On July 13, 2008 a high-level summit meeting was held in Paris attended by representatives – almost all either presidents or prime ministers – from 43 states, mainly EU member states and their southern Mediterranean partners. The purpose of the summit was to launch French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s idea for a new Mediterranean Union. Called “The Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean,” the new initiative – first raised during Sarkozy’s election campaign – had evolved from the original idea of bringing states from the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean together in a new collective venture into an upgraded incarnation of the familiar Barcelona Process that had originally begun in 1995. [1]

One of the points noted by the media in the wake of the summit was that the joint declaration issued at the close of the meeting included a commitment to pursue a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone (WMDFZ) in the Middle East. Indeed, under the title: “A Strategic Ambition for the Mediterranean,” Section 5 of the declaration includes a clause noting that “the parties shall pursue a mutually and effectively verifiable Middle East Zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery systems.” [2] The following commentary takes a closer look at the summit joint declaration and assesses the significance of this commitment. It then considers more generally the possible routes and prospects for enhancing WMD arms control in the Middle East today.

The Joint Declaration: Making Sense of Section 5
When taken out of context – which was the case for most media reports following the summit – the clause in the joint declaration relating to the pursuit of a WMD Free Zone in the Middle East might seem like a direct and firm statement of intent by the attending parties. When considered within the context of both the section in which it is embedded and the declaration in its entirety, however, the “commitment” loses much of its potential significance.

A closer look reveals the true nature of the declared commitment. First, it states clearly in the opening sentence of Section 5 that the current Mediterranean initiative is the expression of a common aspiration to achieve peace and regional security according to the Barcelona Declaration of 1995. It is thus this 13-year old declaration that is the source and inspiration for the currently expressed need to comply with “a combination of international and regional nonproliferation regimes and arms control and disarmament agreements.” In fact, the language used in the new declaration was incorporated virtually word for word from the older document. If the idea for pursuing arms control originates in, and draws upon an existing and familiar framework, one should probably not expect anything either dramatic or new.

Moreover, the desired agenda is formulated in very broad and encompassing terms: the call is for adherence to all international agreements (i.e., the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)) as well as regional arrangements. The wide scope of the arrangements mentioned in Section 5 underscores that the call is more in the nature of a “general hope and aspiration” than anything approximating a concrete initiative or agenda.

Consideration of the broader context of the joint declaration only strengthens this impression. The concrete projects and key initiatives envisioned by the new Union for the Mediterranean appear in an annex at the end of the document. Here it is stated clearly that the goals set by the 1995 Barcelona Declaration must be translated into major regional concrete projects, and, at the first stage, “it is decided to launch a number of key initiatives…which the future Secretariat is mandated to detail.” The list of six projects includes the de-pollution of the Mediterranean, maritime and land highways, civil protection, a Mediterranean solar plan, a Euro-Mediterranean University, and a Mediterranean business development initiative. [3] No mention is made of WMD proliferation.

Finally, it is significant that the end of Section 5 includes references to political and security aspects of current relations in the Middle East that need attention. The emphasis on these important long-term goals – also part of the 1995 Barcelona Declaration – tempers the immediacy of the call for eliminating WMD. It states that the parties must consider practical steps to “promote conditions likely to develop good-neighborly relations among themselves and support processes aimed at stability, security, prosperity and regional and sub-regional cooperation,” as well as to “consider any confidence and security-building measures that could be taken between the parties with a view to the creation of an ‘area of peace and stability in the Mediterranean.’” [4]

In short, what is contained in Section 5 of the July Paris declaration is a generally stated vision and aspiration for regional WMD arms control in the Middle East. Nothing in the document indicates that the new and enhanced Barcelona Process intends to pursue this goal differently, or any more vigorously than has been the case since 1995. Even if the wording of the declaration had hinted at a stronger intent to work in this direction, however, the Barcelona framework would probably not be the proper framework for carrying it out. For one, it does not include all the relevant actors; Iran, for example, the primary nuclear proliferation concern in the Middle East today, remains outside of that framework. Another major constraint for dealing with such a topic in a Euro-Mediterranean setting is the relative weakness of the EU in terms of its ability to assume a significant role in dealing with hard international security issues. [5]

How to Pursue the Control of WMD?
While the refurbished Barcelona Process does not make the control of WMD one of its concrete regional projects – and in any case is probably not the best framework for pursuing this goal in the Middle East – the fact that the vision has been raised once again provides an opportunity to reconsider available routes for dealing with this serious challenge to regional security. The question that must be addressed is how the international community can best control WMD arsenals and proliferation, especially in light of the recent mixed record of stemming nuclear activities in NPT member states in the Middle East. [6]

There are two basic approaches for negotiating agreements designed to halt the spread of WMD in the Middle East, each grounded in a different logic of arms control. [7] The first approach is expressed through support for various international disarmament and nonproliferation treaties, such as those mentioned above, which focus on the elimination of weapons of mass destruction. The second approach is more state sensitive. It focuses on a specific group of states whose relations are characterized not only by the threat of WMD, but also by insecurity and even hostility. Going beyond the weapons themselves, it identifies a relevant regional framework within which the fostering of improved inter-state relations becomes the prime target for arms control efforts.

The ideas expressed in Section 5 of the Paris joint declaration are consistent with the latter approach to the control of WMD. In this regard, the document has considerable merit in refocusing attention on the regional approach to arms control.

I. Disarmament via International Treaties
The first approach to WMD arms control – focusing on global treaties that seek to eliminate weapons – is the firmly established disarmament and nonproliferation tradition. Yet while international disarmament treaties over the years have helped to reduce WMD arsenals world-wide and in the Middle East, they have not succeeded in eliminating the problem. Although the NPT has helped create and entrench an important norm against nuclear weapons, one cannot escape the conclusion that attempts to promote the international disarmament and nonproliferation agenda will not in themselves stop the spread of WMD. Recent experience with determined nuclear proliferators who have aspired to obtain nuclear weapons while remaining a party to the NPT is telling in this regard. [8]

Membership in the NPT rests on the assumption that disarmament and nonproliferation are in the common interest of all states. This assumption, however, has clearly not always been warranted. In the post Cold War years, in a number of instances and for different reasons, certain states have decided to acquire or develop nuclear weapons technology in direct violation of their NPT commitment to remain non-nuclear. The lack of any mechanism for addressing this reality, and in particular, the absence of any provision for addressing specific state interests and concerns has severely handicapped the NPT as far as its ability to ensure that determined proliferators do not acquire nuclear weapons.

II. The Regional Approach
In contrast to the traditional weapons-based approach, the state-based regional approach to arms control holds more hope for addressing the specific interests and concerns of states regarding WMD development and procurement, and as such has considerable value in the context of the Middle East.

In conceptual terms, a regional approach to arms control highlights the complexity inherent in the weapons/security relationship. It questions what the disarmament approach takes for granted, namely, that when weapons – especially WMD – are eliminated, security on the regional and even global scale is directly enhanced. The logic underlying the regional approach is that weapons are normally sought in response to perceptions of insecurity that result from poor inter-state relations. So unless these sources of insecurity are directly confronted and addressed, the perceived need for weapons will remain high, and if relations are particularly strained, could even increase. In such cases, efforts that focus exclusively on the need to eliminate weapons or stop their spread will most likely fail. In the nuclear realm, an added layer of technological and political status that is very often associated with the achievement of indigenous nuclear weapons capability provides an additional motivation for some states, and needs to be factored into the regional equation as well. [9]

To consider a WMDFZ in the Middle East means to think about weapons in their relevant regional context. This implies focusing not only on the weapons, but also on the full spectrum of inter-state relations that comprises the regional context for arms control or nonproliferation efforts. According to this logic, disarmament goals cannot be approached effectively, or sometimes even understood, outside the context of state concerns, interests, and behavior, and different manifestations of state interactions. Moreover, from this regional perspective, the dilemma of WMD proliferation is not a question of a contradiction between a self-interested state bent on acquiring WMD and the so-called “collective interest” in disarmament expressed through global treaties. In fact, it is the assumption of a collective or common interest in disarmament that needs to be questioned, as it rests on a rather superficial and potentially misleading characterization of the very real dilemmas that some states confront.

When thinking about the control of WMD in the Middle East today, then, the focus should be on the process by which states discuss and assess their relevant interests and concerns, as well as on the regional relations within which WMD are pursued. The goal of such discussion is the creation of rules of the game for engagement and more peaceful coexistence among the relevant states. The idea of a WMDFZ encourages this type of dialogue and discussion, whereas the NPT has no place for it.

When considering the situation in the Middle East, the major emphasis and focus of inter-state discussion of WMD must be directed toward lowering the intensity of perceived threats, increasing mutual confidence and trust, and improving inter-state relations. Because weapons are an overt manifestation of problematic inter-state relations, it is easier to focus on them, and to give them primacy as the target of arms control efforts. But it cannot be emphasized enough that confronting the complex underlying web of relationships is the real key to ultimate stability in the Middle East. Any initiative that ignores this dimension of the problem is bound to come up short. [10]

From Conceptual Logic to Implementation in the Middle East Today
Beginning discussion of a WMDFZ in the Middle East necessitates meeting several requirements. First, a strong extra-regional party must provide the framework for the dialogue and ensure that the relevant parties show up and take part. This is no easy task in the Middle East today, and it is not clear who can assume this role. In the early 1990s the role of convener was successfully assumed by the United States; U.S. prodding was critical for enabling the Arms Control and Regional Security talks (ACRS) to proceed as part of the multilateral track of the Madrid Peace Process that emerged in the wake of the First Gulf War in 1992. Second, success also depends on the willingness of all the relevant regional parties to attend. The most difficult (although certainly not the only) challenge in this respect today is Iran. Finally, it must be clear that the initial goal of such talks must be to improve inter-state relations, build confidence, and create a basis of mutual trust among the parties. Unfortunately, very little room for optimism exists on any of these counts given the current state of the Middle East.

Indeed, while the logic of regional arms control talks in the Middle East is very sound – and was underscored by the initial successes of ACRS [11] – little to no chance of pursuing such talks exists today. It would be very difficult to reconvene an Israeli-Arab dialogue framework of the ACRS kind at this stage, and adding Iran would make it virtually impossible. Iran oscillates between severely attacking Israel as an aggressive entity and castigating it for being weak and cowardly when Israel takes accommodating steps such as unilateral withdrawals. Iran’s door is tightly locked as far as Israel is concerned, and as long as this is the case, the regional approach will be severely limited.

Additionally, reports indicate that over ten states in the Middle East have expressed their desire to develop civilian nuclear programs to the IAEA. The Gulf Cooperation Council states are talking about a joint nuclear program, and even Jordan and Egypt have indicated an interest in pursuing their own national programs. [12] Iran is no doubt the primary factor motivating these states to begin contemplating civilian nuclear programs, which many analysts fear could provide the basis for a military capability. Iran’s activities in the nuclear realm, together with indications of its ambitions to become a regional hegemon, have introduced a strong element of instability in the region as a whole, and today many states – both in the region and beyond – are extremely nervous in the face of Iran’s growing ability to stir up trouble. When one considers these current regional realities, the importance of beginning official regional security discussions is all the more apparent.

Taking Every Opportunity to Talk
Dialogue on security issues, then, must be pursued in the region in whatever framework or format possible. Embracing every opportunity to hold dialogue on these issues is essential because so much work must be done. Today this means pursuing regional dialogue primarily in unofficial frameworks and often without the participation of Iran.

The proposal that regional security dialogue should be reinitiated in the Middle East, however, is sometimes met in the Arab world with a degree of skepticism. One hears in commentary in the Arab world, for example, expressions of fatigue with this kind of discussion; they claim that security issues have already been discussed many times during the past years, in the context of ACRS, as well as at various Track I and a half, and Track II meetings. [13]

In response to these doubts, it should be emphasized that while it is true that there has been dialogue, there is still a very long way to go. The Track II dialogues that were active during the ACRS years, and that continued to focus on arms control issues up until around 2001, gradually lost steam because nothing was being advanced at the official level. In the years of the Intifada even these unofficial discussions ground to a halt, with no meetings of this sort held for at least three years. When the level of violence in the Israeli-Palestinian sphere was reduced, and Track II discussions were resumed (around 2005), the regional situation had changed significantly, with the much more apparent need, for example, to take Iran’s nuclear ambitions into account. Moreover, the lessons of the ACRS experience must be discussed in Track II frameworks – there are different explanations for both the successes and the breakdown of this unique experience, and the lessons are important.

The dynamics of the situation dictate that progress will be slow; one cannot be impatient with this kind of dialogue. The complex array of regional relations and realities means it will take time. This is especially the case when the starting point is a region where some states do not even recognize the existence of others let alone maintain diplomatic relations with them. Problems of normalization of relations remain even between Israel and the states with which it has made peace; thus, for example, Egyptian experts are most reluctant to attend seminars and conferences in Israel, even at the unofficial level.

In Sum
The idea of pursuing a WMDFZ in the Middle East is important for at least two reasons: it emphasizes the regional nature of the proliferation challenge in this area of the world, and it has the value of promoting regional dialogue. But following this route means first and foremost recognition of the importance of the context within which WMD exist and are pursued. To confront the dangers of WMD proliferation, the first step is to improve the nature of inter-state interactions and relations, because at heart, this is an issue of international security. Unfortunately, in the Middle East today, the prospect of advancing this dialogue at the official level is very slim indeed; continuing dialogue at the unofficial level at least, is essential.

Emily B. Landau – Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), Tel Aviv University

SOURCES AND NOTES
[1] A major explanation for this shift in emphasis for the new grouping of states was pressure from Germany’s Angela Merkel, who strongly opposed the idea of a Mediterranean initiative that would exclude northern EU states such as Germany. For background material on this initiative see Robert Aliboni (et al), Putting the Mediterranean Union in Perspective, EuroMeSCo Paper no. 68, June 2008; Eduard Soler i Lecha, “Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean, Genesis, Evolution and Implications for Spain’s Mediterranean Policy,” Working Paper of the Observatorio de Politica Exterior Espanola, n. 28, Madrid: Fundacion Alternativas/ Fundacio CIDOB, 2008; and Eduard Soler i Lecha, “Why Sarkozy’s Mediterranean Plan is Arousing Suspicions,” Europe’s World, Summer 2008, pp. 107-109.
[2] “Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean,” Paris, 13 July 2008.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid.
[5] In addition, significantly, the proposal has not seemed to elicit any serious attention on the part of the Middle East states themselves.
[6] Libya is the success story, whereas Iran has so far proven to be impenetrable to international efforts to curb its nuclear ambitions. Iraq and Syria are somewhere in the middle, each for different reasons.
[7] For one discussion of different arms control approaches, see David Mutimer, The Weapons State: Proliferation and the Framing of Security (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000) pp. 29-43.
[8] See discussion in Emily B. Landau, “A Nuclear Iran: Implications for Arms Control in the Nuclear Realm” in Ephraim Kam (ed.) Israel and a Nuclear Iran: Implications for Arms Control, Deterrence, and Defense, Memorandum No. 94, (Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), July 2008), pp. 35-37.
[9] See for example, Scott Sagan, “Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb”, International Security (21:3, Winter 1996/97) pp. 54-86.
[10] Some researchers recognize the difficulty of promoting regional dialogue on a WMDFZ and hope to start with states’ adherence to international treaties, but such proposals are not likely to produce the sought-after results for the reasons discussed here. For a good example of this approach see Merav Datan, “Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East: Conditions for Disarmament,” November 2006, http://www.pugwash.org/reports/pac/56/papers2-3.htm. [View Article] See also recent collection of papers on the idea of a WMDFZ in the Middle East in International Relations, vol. 22, issue 3, September 2008.
[11] For a sample of the studies on ACRS, see Bruce Jentleson and Dalia Dassa Kaye, “Security Status: Explaining Regional Security Cooperation and Its Limits in the Middle East,” Security Studies (8:1, 1998) pp. 204-238; Peter Jones, “Negotiating Regional Security and Arms Control in the Middle East: The ACRS Experience and Beyond,” Journal of Strategic Studies (26:3, 2003) pp. 137-154; and Emily B. Landau, Arms Control in the Middle East: Cooperative Security Dialogue and Regional Constraints (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press and JCSS, 2006).
[12] See Emily B. Landau, “New Nuclear Programs in the Middle East: What Do they Mean?” INSS Insight no. 3, December 11, 2006; and Joseph Cirincione and Uri Leventer, “The Middle East’s Nuclear Surge,” International Herald Tribune, August 13, 2007.
[13] For an analysis of past experience with unofficial dialogue in the Middle East see Dalia Dassa Kaye, Talking to the Enemy: Track Two Diplomacy in the Middle East and South Asia (Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Security Research Division, 2007).