The United States and Japan, longstanding Pacific allies, are at an important transitional point in their relationship as the new administrations in each country address issues associated with the future of missile defense, extended deterrence, nuclear nonproliferation, and nuclear disarmament. A November 2009 visit to Japan by President Obama reassured Japanese citizens about the U.S. commitment to the region; however, the exact evolution of the U.S.-Japanese relationship remains uncharted as decisions are made about the future of U.S. and Japanese missile defense and the United States nuclear deterrent.

Reaffirming the U.S. - Japan Security Alliance
Since the historic election on August 30, 2009 in which the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) ousted the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) that had been in power for over 50 years, concerns have arisen over the state of the U.S.-Japan alliance, given that the new ruling party is more liberal and center-left than its conservative predecessor. This has led some to speculate that a shift in Japan’s foreign policy may be in store. Moreover, Prime Minister Hatoyama’s proposal to establish an “East Asia Community” has generated the impression that the DPJ would place more emphasis on Japan’s relationship with its Asian neighbors than the United States. In light of these concerns, the recent reaffirmation of the importance of the U.S.- Japan security alliance by the heads of both states gave some relief to those who were worried about the future of the alliance. Additionally, during his recent visit to the country, President Obama reassured Japan about the future of America’s engagement with the Asia Pacific region. [1]

In his first trip to Asia since taking office in January 2009, President Obama chose Japan as the first country to visit. As was the case with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s visit in February 2009, the United States demonstrated its recognition of the importance of the U.S.- Japan alliance by visiting one of its closest allies before any other country in the region. When Secretary Clinton visited Japan in February, she also underlined the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance, reiterating that the bilateral relationship is a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy and peace and security in the Asia Pacific. [2] In addition, former Prime Minister Taro Aso was invited to be the first foreign leader to meet President Obama at the White House. At the meeting, both leaders reaffirmed the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance to tackle regional and global challenges ranging from North Korea’s missile and nuclear issues to global warming and the global economic crisis. [3]

While both heads of states emphasized the importance of the alliance, neither President Obama nor Prime Minister Hatoyama highlighted the issue of missile defense at their meetings. This is a noteworthy difference from previous administrations in both countries. During the Bush Administration, strengthening U.S.-Japan missile defense cooperation was considered a way to enhance bilateral security ties, and the two leaders reiterated the importance of missile defense whenever they met.

Japan’s new ruling party has been considered less enthusiastic about missile defense than the LDP. When the DPJ was in opposition, for example, Tsuyoshi Yamaguchi, the shadow deputy defense spokesman commented, “missile defense is useless.” [4] On November 24, 2009 at the cabinet committee on the defense budget, Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada said that the value of the expensive missile defense system that Japan has developed in cooperation with the United States must be explained to the public. In response to Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa’s request for a fiscal year 2010 budget of 94.4 billion yen ($1.06 billion dollars) to deploy Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) units at three more Japanese military bases over the next five years, Mr. Okada commented that the government should be able to thoroughly explain the decision to the public given that PAC-3 is a very expensive system and accounts for a majority of the defense budget. [5] On December 15, 2009, the DPJ cabinet approved defense spending guidelines for the fiscal year 2010, but it suspended new funds for any further PAC-3 deployment until after April 2011. [6]

This is a significant policy shift from its predecessor’s direction on missile defense policy. Under the leadership of the LDP, Japan continued to enhance its missile defense system. In January 2009, for example, the Japanese Ministry of Defense released its basic policy on space development and use, highlighting the importance of space for defensive purposes in conjunction with further improvements in Japan’s missile defense system. [7] Japan had restricted itself from using outer space for defensive purposes until enactment of the Basic Space Law in August 2008, which lifted the ban on the government’s use of space for such purposes as part of efforts to deploy more comprehensive missile defenses. According to the Defense Ministry’s January 2009 policy statement, it planned to develop an early warning satellite system to detect ballistic missiles in their boost phase as part of efforts to enhance the effectiveness of the country’s missile defense system, lessening Japan’s current reliance on the United States for warning information on ballistic missile launches. Currently, the United States and Russia are the only countries to possess such early warning satellites. The Space Basic Plan issued by the Strategic Headquarters for Space Development under the Japanese Cabinet on June 2, 2009 included a research project to develop early warning satellite technology. [8]

The Japanese government was scheduled to issue its updated National Defense Program Guidelines and the Mid Term Defense Program at the end of 2009. The new guidelines were supposed to include a new policy on space development and its use for defense purposes; however, Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama postponed issuing the new guidelines for a year in order to review overall national defense after the change of government. [9] It is difficult, therefore, to define the current government’s plans for missile defense and space policy. Given the DPJ’s reluctance to provide funding for further development of a missile defense system, it is doubtful that the new defense guidelines issued under the DPJ will include development of early warning satellites.

Moreover, changes in U.S. policy on missile defense in Eastern Europe might have an impact on U.S.-Japan missile defense cooperation and Japan’s approach to missile defense more generally. While President Obama is not as enthusiastic as his predecessor about the deployment of missile defenses, he is – in principle – supportive of the idea “if the technology proves to be workable.” [10] President Obama has not specifically commented on U.S.-Japan cooperation on missile defense, though he has taken several steps to confirm the importance of the two nations’ alliance.

North Korea’s Missile Launch
The issue of missile defense in Japan is not likely to disappear. Though the Obama administration’s less enthusiastic stance on missile defense was obvious by the time North Korea conducted its missile test in April 2009, the launch gave momentum to missile defense advocates in Japan. The Japanese government had taken a strong stance against North Korea before it launched what it called a “communications satellite” on April 5, 2009. On March 27, then-Prime Minister Taro Aso gave authorization at Japan’s Security Council meeting to mobilize missile defenses in case the need arose to shoot down any North Korean rocket that might fall toward Japanese territory. Based on the decision, then-Defense Minister Yasukazu Hamada ordered the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to deploy missile defense systems both on sea and land. The Japanese government felt, however, that it was highly unlikely that North Korea’s projectile would actually fall onto Japanese territory, and as expected, neither Tokyo nor the United States needed to intercept it.

After the launch, Japan sought a meeting of the UN Security Council, which became quickly bogged down by Russian and Chinese questioning of whether North Korea had, in fact, violated the resolution banning missile tests. Domestically, both Houses of the Japanese parliament (the House of Representatives on April 7, and the House of Councillors on April 8) passed a resolution condemning North Korea’s missile launch as a violation of UN Security Council Resolutions 1695 and 1718 and urging the Japanese government to impose new sanctions on North Korea. [11] On April 10, based on the parliamentary resolution, Japan extended its unilateral sanctions against North Korea, which had been in force since Tokyo imposed them after the 2006 missile tests.

North Korea’s missile launch invited consideration of further hard-line policies among some Japanese politicians. Some LDP members supported a debate on the possibility of preemptive attacks against North Korea’s missile launch pad. [12] Then-Defense Minister Hamada, however, expressed his opposition to this idea. [13] North Korea’s missile launch also provoked another conservative Japanese politician, Goji Sakamoto, head of the LDP’s Headquarters, to indicate his support for Japan’s nuclearization. Although he later explained that he was fully aware that Japan is not allowed to possess nuclear weapons, he insisted that Tokyo should take a firm stance against North Korea. [14] Mr. Hamada stated that Japan should consider deploying an early warning satellite system into space to detect the launch of a ballistic missile as highlighted in its basic policy on space development and use. [15] Similarly, editorials in all of Japan’s main daily newspapers condemned the launch, calling for diplomatic means to resolve the issue. The Shankei Shimbun also called for a government discussion on extending Japan’s missile defense program to include offensive capabilities. [16]

Background of U.S.-Japan Missile Defense Cooperation
During the past decade, North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs and the Bush administration’s support for missile defense led to significantly enhanced Japanese missile defenses. Many Japanese government officials believe that establishing a robust missile defense system is the best course of action to protect the country from missiles launched by North Korea. Tokyo considers that the defensive nature of such a system does not contradict Japan’s “exclusively defensive defense” policy.

Under the government of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, Japan officially decided to deploy missile defenses in collaboration with the United States. The Koizumi administration (from 2001 to 2006) followed the same direction as the U.S. administration during that period and made missile defense a cornerstone of its national security. While concerns and controversies remain both inside and outside Japan, deploying a missile defense system has come to be perceived as a more realistic option than more overtly offensive measures the nation could take to respond to regional threats, particularly those posed by North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs.

The Japanese government officially decided to acquire ballistic missile defense capabilities on December 19, 2003 when it issued the cabinet decision “On Introduction of Ballistic Missile Defense System and Other Measures.” [17] To implement the new agenda laid out in this Cabinet decision, in December 2004, the Japanese government approved the National Defense Program Guidelines in the Mid-Term Defense Program (Japanese Fiscal Year (JFY) 2005-2009). The Guidelines endorsed the development of missile defenses and implied that the Three Principles on Arms Export and provisions related thereto could be modified as necessary for ballistic missile defense (BMD) deployment. The Three Principles barred the Japanese government from jointly developing, producing, or transferring weapons parts to any foreign countries, including the United States. On December 24, 2005, the Japanese cabinet decided that Japan would jointly develop more advanced next-generation missile interceptors with the United States. To explain the decision, then-Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe stated that the Three Principles would not apply to U.S.-Japan missile defense cooperation. [18]

The Japanese government steadily adopted these decisions in order to be ready for the actual deployment of BMD systems. In response to North Korea’s missile launches in July 2006 and its nuclear test in October of the same year, Japan accelerated its missile defense deployment schedule, and the first Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-3 ballistic missile interceptors arrived at Iruma Airbase in Saitama Prefecture, near Tokyo, in March 2007. [19]

Current Capabilities
Japan has deployed a multi-layered missile defense system consisting of ground-based terminal phase systems (PAC-3) and sea-based mid-course missile defense (the Aegis BMD system).

PAC-3 deployments in the Tokyo Metropolitan area were completed in March 2008. Japan conducted its first test of the PAC-3 interceptor at White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico on September 17, 2008. At the test, Japan’s Air Self-Defense Force successfully shot down a mock ballistic missile. [20] A second test conducted on September 16, 2009 was also successful. [21]

Under the LDP government, PAC-3 missiles were scheduled to be deployed with 16 fire units around Japan’s major cities by March 2011. [22] On December 15, 2009, however, the DPJ administration put on hold an additional deployment of PAC-3 interceptors in fiscal year 2010, which was to begin in April. Despite this measure, the basic policy on the defense budget for the year stated that Japan will make necessary improvements in order to maintain the current PAC-3 capability.

The Aegis system features the Standard Missile 3 (SM-3), a three-stage missile with a range of 1000 kilometers that is said to be capable of intercepting missiles up to an altitude of 200 kilometers or higher. The SM-3 block IA missile is designed to intercept ballistic missiles in outer space during mid-course flight, and with Aegis BMD, it can intercept a short- to intermediate-range ballistic missile.

A milestone in U.S.-Japan missile defense cooperation occurred when Japan became the first country other than the United States to intercept a mock missile successfully with the Aegis system. On December 18, 2007, a Japanese Aegis guided missile destroyer, Kongo, intercepted and destroyed a ballistic missile target in space for the first time. The flight test was conducted in cooperation with the United States Missile Defense Agency. [23]

The results of Aegis system tests have been mixed. Despite earlier successes, the failure of a second Aegis missile defense test off Kauai, Hawaii in November 2008 disappointed both U.S. and Japanese missile defense proponents. The Japanese Aegis class destroyer Chokai tracked and locked on to a ballistic missile target, but the launched SM-3 block IA failed to intercept it. Despite this failure, Japan’s Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) announced that the anti- ballistic missile system had passed a quality test. The MSDF posited that the Chokai’s SM3 interceptor launcher and other related equipment performed as expected; the cause of the test failure was deemed to be the interceptor’s warhead. [24] The third such test was successful when the Japanese destroyer Myoko intercepted a mock missile launched from the Pacific Missile Range Facility on the island of Kauai on October 28, 2009. [25] Despite mixed results, before the change in government, the Ministry of Defense had planned to deploy four Aegis-equipped destroyers armed with SM-3s by March 2011.

The Japanese and U.S. governments have been jointly developing an advanced version of the SM-3 Block IIA missile to improve defensive capabilities against longer-range missiles, such as the Taepodong. Before the change of government, the new SM-3 was scheduled to be available by 2014. [26] Japan and the United States have also been discussing deployment of Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) since 2005. If it goes forward, deployment of this system is unlikely to happen before 2011-2012 due to financial constraints. [27]

Legal Issues
Despite tangible progress in U.S.-Japan missile defense cooperation during the past decade, Japan’s long-standing self-imposed restrictions on the military use of space has represented something of an impediment. In 1969, when Japan’s Space Agency was established, the Diet unanimously adopted a resolution committing Japan to using space for peaceful purposes only. In Japan, a “peaceful purpose” is interpreted as non-military. However, a more widely accepted interpretation of peaceful purposes, including that of the Outer Space Treaty, is non-aggressive. On August 27, 2008, the Basic Space Law was enacted; the law lifted the ban on the Japanese government’s use of space for defensive purposes. The Basic Space Law changed the interpretation of peaceful purposes from non-military to non-aggressive as understood by the rest of the world. Under the new Basic Space Law, the SDF can manufacture, possess, and operate its own satellites to support military operations, including ballistic missile defense.

The SDF plans to procure satellites for reconnaissance, early warning, and tracking and communications purposes. To date, Japan has been totally reliant on the United States for such capabilities. [28] It was the U.S. Defense Support Program satellites, for example, that detected the North Korean missile launches in July 2006. Japan’s next National Defense Program Guidelines and the Mid Term Defense Program are to be issued at the end of this year, and the new policy on space development and its use for defense purposes is to be included.

Another legal barrier for Japan is its constitution, the current interpretation of which does not allow the country to exercise the right of collective self-defense. Under the current Japanese government’s interpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution, Japan is barred from using its missile defense capabilities to defend a third country, including its ally – the United States. As technological capabilities are brought on stream to intercept longer-range ballistic missiles, however, the argument that Japan cannot shoot down a missile heading to the United States may be perceived as unacceptable. [29]

China’s Response
Within the regional context, China has been worried that U.S.-Japan missile defenses could thwart China’s limited nuclear deterrent, provide Japan an offensive military capability, encourage Japanese militarization, and trigger a regional arms race. [30] China’s main concern, however, is that U.S.-Japan missile defense might be used to protect Taiwan in case of a conflict between Beijing and Taipei. China’s opposition to U.S.-Japan missile defense cooperation has not been as vehement as Russia’s was to the U.S. plan to deploy missile defenses in Eastern Europe. If China perceives that the missile shield affects the cross-straight relationship, however, it is likely that its opposition will intensify.

In response to China’s concerns, the Japanese government has reiterated that its missile defense efforts are purely defensive and not designed to threaten other countries. Moreover, when the Japanese government first decided to deploy a missile defense system in December 2003, the decision specifically prohibited it from protecting a third country such as Taiwan. [31] While Japan has expressed its concerns over China’s fast-paced military modernization, Tokyo nevertheless deliberately avoids mentioning that China is a threat to Japan. Japan’s Defense White Paper emphasizes, for example, that missile defense development is a response to the threats from North Korea. [32]

Public Opinion
Given its largely negative view of any military engagement, the Japanese public has not fully supported missile defense, despite clear statements from previous governments that missile defense is exclusively defensive and compatible with Japan’s defense policy. Nevertheless, threats from North Korea and increasing anti-North Korea sentiment fueled by the abduction issue have diminished the Japanese public’s opposition to missile defense. A 2006 public opinion poll conducted by the Cabinet Office indicated that 56.6 percent of respondents support BMD while 25.5 percent oppose it. A Yomiuri-Gallup public opinion poll conducted in December 2006 yielded similar results: while 60 percent of respondents support BMD, 31.4 percent oppose it. [33] With the threat from North Korea, it is likely that the Japanese public continues to view missile defense as necessary to protect the country.

Future Prospects
Before Japan’s historic political shift in September 2009, it was a generally accepted view that Japan’s already-scheduled system deployment date of 2011 was likely to be implemented, assuming that missile defense flight tests met expectations. However, the DPJ government, in partnership with pacifist and left-leaning coalition partners, is reviewing its predecessor’s security policy. When President Obama visited Japan in November, Prime Minister Hatoyama hinted at the need for a new type of U.S.-Japan alliance while reaffirming the importance of the current relationship: “as time changes and as the international environment changes, there is a need for us to further develop and deepen the U.S.-Japan alliance to make it even a more constructive and future oriented alliance.” In light of both governments’ apparently less supportive attitude toward missile defense, whether the two countries will continue jointly developing more advanced next-generation missile interceptors is uncertain.

Nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament gained international momentum following President Obama’s speech in Prague in April 2009 in which he reaffirmed the United States’ commitment to seek a world without nuclear weapons. President Obama’s initiative for nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament has been particularly well received by the Japanese people. At the same time, the prospect that the United States might pursue significant reductions of its nuclear arsenal has generated new concern among countries that feel protected by the promise of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence. Japan, in the midst of an unstable regional security environment, has become nervous about the possibility of losing the security associated with credible U.S. extended nuclear deterrence, the cornerstone of Japan’s security. The Japanese government is trying to complement extended deterrence with missile defense. During his November 2009 visit, in order to mitigate concern from Japan, President Obama repeated the U.S. security assurances.

Before the power shift in September, the Japanese government had vigorously lobbied a U.S. congressional nuclear task force to maintain the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella to deter possible attacks by China and North Korea. The LDP had long insisted that the United States should retain a nuclear weapons first use policy to deter North Korea’s chemical and biological attacks. While the DPJ has not issued any official statement with regard to no-first use, Foreign Minister Okada has long supported a no-first use policy.

With relatively new governments in both countries that have different policy priorities, Japan and the United States are facing a critical moment in their security relations. How they address the intertwined issues missile defense, extended deterrence, and nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament policies will be an important determinant of the direction that relationship takes. The two countries have to have a more serious and pragmatic dialogue related to these issues before either one takes any official decisions.

Masako Toki – Monterey Institute James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies