On September 3, 2008, French President Nicolas Sarkozy arrived in Damascus, Syria, making him the first Western leader to visit the Arab republic since the assassination of Lebanon’s former Prime Minister Rafik Harari three years ago. [1] Sarkozy joined Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the emir of Qatar, Hamad bin Khalifa, for a summit meeting with Syria’s ruler, Bashar Assad. [2] Citing Damascus’s influential role in the Middle East, Sarkozy, whose country currently holds the European Union (EU) Presidency, emphasized the need for dialogue, stating, “…One must have the courage to talk to everyone.” [3] For Syria, President Sarkozy’s visit represented a step out of its diplomatic isolation resulting from its alliance with Iran, its support for Hamas and other extremist Palestinian organizations, allegations that the Syrian government was involved in the 2005 assassination of Hariri, and claims that it had not fully disclosed details about its nuclear program. [4]
President Sarkozy’s visit to Damascus came on the heels of the July creation of the Union for the Mediterranean, a new European Union initiative that brings together the leaders of 43 countries around the Mediterranean, including the 27 members of the EU as well as states in North Africa, the Balkans, and the Middle East. [5] The Union for the Mediterranean project is the latest example of EU involvement in the Middle East, building on groundwork laid more than a decade ago by the November 1995 launch of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, known as the Barcelona Process. [6]
At the Union’s inaugural summit, held on July 13, 2008 at the Grand Palais in Paris, Syrian President Assad held indirect talks with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert through Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan. Although the two countries, which technically have been at war since 1948, have been holding indirect talks since May in the hopes of reaching an accord, the Turkish-mediated talks at the summit marked the first high-level negotiations between the two governments. [7] Assad also met with Lebanon’s new president Michel Suleiman to discuss the possibility of establishing diplomatic relations. [8] While Sarkozy praised this step, claiming that “President Bashar al-Assad’s will to open diplomatic representation in Lebanon is historic progress,” Assad cautioned that both countries must “define the steps to take to arrive at this stage” before diplomatic relations could be fully established. [9] In August, however, Assad and Suleiman agreed to establish full diplomatic relations [10] and to reactivate a joint committee to demarcate borders and control trafficking between the two countries. [11]
“Basking in International Limelight” [12]
The recent developments in Syria’s relations with its neighbors, as well as with Europe, indicate that President Assad has taken a major step forward in rehabilitating his country’s reputation, a move that may result in major benefits for Syria. Sarkozy emphasized Syria’s importance to the region, stating that, “It is important that Syria takes on a full role in the affairs of the region” and that “Syria plays an essential role.” He called the revived dialogue between France and Syria “clear-sighted, frank and loyal.” [13] France’s Foreign Minister, Bernard Kouchner, praised the progress made in the Israeli-Syrian talks as well as in the Syrian-Lebanese negotiations, saying, “Being around the same table with people you have fought is the beginning of something, it is a wind of hope.” [14] Another French official observed,
There has long been a view within French diplomatic circles that Bashar al-Assad really wants to end Syria’s habit of troublemaking and re-enter the community of nations, but until recently had been undermined by the older elements of the regime left over from his father’s days. He’s not perfect…[but] there are enough signs of change and a willingness to work together that we can’t let that kind of opportunity pass by. [15]
Analysts and commentators reiterate that,
while Assad is constrained by his father’s administration’s struggles with Israel and other neighbors, he has pursued efforts to restore Syria’s international reputation, as evidenced by his trade agreements and opening of borders with Turkey and his new alliance with Qatar. [16]
Since the Union of the Mediterranean summit, other European leaders have followed Sarkozy and Kouchner’s lead: at the summit, German Chancellor Angela Merkel held impromptu talks with President Assad, [17] while in subsequent weeks, Dr. Mahmoud al-Abrash, Speaker of the Syrian People’s Assembly discussed Syrian-German relations with Gregor Gysi, head of the Left Party group at the German Parliament. [18] The British government also issued a statement praising the establishment of diplomatic ties between Syria and Lebanon. [19] Such praise from Western leaders is particularly welcome for Syria.
The emergence of claims of a nuclear program in Syria is the latest international political challenge for the regime in Damascus. Although many experts believe that Syria has had a significant stockpile of chemical weapons, the prospect of a Syrian nuclear program has not usually been addressed. On September 7, 2007, Israeli aircraft attacked a Syrian military installation; briefings from the American intelligence community later suggested that this facility was a reactor built with North Korean aid and designed to produce weapons-grade plutonium. In June 2008, IAEA inspectors visited the site and tested environmental samples for radioactive materials and cooling elements. In September the IAEA reported its preliminary findings that showed no evidence of “any nuclear material.” [20]
The IAEA is set to release its final report next month, but further investigation beyond the single visit has been hampered. Syria has refused to give IAEA inspectors access to at least three additional sites believed to be tied to the alleged program. Ibrahim Othman, Director General of Syria’s Atomic Energy Commission, said that while his country is cooperating with the IAEA, “this cooperation will not in any way come at the expense of exposing our military sites or causing a threat to our national security.” [21] Further complicating the investigation was the assassination of Brigadier General Mohammed Suleiman, an aide to President Assad and the IAEA’s principal contact on the nuclear issue. General Suleiman was killed by sniper fire at a resort near the port town of Tartous on August 2. [22] As a result of these developments, Mohammed El Baradei, the head of the IAEA, has indicated that it may now be impossible to make a conclusive judgment on Syria’s activities. [23] Nevertheless, Israeli security officials have accused Syria of resuming the construction of nuclear facilities in its territory for military purposes. [24]
Syria has consistently denied the allegations. In an interview published by a Qatari newspaper, President Assad argued, “We don’t want a nuclear bomb…Where would we use it?...War in the region will effectively remain conventional.” [25] Most Arab governments have remained strikingly silent on the subject of Syria’s potential nuclear program and Israel’s military strike, leading some observers to speculate that Syria’s neighbors favored Israel’s action, yet can not explicitly say so due to domestic pressures against supporting Israel. [26] Nevertheless, since the attack on the installation more than a year ago, a number of experts have expressed doubt about the allegations and criticized the conclusions drawn by the U.S. intelligence community. [27] Some suggest that the allegations are being fed by members of the Syrian opposition who worry that the United States might be on the verge of dropping its diplomatic freeze, which would render the opposition’s role and the monetary assistance it receives from the U.S. administration irrelevant. [28]
Little evidence suggests, however, that the United States is in fact preparing to draw Syria out of its diplomatic isolation. In response to Lebanese President Suleiman’s statement that the international community should open up to Syria because of its regional importance, Washington officials warned that “until Syria plays a positive role in the region, it is going to continue to isolate itself.” [29] Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and
U.S. Assistant Secretary David Welch, however, recently met with Syrian Foreign Minister Wallid Muallem. Rice downplayed the talks, stating that: “it was just to talk a bit about the regional situation and some of the emerging efforts there.” [30] In a somewhat contradictory statement, Muallem said that the meeting was “positive and marked the start of an upcoming dialogue.” [31] Nevertheless, the current U.S. administration remains chilly toward
Syria; in his farewell address to the United Nations General
Assembly, President George W. Bush stated, “A few nations – regimes like Syria and Iran – continue to sponsor terror, yet their numbers are growing fewer and they’re growing more isolated from the world.” [32
]
Syria, Israel, and Iran
The U.S. demand that Syria play a “positive role” may well refer to its continued ties with Iran, as well as its to failure to move forward with peace negotiations with Israel and its support for radical Palestinian groups.
U.S. officials claim that “Syria is still seen as having a behavior problem,” [33] a perception that stems from the stalling of peace talks with Israel. One diplomat in Damascus argued, “Assad wants to keep talking with Israel without committing to anything. It is understandable since Israel has also not given him anything.” [34] Although Assad allegedly asked Sarkozy for help with the mired peace talks, [35] both Assad and Israel’s Olmert favor Washington’s involvement in peace negotiations. When President Bush declined to participate in Israeli-Arab peace talks, both sides reluctantly accepted the Turkish-brokered negotiations as the next best alternative. [36] While Assad tells reporters that he “wants to make peace with Israel” and that, to counter regional fundamentalism, “you absolutely need peace,” he also argues that the United States must remain the main player in brokering negotiations and that no deal can be concluded until a new administration in Washington is willing to take an active role in peace talks. [37] At the same time, Assad has shown great unwillingness to compromise on Syria’s demands: in September 2008, he told reporters, “After eight years of paralysis, after the war on Lebanon, after two attacks on Syria, there is no trust. We are probing Israel’s intentions, we don’t trust them and perhaps they don’t trust us. We want to make sure that the Israelis are ready for peace…Ready to return the whole Golan.” [38] A land-for-peace agreement in the Golan Heights has been Damascus’s goal since 1973. [39]
Up to this point, Syria has also failed to scale back ties with Iran and cut its links to Hamas and Hezbollah, the most recent demands made by Israel during the two nations’ indirect talks. [40] The subject of Iran marked a point of contention in Assad’s discussions with Sarkozy. The French leader asked Syria for help in easing the international standoff with Iran over its nuclear program. Although Assad asserted that Tehran was not seeking to obtain nuclear weapons, Sarkozy asked him to convince Iran to “provide proof, not just intentions, but proof” that it was seeking to develop nuclear technology solely for peaceful purposes. [41] Assad agreed to Sarkozy’s request and pledged to work toward a peaceful solution, stating that any attack on Iran would be “catastrophic.” [42] French diplomats “detect growing daylight between Damascus and its key regional ally,” and they have been urging Sarkozy to convince Assad that he can gain more by distancing himself from Tehran and partnering with the West than by continuing the alliance with Iran. [43] Israel, however, remains suspicious about the link between Syria and Iran. Israeli foreign ministry spokesman Yigal Palmor criticized Sarkozy’s praise of Syrian efforts, stating, “Europe must be very careful in its relationship with Syria as that country opens up…Except for a slight change in tone, Syrian policies have not changed.” [44]
Syria’s continued support for the Lebanese group Hizbollah, the Palestinian organization Hamas – both of which have been designated by the U.S. Department of State as terrorist organizations – and other militant Palestinian groups has also been a sticking point. Israel has demanded that Syria expel the Hamas leadership from Damascus and cut an alleged supply line to Hizbollah. [45] Syria remains on the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism; the most recent report states, “The Syrian Government insists that the Damascus-based groups undertake only political and informational activities…Syria’s public support for the groups varied, depending on its national interests and international pressure…Syrian officials publicly condemned international terrorism, but made a distinction between terrorism and what they considered to be “legitimate armed resistance” by Palestinians in the Occupied Territories and by Lebanese Hizballah.” [46] Although Syrian ambassadors and other officials outside the country claim that Damascus has made a serious effort to cut ties with Hezbollah and expel Hamas leaders, Syria still publicly supports the groups. Assad recently told Hezbollah’s Al-Manar television, “We don’t see any interest in abandoning the resistance. Our position has always been clear. Our position toward the resistance against any occupation in Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine is firm and has not changed.” [47] Some analysts have suggested that Hizbollah’s ability to land rockets inside Israel despite enduring assaults, as well as Syria’s withdrawal of troops from Lebanon, have reduced Assad’s influence over the group and made it more difficult to restrain. [48] At the same time, the Bush administration is seen to have failed to offer adequate incentives to induce Syria to take action against the group. One Western ambassador, for example, commented, “Essentially you are asking [the Syrians] to connive in their own demise...Persuading Hezbollah to commit hara-kiri doesn’t make sense from Syria’s point of view. It would mean the loss of their No. 1 card, not only in Lebanon, but with Israel.” [49]
Conclusions
In short, Syria is in the process of rehabilitating its standing with Europe, beginning with France but slowly including other countries like the United Kingdom and Germany, without making significant progress in negotiations with Israel or compromising on major issues such as its relations with Iran or its ties to terrorist organizations. This is not to say, however, that President Assad and the Syrian government are reluctant to move forward. The Syrian economy has recently been in decline as the result of two poor harvests, depletion in oil production, and a drop-off in Iraqi funds, as refugees have now used up most of their savings. [50] In order to fight the inflation that has resulted from these changes, Syria will need a significant increase in foreign direct investment and development aid. Although the EU and other aid agencies and corporations have provided some assistance, they have been constrained by Syria’s isolation from the West. [51] At the same time, Syria’s economic association agreement with the EU faces opposition from Britain if Syria does not cut back on its ties with terrorist organizations; since the agreement requires unanimous approval from all EU members, this could put trade cooperation with Europe in jeopardy. [52] Syria therefore stands to see significant benefits to its economy if it improves its relationship with the West.
At the same time, Syria’s actions vis-à-vis Iran and Palestinian militant groups suggest that it is, as one analyst puts it, “trying to hold on to several winning cards.” [53] The support of Assad’s government for Hizbollah and Hamas, and its maintenance of ties with Iran, ensure that it will remain a key player in the region’s geopolitics after its withdrawal from Lebanon, a major improvement from the point not long ago when the regime stood to lose not only its international reputation, but also its leverage and relevance.
President Assad has also made it clear that the history between Syria and Israel makes it difficult for either side to maintain good faith. Clearly, neither side expects to reach a settlement soon. Israeli accusations that Syria is running a covert nuclear program have hardly smoothed relations, and Assad has not done himself any favors with Israel or the United States by refusing to allow the IAEA to return for a follow-up visit. Without further evidence, the IAEA as well as France and other western countries seem to be content to accept for the moment at least the inability to make a definitive determination as to whether a Syrian nuclear program exists. Syria’s refusals to allow further investigation, however, provide lingering doubts which might conveniently be currently ignored for political reasons, but which may re-emerge in the months ahead. It also remains to be seen whether the change in the U.S. administration will lead to progress in Syrian-Israeli negotiations, as Assad hopes; as an autocratic ruler, however, he can afford to wait and see.
Syria’s actions suggest, therefore, that Assad hopes to portray himself as accommodating and willing to work for peace, while at the same time hedging his bets with the same regional alliances that put his government in a position of influence in the first place. While Sarkozy and other European leaders seem to consider this strategy sufficient to merit the termination of Syria’s freeze-out, the United States has made it clear that President Assad must make himself and his government more accommodating if any significant progress is to be made.
Amanda Moodie – Computer Sciences Corporation
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SOURCES AND NOTES
[1] “Assad’s Charm Offensive,” Jerusalem Post, September 3, 2008, http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1220444321685&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull. [View Article]
[2] “No Bush Road to Damascus,” Boston Globe, September 7, 2008, http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/editorials/articles/2008/09/07/no_bush_road_to
_damascus?mode=PF. [View Article]
[3] “Sarkozy Nudges Syria into International Fold for Bold Mediterranean Summit,” International Herald Tribune, July 12, 2008 [http://www.iht.com/bin/printfriendly.php?id=144444623].
[4] Steven Erlanger and Katrin Bennhold, “Sarkozy Helps to Bring Syria Out of Isolation,” New York Times, July 14, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/14/world/europe/14france.html. [View Article] For more, see NTI: Country Overviews: Syria: Nuclear, August 2008, http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Syria/Nuclear/index.html. [View Article]
[5] “The Union for the Mediterranean is Born,” France 24, July 13, 2008, http://www.france24.com/en/20080713-union-mediterranean-born-mediterranean-summit. [View Article]
[6] The Barcelona Process was intended to “establish a comprehensive Euro-Mediterranean partnership in order to turn the Mediterranean into a common area of peace, stability and prosperity through the reinforcement of political dialogue and security, an economic and financial partnership and a social, cultural and human partnership.” The process has contributed to numerous positive developments in the Mediterranean region, including the re-engagement of Libya in the international community and the fragile stability in the Balkans, but it has run into criticism from Arab leaders who critique the organization’s linking of military security to an overall strategy of partnership, as well as from others who criticize its inability to make progress on the Israel-Palestine conflict. For more, see “Barcelona Declaration,” European Union, July 26 2005, http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r15001.htm; [View Article] Debay Tadesse, “Challenges and Opportunities for a Mediterranean Union,” ISS Today, Institute for Security Studies, September 4, 2008, http://www.issafrica.org; [View Article] and Fred Halliday, “The ‘Barcelona Process’: Ten Years On,” OpenDemocracy, November 11, 2005, http://www.opendemocracy.net/globalization/barcelona_3019.jsp. [View Article]
[7] “The Union for the Mediterranean is Born,” see source in [5].
[8] Syria and Lebanon have not had embassies in each other’s countries since Lebanon became independent in 1943 and Syria in 1945. Syria borders Lebanon to the north and east, and dominated Lebanese foreign policy and maintained a military presence in the region until 2005. The February 14 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, for which many accused Syria, led to a series of demonstrations demanding Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. By April 26 2005, Syria had withdrawn all its troops. For more, see Esther Pan, “Middle East: Syria and Lebanon,” CFR Backgrounder, Council on Foreign Relations, February 18 2005, http://www.cfr.org/publication/7851/middle_east.html; [View Article] and “Syria, Lebanon to Open Embassies, France Says,” CNN, July 12, 2008 [http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLd/meast/07/12/syria.lebanon.ap/index.html].
[9] “Syria, Lebanon to Open Embassies, France Says,” see source in [8], [http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLd/meast/07/12/syria.lebanon.ap/index.html].
[10] “Syria and Lebanon Establish First Full Diplomatic Relations,” International Herald Tribune, August 13, 2008, http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/08/13/mideast/syria.php. [View Article]
[11] “Lebanon and Syria to Demarcate Border, Normalize Ties,” AFP, August 14, 2008, http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5j22Gzs9gkE9v0ruADOUcQ4ynXteQ. [View Article]
[12] Khaled Yacoub Oweis, “Difficult Decisions Loom for Syria’s Assad,” Reuters, September 8, 2008, http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2008/9/8/worldupdates/2008-09-08T172010Z_01_NOOTR_RTRMDNC
_0_-353754-1&sec=Worldupdates. [View Article]
[13] “France Brings Syria’s Assad Out of the Diplomatic Cold,” AFP, July 12, 2008, http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5i-h3tw5Mgnv444IekP0s6yXnmXgA. [View Article]
[14] “Assad, Suleiman Set to Hold Talks in Paris,” Deutsche Presse-Agenteur, July 12, 2008, http://www.monstersandcritics.com/news/europe/news/article_1416599.php/Assad_Suleiman_set_to_hold_talks_in
_Paris__2nd_Lead_. [View Article]
[15] Bruce Crumley, “France’s Fling with Syria,” Time, September 4, 2008, http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,1838370,00.html. [View Article]
[16] Oweis, “Difficult Decisions Loom for Syria’s Assad,” see source in [12]; and Chris Phillips, “How Syria Came in from the Cold,” Guardian, September 10, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/sep/10/lebanon.syria. [View Article]
[17] “Syria Must Now Prevent Arms Smuggling: Germany,” EUBusiness.com, July 14, 2008, http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/1216038722.2/view. [View Article]
[18] “Syria-Germany,” Qatar News Agency, September 7, 2008, http://www.qnaol.net/QNAEn/News_bulletin/News/Pages/08-09-07-2142_977_0047.aspx. [View Article]
[19] “UK Welcomes Establishment of Lebanon-Syria Diplomatic Ties,” Pakistan Times, August 16, 2008, http://www.pakistantimes.net/2008/08/17/newswire3.htm. [View Article]
[20] Jay S. Solomon, “Syria Signals It Will Stop U.N. Inspectors,” Wall Street Journal, October 4, 2008
[21] Ibid.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Yoav Stern, “Report: Israel Believes Syria Renewing its Nuclear Activity,” Haaretz, October 2, 2008, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1025851.html. [View Article]
[25] “Nuke Charges are US ‘Campaign of Lies’: Syria,” Al Arabiya, April 28, 2008, http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2008/04/28/49058.html. [View Article]
[26] For more, see Richard Weitz, “New Insights About 2007 Israeli Air Strike in Syria,” WMD Insights, May-June 2008. [View Article]
[27] “Experts Doubt Syria has Resumed Nuke Activity,” Jerusalem Post, October 2, 2008, http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1222017434086&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull; [View Article] and Seymour Hersh, “A Strike in the Dark,” New Yorker, February 11, 2008, http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/02/11/080211fa_fact_hersh. [View Article]
[28] “Experts Doubt Syria has Resumed Nuke Activity,” see source in [25].
[29] “Sarkozy’s Syria Visit to Formalize Top-Level Ties,” People’s Daily Online, September 3, 2008, http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90777/90854/6491952.html. [View Article]
[30] “Rice Holds Talks with Muallem,” Gulf Times, September 28, 2008, http://www.gulf-times.com/site/topics/article.asp?cu_no=2&item_no=244277&version=1&template_id=37&parent_id=17. [View Article]
[31] “Rice and Syria FM Hold Talks on Regional Peace Efforts,” AFP, September 27, 2008, http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5hxVDbyZ1_v0Nt6QwmbwPxxQufKxQ. [View Article]
[32] “Bush Lashes Syria, Iran as Terrorism Sponsors,” AFP, September 23, 2008, http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20080923/wl_afp/undiplomacybushsyriairan_080923143638;_ylt=AgzGmKMoj2yA6inL
_Mh9RJqQOrgF. [View Article]
[33] Oweis, “Difficult Decisions Loom for Syria’s Assad,” see source in [12].
[34] Ibid.
[35] Ibid.
[36] “No Bush Road to Damascus,” see source in [2].
[37] Alain Gresh, “Making Peace with Syria,” International Herald Tribune, September 1, 2008, http://www.iht.com/bin/printfriendly.php?id=15799819; [View Article] and “No Bush Road to Damascus,” see source in [2].
[38] Gresh, “Making Peace with Syria,” see source in [35].
[39] Phillips, “How Syria Came in from the Cold,” see source in [16]. The Golan Heights was captured by Israel from Syria in the 1967 Middle East War.
[40] Oweis, “Difficult Decisions Loom for Syria’s Assad,” see source in [12].
[41] “France Brings Syria’s Assad Out of the Diplomatic Cold,” see source in [13]; “Syria, Lebanon to Open Embassies, France says,” see source in [8].
[42] Bethany Bell, “Syria Back in International Fold,” BBC News, September 4, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle_east/7598747.stm. [View Article]
[43]Crumley, “France’s Fling with Syria,” see source in [15].
[44] “France’s Sarkozy, Syria’s Assad Meet on Advancing Peace Effort,” Dow Jones Newswires, September 3, 2008, http://www.lloyds.com/dj/DowJonesArticle.aspx?id=403059. [View Article]
[45] Oweis, “Difficult Decisions Loom for Syria’s Assad,” see source in [12].
[46] Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, “Country Reports on Terrorism,” U.S. Department of State, April 28, 2006, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2005/64337.htm. [View Article]
[47] Zeina Karam, “Syria Makes Peace Proposal to Italy,” Associated Press, September 5, 2008 [http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5haGKrDU9QJh2jFv3JNNHSq6l-kPAD9301RJ00].
[48] Daniel Sobelman, “Hizbollah Two Years after the Withdrawal - A Compromise between Ideology, Interests, and Exigencies,” Strategic Assessment, Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies, 5(2), August 2002, http://www.weltpolitik.net/Regionen/Naher%20u.%20Mittlerer%20Osten/Gesamtregion/Analysen/Hizbollah
%20Two%20Years%20after%20the%20Withdrawal%20-A%20Compromise%20between%20Ideology,%20Interests,%20and%20Exigencies.html. [View Article]
[49] Neil MacFarquhar, “Why Syria Has Much to Lose if Hezbollah is Finally Halted,” New York Times, July 26, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/26/world/middleeast/26syria.html?fta=y. [View Article]
[50] “Upbeat in Syria,” Economist, June 6, 2008, http://www.economist.com/agenda/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11520335. [View Article]
[51] Ibid.
[52] Oweis, “Difficult Decisions Loom for Syria’s Assad,” see source in 12.
[53] Ramzy Baroud, “The Syria-Israel Peace Gambit,” Khaleej Times, September 10, 2008, http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticle.asp?xfile=data/opinion/2008/September/opinion_September46.xml&
section=opinion&col. [View Article]
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