Iran’s February 4, 2008 announcement that it had launched a rocket developed to carry a research satellite into orbit in late 2008 or early 2009 upset Moscow’s policy towards Tehran. [1] While a few officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed Russia’s concerns about Tehran’s pursuit of missile technology, for the most part, Russian officials have remained notably silent about the launch, seeming to follow the principle that if one is not sure what to say, the best policy is to say nothing at all.

The rocket was launched from Iran’s newly inaugurated space center (whose location was not specified in the Iranian announcement), laying the groundwork for what Tehran says will be the future launch of its first domestically produced satellite. The rocket, called “Kavoshgar-1” (“Explorer 1”), is designed with the capability of carrying a satellite into a low earth orbit. [2] Iranian media gave no details about the rocket/launch vehicle, but Russia’s RIA Novosti noted that some experts believe it could be an advanced version of the Shahab-3 ballistic missile, which has a range of up to 2,000 kilometers (km) (about1,200 miles). [3] According to Jane’s International Defense Review, the rocket launch site, and presumably the space center, are both located near a missile development and test facility that has most recently been associated with test launches of the Shahab missile system. [4]

Iranian state sources were mum on the exact altitude reached by its “research rocket.” They reported, however, that it reached “space,” generally defined as 62.5 miles above earth. [5] The test was a hailed as a forerunner to the anticipated launch early in 2009 of Iran’s first satellite, “Omid” (Hope), which Iranian scientists have reportedly spent 10 years developing. [6] Iran insists that the Omid satellite will be used to improve phone and internet services while also monitoring natural disasters. [7]

Underlying international concern over the launch is that it provided further evidence that Iran continues to make improvements in the performance and range capabilities associated with its missiles and purportedly civilian space program, even as it seeks mastery of uranium enrichment, a technology that could provide the fuel for nuclear reactors or material for nuclear weapons. In the Russian government, only officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs commented publicly on the launch, while the Ministry of Defense remained conspicuously silent. Four days after the event, deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Aleksandr Losuykov admitted that “the prospect of Iran creating such a weapon is a concern for us as well as other states.” [8] A few days later, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov reiterated Russia’s concerns: “We do not approve of Iranian actions that are aimed at persistently demonstrating intentions to develop missile technology and to continue enriching uranium. … I think it is advisable to refrain from any actions and especially statements that might aggravate the situation, even as Iran appears bent on ignoring the international community, as well as decisions of the UN Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).” [9] The chairman of the International Relations Committee of the Russian Duma (the lower chamber of parliament) Konstantin Kosachev echoed the point, declaring that, “It was a wrong step for Iran to demonstrate power at a time when the international community is divided on that country. The Iranian leadership made a regrettable mistake.” [10]

The final version of the Russian position on the launch was unveiled on February 12. It was shaped along the lines of the well-known Russian stance on the Iranian nuclear program. “From the point of view of international law, these actions are not prohibited,” said Lavrov, referring to the space delivery vehicle launch. Lavrov then warned that “Russia does not approve of constant demonstration of [Tehran’s] intention to develop the missile sector and to enrich uranium.” [11] The framing of the Russian assessment of Iranian policy in this way suggests two important consequences. First, Moscow will clearly avoid giving any endorsement to the Iranian missile program, regardless of how it is packaged for international consumption and, second, there appear to be grounds for a common U.S.-Russian position on the issue along the lines of the existing cooperation in the UN Security Council with regard to Iran’s sensitive nuclear activities and missile program.

Indeed, what Iran hailed as a great achievement seriously complicates Moscow’s efforts to avoid taking sides in the evolving standoff over Tehran’s nuclear and missile programs. Russia has tried to adhere to a balanced position in line with the letter of international law. Moscow supported UN Security Council resolutions in December 2006 and March 2007 demanding that Iran stop its uranium enrichment program and imposing a range of economic sanctions on the country. However, it also continued construction of the nearly-complete Bushehr nuclear power station in Iran, a project that was not barred by the UN resolutions and that Russia believes is consistent with Iran’s right under Article IV of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to exploit nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. (For more background on Russia’s construction of the Bushehr reactor, see “Russian President Putin’s Visit to Iran: Much Speculation, Few Successes,” WMD Insights, December 2007-January 2008; “Update: The Bushehr Payment Dispute,” WMD Insights, June 2007; “The Bushehr Payment Dispute: Moscow Signals the Limits of its Support for Iran,” WMD Insights, May 2007.) Russia’s balancing act is likely to be more difficult after the February 4 test.

The Iranian test also weakens Moscow’s case against the deployment of a U.S. missile defense system in Eastern Europe. Moscow has opposed the system on the grounds that Iran has not demonstrated the ability to manufacture missiles with sufficient range to strike Europe or the United States and is not likely to have that ability for the foreseeable future. (See, “Moscow Rejects U.S. Written Proposals on Missile Defense, Downplays New Iranian Missile Test,” WMD Insights, February 2008.) As RIA Novosti noted, however, “The United States and its allies fear that Iran’s space program is a cover for the development of long-range ballistic missiles to carry nuclear warheads.” [12] The Iranian rocket launch suggests that the U.S. fears might be well founded, a point that is now beginning to be raised in Russia.

Former Chief of Staff of Strategic Rocket Force Viktor Yesin stated that the February 4 launch demonstrated that Iran had mastered technology that will enable it to create weapon-delivery vehicles with 3,500-4,000-km range capable of reaching Europe. [13] Former Director of the 4th Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense, Retired General Vladimir Dvorkin, warned that the image of the Iranian missile program as technologically backward does not withstand scrutiny. The latest Iranian missile, the “Shahab-3,” said Dvorkin, was an indigenous design rather than one borrowed from North Korea. Unlike the North Korean Nodong-1, whose first stage consisted of four Scud-type missiles linked together, Shahab-3’s first stage features one very powerful engine designed by Iranian engineers. Furthermore, remarked Dvorkin, many prefer to forget that the Soviet Union designed 5,000-km range missiles in the 1950s, at the same technological stage that Iran has already achieved, so the task is not beyond Tehran’s reach. [14]

In contrast to these views, some Russian military affairs analysts tried to downplay the significance of the space delivery vehicle launch. Retired General Vladimir Belous, who now works at the Moscow-based Institute of World Economy and International Relations, claimed that the vertical-launch Iranian missile could be used to carry a nuclear warhead because its engines are not powerful enough. Belous stated that Iran is still eight to 10 years away from deploying a long-range weapon-delivery vehicle capable of delivering a nuclear warhead to Europe or the United States. [15] As demonstrated by Yesin’s and Dvorkin’s comments, Belous’s opinions are not widely shared, however.

The February 4 “surprise” was especially unpleasant for Moscow since only a short time earlier, on December 16, 2007, after a delay of many months, Russia had begun the transfer of nuclear fuel for the Bushehr nuclear power station. The third of eight planned shipments took place on January 18, just two weeks before the missile launch. [16] At the time, Russia viewed the fuel delivery as a way to weaken Iran’s claim that it needed to develop a domestic uranium enrichment capability in order to avoid dependence on foreign suppliers. [17] By delivering fuel even as a new UN Security Council resolution on Iran was under discussion, Russia apparently sought to demonstrate that the Bushehr fuel supply was safe from political currents (Russia promised to complete delivery of the fuel approximately six months before the completion of the nuclear power plant, which is now scheduled for the fall of 2008). [18]

Moscows response to the Iranian missile test, however, was but one sign of growing estrangement between Russia and Iran. By coincidence, on the same day as the Iranian space delivery vehicle was launched, foreign ministers of six countries (the United States, Great Britain, Russia, Germany, France, and China) completed negotiations on a new UN Security Council resolution that tightened sanctions against Tehran because of its refusal to halt its uranium enrichment program. In Russia, that step was regarded as a shift closer to the position of the United States and its allies and a sign of serious displeasure with Iran. According to Russian nongovernmental sources, Moscow was seriously disappointed that its delivery of fuel, which was supposed to reduce Iran’s interest in an indigenous uranium enrichment capability for at least some time, failed to achieve the desired result. [19]

Conclusion
For the foreseeable future, Russia is not likely to adopt the stern U.S. position toward Iran, which seeks to maximize Iran’s economic and political isolation. Russia clearly wants to avoid a serious confrontation in the region and is concerned that a tougher position, which might include freezing the Bushehr project, could jeopardize its plans for the export of nuclear power reactors and fuel to Arab countries, now increasingly interested in developing nuclear energy. Cancellation of an ongoing reactor project in Iran could give the impression that Moscow is vulnerable to external (especially American) pressure and cannot be counted on as a reliable supplier of nuclear goods. On the other hand, Russian-Iranian relations appear to be deteriorating, as Bushehr and certain Russian sales of advanced armaments (at a level far below that desired by Tehran) seem to remain the only significant link between the two countries. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Iran in the fall of 2007, which was expected to give a strong boost to bilateral relations, failed to yield the anticipated results. Moreover, the two capitals appear to be showing decreasing restraint in their criticisms of one another. How Moscow will sort out these competing trends as the UN Security Council considers a third sanctions resolution against Iran remains to be seen.

Nikolai Sokov – Monterey Institute James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies