In early July, the Group of Eight (G-8) leading industrial states reaffirmed their high-level support for the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) at their summit in Japan. [1] This endorsement followed the fourth plenary meeting of Initiative members in Madrid from June 16-18, 2008. Of the 73 partner nations that had joined the Initiative by affirming support for its Statement of Principles, 56 sent senior officials and other government representatives to the session, a record number of official participants. [2] One of the newest national attendees was India, which had previously remained aloof from the forum.

The meeting addressed three main issues: (1) strengthening nuclear detection and forensics; (2) denying terrorists financing and safe havens; and (3) deterring terrorists from acquiring or using nuclear devices and materials. Although no new initiatives were announced, session participants affirmed support for expanding the number of partner nations (especially among African and Arab nations), local governments, private sector entities, and expert communities engaged in its activities – steps designed to make the Initiative truly global in scope. [3]

Of more than symbolic importance, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and U.S. President George Bush, whose governments remained strained over other issues, marked the occasion by issuing a joint message of support for the GICNT, which was launched by the two governments just prior to the 2006 G-8 summit. [4] Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Kislyak and acting U.S. Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security John Rood also met one-on-one during the conference. [5] On June 17, both governments issued a joint statement praising the meeting for serving as “an important reminder to one another of the commitments we have to each of our citizens to see clearly the concrete steps we can take together to prevent nuclear terrorism.” [6]

Although the GICNT originated as a bilateral Russian-American effort that received the endorsement of the other G-8 members, the Initiative has subsequently gained much broader international support. The GICNT has become an important element of the global nuclear nonproliferation architecture by securing more than 70 member countries in only two years. Participants have adopted a core set of principles designed to prevent, manage, and respond to attacks involving nuclear or radiological materials, and the GICNT community has engaged in a diverse and growing number of activities to put these principles into practice.

Despite its initial success, however, the GICNT faces a number of ongoing challenges. For example, members have yet to harmonize their long-term research and development programs aimed at developing new capabilities for countering nuclear terrorism. In addition, the Initiative’s explosive growth could make it more difficult to achieve collective agreement on the sources, magnitude, and appropriate responses to nuclear terrorist threats. Furthermore, the hierarchical principles underpinning the GICNT could impede efforts to promote universal membership and adherence to its principles.

History
On July 15, 2006, U.S. President George Bush and then Russian President Vladimir Putin launched the GICNT at a joint press conference on the sidelines of the G-8 summit in St. Petersburg. The initial July 2006 Bush-Putin joint statement called on national governments both to strengthen their enforcement of existing nonproliferation agreements and to adopt additional measures to combat nuclear terrorism. In particular, the declaration urged countries to “ensure that law enforcement takes all possible measures to deny safe haven to terrorists seeking to acquire or use nuclear materials” and to “strengthen our respective national legal frameworks to ensure the effective prosecution of, and the certainty of punishment for, terrorists and those who facilitate such acts.” [7]

In October 2006, Russia, the United States, and eleven other countries convened their first GICNT plenary meeting in Rabat, Morocco. U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Robert Joseph and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Kislyak co-chaired the session. The senior policy makers attending the meeting adopted a Statement of Principles and Terms of Reference to govern the GICNT. [8]

At Rabat, the participating governments also established an Implementation and Assessment Group (IAG), co-chaired by Russia and the United States, to coordinate the GICNT’s activities. The initial IAG members included Australia, Canada, China, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Turkey, and the United Kingdom, as well as Russia and the United States. The IAG’s members provide assistance to other governments seeking to implement the GICNT Statement of Principles and have organized activities designed to advance these principles. The IAG also helps to develop the work plan and measures of effectiveness for GICNT-sponsored activities.

From February 12-13, 2007, the 13 participating nations held their second plenary in Ankara with senior policy makers attending from all G-8 member states, as well as representatives of Australia, China, Kazakhstan, Morocco, and host-nation Turkey. Observers from the IAEA also participated. The participants reviewed the specific activities planned for 2007-2008 as part of a newly developed GICNT Plan of Work. The officials stressed the importance of sharing best practices developed through these activities among existing GICNT members as well as expanding the number of states participating in the Initiative and its projects. [9]

The government of Kazakhstan hosted representatives from 38 countries (out of the then 51 governments supporting GICNT) in Astana in June 2007. The European Union and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) sent observers to the meeting. [10] At the session, co-chaired by Kislyak and Under Secretary of State John Rood, participants reviewed recent progress, addressed implementation problems, and discussed how to integrate new partners further into GICNT projects. They agreed to sponsor almost 20 activities during the following two years as part of their revised work plan. [11] These activities were to include projects designed to safeguard nuclear material from terrorists; strengthen the capabilities of participating states to detect, search, and prevent trafficking in nuclear materials; enhance information sharing and law enforcement cooperation; establish appropriate legal and regulatory frameworks; minimize the use of highly enriched uranium and plutonium (which can be used to make nuclear weapons) in civilian facilities and activities; deny safe haven and financial resources to terrorists; and strengthen the capabilities of participants to respond to a terrorist attack involving nuclear materials. [12]

Concurrent with the session in Kazakhstan, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) hosted a conference on International Nuclear Terrorism Law Enforcement in Miami. This meeting was specifically aimed at improving participants’ response, mitigation, and investigation capabilities. The briefings, workshops, and demonstrations held in Miami addressed such issues as nuclear smuggling, legal frameworks for preventing nuclear terrorism, and sharing best practices and technologies. The more than 500 participating diplomats, technical experts, and homeland security and law enforcement personnel included representatives from almost 30 countries, both existing GICNT member states and potential partner nations. The FBI Director and the Deputy Director of the Russian Federal Security Service attended. A video link between Miami and Astana allowed participants in each GICNT event to engage with one another. [13]

Objectives
The GICNT Statement of Principles lists eight core objectives:

• Develop and improve accounting, control, and physical protection of nuclear and other radioactive materials;
• Enhance security for civilian nuclear facilities;
• Improve the ability to detect nuclear and other radioactive materials;
• Bolster capabilities to search, confiscate, and control unlawfully held nuclear materials;
• Deny safe haven and financial resources to potential nuclear terrorists;
• Strengthen national legal and regulatory frameworks against nuclear terrorism;
• Improve capabilities to investigate, analyze, and respond to an incident involving nuclear and other radioactive materials;
• Augment information sharing among participants while protecting confidential data and sources. [14]

One core goal of the GICNT is to address gaps in existing global nonproliferation programs while eliminating undesired redundancies between others. The Terms of Reference for the GICNT adopted at the October 2006 Rabat summit direct participants to “take care to avoid unnecessary duplication with other international programs in the performance of specific activities.” At the Rabat summit, then Under Secretary Joseph added that eliminating gaps was as important as reducing redundancies: “The Global Initiative will build on the existing nuclear nonproliferation regimes, as well as counterproliferation efforts such as the Proliferation Security Initiative, and it will seek to identify holes in our respective national capabilities, legal and regulatory authorities, and partnership capacity to combat nuclear terrorism.” [15]

The GICNT differs in several respects from other efforts existing at the time of its launch. [16] For example, unlike previous cooperative threat reduction programs involving Russia and other former Soviet republics, the GICNT focuses on safeguarding civilian rather than military nuclear facilities. [17] (Even so, some of its programs – such as those designed to improve nuclear detection and attribution capabilities – may indirectly contribute to the security of the latter.)

In contrast to some programs – such as the Proliferation Security Initiative, which addresses primarily state-based proliferation – or those that are concerned with the full spectrum of WMD threats – such as UN Resolution 1540, which concentrates mostly on averting catastrophic terrorism – the GICNT focuses on the “threat of terrorists carrying out attacks involving nuclear facilities, nuclear material, or radioactive substances.” [18] In addition, the GICNT concentrates on security and safety of nuclear items within countries as well as on developing improved national capabilities for post-incident emergency response, consequence management, attribution, and criminal prosecution. “This layered defense-in-depth requires that partner nations not only improve their interdiction cooperation, but that they also enhance the security of nuclear material, develop capabilities to detect its movement, and improve national emergency response, consequence management, criminal justice, and consequence management capabilities.” [19] In this regard, the Global Initiative more closely resembles the U.S. Department of Energy’s “first line of defense” programs that seek to secure sensitive nuclear materials at their source than those of its “second line of defense” programs whose aim is to identify and modify nuclear items traversing national frontiers.

Another distinct feature of the GICNT is the diverse range of public and private actors involved. The GICNT purposely aims to improve interagency collaboration against nuclear terrorist threats, whose causes and effects typically transcend narrow bureaucratic boundaries. [20] The U.S. and counterpart government agencies involved include those responsible for diplomacy, homeland security, defense, intelligence, energy, science and technology, law enforcement, and finance (i.e., to curtail terrorists’ funding).

Moreover, more than most nonproliferation initiatives, the GICNT has sought to engage local government agencies in its activities. This focus reflects the fear that “homegrown” as well as “transnational” terrorists might exploit even small amounts of poorly secured nuclear or radiological materials. Andrew Grant, Acting Director of the FBI’s Office of Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism, told the attendees at the Miami conference that, “There are simply too many opportunities for terrorists to use industrial, medical, or other commonly-found materials to enhance their conventional capabilities.” [21] Within the United States and other countries, state, local, provincial, and other sub-national governments often are primarily responsible for ensuring the safety and security of facilities containing these materials. In addition, local law enforcement agencies could also first detect terrorist activities in that community.

Important private sector actors involved in GICNT activities include a variety of businesses and nongovernmental organizations whose functions concern nuclear energy, nonproliferation, counterterrorism, public safety, and other spheres related to nuclear terrorism. Prominent private actors that have provided statements of support – and perhaps, less publicly, additional assistance – for the Global Initiative include: Hutchison Port Holdings, the world’s largest port investor; the French company Areva, handler of nuclear material transport and control; the multinational corporation General Electric; Cardinal Health, producer and consumer of radiological materials as well as a distributor of pharmaceuticals to help counter the effects of nuclear exposure; and the University of Missouri’s Research Reactor Center, which is experienced in nuclear safety and conversion issues. [22] At the Madrid meeting, representatives of private sector entities as well as representatives from state and local governments and the IAEA reviewed the extent of cooperation with national governments while the U.S. and Russian co-chairs encouraged private sector entities to make public statements in support of the GICNT. [23]

Perhaps because such a large part of the U.S. nuclear infrastructure is owned or managed by the private sector, U.S. officials place particular stress on the value of developing public-private partnerships between government agencies and the businesses, laboratories, and academic research institutes engaged in this area. [24] During an interview prior to the Madrid meeting, Under Secretary Rood cited several U.S. examples to support the view that the private sector “can make a real and meaningful contribution” in prevention, interdiction and mitigation. Rood noted, for example, that airport and port employees have developed considerable experience in screening cargo entering the United States. He also said that emergency personnel employed by private as well as state and local governments would likely play a major role in responding to any nuclear terrorist incident within the United States. Rood further maintained that nuclear industry experts could provide valuable insights on how to detect nuclear materials. [25]

The architects of the GICNT describe the effort as sharing the same general objectives of many other recent nuclear nonproliferation initiatives: addressing the novel challenges to international security that result from the unprecedented geopolitical and technological developments of recent years. Over the past two decades, GICNT supporters note, violent non-state actors such as terrorists, sometimes supported by state sponsors, have been able to exploit illicit trafficking networks to acquire dangerous nuclear technologies and materials. The process of globalization also means that non-state actors can search the globe for potential safe havens in countries with inadequate legal frameworks or other counterterrorist capabilities. The international nuclear nonproliferation regime, centered on the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), was not designed to counter such non-state threats. The GICNT and related initiatives aim to supplement the NPT by constructing a “layered defense-in-depth that can continuously adapt to the changing nature of the threat” presented by nuclear terrorists. [26]

Members
The GICNT is deliberately designed to encourage wide participation. In their joint statement to the June 2008 Madrid plenary meeting, Presidents Medvedev and Bush affirmed “our goal of making this a truly global effort.” [27] In principle, membership in the GICNT is open to any country or organization committed to combating the proliferation of nuclear materials and reducing the risks of nuclear terrorism. To join, a national government need only submit a written endorsement of the GICNT Statement of Principles to the IAG co-chairs. Its flexible requirements allow participants to support specific projects on a case-by-case basis based on the principle of “voluntary participation in the Initiative as a whole and in its separate components.” [28]

The GICNT has experienced an astonishing growth during its first two years. Although the GICNT originated from a bilateral Russian-American initiative, it rapidly secured the support of the other G-8 members (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom), who then sought to extend its membership even further. When the British government acceded to the GICNT, it “call[ed] upon all countries to participate in the GICNT.” [29]

Due to G-8 support, and especially to U.S. and Russian efforts to secure new members, over 50 governments joined the Initiative during its first year. As of June 28, 2008, 73 countries had become “partner nations.” These include all five countries recognized as nuclear weapons states under the NPT (Britain, China, France, Russia, and the United States), other states that have declared possession or are suspected of possessing nuclear weapons (India, Israel, and Pakistan), all EU members, and most countries possessing advanced civil nuclear energy.

The IAEA and subsequently the European Union (as a single institution) have become formal observers. [30] On the occasion of the fourth plenary meeting in Madrid, the EU issued a formal statement reaffirming its support for the GICNT. The declaration reviewed recent EU efforts to counter WMD proliferation and terrorism, and it affirmed that, since the Global Initiative “corresponds with the objectives set out in its own Strategy against the proliferation of WMD…The European Union and its Member States therefore fully endorse and subscribe to the Statement of Principle and the Terms of Reference.” The statement called on “all states concerned by the threat of nuclear terrorism to implement on a voluntary basis the GICNT principles.” [31]

The decision of the Chinese government to join the GICNT and assume a position on the IAG is noteworthy given that Beijing has declined to participate in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). In December 2007, moreover, Beijing hosted a Radiological Emergency Response Workshop attended by 55 representatives from 15 GICNT partner countries. Participants received briefings from China’s Atomic Energy Authority and the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration on using nuclear detection equipment and other opportunities to enhance their capacities to detect potential nuclear terrorist threats. [32]

One possible reason for China’s extensive engagement with the GICNT was that the effort was a joint Russian-American initiative that rapidly gained G-8 support. In contrast, the PSI is more clearly a U.S. initiative that continues to reflect Washington’s security priorities. At the June 2008 Madrid conference, the head of the Chinese delegation, Bentong Song Li, praised the GICNT for relying on recognized international laws, underscoring the concern of China and others that the PSI seeks to employ extralegal authorities to interdict WMD shipments on the high seas or in other legally contested regions. [33] Moreover, the PSI focuses on impeding the transfer of dangerous weapons and materials to rogue states such as Iran and North Korea – countries that enjoy historically strong relations with China. In contrast, the GICNT aims primarily to deny terrorists access to nuclear materials – an objective that Beijing fully endorses.

Whatever the reason for Beijing’s support, maintaining China’s involvement with the GICNT is especially important because Beijing does not participate in the Russian-American strategic arms control process or the threat reduction programs involving Russia and the other former Soviet republics. The GICNT provides one of the few institutional mechanisms by which the international community can engage with the Chinese government on issues related to nuclear terrorism and the security of China’s nuclear materials.

Finally, many governments appear to have joined the GICNT less to shape its evolution than to bolster their nonproliferation credentials by affirming their opposition to nuclear terrorism. In welcoming the June 2007 GICNT meeting in Astana, for example, Kazakh Foreign Minister Marat Tazhin reaffirmed his country’s “determination to actively combat terrorism in all its forms and manifestations…The adoption of effective measures to counter and prevent terrorism is a priority of Kazakhstan’s internal and external policies.” [34] The Sri Lankan government also cited its commitment to opposing terrorism in all its forms when it entered the GICNT in May 2007. [35]

Similarly, when the government of Pakistan joined the GICNT, Islamabad characterized its decision as “recognition of the important role being played by Pakistan as a partner in the global efforts against nuclear proliferation and possible nuclear terrorism.” The declaration also affirmed “that nuclear security and export control measures in Pakistan are at par with the latest international standards.” These statements presumably intend to counter recurring international criticisms of Pakistan for refusing to join the NPT, developing nuclear weapons, and having lax nuclear security policies. (Pakistan’s leading nuclear expert, Abdul Qadeer Khan, ran the most notorious illicit nuclear trafficking operation. Preventing the advent of another such network was one of the main reasons for the GICNT’s establishment and rapid growth.) Even so, Pakistan’s accession declaration underscored the low costs involved in GICNT membership by noting that its provisions apply solely to a country’s civilian nuclear facilities, while any military facilities fall outside the Initiative’s jurisdiction. [36]

Activities
The GICNT entails a range of specific activities that aim to protect nuclear material, detect illicit nuclear trafficking, interdict and recover diverted nuclear items, and respond to nuclear terrorist incidents through measures focused on emergency response, consequence management, and identifying and bringing to justice those responsible for actual or attempted nuclear terrorism. Participants collaborate closely with private sector civilian nuclear power producers as well as with the IAEA and other multilateral institutions involved in enhancing the safety and security of nuclear materials. Many GICNT activities also stress the importance of capacity building through exchange of technologies and best practices to enhance members’ capabilities to deter, detect, prevent, and respond to nuclear terrorist threats.

The GICNT began a formal exercise program earlier this year. On April 15, the first meeting of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism Exercise Planning Group occurred in Paris. [37] The following month, Spain hosted the first official table-top exercise program under GICNT auspices. [38] In early June 2008, the Kazakh military conducted a large-scale GICNT field exercise that simulated a mock terrorist seizure of a nuclear research facility near Almaty. According to Adil Shayakhmetov, head of the Kazakh security services’ anti-terrorism unit, the scenario allowed the almost 1,000 military and emergency personnel involved to improve their joint communication and operations skills. [39] The participants at the Madrid meeting called for strengthening the exercise program, which aims to improve multinational interoperability among participants as well as develop and test new operational concepts and capabilities. [40] The Spanish government will host the next major GICNT field exercise this fall. [41]

Future Opportunities and Challenges
Perhaps the GICNT’s clearest contribution has been to sustain international attention to the threat of nuclear terrorism by non-state actors even while problems associated with states of proliferation concern – notably Iran and North Korea – continue to dominate the media and the nonproliferation agenda of most governments. Even so, the Initiative faces several modest challenges as it moves forward.

The parties to the GICNT have yet to harmonize their longer-term research and development priorities in the area of nuclear terrorism. Improved nuclear detection capabilities, for example, would be of interest to many individual participants and to the international community as a whole. Developing an enhanced portfolio of tools to counter nuclear terrorism has become especially important given that the rising price of fossil fuels and concerns about climate change have contributed to the resurgence of interest in civilian nuclear energy around the world.

Many of the specific projects under the GICNT’s auspices might have occurred even without the Initiative. In this respect, the GICNT is replicating the phenomenon seen with the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction, the June 2008 Paris Donor conference on Afghanistan, and other large multinational enterprises in which national governments pursue primarily unilaterally determined programs under the gloss of a multilateral framework. [42]

The GICNT governments will also have to address some membership issues. The exponential growth in the GICNT’s membership could make it more difficult for the initiative to achieve collective agreement on the sources, magnitude, and appropriate responses to nuclear terrorist threats. As a result, the GICNT may devolve into a kaleidoscope of small “coalitions of the willing” whose members most closely share these assessments. Already, GICNT-related exercises, meetings, and other activities generally engage only a small number of the total membership, often on a regional basis.

The varied pattern of GICNT engagement could yield benefits by underscoring the voluntary nature of the GICNT. Organizing activities by region has also facilitated the expansion and application of other WMD nonproliferation institutions, notably the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention. At the same time, wide variations of engagement in the GICNT could encourage institutional buck-passing and de facto if not de jure EU-style “opt-outs.” Moreover, as with the Proliferation Security Initiative, UN Security Council Resolution 1540, and other nuclear nonproliferation measures, the essentially cost-free nature of membership in the GICNT allows governments to affirm their nonproliferation bona fides at little cost. In addition, the growing diversity of members could complicate the GICNT’s explicit goal of helping participating countries meet their distinct security needs.

A final challenge relates to GICNT’s respect for the same hierarchical principles that have decreased some governments’ support for the NPT. States not possessing nuclear weapons have criticized what they perceive as the treaty’s special treatment of nations possessing nuclear weapons at the time of its adoption. Despite its expanding membership, the GICNT, especially its IAG leadership team, remains dominated by the same “nuclear have” countries that enjoy predominant influence in the NPT, the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group, and other multinational nonproliferation institutions. The IAG Terms of Reference adopted at the Rabat meeting state that its “composition will be further adjusted with a view to making it more representative in order to facilitate the comprehensive implementation of the Initiative.” [43] The GICNT would probably find it easier to secure the cooperation of developing countries, where potential nuclear terrorists have been active in the past, if it invited some of them into its leadership group.

As with several other recent nonproliferation measures, there is much to be positive about regarding GICNT. But one has to wonder whether the strong concepts on which it and the others are founded could yield still more. Given the short period the GICNT has been underway, it is too early to make any conclusions regarding its effectiveness. One could raise, for example, a concern similar to one that has been expressed regarding PSI, that is, that it is a popular and easy step for a state to support because it does not really require any specific action or expenditure of resources. The mixed results of other measures leave one unsure that its full potential will be realized. Perhaps over time, it will prove otherwise.

Richard Weitz – Hudson Institute