEP with Moscow’s own plan to establish international nuclear fuel services “will be a major priority for Russia next year.” [29] At the May 2007 GNEP meeting in Washington, Nikolay Spasskiy, deputy director of Russia’s atomic energy agency, stated that “implementation of this initiative enhances the cumulative effect of the other initiatives and mechanisms in this field.” [30] In November 2007, Russia and the United States renewed a 2000 agreement to each dispose of 34 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium. This measure will contribute to realizing GNEP’s objective of eliminating global civil stockpiles of separated plutonium. [31]

Nevertheless, the escalating tensions between Russia and the United States during the past year seem to have impeded bilateral cooperation regarding GNEP and other issues. The two governments have yet to sign the proposed Russian-American civil nuclear cooperation agreement Putin and Bush described at their joint news conference, held on the sidelines of the July 2006 G-8 summit in St. Petersburg. American officials also have not secured congressional approval of a waiver from section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act (specifying the requirements for agreements for nuclear cooperation) to allow Russia to reprocess U.S.-origin spent nuclear fuel.

Engaging Russia in the GNEP initiative offers many important benefits. Russian nuclear experts have more experience with reprocessing technologies than their American counterparts, where reprocessing has been renounced since the late 1970s because of its costs and proliferation risks. Since the Carter administration, the U.S. nuclear power program has stored spent nuclear fuel rather than attempting to recycle it. Potential Russian contributions to GNEP include sharing existing technologies and facilities (including the fast neutron BN-600 reactor at Beloyarsk), collaborating on developing more advanced recycling techniques, and sharing the costs of pursuing GNEP initiatives. [32]

Late Joiners Canada and Australia
After considerable hesitation and debate, the Canadian government joined GNEP in September 2007. On the one hand, as the world’s largest uranium exporter, Canada has a strong interest in influencing the policies and evolution of GNEP, not least because the initiative has come to include some of the world’s most important uranium-enriching countries. On the other hand, many Canadians feared that joining GNEP would require their country to accept the return of spent nuclear fuel that had originally contained Canadian uranium for disposal. [33]

In the end, the Canadian government concluded that the benefits of joining GNEP – specifically, the ability to influence the partnership’s decisions – outweighed these strong reservations. Foreign Affairs Minister Maxime Bernier issued a statement arguing that, by joining GNEP, “Canada can continue to be an effective advocate for nuclear safety and nonproliferation.” [34] Gary Lunn, the Minister of Natural Resources, explained that, “As the world’s largest producer of uranium and a country taking steps to tackle climate change through the development of clean energy technology, Canada’s responsibility is to help shape the safe and secure development of nuclear energy worldwide.” [35] An official in Lunn’s office insisted that GNEP did not require the repatriation of spent fuel or other nuclear waste and that, in any case, “Canada does not import spent fuel and we will not do so.” [36] In addition, one Canadian nuclear expert believed that Ottawa wanted to improve the prospects that Americans would buy Canadian CANDU reactors, which can run on spent fuel byproducts created in light-water reactors. [37]

The Australian government faced similar considerations as it deliberated whether to join GNEP. Like Canada, Australia is one of the largest suppliers of natural uranium. The country also possesses the world’s largest reserves of uranium. Although Australia has no nuclear power plants, its government wanted to participate in any GNEP decisions that might affect international civil nuclear energy developments. Nevertheless, as in Canada, opponents of Australia’s joining GNEP feared it would require Australia to accept nuclear waste products that resulted from the burning of nuclear fuel manufactured from Australian uranium. When the government finally signed on to GNEP in September 2007, it stipulated two conditions. First, Australia would not need to accept nuclear waste from other countries. Second, the government reserved the right to enrich uranium in Australia in the future. [38]

South Korea’s Controversial Commitment
Other governments have also cited a desire to influence GNEP decision-making as the reason for their participation as full partners, which requires signing the Statement of Principles. In announcing South Korea’s December 2007 decision to join, the head of the atomic energy bureau of the Ministry of Science and Industry, Kim Young-sik, stated that, “By joining GNEP, South Korea can maximize its interest in critical decision making processes related to atomic energy issues, and can use its membership to bolster exports to countries interested in nuclear power generation.” [39]

Furthermore, joining as a full member could increase South Korean opportunities to obtain additional GNEP research and development funding. In November 2007, the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute received funding through one of GNEP’s four industry consortias to conduct research on very high-temperature reactors and advanced burner reactors. [40]

Some nuclear experts have cautioned that South Korea’s intent to research pyro-processing could prove problematic for achieving GNEP objectives given concerns that the resulting product could still be diverted for use in manufacturing nuclear weapons. Although for three decades South Korean governments have renounced nuclear weapons and called for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, the country conducted a covert nuclear weapons program in the 1970s, before joining the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapon state. [41]

Nuclear Holdouts South Africa and India
South Africa has thus far declined to join GNEP. Its government fears that participation would impede the country’s ambitions to resume uranium enrichment and sell reactor fuel on the international market. During the Cold War, South Africa manufactured a half-dozen nuclear bombs, based on domestically produced highly enriched uranium. It later dismantled the weapons, placed their nuclear materials under IAEA inspection, and joined the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state. The South African government has already announced plans to construct new nuclear reactors and fuel them using indigenously mined and enriched uranium. The South African government has expressed interest in collaborating with foreign governments in developing uranium enrichment capabilities, but to date has remained outside GNEP.

In explaining her country’s approach, Minerals and Energy Minister Buyelwa Sonjica told reporters at the IAEA’s 2007 annual meeting in Vienna that, “We were concerned that some aspects of GNEP declaration would conflict with our national policy.” [42] Apparently reflecting a concern shared by many of the delegates at the gathering, she said her government was disappointed about not being consulted in the drafting of the GNEP principles, despite South Africa’s importance as a uranium supplier and past experience with enrichment. Sonjica explained to the IAEA General Conference that her government therefore wanted to “ensure that no unwarranted restrictions are imposed on the right of States to pursue nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.” [43] Tseliso Maqubela, the ministry’s nuclear program director, characterized GNEP’s possible constraints on South Africa’s nuclear activities as “a sovereignty issue” touching on “our own nuclear fuel reserves and fuel supply.” [44]

India, which is deciding whether to commit to a separate bilateral civil nuclear energy agreement with the United States, has also declined invitations to join GNEP. In a February 2006 news conference, Sell said that “once India has met its nonproliferation commitments, that in addition to expanded civil nuclear cooperation, which was originally talked about, we would also look forward to expanding our cooperation and our partnership with India on the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership.” [45]

Yet, many Indians worry that doing so might constrain their ability to enrich uranium or reprocess spent nuclear power plant fuel, issues that have also complicated the proposed U.S.-Indian deal. One analyst warned that Washington “is trying to do an end-run around India’s stand on the proposed separation of its civilian and military nuclear facilities by suggesting that Indian participation in a new American-sponsored global nuclear initiative is conditional on the acceptance of in-perpetuity international safeguards on the overwhelming majority of its nuclear facilities, including reprocessing plants.” [46] (For additional background on the U.S.-India nuclear deal, see “Commercial Motivations Add Impetus to Indo-U.S. Nuclear Agreement,” WMD Insights, May 2007 and “Did China’s Autocracy Exploit India’s Democracy to Stall the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal?” WMD Insights, November 2007.)

U.S. officials have sought to assuage these fears. NNSA representatives have stressed that they will not require GNEP members to permanently foreswear the right to enrich uranium or reprocess plutonium. They also have insisted that GNEP policies would be determined by a multinational steering committee governed by the principle of consensus. [47] In September 2007, the GNEP partners signed a statement of principles explicitly denying that any participating country would have to renounce their nuclear plans: “States participating in this cooperation would not give up any rights, and voluntarily engage to share the effort and gain the benefits of economical, peaceful nuclear energy.” [48]

Although such reassurances may have facilitated the entry of Australia and Canada into the program, South Africa and India have declined to sign on. In addition, these U.S. statements have aroused concern among nonproliferation experts that GNEP will have the perverse effect of encouraging the proliferation of sensitive nuclear technologies. (Argentina, Brazil, and Germany have also held back from joining GNEP. They are discussed briefly in the concluding section, below.)

Congressional and Expert Concerns
Members of Congress remain unenthusiastic about GNEP. Many Democrats and some Republicans have expressed unease that the program will encourage nuclear proliferation, waste money on a narrow range of excessively ambitious and unachievable technologies, and divert funding from other more important priorities, such as cleaning up domestic nuclear waste sites.

In May 2006, Congress appropriated less than half of the Bush administration’s requested $250 million budget for GNEP. In addition to concerns about the risks of furthering nuclear proliferation by promoting reprocessing over long-term spent fuel storage, members complained that the administration had not provided them with adequate information about the long-term costs of the initiative, which could amount to billions of dollars. [49]

In August 2006, the DOE proposed accelerating the GNEP timetable, transforming the initiative from largely a long-term research and development program into one that also would work extensively with the civilian nuclear industry to incorporate readily available technologies into new reactors. The ambitious schedule envisaged operating a commercial-scale reprocessing plant and a fast reactor by approximately 2020. Many nuclear experts argued that few of the breakthrough technologies sought by GNEP would become viable for many decades. These technical arguments, combined with continuing cost concerns, subsequently led Congress to refuse to fund the accelerated timetable, resulting in GNEP reverting to its focus on longer-term research and development. [50]

For FY 2008, Congress allocated only $181 million for Bush’s Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative, which funds GNEP, instead of the requested $395 million. Congress agreed to support GNEP research but not the creation of commercial facilities or technology demonstration projects. Congress also diverted some money to long-term waste disposal and funding an international nuclear fuel bank under IAEA supervision. [51]

Many American nuclear experts have also voiced alarm about GNEP, especially its plans to resume nuclear reprocessing in the United States and encourage its use in other countries. In May 2006, Stephen Young, senior analyst at the Union of Concerned Scientists, endorsed the congressional funding cutbacks, arguing that, “GNEP would only succeed in making it easier for terrorists to obtain the material needed to make a nuclear weapon.” [52] In October 2007, experts at a number of leading U.S. national and regional nuclear arms control organizations signed a letter urging the Senate Appropriations Committee to eliminate all GNEP funding. [53]

The National Research Council (NRC) of the National Academies issued a highly critical assessment of GNEP on October 29, 2007. The report, which evaluated the entire DOE nuclear energy research and development program, argued that GNEP had adopted an excessively rapid deployment schedule that entailed considerable financial and technical risks as well as a premature narrowing of nuclear energy technologies. The authors also faulted DOE for not seeking sufficient external input by independent peer reviewers and for inadequately addressing the waste management challenges that have long hindered use of civilian nuclear energy. Nevertheless, 15 of the 17 members of the committee authoring the report supported continuing GNEP as a limited reprocessing research program. [54] In response, DOE argued that the NRC panel misunderstood GNEP, especially its timeline and relationship to the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative. [55]

The following month, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) confirmed widespread concerns about the cost of GNEP’s reprocessing initiatives. CBO analysts concluded that, using a wide range of financial and technical scenarios and assumptions, reprocessing spent nuclear fuel in the United States would probably cost billions of dollars more than would disposing of the spent fuel directly in a long-term repository. [56]

Critics worry that GNEP is encouraging several countries to begin new uranium enrichment programs, or reactivate such long abandoned plans, based on the fear that GNEP will effectively divide the world into uranium-enriching (and fuel selling) “haves” and “have nots.” Many Sunni Arab governments have recently announced plans to pursue civilian nuclear energy programs. Although none of these countries have committed to develop indigenous enrichment capabilities, fears exist that GNEP, combined with pressures to imitate Iran, could encourage them to do so. [57] For example, Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa are producers of natural uranium that have resumed uranium enrichment programs in response to rising uranium prices, anticipating higher demand for nuclear fuel and hoping to participate as fuel suppliers in GNEP.

Nonproliferation experts also express concerns about GNEP’s support for UREX-Plus as a preferred technology to chemically remove uranium and other elements from dissolved spent fuel, leaving plutonium and highly radioactive elements. Earlier DOE studies cautioned that the reactor fuel derived from UREX-Plus separation will not be sufficiently radioactive to be “self-protecting” according to IAEA and other standards, meaning that clandestine national nuclear programs or terrorists might be able to process the fuel to extract its plutonium without the concern for receiving possibly fatal doses of radiation from the material. In addition, since UREX-Plus would employ plutonium in powder and liquid forms, and would mix it with other nuclear materials, it could become harder to measure and monitor the plutonium, which could increase the risks of its unauthorized diversion. Critics also fear that determined proliferators could nonetheless use plutonium derived through UREX-Plus to make a nuclear bomb. GNEP’s advocates say that recent technical progress has helped overcome these problems and that, in any case, UREX-Plus is more proliferation resistant than the decades-old PUREX reprocessing approach currently used in Britain, France, Japan, and Russia. [58]

Future Prospects
GNEP’s future will depend on whether it continues to enjoy broad international support and whether the next U.S. administration and Congress will continue to fund it. Such important nuclear players as Argentina, Brazil, Germany, India, and South Africa still remain noncommittal about joining the initiative. Although Argentina, Brazil, and India have made clear they will not soon join, and German position is unresolved. Germany’s coalition government, which is currently engaged in a contentious debate over the appropriate status of nuclear energy in the country’s future energy plans, is still undecided about participating in GNEP.

Within the United States, concerns about global warming resulting from the emission of greenhouse gases from the burning of fossil fuels have increased support for expanding the use of nuclear energy, providing essential safety and security concerns are met. But GNEP’s critics fear that the initiative has become a risky, costly, and overly ambitious endeavor that is overly optimistic in forecasting that desired nuclear technologies will emerge in future decades, as needed.

Richard Weitz – Hudson Institute