On June 27, 2008, the North Korean government ostentatiously blew up the cooling tower at its Yongbyon nuclear facility before the world’s media. More importantly, on June 26, Pyongyang delivered its long-awaited declaration of its past nuclear programs and activities to the other parties to the Six-Party Talks, leading to the Group’s first formal meeting in nine months. The six participants are now debating how to verify the North Korean declaration as well as how to proceed to the next phase of the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula during which Pyongyang is to abandon its nuclear weapons infrastructure in return for economic and energy assistance.

Background
The Six Party Talks on Korea’s Denuclearization among China, Japan, Russia, North Korea, South Korea, and the United States began in August 2003. For years, these discussions failed to yield meaningful progress. (For more information on the Six-Party process, please see past issues of WMD Insights.) On September 19, 2005, the six parties agreed on a Joint Statement that outlined the basic terms for the “verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner.” In essence, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) agreed to abandon its nuclear weapons program in return for “energy assistance” from the other parties as well as normalized relations with Japan and the United States. [1] The deal fell apart, however, after the parties proved unable to negotiate mutually acceptable terms for its implementation and to resolve a dispute over frozen North Korean funds. It took the shock of October 9, 2006, when North Korea detonated an underground nuclear explosive device, to provide the necessary incentive to move forward.

Under the terms of the accord signed in February 2007, the DPRK consented to disable and eventually dismantle its nuclear weapons complex, beginning with a “60-day phase one” requirement to suspend work at its Yongbyon facility (which actually took four months to complete). In return, the other parties pledged to provide Pyongyang with energy supplies, starting with an initial delivery of 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil. They also pledged additional energy and economic assistance once North Korea suspended and then eliminated its nuclear weapons program. In addition, Japan and the United States committed to “normalize” their relations with the DPRK as part of a comprehensive effort to transform northeast Asia into a more benign security environment. To advance these goals, the parties established five working groups addressing the following issues: (1) North Korea’s denuclearization; (2) economic and energy cooperation; (3) Japan-DPRK relations; (4) U.S.-DPRK relations; and (4) the regional security architecture. [2]

On October 3, 2007, the parties released a “Second-Phase Actions for the Implementation of the September 2005 Joint Statement,” which specified the steps each party would take during the next phase of the denuclearization process. Among other provisions, this agreement stipulated that North Korea would “disable all existing nuclear facilities subject to abandonment” and “agreed to provide a complete and correct declaration of all its nuclear programs” by December 31, 2007. In return, the other parties committed to provide “economic, energy, and humanitarian assistance up to the equivalent of one million tons of heavy fuel oil” for the generation of electricity. The United States also reaffirmed its commitment to remove North Korea from its list of state sponsors of terrorism and rescind economic sanctions imposed on the DPRK under the Trading with the Enemy Act. [3] After the international community has verified the accuracy of North Korea’s declared nuclear programs, the parties plan to transition to the third phase of the denuclearization process, which would entail actually dismantling the facilities.

Current Issues and Concerns
Substantial progress has been made toward North Korea’s denuclearization during the past year, including both the negotiation of the formal agreements described above and concrete steps taken toward their realization. In July 2007, the DPRK shut down its main nuclear reactor at Yongbyon and subsequently disabled the three principal plutonium production facilities at the complex – the 5-megawatt reactor, the reprocessing plant, and the fuel fabrication plant. On June 27, 2008, DPRK detonated the cooling tower at the Yongbyon facility, which was actually of less practical importance than the cessation of plutonium extraction from the reactor’s fuel rods. Nonproliferation experts assess that it would take Pyongyang several years to return its plutonium-based nuclear program to the level it had achieved before these dismantlement measures. [4] This assessment is based in part on the fact that the nuclear explosive device that the DPRK detonated in October 2006 generated a very low yield, leading to speculation that Pyongyang has yet to develop a workable bomb let alone a warhead small and sophisticated enough to be delivered by one of North Korea’s long-range ballistic missiles.

On June 26, 2008, North Korea delivered the promised declaration of its nuclear programs, albeit belatedly, providing a list of its stockpiles of nuclear material as well as the facilities used to produce them to the Chinese government for forwarding to the other parties. The delivery prompted the delegations to the Six-Party Talks to reconvene after a nine-month hiatus to discuss a protocol to substantiate that the DPRK had provided a complete inventory of its nuclear weapons programs and had dismantled any ability to pursue them further.

Verifying North Korea’s Nuclear Declaration
A formal meeting of the negotiating teams occurred in Beijing from July 10-12. The participants reaffirmed their general commitment to verify the DPRK nuclear declaration, and repeated both that North Korea would complete the disablement of its nuclear facilities by the end of October, and that the other parties would complete delivery of their pledged energy and economic aid by then as well. They also resolved to continue developing a set of “Guiding Principles of Peace and Security in Northeast Asia.” [5] On July 23, the foreign ministers of the six parties met informally in Singapore on the margins of the annual session of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum and essentially endorsed the agreements reached in Beijing. Of note, the direct encounter between U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and North Korean Foreign Minister Pak Ui-chun represented the highest-level contact between the two governments in four years – and the first after the DPRK detonated its nuclear device in October 2006. [6]

Both sessions of the Six-Party Talks addressed two major questions. First, how can the parties verify the accuracy of the information provided by the DPRK? Second, what supplementary information must North Korea provide to compensate for gaps in the declaration? They also addressed how to monitor disablement and dismantlement of the DPRK nuclear complex as well as how to compensate North Korea with economic and other assistance.

The six governments agree in principle that the DPRK declaration must be verified, but they have yet to specify how intrusive inspections will be. At the Beijing talks, the U.S. delegation reportedly presented a four-page draft specifying the means and methods for verifying the DPRK nuclear declaration and other documents. The measures reportedly included regular on-site inspections of North Korean nuclear facilities, a mechanism for short-notice (24-hour) inspections at any suspected site, permission to extract soil samples near North Korean nuclear sites, and interviews with key DPRK nuclear personnel. [7] The North Korean government has yet to consent to such extensive verification measures. The U.S. proposal also reportedly advocates reestablishing the presence of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in North Korea. DPRK officials, however, reportedly oppose allowing the IAEA to play a major verification and monitoring role due to previous confrontations. [8]

During their July meetings, the parties agreed on the basic verification principles but deferred the issue of specifying the precise methods and means of doing so, including the draft American proposal, to subsequent negotiations at the working group level. The North Koreans have yet to agree on a date for beginning these working group talks. [9]

The June 2008 declaration left unresolved three specific areas of concern regarding the DPRK’s past nuclear operations. These gaps include: the number of atomic bombs it manufactured from the plutonium produced by the now-disabled Yongbong facility; continued suspicions that the DPRK operates an underground uranium enrichment program; and allegations that the North Koreans have collaborated with other countries, particularly Syria, in pursuit of nuclear weapons.

According to various sources, the June 2008 declaration, which has not been made public, affirms that the DPRK has produced slightly less than 40 kilograms of plutonium. Although the statement did not specify how many nuclear weapons North Korea actually assembled, this quantity of plutonium could have provided sufficient fissile material to manufacture approximately seven nuclear weapons. [10] U.S. National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley told the media that the North Korean document also states that Pyongyang is neither currently enriching uranium nor supporting the proliferation of nuclear weapons elsewhere. Hadley pointed out that this wording does not address whether the DPRK was involved in uranium enrichment or nuclear cooperation with other countries in the past, as Washington suspects. [11] It is unclear, however, whether the parties will insist that North Korea confirm its past uranium enrichment and international nuclear collaboration efforts or whether it will only need to pledge not to undertake such activities in the future.

For their part, the North Koreans have protested that the other parties are lagging in fulfilling their pledges of energy and economic assistance. On July 4, the North Korean Foreign Ministry issued a statement claiming that, while the DPRK had dismantled over 80 percent of its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon, the other five countries had provided only 40 percent of their pledged aid. [12] The Foreign Ministry subsequently stated that, “The DPRK is ready to cooperate in verifying the nuclear declaration, but the basic principle of ‘action for action’ should be observed.” [13] The North Korean delegation to the Singapore talks demanded an acceleration of aid deliveries to Pyongyang. [14] North Korean officials also complained that Washington and Tokyo continue to adopt a hostile attitude, most notably by continuing to impose economic and other sanctions.

Sustaining Chinese-Russian Support
China and Russia have both opposed North Korea’s acquisition of nuclear weapons while simultaneously resisting international initiatives that they believe could create chaos on the Korean peninsula. Both Beijing and Moscow desire a change in Pyongyang’s behavior, but not a change in its regime. They remain more concerned about the potential immediate collapse of the North Korean state than about its government’s intransigence on the nuclear question. As a result, Russia and China have been pressing Washington and Pyongyang to settle their differences through negotiations. Despite their differences with North Korea, Chinese and Russian leaders fear that North Korea’s disintegration could produce widespread economic disruptions in East Asia, generate large refugee flows across their borders, weaken Chinese and Russian influence by ending their unique status as interlocutors with Pyongyang, and potentially remove a buffer separating their borders from U.S. ground forces (should the U.S. Army ever deploy into northern Korea). At worst, the DPRK’s collapse could precipitate a military conflict that spills across into Chinese territory. Policy makers in both countries appear to have resigned themselves to dealing with Kim Jong-il for now, while hoping a more accommodating leadership will eventually emerge. [15]

Longer-Term Objectives and Obstacles
Implementing Phase Three of Korea’s Denuclearization
The stated purpose of the final phase of the Six-Party Talks is to dismantle North Korea’s verified nuclear weapons holdings and ensure that Pyongyang does not resume nuclear proliferation in the future. The kinds of guarantees the international community might seek in this regard, and the guarantees that the DPRK might offer, remain unclear. One possibility is that the parties might simply extend whatever verification and monitoring mechanisms they use to confirm North Korea’s June 2008 declaration. This does not allow, however, for addressing new suspicions about nuclear activities that may arise subsequently in other locations (e.g., possible nuclear research or nuclear technology transfers).

Another question is what demands North Korea will make in exchange for abandoning its nuclear programs. At the Singapore meeting, DPRK spokesperson Ri Tong-il said his government wants to achieve an official end to the 1950-53 Korean War, with a formal peace treaty replacing the current armistice. [16] Indications also suggest that the North Koreans might want the light-water nuclear reactors offered Pyongyang under the now abandoned 1994 Agreed Framework and mentioned in the ill-fated September 2005 Joint Statement. [17] It might also demand more economic assistance or require that verification and monitoring measures extend to encompass South Korea and U.S. military forces based there. They may also insist that the other parties rescind any remaining economic and political sanctions. [18] “What is important in the next stage is that these measures should lead to a complete abandonment of hostile policies toward our republic,” Ri told journalists at Singapore. [19]

Many of these issues are likely to confront the next U.S. administration. DPRK policy makers could decide to delay surrendering their nuclear weapons and possibly other nuclear assets until they can better assess future U.S. policies towards the peninsula. In addition, the members of the next U.S. administration will face the dilemma of wanting to consummate North Korea’s denuclearization without proving so generous as to encourage other countries to seek WMD as a means to pry concessions from Washington.

Normalizing Intra-Korean Relations
The advent of a new administration in the Republic of Korea (ROK) in December 2007, led by conservative president Lee Myung-bak, has complicated the negotiations. The previous South Korean government of President Roh Moo-hyun had been very concerned about improving ties with the DPRK as well as affirming independence from Washington. Roh argued that North Korea developed nuclear weapons in response to U.S. threats and to induce Washington to engage in a dialogue. His own administration feared that rash U.S. actions would precipitate a war on the peninsula, which would prove disastrous for South Korea no matter what its outcome. Members of the Roh administration wanted to promote the DPRK’s economic reform while integrating the country into East Asian economic processes, hoping that such developments could help stabilize North Korea in the short-term and provide incentives and leverage for moderating its foreign policy over the long run. The Roh approach implicitly assumed that the North Korean government would not collapse soon and that the DPRK is prepared to alter policies that most threaten South Korea.

The new ROK government has been more modest in its stated ambitions regarding North Korea’s evolution. President Lee has refused to commit to implement the costly agreements negotiated by the ROK and the DPRK under his predecessors. These accords, which envisage South Korea funding multibillion-dollar infrastructure projects in the North, are seen as overly generous by some members of Lee’s party given only limited changes in DPRK foreign and domestic policies. [20] Representatives of the new South Korean government have also been much more guarded in their assessment of recent progress with respect to denuclearization. For example, the new ROK government responded to the North’s destruction of the cooling tower by terming it “only the first step towards the complete denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.” Presidential spokesperson Lee Dong Kwan then went on to observe that, “North Korea still has a lot of additional steps to take.” [21] President Lee subsequently termed the North Korean declaration of June 2008 insufficient because it does not disclose the full extent of the North’s weapons program. [22] The South Korean envoy to the Six-Party Talks, Kim Sook, cautioned against undue optimism since “implementing the verification guideline is a very difficult job where we need to coordinate the different position and interests of the six parties.” [23] For its part, the North Korean government has condemned Lee’s standoffish approach and refrained from engaging directly with his administration. [24]

Normalizing DPRK-U.S. Relations
North Korea’s June 26 declaration prompted President Bush to exempt the country from the provisions of the Trading with the Enemy Act (leaving only Cuba subject to them). The President also notified Congress of his intention to rescind North Korea’s designation as a state sponsor of terror in 45 days, on August 11. [25] DPRK negotiators have long demanded removal from that list. The designation requires the United States to veto proposed International Monetary Fund and World Bank aid to the DPRK, prohibits U.S. arms sales to North Korea, and constrains other economic ties.

National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley stressed that the U.S. government could reimpose these sanctions and apply new ones should North Korea fail to carry out its remaining denuclearization commitments or behave disruptively in other ways. [26] “This can be a moment of opportunity for North Korea,” President Bush explained. “If North Korea continues to make the right choices, it can repair its relationship with the international community, much as Libya has done over the past few years. If North Korea makes the wrong choices, the United States and our partners in the six-party talks will respond accordingly.” [27]

In any case, many other U.S. sanctions on North Korea remain in effect. Some U.S. officials and analysts have argued the DPRK should meet additional requirements before lifting these remaining restrictions. The two most often raised with respect to WMD are to insist that North Korea abandon its ballistic missile research programs – including development of long-range ballistic missiles that can reach the United States – and to provide guarantees that North Korea will not transfer nuclear or missile technologies to other countries or terrorist groups. The DPRK adhered to a unilateral moratorium on missile testing late in the Clinton administration, but U.S. intelligence has indications that North Koreans have provided nuclear assistance to Syria, at least until recently. [28]

Normalizing DPRK-Japan Relations
Relations between Japan and the DPRK have seen much less improvement than those between Pyongyang and Washington. Concerns about North Korea’s expanding ballistic missile and nuclear weapons capacities prevail throughout the country. At the elite level, Japanese leaders have made promoting democracy a fundamental theme of Japanese diplomacy that underscores the clash of values separating Tokyo and Pyongyang. [29] After the DPRK’s July 2006 ballistic missile tests and its October 2006 detonation of a nuclear device, the Japanese government progressively expanded its sanctions. The Japanese Foreign Ministry characterizes its approach toward the DPRK as “dialogue and pressure.” [30]

Further, Japanese officials and the Japanese public remain outraged by the DPRK’s past abductions of Japa­nese citizens and other illegal activities in Japan. During his September 2002 summit with then Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, Kim Jong-il admitted that Pyongyang had kidnapped over a dozen Japanese citizens between 1977 and 1983 to serve as language instructors for DPRK intelligence agents. The acknowledgement backfired after an outraged Japanese government and public opinion demanded more information than the secretive North Korean leadership proved willing to provide. Many Japanese remain unconvinced that most of the abductees died in North Korea, while DPRK representatives have resumed demanding compensation for Japan’s colonial occupation and the removal of Tokyo’s sanctions on DPRK commercial activities. [31]

The modest improvement in DPRK-American ties has left Japan as the least supportive member of the Six-Party Talks. Japanese government representatives have characterized the current negotiations as unsatisfactory because they have yet to meet Japan’s twin objectives of eliminating North Korea’s nuclear program and clarifying the status of the abducted Japanese citizens. Despite criticism at home and abroad, the Japanese government adamantly refuses to normalize relations with the DPRK or provide substantial financial assistance in the absence of meaningful progress on these questions. [32] A March 2007 working group meeting between Japanese and DPRK representatives quickly broke up when neither country yielded on the abductee issue and other differences. Japanese officials also unsuccessfully lobbied Washington not to remove the DPRK from its list of state sponsors of terrorism until the DPRK clarified the status of the abducted Japanese. [33]

At the Beijing talks, the DPRK delegation said North Korea would reinvestigate the abduction issue. In return, the Japanese representatives said they would rescind some travel sanctions. [34] Even so, Tokyo has yet to commit to provide energy and other economic assistance to the DPRK as part of its contribution to implementing the denuclearization deal, although the other parties appear prepared to make up any shortfalls. [35] Furthermore, although Japanese Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura welcomed the DPRK’s June 2008 nuclear declaration, he stressed that it needed to be verified and “would have been better if the declaration had included nuclear weapons.” [36]

Reducing Proliferation Threats in Northeast Asia
Despite Tokyo’s insistence on resolution of the abductee issue, the denuclearization process has remained largely separate from the other key issues that have complicated North Korea’s integration into the international community. These include its programs for developing and exporting ballistic missiles, the threats its conventional forces might pose to South Korea, and continued concerns about the regime’s violations of human rights and civil liberties. Addressing these regional security concerns remains important since they sustain many of the incentives for WMD proliferation in northeast Asia. Former Bush administration officials have claimed that its strategy had always been to use the North Korean nuclear issue as an opportunity to promote wider regional cooperation and resolve problems persisting since the Korean War. [37]

A day after the informal Six-Party talks in Singapore concluded, North Korean Foreign Minister Pak Ui-chun unexpectedly signed ASEAN’s non-aggression pact. This Treaty of Amity and Cooperation calls on signatories to renounce the use of force and settle conflicts peacefully. Although largely symbolic, the gesture further confirms the DPRK government’s desire to reduce its regional isolation. [38]

Conclusion
The long-term prospects for the DPRK’s denuclearization under the Six-Party Talks remain uncertain. Currently, the parties have agreed on an ambiguous, complex, multi-phase settlement, but that agreement could unravel at many points and in many ways. The parties have decided to postpone some intractable issues, such as whether to provide the DPRK with civilian light-water reactors and what North Korea must do with its stockpile of nuclear weapons, the number of which is even in doubt. Critics doubt whether the DPRK government will fulfill its commitments or complain that a better deal was achievable years earlier, before North Korea resumed plutonium reprocessing and tested its bomb. [39] Additionally, there are political uncertainties due to the upcoming U.S. presidential elections and the opaque power balances and decision-making processes within North Korea. Nevertheless, the accord appears to have ended the immediate crisis over the DPRK nuclear program and established a foundation for possibly expanding cooperation among the signatories.

Richard Weitz – Hudson Institute