Having solidified his domestic political base, Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez may now be taking initiatives to increase his country’s international status that may create new concerns among his neighbors and incite confrontations with the West. In particular, Venezuela’s announced plans to develop nuclear technology and its recent agreements with Russia and Iran have generated a frisson of anxiety about the underlying intentions of the “Bolivarian” President.  In May 2005, in his weekly radio address to the nation, President Chavez commented that nuclear power is one way to diversify sources of energy and that Venezuela should investigate an indigenous nuclear power program in the same way Iran, Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico had done. In doing so, Chavez said Venezuela would cooperate with other Latin American countries and seek support from countries such as Iran. [1] Venezuela did not appear to achieve much progress in this regard until November 2008, when the visiting head of Russia’s Rosatom, Sergey Kiriyenko, and the Venezuelan Minister of Energy and Petroleum Rafael Rameriz Carreno signed an agreement to cooperate in the field of nuclear energy.

President Chavez has argued that nuclear technology is important to Venezuela, particularly for its energy, medical, and agricultural sectors.  In November 2005, he said nuclear technology would add to Venezuela’s energy matrix.  More recently, in September 2008, President Chavez reiterated that Venezuela was interested in developing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including medical research and electricity generation. [2] Some analysts assert, however, that because the country is abundant in natural resources, Venezuela has no need to develop nuclear energy. Currently, Venezuela’s hydroelectric plants provide 75 percent of the country’s domestic energy supply. The country is also the fifth largest oil exporter in the world. Oil accounts for over 80 percent of the nation’s total exports. [3] In the view of some analysts, Venezuela’s future energy needs could be met by diverting some of its oil reserves to power its cities.

Venezuela-Russia Nuclear Cooperation
In September 2008, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin announced that Moscow would extend an offer for peaceful nuclear cooperation to Venezuela, and the two countries signed an agreement two months later.  Under the agreement, Russia will assist Venezuela in: the exploration and development of uranium and thorium deposits, applied research in thermonuclear fusion, design and construction of research reactors and nuclear power plants, and the production of radioisotopes to be used in medicine and agriculture. [9] Russian Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin summarized the bilateral agreement as covering all aspects of power generation cooperation, “from exploration to production to transportation,” including the construction of pipelines and the supply of equipment and processing. [10] The agreement does not allow Venezuela to use Russian dual-purpose equipment and materials or know-how related to the production of nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices, and it will also carry IAEA guarantees. [11]

A nuclear agreement with Russia makes sense in the near term even if a nuclear program will not be up and running soon.  The agreement may provide Venezuela a willing ally to help promote its search for greater regional influence.  Since Chavez took office in 1998 he has visited Russia on several occasions, and Alex Sánchez, a research fellow for the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, points out that such meetings have usually resulted in agreements to exchange Russian military equipment for Venezuelan petro-dollars. [12] In 2006, for example, Venezuela signed an agreement to acquire $3 billion worth of military equipment from Russia. [13] Since then, Caracas and Moscow have signed several additional military-technical cooperation contracts, including one agreeing to Venezuela’s purchase of Kalashnikov assault rifles and an agreement to build a plant in the Latin American country for the production of such rifles. [14] In September 2008, two Russian Tu-160 bombers conducted air patrol flights after landing at the Libertador base in Venezuela, and in October, Russia’s nuclear-powered missile cruiser Petr Velikly sailed into the port of La Guaria, marking the first showing of Russian naval forces in the Caribbean since the Cold War. [15] Finally, in December 2008, Russia and Venezuela held joint naval exercises called VENRUS-2008. [16]

Russia’s renewed presence in the Western Hemisphere has been dubbed a “new geopolitical reality” and an indicator of its “global interests.” [17] Moscow may see it, for example, as a counter to increased U.S. presence in some of the states of the Former Soviet Union (FSU).  Oksana Antonenko at the International Institute for Strategic Studies also suggests that Russia is using Chavez to irritate Washington in retaliation for the U.S. decision to locate naval vessels in the Black Sea when Russia sent troops into Georgia in August 2008. [18]  Though Russian officials deny any retaliatory steps, [19] Moscow announced its plans for joint naval exercises with Venezuela shortly after President Bush sent warships into the Black Sea near Georgia for what were said to be humanitarian purposes. [20] Chavez himself claims to have formed a strategic alliance with Russia to protect his country from the United States. [21]

Most analysts agree, however, that economics is the key attraction for Russia in its relationship with Venezuela.  According to Mikhail Margelov, chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Russian parliament’s upper house, Latin America provides an immense investment opportunity. He adds that Russia is striving to become a strong competitor in certain regions and that his country does not yet have the presence it seeks in Latin America. [22] Andrei Klimov, the deputy head of the Duma’s International Affairs Committee, stated that Russia’s Latin American policies were the result of its defined interests, especially those related to business. [23] An agreement to create a joint bank to help finance projects in both countries signals further economic ties. [24] Russia may also see in Venezuela a potential beneficial market for its arms and other products.

Above all, however, oil and gas act as the main pillars of the bilateral relationship. In September 2008, President Chavez signed a memorandum granting five Russian oil firms access to the country’s oil resources. [25] At the time of the agreement, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin declared that his country’s relations with Latin America would be a foreign and economic policy priority. [26] According to Orlando Ochoa, a political analyst and professor of economics and international affairs at the Universidad Católica Andrés Bello in Caracas, Venezuela turned to Russian oil firms because “they have the scope, resources and capacity to make progress in the Belt, as opposed to weaker or less experienced Latin American and Asian companies that have been granted blocks rather as a symbolic gesture.” [27]

Regional Perspectives of Venezuelan Nuclear Developments
Regional views on Venezuela’s pursuit of nuclear energy run the gamut from skepticism based on economic and technical capabilities to real concern over a potential latent nuclear weapons capability of an ambitious President. Varying levels of dread seem to exist over these developments as Venezuela continues to take a confrontational stance against the West, and the United States in particular.

Argentina and Brazil refuse to cooperate with Caracas on nuclear issues. [55] Brazil’s Secretary of State for Science and Technology José Goldemberg stated that his country could not see any advantages to nuclear cooperation with Venezuela.  The former secretary suggested that such an agreement would place Brazil under unwarranted international scrutiny, and the benefits would be one-sided since Venezuela does not have a noteworthy nuclear program. [56]  Further concerns arose in December 2008, when officers from the Turkish Directorate of Customs Smuggling and Intelligence seized 22 radioactive containers in the Port of Mersin sent by Iran that were headed to Venezuela.  The containers were carrying nitric acid and sulfate, both of which are used to produce explosives. [57] During a January 2009 communication, Goldemberg suggested that although both Venezuela and Iran have political interests in nuclear energy, those interests may yield different products.  He indicated that he believes that Iran seeks to eventually construct nuclear weapons, while Venezuela wants a nuclear energy program to irritate Washington. [58] 

Some regional analysts believe that Venezuela may be seeking nuclear technologies as a means to develop a latent nuclear weapons capability.  Dr. José Aquiles Baesso Grimoni, General Director of the Electronics and Energy Institute at the University of Sao Paulo, for example, commented that President Chavez may be interested in nuclear technology for belligerent reasons. [59] The path toward proliferation is not new to South America.  During the 1980s, both Argentina and Brazil had secret programs to develop nuclear weapons that were deeply rooted in their civil nuclear programs.  Alejandro Nuñez Carrera, Head of the Regulating Actions Department, National Commission of Nuclear Security and Safeguards in Mexico, suggests that the situation in Venezuela could play out like that of Argentina and Brazil as both countries began their nuclear program under military regimes by focusing on developing technology to enrich uranium.  Carrera believes, however, that weapons development may prove to be a major challenge for Venezuela, particularly given the technological impediments facing the country.   In addition, Venezuela is a signatory to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the 1969 agreement that prohibits nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. [60]   Julio Vergara highlights that Venezuela is also party to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and, while it has the right to develop nuclear energy if it feels that such a resource is pertinent to its socio-economic development, such a measure should be closely attached to relevant IAEA safeguard agreements. [61]